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ABSTRACT
Core executive decision-making in economic policy in the UK is dom inated 
by a Prime Minister-Chancellor axis and a set of constraints defined by vast 
flows of capital around foreign exchange m arkets. This thesis examines 
policy-making during the Thatcher governments in  relation to the debate 
about ERM m em bership from 1979 to 1990. The analysis reconstructs the 
choices w hich faced the Thatcher governments given their economic and 
E uropean  policy in terests and capital accum ulation  p rio rities, and  
investigates core executive actors' activity against this background. From the 
first Thatcher adm inistration onw ards, the core executive was seriously 
divided on ERM m embership and the government was unable to pursue a 
coherent policy on the issue. As a result of both a power struggle between 
the Prim e M inister and successive Chancellors and  the retention  of 
empirically untenable policy positions by core executive actors, economic 
policy-making falied as a judgem ent about effective means to ends. In this 
sense, decision-m aking became non-rational. H aving renounced  the 
potential benefits of ERM m em bership for most of the 1980s, the Prime 
Minister and Chancellor decided to enter ERM in autum n 1990 at a central 
rate of DM2.95 w hich served neither their own interests nor those of UK 
producers. The failure of the Conservative governm ent to pursue  an 
effective policy on ERM membership represented a failure to cope w ith  or 
understand the implications for successful economic m anagem ent of vast 
capital flows around foreign exchange markets.
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CHAPTER 1 
CORE EXECUTIVE DECISION-MAKING
Since states started to trade w ith each other, they have been forced to 
confront the question of how to organise paym ent for that trade. Their 
endeavours to deal w ith  the problem  have fallen into cycles in w hich 
currency values are fixed against each other in an international system for 
periods of time only for the system to break dow n as the national costs of 
m aintaining them  outw eigh the national and collective benefits of their 
continued operation. W hen a system  collapses, currencies move freely 
against each other until a time w hen the national and collective costs of 
pursuing unilateral state objectives outw eigh their national benefits. Any 
particular method of facilitating trade has become not an end in itself, to be 
judged a failure or success by its longevity, bu t a means of minimising the 
problems posed to national growth by the necessity of exchange rates to be 
used and then discarded when its effectiveness wanes.
The collapse of the Bretton W oods system  in 1972-1973 w as 
particularly significant because in its aftermath, states began to face a new 
dilemma in currency management. Unprecedented sums of capital bearing 
no re la tion  to trade  flow s w ere now  m oving around  the w orld  
electronically. As a result, states faced fewer problem s in  m aintaining 
adequate sums of foreign exchange to pay for trade. Instead, choices about 
exchange rate m anagem ent were increasingly defined by the costs which 
rapidly falling and rising currencies im posed on countries in term s of 
inflation and competitiveness respectively. Overall, the foreign exchange 
m arkets became divorced from the dem ands of trade and  became an 
independent structural constraint on states in m aking their economic 
policies.
To cope w ith  the consequences of this phenomenon, different states 
at different times have sought collective currency arrangements, not simply 
to facilitate trade, but to defend their national interests against the exchange 
markets themselves and those countries which benefit m ost from exchange 
rate operations at any particular time. Between 1978 and 1993, the European
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Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) represented the most systematic effort by 
any group of states to deal w ith the problems of currency m anagem ent in 
the post-Bretton W oods world. A lthough in July 1993 the scale of the 
exchange m arket flows proved stronger than the EC's collective ability to 
m aintain the original rules of the system, for most of its duration the ERM 
provided its participants w ith a package they found generally acceptable in 
term s of benefits over costs, given the prevailing in ternational currency 
environm ent. The ERM's de facto abandonm ent in  1993 w as not an 
adm ission that a decade and a half of currency m anagem ent had  failed. 
Rather, it was a recognition of the fact that the costs of participating in the 
system in the particular set of circumstances prevailing were too high for all 
bu t Holland and Germany. Indeed, for the ERM states, the questions which 
the system sought to address about the relationship betw een the economic 
objectives of nation-states remain as pertinent as ever
Alone among the ERM and former ERM states, the UK governm ent 
chose to dance on the system 's supposed grave. This thesis examines the 
peculiar developm ent of UK policy towards ERM from the arrival of the 
Conservative governm ent in office to its decision to enter the system in 
October 1990. For over a decade the question of ERM membership tore at the 
heart of the Conservative government. During the entire period the Prime 
M inister faced pressure for membership from somewhere w ithin  the core 
executive. As the question of joining occurred and recurred, first as an issue 
of the UK's relations w ith the EC and then of economic policy m anagem ent 
and  finally  of bo th , the in ternal governm ent conflicts an d  their 
consequences came to dominate core executive operations in both  areas. By 
providing a comprehensive account of the development of policy on ERM 
m em bership, the thesis aims to throw  some light on the nature  of core 
executive decision-making on economic policy w ithin a European context 
during the period.
As a central political issue of the 1980s and 1990s, the Thatcher 
governm ents' debates about ERM m em bership have a lready been the 
subject of m uch debate. Existing com m entary tends to fall in to  two
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categories, both of which leave significant gaps in our knowledge of policy 
development. Some of those who were participants in  the decision making 
process have given their accounts in memoirs, most notably Nigel Lawson 
and  M argaret Thatcher. These memoirs provide useful detail of particular 
episodes of conflict and debate but they are inevitably subjective and self- 
justifying. Indeed, the participants have disagreed not only about the 
substance of ERM membership but retrospectively about who took decisions 
on  the issue and how and w hen they were m ade. In them selves, the 
various memoirs cannot provide a systematic or comprehensive account of 
the development of ERM policy.
By contrast, W illiam Keegan and D avid Smith in M r Lawson's 
Economic Gamble and From Boom to Bust: Trial and Error in British 
Economic Policy have described the governm ent debate about ERM 
m em bership in the context of the governm ent's broad macro-economic 
policy  in their respective books. Both have significant sources of 
information and are illuminating on particular episodes. But their accounts 
are produced under some significant constraints.
First, the secrecy which surrounds UK government makes it difficult 
to establish w ith any certainty what, w hen and how decisions were made. 
However, by rigorously seeking to reconstruct specific decisions and non­
decisions on ERM membership rather than tell a readable story, it is possible 
to provide a potentially more accurate version of events. For example, both 
Sm ith and Keegan assum e that m em bership only became a seriously 
contested issue w ithin the Conservative governm ent in  1985. Yet there is 
considerable evidence that m em bership was a divisive issue w ithin the 
governm ent during its first term of office and that the terms of debate for 
the rest of the decade were defined by that original conflict.
Second, since their prim ary concern is w ith  broad macro-economic 
policy, Sm ith and Keegan do not give m uch detailed  a tten tion  to 
m em bership as an issue of EC policy. Third, their accounts at times fall 
victim to the 'black box' approach to analysis. We understand the outcomes 
of policy w ithout having a clear understanding of how they are arrived at
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from  inputs into the decision-making process, particularly w hat interests 
they benefit. Through combining extensive interviews w ith policy-makers 
and  a concept of the costs and benefits to the central actors of particular 
courses of action, it is possible to create a more com prehensive and 
systematic account of policy.
The rem ainder of this chapter has three roles. Section 1.1 describes 
the creation of ERM and the reasons behind the UK's non-participation in 
the system before the Conservative governm ent came into office. Section
1.2 reviews some traditional theoretical approaches to decision-making. 
Section 1.3 constructs an analytical framework for this particular study. The 
final section discusses the methodology and organisation of the subsequent 
chapters w ithin terms of the analytical framework of the thesis.
1.1 THE ORIGINS OF THE EXCHANGE RATE MECHANISM
In December 1978, in the aftermath of the European Council in Brussels, the 
EC states agreed to launch a European M onetary System (EMS) w ith  an 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) as the centrepiece of the system. W hilst 
all nine EC states were to be members of EMS, the UK would not participate 
in the ERM. The start of the ERM was delayed by a French effort to raise 
farm prices and the system finally came into operation in March 1979.
The initial desire for m onetary stability in the EC was born ou t of 
d isillusionm ent w ith  floating currencies. Floating p roduced  not only 
diverging currencies but a licence for member-states to inflate at will, w ith 
three key effects. First, floating m ade nonsense of m any of the trade, 
industrial, and particularly, farming policies of the Community, which were 
based on some unanim ity of interests. Second, intra-Community trade was 
threatened. In principle, floating should have been beneficial because most 
in tra-C om m unity  trade  w as of m anufactu red  goods, p roducing  a 
competition of labour costs that made it essential that exchange rates offset 
those cost differentials. However, floating was not achieving this result and 
instead rates were overshooting, that is moving in the opposite direction to 
inflation. As a result, protectionist pressure mounted. Finally, floating was
4
m aking  dem and  m anagem ent difficult. Those countries w ith  w eak
currencies which attem pted to expand in an inflationary environm ent came
under sustained deflationary pressure in the exchange markets. Meanwhile,
countries w ith stronger currencies found that trying to stimulate dem and in
export-oriented sectors was ineffective as the investm ent climate was being
prim arily determ ined by the international m onetary environm ent and not
by their individual macro-economic policies. Disaffection w ith floating was
expressed by a wide range of interests including the European Commission,
the m em ber state governments and economists. M any considered that the
ultim ate consequence of floating was that EC states' overall economic
performance deteriorated in relation to those of the US and Japan.i
This general disaffection was most keenly felt by the W est German
Chancellor, H elm ut Schmidt. His particu lar in terest was tied  to the
dow nw ard float of the dollar and the upw ards pressure this change was
putting  on  the Deutschm ark against the other EC states. The effect was
twofold: German goods were m ade uncompetitive and pressure m ounted
on the Deutschm ark as an international reserve asset. Schmidt w anted the
effects of the falling dollar to be spread more equally between the European
states. He was also concerned that floating was producing an inflationary
environm ent from which Germany could not imm unise itself. In political
terms, Schmidt saw a European monetary system as an act of self assertion
by Europe against the United States which he considered too w eak to
provide leadership out of the world economic malaise and unresponsive to
Europe’s interests particularly in security m atters.2 In the words of a former
UK Treasury official:
It [the ERM] was born out of the misbehaviour of the dollar and the 
midwife was Schmidt and he knew why he was doing it. It was a 
poking out of tongue at the raped international currency.3
Schmidt found a significant ally in President Giscard d 'Estaing of 
France. He was concerned at the costs to French farmers of the disruption in 
the Com m on A gricultural Policy (CAP) and he believed that French 
industry  w ould  only becom e a w orld  com petitor w hen some anti-
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in fla tionary  discipline w as injected into the economy. M oreover, if 
Germ any was to reflate its economy, as Giscard wished, it needed to be 
offered the carrot of m onetary stability. In sum, it was from a coalition of 
Germ an and French interests that the political im petus for a European 
m onetary system came.4
Having decided to act, Schmidt and Giscard looked to bring the UK 
governm ent into their deliberations, A trium virate negotiating team  was 
estab lished  to develop  a possible exchange rate  system . The UK 
representative was Kenneth Couzens, the Second Perm anent Secretary at 
the Treasury in  charge of International Finance. How ever, he quickly 
became isolated from the French and German representatives who believed 
that he was only trying to block their efforts. The other tw o sim ply 
developed their own proposals to the satisfaction of Schmidt and Giscard. 
How ERM W orked
The aims of the proposed EMS were threefold. First, to facilitate trade by 
creating a zone of m onetary stability in the EC. Second, to coordinate the 
m onetary and exchange rate policies of member states towards the rest of 
the world. Third, to prepare the way for the birth of a European Monetary 
Federation (EMF) and the use of the European Currency Unit (ECU) as a 
reserve currency. However, for the short term, it was the first objective 
which received exclusive priority and, significantly, no effort was made to 
develop a dollar policy.5
The ERM itself was designed as an attem pt to combine some of the 
advantages of a fixed rate system w ith flexibility. Each member agreed a 
central rate for its currency in terms of a weighted composite basket currency 
known as the Ecu. These central rates were organised in a parity grid and it 
was these rates which had to be defended by all participants within a 2.25 per 
cent of the parity ( or a 6 per cent band for the Italian lira). Pressure on the 
parities was recognised through a divergence indicator. If a single currency 
varied by more than 75 per cent of its perm itted divergence from the system 
as m easured by its Ecu exchange rate, then some form of corrective action 
had to be taken whether it be central intervention or policy adjustment. In
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the event of sustained pressure, the parity rates could be realigned relatively 
easily by collective agreement.6
If the ERM states did not want to contemplate frequent realignments 
then  the system  w ould have exerted a counter-inflationary discipline on 
econom ies w hich expanded too rapidly in  relation to their partners. A 
unilaterally expanding economy which sucked in imports w ould eventually 
be faced w ith  either a balance of paym ents deficit or inflation or both. 
C onsequently, its exchange rate w ould move tow ards the bottom  of its 
parity  range. U nder its mem bership obligations, that governm ent w ould 
either have to intervene to buy its currency; or deflate its fiscal policy to 
restrain  the dem and for imports; or raise interest rates to attract capital. 
States w ith  currencies appreciating towards the top of their band w ould 
have to sell their currencies or cut interest rates to keep their currency 
down. The consequence for weak currency states w ould be that they might 
have to deflate to protect the exchange rate w hen the domestic economy 
needed to expand. For strong currency states the cost w ould be in fuelling 
their m oney supply through intervention and in renouncing the counter- 
inflationary w eapon of an appreciating exchange rate.7
Yet if the provisions for easy realignments were utilised, as certainly 
Schmidt and Giscard envisaged them to be there w ould be no reason w hy 
the ERM should perform as a traditional fixed rate system at all. Rather, it 
w ould  operate as a 'd irty  floa t/ The chief aim w ould be to allow the 
exchange rate to offset some differential in inflation w ithout allowing the 
exchange rate to move in the opposite direction to inflation, as frequently 
occurred under free floating.8 
UK Non-M em bership
W ith the proposed ERM a secure venture, the UK governm ent was faced 
w ith  a decision about whether to join the system. Opinion w ithin both the 
governm ent and W hitehall was divided. The Treasury was quite rigorously 
opposed to the idea of membership and was supported to a lesser degree by 
the Bank of England. It believed that a new European system of pegged 
exchange rates was not compatible w ith the UK's economic interests. First,
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the Treasury 'had  considerable doubt as to w hether it [the ERM] w ould 
surv ive.'9 Second, Treasury officials believed that sterling w ould be a petro­
currency in the 1980s and so the sterling rate w ould fluctuate in the opposite 
direction to the price of oil from the other EC currencies. According to one 
form er Treasury official: 'We were absolutely pre-occupied in those days 
w ith  the price of oil.’10 Third, as the EC state least dependent on community 
trade, the UK's trade did not suffer in quite the same way as the others from 
floating. In fact, it was only once sterling was allowed to float in 1972 that 
UK m anufacturing exporters were able to hold their share of w orld trade. 
Fourth, the Treasury considered it unwise for the UK to be part of a system 
which could be construed as anti-dollar. Fifth, it believed that the ERM was 
designed to serve G erm an interests and w ould  leave the b u rd en  of 
adjustm ent on traditionally weak currencies such as sterling. The UK w ould 
be left having to use an overly deflationary policy to maintain sterling at an 
artificially high rate against the Deutschmark, n
The prim ary supporter of m em bership was the Foreign Office. It 
believed that it was damaging for the UK to allow France and Germany to 
make all the running in the EC and that the UK needed to fully participate 
in the developm ent of the Community. At the same time, some senior staff 
considered that sterling w ould actually benefit from being included in  a 
satisfactory European exchange rate system. One such official recalled:
We just thought that the Treasury was wrong on their own grounds 
bu t that is not an easy battle to fight. ... A lot of us felt that w e were 
m aking a perfectly serious economic and financial analysis, b u t it 
happened to be different from w hat was certainly the majority view
in the Treasury. 12
The Foreign Office's economic argument was supported by some officials at 
the M inistry of Agriculture and Fisheries and Food (MAFF) and its political 
case was backed by the European Secretariat at the Cabinet Office. W hilst the 
head of the European Secretariat was not particularly enthusiastic about the 
ERM concept, he believed that it was im portant that the UK should not be 
left behind if such a system began operating. 13
The Labour government saw the issue primarily w ithin the term s of
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the Treasury argum ent. W hilst Callaghan and Healey did  not relish the 
prospect of isolation from the other EC states, they were concerned that the 
UK w ould not be able to maintain a parity within the ERM w ithout heavy 
costs. W ithin the Cabinet, there was significant opposition on essentially 
Treasury grounds that membership of the ERM w ould be deflationary and 
subordinate UK interests to those of Germany. This view was shared within 
the parliam entary party, the NEC and the TUC. Callaghan w anted to keep 
his options open as long as possible but the committed opposition came to a 
head at the Labour Party conference in October 1978 where a barrage of 
m otions against ERM m em bership were subm itted. According to the 
colum nist, Peter Jenkins, it was this debate w hich w as decisive in 
Callaghan's judgem ent against joining the system.14
Callaghan's and the Treasury's opposition to ERM membership has to 
be understood in terms of the UK's historical experience of fixed exchange 
rate systems. By the end of the 1970s, the UK core executive tended to see 
sterling 's participation in a succession of fixed exchange rate systems as a 
series of failures. Certainly, failure was obvious in the case of the 'snake' 
which linked the values of certain European currencies by allowing them to 
fluctuate only w ithin narrow  margins. Sterling survived only six weeks in 
this system  before it was w ithdraw n in May 1972. W ith sterling under 
pressure  from  the Deutschm ark, the H eath governm ent decided that 
econom ic grow th  should  take priority  over the exchange rate. The 
experience w as perceived as an overw helm ingly negative one by the 
Treasury and left officials there deeply sceptical about the whole idea of 
European exchange rate systems.15
By contrast, the UK's mem bership of the Gold Standard and the 
Bretton W oods system were seen as unsuccessful because core executive 
actors generally believed that sterling was maintained and defended at too 
h ig h  levels for too long. In the process, the UK 's in te rnational 
com petitiveness was seriously eroded, causing balance of paym ents 
problems. In 1926 the UK rejoined the Gold Standard and was forced to 
pursue deflationary policies to m aintain sterling's fixed parity. After 1931
9
w hen  sterling w as forced off the S tandard, there w as a significant 
im provem ent in the UK's trade performance. From 1949 to 1967, successive 
UK governments defended a $2.80 parity in Bretton W oods which by the 
early 1960s appeared to be restricting growth. The economic policy of the 
first three years of the first Wilson government, in which Callaghan was 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, was to a large extent determined by the defence 
of sterling bu t it was not enough to avert devaluation in 1967. W hen 
Bretton Woods collapsed five years later, and sterling also quickly departed 
the snake, UK policy-makers believed that sterling was now liberated from 
the yoke of fixed rates. W ith floating came the hope that deficits in  the 
balance of paym ents could be financed w ithout having to resort to 
deflationary action.To some extent, this optimism was justified in that the 
UK's trade performance did improve under floating. 16
Yet the UK's previous experience w ith fixed exchange rate systems 
cannot alone explain all the opposition to ERM membership. Rather, it is 
necessary to consider w hy the Treasury examined m em bership solely in 
terms of the advantages and (predominantly) disadvantages of returning to 
fixed exchange rates, rather than entering a 'dirty float'. In the early 1980s the 
UK need not have been tied to an artificially high rate against the 
D eutschm ark, w ith  the ensu ing  defla tionary  consequences, if the 
governm ent w ere to use the ERM's rea lignm en t p rov isions.T he 
explanation now offered by Treasury officials for the failure to accurately see 
how ERM w ould w ork is that it was not presented to them  in this way. 
There was according to a senior official, 'no belief that we could realign 
within two years/17
By conceiving m embership as a return  to fixed exchange rates, the 
core executive did not address the ongoing disadvantages of floating for the 
UK economy. Removing the floor under sterling produced the hum iliating 
sterling crisis of 1976. At the beginning of that year, the government came 
to the conclusion that sterling was still too high to ensure competitiveness. 
In March, the Bank of England sought to manage sterling dow n by selling 
on a falling market. W hen the markets realised this, they sold sterling at a
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rap id  rate and it fell beyond the level the government wanted to achieve. By 
October 1976 sterling sank to $1.55 and appeared to have no floor despite 
interest rates of 15 per cent. To secure adequate foreign exchange reserves, 
the governm ent was forced to negotiate a loan from the IMF, w hich was 
conditional on public expenditure cuts.18 The crisis dem onstrated that 
floating vested considerable power in the exchange market operators. At the 
sam e tim e, it deprived the UK of m ost of its reserves and required  
deflationary action at least as harsh as the defence of the $2.80 parity in the 
1960s.
In the light of this experience the Treasury could have seen ERM 
m em bership as an insurance policy against a repeat of the 1976 crisis, 
because it offered a definite floor for sterling and promised collective action 
by  m any central banks to defend it. W ith sterling inside an exchange rate 
system  w ith  international obligations, it w ould be far less likely that the 
exchange m arkets w ould  view the UK governm ent as ind ifferen t to 
s te rlin g 's  fate as they had  done in  1976. H ow ever, the T reasury  
retrospectively saw the 1976 crisis as a problem of 'economic fundam entals', 
not of the relationship betw een a governm ent's m onetary intentions and 
the exchange markets. This view ignored the fact that there w ere m any 
examples of currencies being moved by the foreign exchange m arkets in the 
opposite  d irection  to 'econom ic fundam enta ls ' w ith  very dam aging  
consequences. For example, the appreciation of an inflationary currency is 
often disastrous for international competitiveness. Yet w ithout developing 
such a critique of floating, UK core executive actors could not see ERM as a 
means of addressing the problem of overshooting.^
1.2 THE CORE EXECUTIVE AND A RATIONAL ACTOR 
FRAMEWORK
In producing a decisional study of this kind, a range of theoretical and 
methodological questions arise, which can be handled in three parts. The 
first p a rt of the section argues that a core executive m odel is more 
appropriate to a macro-economic decisional study than the traditional policy
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community approach, and, then considers who are the central actors w ithin 
the core executive in  economic and European policy. The second part 
discusses the problem s in using neo-M arxist, rational choice, economic 
ideology and new institutionalist theoretical frameworks for this particular 
policy study. The final part outlines a detailed rational-actor framework for 
understanding the developm ent of the Conservative governm ent's policy 
on ERM membership.
Core Executive versus Policy Communities  
As Dunleavy and Rhodes note, the operations of the UK core executive, 
'those organisations and structures which prim arily serve to pull together 
and to integrate central government policies,' are under-researched.20 Most 
decisional studies of UK politics examine issues which are taken at sub­
central levels of the state apparatus within a policy community framework. 
According to this approach, the central focus of analysis and policy making 
should be the civil service- interest group dynamic. Jordan and Richardson 
see UK policy m aking as characterised by an array of fragm ented policy 
communities in which decisions are made by government departm ents and 
agencies, interest groups and professionals w ith shared interests in  that 
particular area of policy.21 Policy communities are characterised by frequent 
consultation between members, a shared specialist language of debate and 
consensual bargaining. They produce fairly stable policy outcomes. W ith 
the basic dynamics of policy change operating at relatively low levels of 
government, core executive activity is left as 'icing on the cake.'22
In down-playing the role of the core executive, the policy community 
approach is flawed in two ways. First, the Conservative governments and 
the 1987-1992 governm ent in particular, revealed that the core executive 
and professionals often did not share the same language or values and that 
professionals were relatively powerless to stop the core executive imposing 
radical policy changes. In the case of both health and education, the 
governm ent introduced policies w ith the expressed aim of reducing the 
power of doctors and teachers. Even a policy community approach which
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allowed for membership of a policy community to change over time, could 
not account for the fact that the proposed beneficiaries of reform were not 
brought into the decision-making process.
For example, the 1988 Health Service Review was conducted entirely 
w ithin the core executive itself in a committee chaired by Thatcher,despite a 
flood of proposals from health professionals.23 Indeed, if Lawson is to be 
believed, then he and the Treasury were more influential in the process 
than  the D epartm ent of Health, the heart of the alleged health  policy 
com m unity:
Throughout the course of the review the relative weakness of the 
official DHSS and of its successor the Departm ent of Health m eant 
that a remarkable amount of the work, both in terms of the analysis 
and the working-up of solutions, as well as the knocking dow n of 
nonsenses, fell to the Treasury.^
Afterwards, the core executive was able to implement its reforms despite the
opposition of all the m edical professions. Overall, the Thatcher years
indicate that core executive actors (especially m inisters) can and will
develop  in te res ts  in d ep e n d en t of those responsib le  for po licy
im plem entation. Even in the policy sectors w hich traditionally  have
sustained a policy community analysis, the nexus of external interests and
lower tier agencies are relevant only to the extent that the core executive is
relatively indifferent to the outcome of decision-making.
Second, on the issue which has been the central preoccupation of
post-w ar governm en ts and  w hich  cond itions the po licy -m aking
environment of all other sectors, namely macro-economic policy, the policy
community approach has said little and can effectively contribute even less.
In their own analysis, Jordan and Richardson never adequately address the
issue. Although they admit that there are a few policy areas which do not fit
their model, - for example abortion and the development of Trident - they
do not believe that these cases threaten the paradigm 's overall validity:
Groups do not have insider access to influence all kinds of policy but 
even w here policy is evolved internally, in the longer term  it will 
only be tenable if it can be sold to an influential constituency.25
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W hilst Jordan and Richardson recognise that m uch of their analysis
is concerned w ith  low politics, this does not lead them  to exclude high
politics from the approach:
We w ould argue that the sectorisation of policy-making and the 
developm ent of policy comm unities m ay well w ork tow ards the 
disaggregation of all policy issues into 'low ' and 'm anageable ' 
problem s. Big cross-sectoral issues are difficult to m anage both 
intellectually and politically. It is impossible, intellectually to take 
account of all possible linkages between policy areas, and in political 
term s too many conflicting interests may be involved for a workable 
consensus to emerge. Thus it is no surprise that the bulk of policy­
m aking and implementing activity is concerned w ith issues which 
m ight be perceived as technical and detailed .... W hile everyone 
seems to have an opinion about 'h igh ' politics, implementation is the 
province of groups deeply comm itted to their specialised interests 
and concern over detail.26
Indeed, they firmly reject the idea that a policy community approach cannot 
be applied  to economic policy.27 In their original study, they used the 
in troduction  of VAT in 1973 as an example and argued that tripartite  
structures were the means by which 'h igh politics' economic policy was 
resolved into manageable low politics problems. In their later work, they 
denied that the Conservative governm ents killed tripartism  and argued 
that the NEDC remained an effective policy-making forum  particularly in 
regard to employment policy.28
W hat Jordan and Richardson persistently ignore is the discongruence 
betw een m uch of economic policy making and the fundam ental premise on 
which their approach is based. They argue that UK decision-making is 
characterised by consultation and negotiation for two reasons. First, there is 
a cultural bias which emphasises the need to legitimate decisions through 
consultation. Second, since the whole of UK public adm inistration rests on 
the assum ption that groups will co-operate in the implementation of policy, 
it is functionally necessary for governm ents to consult the 'affected 
in terests '.29 In the cases of the introduction of VAT, tripartite negotiations 
over incomes policies and job creation schemes, the core executive was 
certainly dependent on others to im plem ent its decisions. However, on
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m any economic policy issues - for example, monetary policy, exchange rate 
m anagem ent, taxation and public expenditure - the core executive simply 
executes its ow n decisions. On these issues, even the m ost half- hearted 
empirical observation indicates that decision-making is confined w ithin the 
core executive itself.
It is often these kinds of decisions w hich do not pose problem s of 
im plem entation from which other policies flow. Central policy-makers did 
indeed look to the CBI and TUC to im plem ent job creation schemes but 
only after the decisions central actors made for themselves about m onetary 
and fiscal policy produced rising unemployment. To suggest, as Jordan and 
Richardson do that 'the TUC and CBI can claim more say over employm ent 
policies than  can Parliament7 is rather to miss the point.30 In the case of 
VAT, as Jordan and Richardson themselves admit, the H eath governm ent 
took the strategic decision to introduce the tax w ithout any consultation. 
C onsultation w ith groups took place only over the technicalities and the 
problem s of implementation.31
M any economic policy decisions are not and cannot be m ade in the 
conditions described by the policy com m unity literature. The approach 
suggests that policy is m ade in a stable national environm ent in  which 
governm ents and groups share an interest in the avoidance of sudden  
policy change so as to maintain their co-operative relations. By contrast, the 
exchange m arkets and the interdependence of national economies m ean 
that economic policy-makers are forced to operate in an unpredictable 
in ternational environm ent in w hich nation-states com pete for scarce 
economic benefits. As often as not, m onetary and exchange rate policy 
confront policy-makers w ith w hat Polsby terms an 'acute7 issue where there 
is no time for consultation w ith those affected by the decision. 32 if there is a 
run  on sterling or the Bundesbank raises its interest rates, the core executive 
will not wait to ask the CBI's position before deciding on a response.
Similarly, w hilst policy com m unity analysis stresses tha t policy­
makers seek to avoid risks, much economic policy is essentially about risk 
assessment. Policy-makers are forced to make recurring choices about the
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same policy options, notably the level of interest rates, public expenditure 
and  taxation. In each case, they are assessing how firms, consumers and 
financial m arkets (which they cannot control) are likely to respond to any 
particu lar policy change at any particular time given the prevailing 
domestic and international climate and the state of other policies. In a world 
w here  huge sum s of capital bearing no relation to trade flows are. 
instantaneously moved around the w orld by globally operating institutions 
and  speculators w ith  potentially huge consequences, risk avoidance is 
impossible.
W ho M akes Economic Policy?
Rather than the broad and open policy community described by Jordan and 
Richardson, macro-economic policy is made in a very closed policy-making 
env ironm en t even w ith in  the core executive itself. The follow ing 
discussion first considers how the Treasury and the Bank of England have 
traditionally been portrayed as the dom inant policy-makers and then argues 
that contrary to these claims, it is the Prime Minister and Chancellor who 
are the key policy actors.
Through m uch of the general academic literature on UK economic 
policy, the image of an all powerful Treasury assisted by the Bank of 
England looms large. Those writers who have located a financial rather 
than industrial bias in policy have generally attributed this to a Treasury 
stranglehold on the policy machinery.33 For example, Ingham identifies the 
C ity/Bank of England/Treasury triangle as the 'core institutional nexus' of 
British society. The institutions share a m utual but independent interest in 
the production of stable money forms and have the overriding pow er to 
shape policy to that end. According to Ingham, the Treasury, not Labour 
ministers, was responsible for the decision not to devalue sterling between 
1964-1967 w ith the ensuing consequences for UK industry 34
W riters more directly concerned w ith the Treasury as an institution 
have d raw n similar conclusions. In Ham 's view Treasury officials have 
enjoyed 'a  rem arkable degree of autonom y and influence and for long 
stretches of tim e  [have] set the pattern of government for the whole civil
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service apparatus.'35 Pollard firmly blames Treasury power for the 'w asting
of the British economy' and concludes that 'ministers basically do w hat the
Treasury and Bank of England tell them to d o .'36 Meanwhile, Thain sees a
powerful Treasury imposing U-turns on governments of whatever party:
The spectacle of most governments taking power w ith  the express 
intention of not introducing an incomes policy only then to do so 
offers prim a facie evidence for the existence of a dom inant civil 
service.37
In their study of public expenditure decision making in the UK, Heclo and
W ildavsky conclude that the Treasury's judgm ent on expenditure is the
given factor around which official and ministerial bargaining takes place.38
Both participants and analysts of the Labour government of the 1960s
and 1970s have supported the dom inant Treasury thesis. Tony Benn for
example has repeatedly argued that the Treasury is too powerful in regard to
m in isters.39 Similarly, the former Chief Secretary, Joel Barnett concluded
that the 'official' system defeated ministers. 40 in  his analysis of the 1974-1979
Labour government, Coates argues that 'Treasury conservatism was a m ain
obstacle to the government's radicalism. '41
W riters concentrating on the general policy-making process have not
significantly disputed the dom inant Treasury thesis. Keegan and Pennant-
Rea argue that the Treasury and the Bank of England are able to gradually
assert power over the lifetime of a party government:
Indeed there appears to be something of a cycle of influence over 
economic policy w ith the political party and manifesto being in  the 
ascendant early in the adm inistration (and) the influence of the 
T reasury and the Bank of England gradually  becom ing m ore 
im portant w hen over-ambitious plans begin to go w r o n g .4 2
At the same time, they argue that on monetary and exchange rate policy, the
Bank of England is generally the most powerful actor:
O ften the Bank's 'pow er' comes from presenting an apparently  
irrefutable case to the Chancellor and Prime Minister that it will not 
be able to sell any more government stock to the public, or hold the 
exchange rate at the official target rate, unless the G overnm ent 
introduces policies which, for example, stand a chance of convincing 
the m arket that it will fight back against inflation.43
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Similarly, Hodgem an asserts the power of the Bank in this area:
In general, the Bank has played a major part in determ ining the 
objectives of m onetary policy, and the major part in deciding how 
policy is to be conducted to attain these objectives.44
Mosely takes an opposite cyclical view to that of Keegan and Pennant- 
Rea bu t agrees that the Treasury is still powerful. He argues that in the first 
three years or so of a government's life, Treasury officials will pull ministers 
along to their ends. Thereafter, the Treasury tends to assume a defensive 
posture as ministers make it more clear w hat measures they cannot expect 
the Cabinet to accept.45 In sum, there is a general consensus among these 
w rite rs  th a t w h ils t m in isters m igh t have form al co n stitu tio n a l 
responsibility for policy, real power lies with the Treasury and to a greater or 
lesser extent the Bank of England.
Treasury Weakness
Evidence against the dom inant Treasury thesis comes from several sources.
Former participants in the policy process do not all share the view of Labour
m inisters. In his account of his time as head of the policy un it under
W ilson and Callaghan, Donoughue concludes that 'w ithout Callaghan, the
Treasury was able to do little .'46 Frank Cooper, a form er Perm anent
Secretary at Defence told Young and Sloman:
The knight m andarins at the Treasury are less in charge of the
Treasury than any Permanent Secretary is of any other departm ent.....
It is the ministers in the Treasury who call the shots.4?
In the view of a former senior Foreign Office official:
They don 't tolerate very much independent thinking in the Treasury. 
They like to think that they sort of tell Chancellors w hat to do. And, 
in some m easure all officials tell their ministers w hat to do. But they 
are actually very susceptible to the views of the Chancellor and they 
are very faithful reflectors of those views.48
According to a senior Treasury official, 'All my experience of thirty  odd 
years in  the Civil Service is that if there is a departm ental view it is 
minimal; w hat m atters is m inisters' view s.'49 Indeed, draw ing conclusions 
from their interview-based study of the Treasury, Young and Sloman argue
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that 'far from being secretly dominated by officials, the Treasury is the most 
political of all departm ents/50
At the same time, when specific decisions are empirically analysed it 
is difficult to uphold the dominant Treasury thesis. In Holmes' study of the 
H eath government, he shows that Heath, not the Treasury was responsible 
for the erroneously nam ed Barber boom. Using four case studies, namely 
the production of Concorde, the applications for membership of the EC, the 
abolition of resale price maintenance, and the 1964-67 non-devaluation of 
sterling, Bruce-Gardyne and Lawson provide the m ost com prehensive 
empirical analysis of power w ithin the core executive. They conclude: 'w hat 
is striking about our case histories is the chequered record of Treasury 
achievem ent.'51
W hilst the abolition of the RPM was no more than  a peripheral 
interest for the departm ent, in the other cases the Treasury was deeply 
involved and  profoundly  powerless. The Concorde saga w as one of 
'unrelieved hum iliation for the Treasury' as it failed in very determ ined 
efforts to kill off and then modify the project.52 On sterling, rather than  the 
incoming Labour government succumbing to Treasury pressure in 1964 as 
m any claim, it was W ilson and his Chancellor James Callaghan w ho took 
the decision not to devalue w hen in opposition. By contrast, 'The Treasury 
was chaste; bu t if, in  the autum n of 1964, the incoming ministers had been 
intent on rape the departm ent was in no mood for a struggle.'53 W ilson 
then  o rdered  th a t the w ord  devaluation should  be expunged from  
W hitehall vocabulary w hilst Treasury officials believed that devaluation 
was undesirable bu t not uncountenanceable. In response: 'its (Treasury's) 
h ig h  com m and  m eekly  accep ted  the  u n m en tio n ab ility  of the 
unm entionable and acquiesced in the brief to w ork w ithin an impossible 
fram ew ork.'54
Similarly, th roughout the 1960s the Treasury rem ained deeply 
sceptical about UK entry to the EC believing that it w ould gravely damage 
sterling. Yet the Treasury:
w as strikingly unsuccessful in im pressing its anxieties on  the
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politicians in 1961 and again in 1966-1967, notw ithstanding the fact 
that the Chancellor was at best an agnostic on Europe. Admittedly in 
1961 its anxieties were m uch less acute than they later became.... But 
in 1966, w ith ... a vastly enhanced awareness of the risks involved for 
the currency, it was unable to dissuade the G overnm ent from  
accepting a determ ined rejection of the devaluation option w ith  a 
decision to renew the Market application. The Treasury knights were 
pow erless to prevent the adoption of w hat they knew  to be a 
hopelessly contradictory strategy. 55
The Bank of England exercised no more power during this period
than  d id  the Treasury. On the two decisions w here it had a profound
interest, namely non-devaluation and the EC applications, the Bank played
a peripheral role. A lthough the Bank strongly supported EC mem bership
"neither the Tory government in 1961 nor the Labour government in 1966,
lost a nights' sleep about the view of Threadneedle Street on E urope/ 56
Similarly, the Bank supported non-devaluation bu t d id  not exercise any
influence over Wilson and Callaghan:
At no time - either in 1964 or subsequently - did the Governor or the 
Bank do anything to stiffen the Government's resolve to defend the
exchange rate  At any time the Government could have cut the
Gordian knot, and it is hard to see w hat the Bank could have done 
about it. 57
Indeed, w hen the Bank of England subsequently found itself at odds w ith a 
Conservative Prime Minister and Chancellor over whether to float sterling, 
it was powerless:
The Bank did resist the pressures to float, and continued to do so 
right up  to the m orning of the day the Chancellor's decision was 
announced. Its advice was simply brushed aside. 58
Overall, the Prime M inister and Chancellor dom inate economic 
policy-making w ithin the core executive, particularly on issues of m onetary 
and exchange rate management. They are generally autonomous both from 
the preferences of the Treasury and the Bank of England and from their 
Cabinet colleagues w ho tend to be involved only w ith  issues of public 
expenditure since they affect all departments. 59 Nevertheless, the issue of 
ERM m embership was a matter of EC as well as being an economic policy
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issue and here the distribution of influence w ithin the core executive needs 
to be considered somewhat differently.
D uring the UK's application for EC entry and the early years of 
m em bership, both  commentators and participants in  the policy-m aking 
process believed that the Foreign Office was often the decisive actor. In their 
study, Bruce-Gardyne and Lawson conclude that the Foreign Office was 
m ore influential than m inisters on the applications for EC m em bership. 
Every Foreign Office m inister endorsed the Foreign Office strategy of 
applying for mem bership even though at least two took office resolutely 
opposed to It. In 1967, ministers almost instantly aligned themselves w ith 
the departm ent's plans for renewal of the application w hen such plans were 
apparently doomed to failure.60 Similarly, David Owen commented on the 
applications:
Successive governm ents had allowed them  [the FCO] too m uch 
leeway. The result was that these Foreign Office civil servants had 
been acting almost as politicians, making political concessions and 
judgem ents, working very closely w ith ministers and having great 
influence w ith m inisters.'6!
During his tenure in office, Tony Benn concluded:
I th ink  the Foreign Office's influence in W hitehall is now  quite 
pernicious because the Foreign Office can properly claim that every 
b it of economic policy, industrial policy, social policy is now  
European policy and has to be fed through them.62
However, there are several reasons for believing that the Foreign 
Office is now less influential On EC policy than the Prime Minister, Foreign 
Secretary and  C hancellor, particu larly  on an  issue such as ERM, 
m em bership. First, whilst m inisters' own electoral interests in the 1960s 
applications for Com m unity m embership were lim ited, this is no longer 
true. Since EC policy has become directly and indirectly significant in the 
party  electoral conflict, m inisters now have their ow n clear interests 
independent of the Foreign Office.63
Second, the Foreign Office has traditionally not been influential on 
international or European economic issues. On non-devaluation which was
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directly relevant to the applications for EC membership, the Foreign Office 
exercised no influence at all. W hen the governm ent finally decided to 
devalue in  1967, the Foreign Office was not involved in any stage of the 
decision-m aking process.64 W hilst the Foreign Office's expertise and 
involvem ent in international financial and economic policy has increased 
since the 1960s, it still lacks influence in this area.65 Third, in foreign affairs 
generally and EC issues in particular, commentators have perceived a shift 
in  authority  tow ards the Prime Minister.66 Jenkins and Sloman conclude 
that the Foreign Office's influence is now dependent on the closeness of the 
relationship between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.67
In sum , this thesis locates the core executive as the centre of 
decisional activity and places the Prime Minister, Chancellor and Foreign 
Secretary as the key policy actors. It is the interests and interactions of these 
three m inisters which define the space in which the other institutions of 
the core executive operate. Nevertheless, a core executive m odel is an 
insufficient framework in itself for a decisional study. It simply describes the 
s tru c tu re s  of decision-m aking w ith o u t p ro v id in g  any theo re tica l 
understanding  of how the actual decisional behaviour of core executive 
actors should be analysed. The remainder of this chapter is concerned w ith 
substan tia ting  the particu lar core executive m odel outlined  w ith  an 
appropriate analytical framework of this kind.
Theories o f D ecision-M aking  
Three broad categories of traditional theorising about decision-making and 
economic policy-making in particular can be distinguished: aggregate neo- 
Marxist accounts of the relationship between the state and capital; specific 
m odels of economic policy-m aking w hich stress either ideology or a 
political-business cycle in the case of rational choice theorists; and  new 
institutionalist accounts which concentrate on actors as representatives of 
in s titu tio n a l in te res ts . The fo llow ing  d iscu ssio n  considers the  
appropriateness of each of these theoretical framework to the core executive 
model developed and the particular policy area under investigation.
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Neo-Marxism and the City
Neo-Marxists argue that the behaviour of state officials cannot ultimately be
separated from either the long term  interests of the capitalist class or
continuing capitalist social arrangements. Most neo-Marxist analysis on the
UK has stressed that state actors have consistently served a particular faction
of capital.68 For example, Longstreth states:
The state can be and in the case of Britain has been dom inated by a 
particular fraction of the dominant class, which by no means exercises 
power in the general interest of the dom inant class taken as a whole. 
Their interests have generally although not exclusively 'been the 
guiding thread for economic policy.'69
Similarly, Aaronovitch declares:
By and  large, governm ent in Britain has been concerned w ith
maintaining finance capital and its capitalist basis Finance capital
is not some 'lobby' outside the political system, bu t is built into its 
foundation .70
In his analysis of the crisis facing capitalism in the UK, Anderson argues 
that the City is 'the m ost sectionally decisive single determ inant of the 
shape of the econom y.'7! For Nairn, the City has been the prim ary force 
behind  economic policy both in securing its positive interests and  in 
precluding outcomes beneficial to industrial interests.72
These authors have stressed that the City is a particularly powerful 
influence within the state on exchange rate policy. For example, Longstreth 
builds his case for City power on the return to the Gold Standard in 1926, the 
emergence of the sterling area and the defence of sterling in the 1960s. In 
Coates' view:
It cannot be said that City interests prevailed in total; on the debit side 
m ust go credit policies which show a true Keynesian hostility to the 
rentier. G overnm ents have persistently  intervened in  favour of 
domestic and industrial borrowers, w ith the result that for a large part 
of the post-war period real interest rates have been negative. Yet this, 
and the persistence of exchange controls until 1979, cannot obscure 
the fact that the steadfast determ ination  of bo th  Labour and 
Conservative governments to m aintain the exchange rate of sterling 
until the early 1970s, at the cost of heavy internal deflation, reflected 
systematic and consistent City pressure. Nor can it obscure the fact 
that the decision to follow that by seeking entry to the EC occurred at
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the very time w hen the City was replacing its ow n dependence on 
sterling w ith  an equally in ternational preoccupation  w ith  the 
Eurodollar. W hat is striking about these policies is not only their 
congruence w ith the interests of key sections of the City, bu t their 
centrality to the whole of economic life. It was not just that the City 
exercised an influence beyond its numbers. It exercised an influence 
w here it m attered  m ost, on the w hole basic fram ew ork of 
government policy as a w h o l e .73
Nairn, Coates and Longstreth all argue that City power has at least 
partially resulted from the perm eation of the Treasury and the Bank of 
England with City interests and their dominance within the core executive. 
Longstreth sees further power stemming from the maintenance of the City's 
role in the economy which allows it to set the param eters of economic 
p o l i c y .7 4  Meanwhile, Coates stresses the City's pow er to inflict sanctions 
through the gilt edged and foreign exchange markets.
Ingham offers a critique of this analysis w ithout disputing that the 
state acts according to City interests. He argues that there is no necessary 
reason w hy the Bank of England and Treasury should  preserve City 
interests. Rather, these institutions have their own independent interests 
w hich happen  to coincide w ith  those of the City. W ith m inisters 
subservient to the Bank of England and the Treasury, any potential 
autonom y of the state from finance capital is lost. W hilst macro-economic 
policy is not determ ined by the interests of the City, it ultim ately reflects 
those interests.
Overall, a neo-M arxist approach to this decisional study of UK 
economic policy-making would mean identifying the benefits and costs to 
the interests of the City of the different policy options open to ministers at 
all stages during  the developm ent of policy. The Prime M inister and 
Chancellor w ould not be treated as autonomous actors pursuing their own 
interests bu t as the representatives or reflectors of external interests.
For several reasons, such an approach w ould provide an inadequate 
theoretical framework for this decisional study. In general, neo-Marxists face 
a problem of providing a satisfactory account of why the state should either 
be perm eated w ith the interests of the capitalist class or face a functional
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imperative to act to defend those interests. Certainly, the thesis that the UK 
state has been permeated by City interests relies on a deterministic account 
of the socialisation of interests. As Ingham recognises, the Treasury and the 
Bank of England were by their very nature likely to develop their ow n 
institutional interests. Although historically, the City did generally rely on 
the Bank of England to represent its interests within government, after 1945, 
the Bank distanced itself from the City. By the early 1980s, the interests of 
the Bank and the City were clearly divided. Most publicly, in 1982-1983 the 
Bank deserted the Stock Exchange in its campaign against regulation. As a 
result, the City turned towards bureaucratic forms of representation more 
akin to those betw een other organised interests and governm ent.75 As 
Sargent argues, the City entered a forum of interest representation in which 
it has traditionally been weak.7^
Despite departing from the view that the interests of state actors and 
those of the City are necessarily linked, Ingham  still assum es w ith the 
others that City interests are secured through the Treasury's and the Bank of 
England's dom ination of the core executive economic policy. However, 
even on the issue of the 1964-1967 non-devaluation which is typically cited 
by the neo-Marxists, the policy was sustained by the Prime Minister and 
Chancellor and not the Treasury and the Bank. If the policy reflected or was 
determ ined by City interests, then it is necessary to explain w hy these 
ministers should act on those interests. Yet as Stones argues, W ilson and 
Callaghan were pursuing their own party interests w ithin structures defined 
by international financiers. The two m inisters believed that Labour's 
fundam ental macro-economic interest was in a high growth-high dem and 
economy. However, the paucity of the UK's foreign exchange reserves made 
their situation inherently difficult. In order to m aintain high dom estic 
demand, the government had to preserve both the level of sterling reserves 
held by foreigners and the ability to borrow foreign exchange from abroad. 
Consequently, it faced a trade off. A devaluation in sterling w ould have 
been a stimulus to growth in terms of competitiveness. Yet it w ould also 
have jeopard ised  the governm ent's ability to borrow  w ithou t fierce
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conditions. W ilson and Callaghan judged that credit was more fundam ental 
to their high grow th-high dem and strategy and that the sterling parity  
should be preserved.
H aving taken this decision, the governm ent then  d id  w ha t it 
considered necessary to maintain the parity and international liquidity. This 
did not m ean that the government did everything possible to keep the City 
satisfied on a broad front. For example, the government refused to acquiesce 
to City pressure for cuts in public expenditure. A t the same tim e, it 
successfully ignored the City's outright hostility to the ad hoc nature of its 
m onetary policy, the introduction of new exchange controls and the 
Selective Em ploym ent Act. It was only in regard  to direct threats to 
international liquidity that the government pursued policies which omnes 
paribus it w ould not have chosen. Overall, Stones dem onstrates that the 
Labour governm ent's sterling policy was not determ ined by City interests. 
The fact tha t the City benefited from the policy outcom e on n o n ­
devaluation cannot be used as evidence that it exercised pow er over 
ministers. Rather, ministers defined a set of tactical interests in relation to 
the structures of the financial m arkets in accordance w ith  their ow n 
fundam ental strategic macro-economic interests.77
It is simply unsustainable to claim that the operation of the financial 
and exchange markets force ministers to act on City interests across a broad 
range of policies. W hilst the City does have general interests in regard to 
economic policy, these are not reflected in activity in the financial and 
exchange markets. Financial institutions and speculators enter the exchange 
markets not to communicate their interests to the state bu t to make a profit 
out of operating them. Of course, the manner in which that profit is m ade - 
uncontrolled  buying  and selling of currencies - has very  significant 
consequences for UK governments seeking to manage an open economy. 
Yet it does not and cannot in itself translate City interests into particular 
policy outcomes. Rather, governments must decide how they respond to the 
costs im posed by a rapidly falling or rising currency given their ow n 
interests. Even if the choices which a government makes in that situation
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\coincide w ith  the preferences of the City, this does not prove tha t a 
determ inant power relationship exists. To suggest otherwise is to commit 
w hat D ow ding term s the blam e fallacy in w hich anything less than  
optim um  outcome for one actor must be the consequence of an act of power 
by another actor.78
In sum, a neo-M arxist account of the developm ent of ERM policy 
w ould face two main problems. It could account neither for the autonom y 
of the Prim e M inister, Chancellor and  Foreign Secretary from  other 
institutions in the core executive nor explain w hy these three actors were 
being forced to act according to any other interests than their ow n given 
constraints.
Ideology and the Political Business Cycle
Most non-aggregate w ork on economic policy decision-making falls into 
two loose categories. The first incorporating rational choice approaches 
assumes that ministers decide policy according to a political-business cycle 
seeking to deliver benefits closely in line w ith the preferences of sufficient 
myopic voters to w in re-election. In the run-up to an election, the policy 
will be broadly reflationary. After re-election governments will revert to a 
deflationary policy to mop up the inflationary consequences of the pre­
election boom.
W ithin the approach, analysts disagree as to w hat governments want 
to deliver to voters. Nordhaus builds his analysis around the Phillips Curve 
to suggest that the aim of pre-election expansion is specifically to achieve a 
full level of em ploym ent.79 For Tufte, governments aim to produce both  a 
fall in unem ploym ent and a rise in real disposable incomes so By contrast, 
Mosely argues that governments do not target a key economic electoral 
asset. Rather, the government seeks to correct policy in any particular area 
which the governm ent perceives as in a crisis. The only overall economic 
interest of governm ents is to m aintain a stable policy configuration, 
implementing changes only to steer the economy out of crisis.81
The second approach suggests that ministers will decide on economic 
policy according to their ideological preferences and those of their
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\constituencies. For example, those such as Stewart who argue that British 
politics is governed by 'adversary  party ' conflict, see m inisters taking 
decisions according to their overall party ideology.82 From a comparative 
approach  again using a Phillips curve m odel, Hibbs concludes tha t 
governm ents pursue macro-economic policies broadly in accordance w ith 
the objective economic interests and subjective preferences of their class- 
defined  core political constituencies. Consequently, social dem ocratic 
governm ents put a far higher priority on full employment and 'bourgeois' 
governm ents on the containm ent of inflation.88 Cowart drew  sim ilar 
conclusions from a com parative analysis of both  m onetary and fiscal 
policy.8* In his analysis of the impact of party government on the levels of 
public expenditure, Castles argues that strong parties of the right are not 
interested in expansion whilst social democratic and other parties generally 
seek to provide it. This divergence reflects parties' respective ideological 
preferences for lesser or greater state activity structured by cleavages dating 
from the extension of the suffrage.85
The problem  w ith both broad approaches is that they have neither 
stood up  to rigorous empirical testing nor are they entirely satisfactory in 
theoretical term s.^Theoretically variants of both approaches incorporate a 
Phillips curve model into their analysis, postulating a trade-off betw een 
in fla tion  and  em ploym ent. H ow ever, the grow th  in  im portance of 
m onetary policy since the 1970s has made this link dubious. At the same 
time, both accounts are too heavily focused on the ultimate ends of policy, 
particularly unemployment and inflation. As a result, they have little to say 
about governm ents' interests in relation to the means by which those ends 
are reached. Both economic ideological preferences and to an even greater 
extent expressed voter preferences are preferences for broad ends. By 
contrast, macro-economic policy concerns choices about means. Once this is 
accepted, it becomes a highly dubious proposition to suggest, for example, 
that m inisters seek to accom m odate vo ters ' preferences on w hether 
inflation should be controlled by monetary or fiscal policy. In terms of this 
decisional study, a further problem  arises. W ith their focus on narrow
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economic options, neither approach can easily accommodate the EC and 
foreign policy dimension to the ERM membership issue.
N ew  Institutionalism
New institutionalist accounts suggest that institutions shape individual 
actors' behaviour in very extensive ways. Individuals essentially follow 
institu tional rules and routines rather than  m aking carefully w orked- 
through choices or rationalistic decisions on a case by case basis. W hen new 
issues arise, actors primarily process them by classifying the issue in terms of 
previous organisational experiences and the collective historical memory of 
institutions. Rules and norms exist because they are the best means by 
w hich bo th  indiv idual and collective actors can avoid d isorder and 
potential chaos. As a result, the logic of institutional action is one of 
appropria teness so tha t actors respond to situations w ith  the m ost 
appropria te  action given prevailing rules and the consequences for 
institutional stability.87
In a decisional study of ERM m em bership, a new institutionalist 
approach m ust focus on the major organisational locations, the Treasury, 
the Bank of England, the Foreign Office and possibly Downing Street and 
the Cabinet Office. In addition, a full-flown institutionalist account m ight 
regard Parliament and the major parties as im portant institutional settings. 
A ttention w ould then focus on the ways in w hich these organisations 
developed distinctive procedures for scanning and processing information, 
u n d e rs ta n d in g  the ex ternal env ironm en t, m aking  decisions and  
explain ing/advocating  their policy to other organisations.88 Individuals 
w ould appear in this kind of story as representatives of their institution, 
bearers of its roles and perceptions and culture, more than as autonom ous 
sources of intentionality. In terms of outcomes, we should expect to see 
ERM policy changing only very gradually, and in response to long-run 
adaptions in  the positions of the relevant actors.
Such an approach would have severe limitations for this decisional 
study. First, w hilst the Prime Minister, Chancellor and Foreign Secretary 
have been shown to be generally autonomous from institutions in the core
29
executive on economic policy, a new institu tionalist account w ould  
subsum e these actors back into the Treasury, Foreign Office and Bank of 
England. W hilst institu tional actors m ay indeed have an in terest in 
m ain tain ing  historical practice and institu tional stability , the Prim e 
Minister, Chancellor and Foreign Secretary operate in an electoral arena and 
w ill define  the ir in te res ts  accordingly . C onsequen tly , any  new  
institutionalist account of UK economic policy-making will be radically 
incomplete: it will explain only the ballpark in which the game is played 
and some of the enduring rules but not the strategies adopted by the central 
actors or the eventual policy outcomes which result.
Second, the new institutionalist framework for analysing decision­
m aking does not fit well w ith the unique macro-economic policy-making 
environm ent. New institutionalists suggest that policy change is gradual 
and driven by changes within institutions themselves. However, economic 
policy has trad itionally  changed very rap id ly  as changing economic 
conditions and the volatility of foreign exchange m arkets have instantly 
transform ed policy choices. This does not mean that institutional actors will 
not develop preferences for certain kinds of policy approaches over others ( 
see pp  34-35 for a discussion of this in particular relation to the Treasury, 
Foreign Office and  Bank of England). Rather, particu lar institu tional 
p references w ill consistently  be redefined  w ith in  a dynam ic and 
unpredictable policy-making environment.
1.3 A RATIONAL ACTOR FRAMEWORK
Given the limitations of existing theoretical approaches to decision-making 
for the core executive model outlined in Section 1.2, it is necessary to 
develop a specific analytical fram ework of behaviour for this particular 
study. The following discussion sets out a "thick7 rational actor fram ework 
in w hich the behaviour of the Prime Minister, Chancellor and  Foreign 
Secretary will be analysed in Chapters 2-6. A "thick rational actor account 
m ay sound som ewhat contradictory but it denotes a descriptively rich 
approach to understanding how actors behave by showing the premises and
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m otivations w hich underlay their decisions. Policy actions adopted by 
actors can be seen as rational in these terms, if they maximise actors' 
benefits, net of costs, subject to constraints. We 'u n d e rstan d ' actors' 
behaviour w hen we can construct an account in these terms of causes which 
are com m ensurate w ith  the effects we need to e x p la in .8 9  In terms of the 
issue of ERM membership, this means that there are three key aspects to the 
fram ew ork, nam ely that the m inisters will have interests in economic 
policy, EC policy and in relation to capital accumulation which will impact 
on their consideration of policy. The question for this discussion is, how 
should we conceptualise each of these interests?
Economic Policy Interests
Despite the specific limitations of the rational choice political business cycle 
approach to understanding politicians' decisional behaviour in  economic 
policy, it has considerable general utility in postulating a clear set of interests 
for m in isters, nam ely re-election.The assum ption  tha t governm ents 
maximise their chances of re-election as their fundam ental aim is justified 
on several grounds. First, the attem pt to w in power through the electoral 
system  is w hat d istingu ishes political parties from  o ther political 
organisations. It would seem reasonable then to define the interests of their 
elite actors in relation to that activity. Second, the nature of the UK political 
system intensifies w hat is the logical preference of any set of ministers to 
hold onto power. Since there are no alternative sources of power to control 
of the House of Commons in the form of an effective second chamber or 
regional government, governments which do not secure re-election are left 
w ith nothing. 90 Third, it is widely accepted that macro-economic outcomes 
and considerations are significant determ inants of general elections. W ith 
the electorate so sensitive to a governm ent's economic perform ance, it 
w ould be very strange if governm ents did not consider the electoral 
consequences of economic policy options. Fourth, by allowing the Prime 
Minister to select the election date, the UK political system gives full scope 
to m anaging economic policy in an electoral cycle. However, as Dunleavy 
recognises, accepting the primacy of electoral interests does not m ean that
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governm ents will exclusively pursue preference-accommodating policies or 
strategies. Rather it is quite logically and empirically reasonable to believe 
that m inisters can use their political power to shape preferences to their 
ow n advantage.91
Indeed, governments have the scope to pursue electoral objectives in 
econom ic policy beyond preference accomm odation. In their study  of 
economic policy making, Grant and N ath argue that voters' view of the 
relative importance of different economic issues changes over time and that 
governm ents have engineered that change. Indeed governments are able to 
affect voters' perception of w hat is and is not possible regarding certain 
economic variables. As a result they attem pt to ensure that they are judged 
on the m ain economic variable which they said was im portant on entering 
office.92
In itself, preference accom m odation m ay have adverse electoral 
consequences for a governing party . The electorate 's percep tion  of 
governm ents is by no means solely dependent on their assessment of the 
relationship betw een their policy preferences, however those preferences 
are shaped , and  the governm ent's policy perform ance. R ather, the 
electorate 's perception of a governm ent's general com petence is also 
im portant. Governments are likely to suffer electorally if they pursue 
policies which cause serious public divisions either in ministerial ranks or 
in the parliam entary party. Voters will react against m uddle and conflict 
whatever their views on actual policy. In addition, a governm ent's electoral 
interests w ill deter them  from policies likely to involve problem s of 
effective im plem entation. Such problems will arise w hen a governm ent 
has conflictual relations with those institutions or groups on which it relies 
to execute particular policies. Again, the electorate may well react against its 
im pression  of w eak governm ent w hatever its u n d e rly in g  policy  
preferences. As a result, governments are unlikely to chose from an open 
ended series of policy options. Certain policies may therefore be ruled out 
neither on ideological grounds nor because they fail to accom m odate 
sufficient preferences on the immediate policy issue.
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In sum, the analysis of the thesis is based on the assum ption that 
m inisters do not have fixed interests in economic policy. Rather, their 
behaviour has to be analysed within the context of a range of considerations 
defined by the electoral cycle. First, m inisters w ant to provide m aterial 
benefits to sufficient voters particularly in the run-up to a general election. 
Alternatively, they may look to strengthen the economic position of their 
political constituencies vis a vis other social and geographic groups. Second, 
ministers seek to deliver particular policy benefits on which they have, or 
can at least p lausibly claim to have, a com parative advantage over 
opposition parties. Third, they have an interest in delivering an economic 
policy package to the electorate w hich can be sold effectively by  the 
rhetorical political language they have adopted. Fourth, m inisters are 
interested in pursuing policies which they can implement effectively and do 
not pose problem s of party  m anagem ent. Finally, m inisters' economic 
policy interests are not independent from their position in other policy 
areas.
By postulating a collective electoral interest for m inisters, it is still 
possible to account for divisions between them. At a simple level, ministers 
will disagree over the best short and long term means to achieve that end 
whether it be the electorate's likely response to particular policy outcomes or 
issues of general credibility. More profound conflict will occur for example 
over fundam ental assum ptions of how the m acro-economy w orks or 
assessments of the UK's position in the international economic and political 
system. Different beliefs about underlying economic relationships and 
structures will lead to different judgements about the relationships of both 
individual policies and series of policies to electoral ends. This is not to 
suggest that all rhetorical conflict between ministers can be simply reduced 
to a d ispu te  over electoral strategy w ithou t regard  to ideological 
disagreement. Rather, the resolution of conflict betw een m inisters over 
specific policy decisions cannot be analysed w ithout consideration of the 
relevant electoral yardsticks.
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EC Policy
Analysis of the EC has increasingly recognised that the domestic politics of 
m em ber states is a vital determ inant of its policy m aking o u t p u t .  93 As 
Bulmer argues:
There is little value in examining member states7 European policy in
isolation from their other policies. European policy is conditioned by
m uch the same set of factors which shape domestic p o lic y .9 4
EC policy offers governm ents potential electoral benefits in term s of 
leadership and controlling resources. Yet the adversarial nature of UK party 
conflict and long standing political ambivalence tow ards EC mem bership 
m eans tha t opposition  parties can potentially  reap rew ards from  a 
governm en t m isjudging  its E uropean policy. M oreover, w ith  EC 
m em bership  serving as a cross-cutting party  cleavage, governm ents' 
freedom  of manoeuvre is often constrained by their own party if they w ant 
to avoid a problem  of party  management. As a result, governm ents are 
likely to have a strong interest in whether their overall policy stance strikes 
a pro- or anti-European tone, so that their policy choices centre around an 
isolationist or active dynamic.
In pursuing their EC objectives, governments have since 1975 been 
prim arily  concerned w ith  the heads of governm ent summits. Decision­
m aking w ithin this forum is dominated by a conflict between leaders acting 
as the champion of national interests, and m utual policy adjustm ent so as 
to resolve their domestic problems to their ow n advantage.95 Typically, 
sum m its culm inate in broad package deals over a range of issues. If a 
governm ent w ants to secure active resources from their EC policy, their 
interest is in finding w hat Helen Wallace's terms 'an  acceptable package of 
resources and burdens.'96 W ithout a deal, a governm ent will present its 
position as an act of national defence. Consequently, the actions of the 
Prime Minister, Chancellor and Foreign Secretary in regard to any particular 
EC policy issue cannot be understood outside their objectives in  regard to 
the full range of policy issues dealt with at EC level.
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Capital Accumulation
Pluralists and elite theorists would argue that on an issue such as ERM 
m em bership ministerial behaviour could be understood simply in relation 
to their ow n interests in economic and EC policy. For example, in  his 
analysis of UK economic policy-making, Grant offers an essentially pluralist 
analysis of the relationship between capital interests and policy outcomes. 
He sees no necessary reason why ministers should act in the interests of 
capital nor empirical evidence that they do. Nevertheless, like the neo- 
Marxists he believes that ministers' relationship w ith the City is distinctive 
from those w ith other sectors of capital.97 The City has been particularly 
successful at taking its fundamental interests, such as self-regulation, ou t of 
the political process. Through the sanction of the financial and exchange 
markets, the City has an important but not determinant role in the decision­
m aking process. Its influence is likely to be greatest at a time of economic 
crisis w hen governm ents assign priority  to secure the confidence of 
domestic financial markets and institutions. 98
Otherwise, Grant argues, capital in the UK is weak in relation to the 
state. W hilst it does possess certain second dimensional pow er to keep 
certain issues out of the political arena:
Once a m atter is subject to political decisions, the outcom e for 
business is uncertain. This is not only because other interests come 
into play, bu t because business often has considerable difficulty in 
deciding w hat its interests are, and in having made such a choice, in 
choosing a strategy to pursue them ."
However, in stressing capital's weakness in  terms of representation, 
G rant ignores the likely interactive relationship betw een m inisters and 
capital interests. If the aim of macro-economic policy is to deliver particular 
outcomes in  the real economy organised around capital, then governm ents 
have an interest in the general performance of capital. At the same time, 
since governments can affect the process of accumulation, they may develop 
an interest in the growth of particular forms of accumulation.
Certainly, selective intervention in the accumulation process offers 
ministers in  general, and the Prime Minister and Chancellor in particular
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opportunities to pursue preference shaping strategies. Of the four broad 
strategies identified by Dunleavy, two are directly relevant. First, ministers 
can identify social locations or geographical areas where their support is 
concentrated and then systematically facilitate their growth. By contrast, 
grow th in locations preponderantly supporting opposition parties can be 
discouraged. Second, even if the size of particular social groups is not 
altered, ministers may intervene to alter their relevant social and economic 
position in order to strengthen their party's support among a target category. 
Electoral benefit can accrue to governments by increasing the perception of 
advantage of particular social and economic groups vis a vis other such 
groups.100 To achieve these ends governments can give financial assistance 
to  investm ent in  particu lar sectors of the econom y th rough  R&D 
partnerships and direct subsidies and grants. Alternatively, governm ents 
can assist selective sectors through the regulatory fram ew ork w hich is 
applied for business operations. They can create incentives for investm ent 
in particular geographical areas through special tax breaks and infrastructure 
expenditure. Such policies can add  both to the absolute and relative 
p ro sperity  of the groups who are dependen t upon  the econom ic 
performance of a geographical area an d \o r sector of the economy.
It is ministers ow n attitude towards accumulation which is likely to 
determ ine the im pact of capital in terests on policy outcom es. A 
governm ent's interest in this regard will vary according to circumstance. 
The potential electoral gains of preference-shaping in the m edium  term  
have to be m easured against the short term  costs in  terms of time and 
resources. Governments may chose not to intervene, or opt for lim ited 
intervention, or try to develop a systematic accumulation strategy to ensure 
a steady flow of material benefits to a potential electoral base.
If ministers do not have priorities in terms of capital accumulation, 
then they are unlikely to be constrained in their economic policy areas by 
the effects of different outcomes on particular sites of accumulation. By 
contrast, ministers who possess a fairly systematic accumulation strategy for 
particular groups of capital are more likely to consider the preferences of
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those capital groups in their policy choices. The pursu it of a particular 
intervention strategy may act as a self-imposed constraint on economic 
policy. This does not mean that ministers' interests in  regard to the former 
will necessarily trium ph over the latter. Rather, intervention strategies will 
create an additional cost-benefit analysis. Ministers face incentives to pursue 
particular policies and will embrace costs w hen they decide on policies 
which are detrim ental to their favoured sites of accumulation. In sum, the 
analysis assumes that there is no uniform  relationship betw een capital 
interests and economic policy outcomes. The impact of capital interests has 
to  be understood  in  term s of m in isters ' ow n in terests in  capital 
accum ulation and their place w ith in  a governm ents' overall electoral 
interests.
Institutional Actors
The behaviour of the Prime Minister, Chancellor and Foreign Secretary lies 
at the heart of this thesis. Nevertheless, the positions of other core 
executive actors are not ignored. Whilst the interests of m inisterial actors 
are understood within the 'thick' rational actor framework described above, 
the position of institutional actors are considered w ithin  a broadly new 
institutionalist perspective. Although the Treasury, Foreign Office and the 
Bank are not necessarily able to act on what seems to officials an appropriate 
course of action given their particular rules and norms, in each case, broad 
institutional interests are apparent. The fundam ental interest of all the 
institutions is in the avoidance of crisis and d isrup tion  in their core 
adm inistrative activities. For the Foreign Office, this m eans stability in 
relations w ith  the states w ith which the UK is m ost closely linked. The 
Bank of England's prim e interest is in general stability in  the exchange 
m arkets and the maintenance of routine and uncomplicated techniques of 
controlling money.
W hilst the Treasury has traditionally  been characterised as an 
institution dedicated to the control of public expenditure, this is more an 
often appropriate outcome than a necessary interest in itself. 101It is at least 
as plausible that the Treasury prefers fiscal restraint not in itself but so as to
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avoid the multi-faceted difficulties of raising funds to borrow. It is perhaps 
better to understand the Treasury as a small closed departm ent which seeks 
to m inim ise dependent and potentially  fraught relations w ith  o ther 
departm ents and outside groups. Since there are economic policies which 
function as an autom atic pilot a n d /o r  which do not involve detailed  
in tervention  in  or association w ith  units of production, these policies 
w ould be deemed more 'appropriate' than those which do not involve such 
difficulties. In general, appropriateness is defined in terms of Treasury 
autonom y.
1.4 ARGUMENT, METHODOLOGY AND ORGANISATION
The organisation of the thesis reflects the analytical framework described in 
this chapter. The analysis locates the core executive as the centre of 
decisional activity and places the Prime Minister, Chancellor and Foreign 
Secretary as the key policy actors. The decisional behaviour of these actors 
on ERM m em bership is discussed w ithin a rational actor fram ew ork in 
which these actors are motivated by broad electoral considerations in regard 
to economic policy, EC policy and their capital accumulation priorities. The 
secondary roles of core institutional actors w ithin the core executive are 
understood w ithin a broadly new institutionalist perspective w here w hat 
counts are institutional interests.
Chapters Two to Six eachbegin with an examination of the operation 
of the ERM during a particular period. This provides a clear yardstick for 
assessing the costs and benefits to the government of membership and non­
membership at that time. The narrative then traces the developm ent of the 
core executive 's a ttitude  tow ards m em bership chronologically, w ith  
particular em phasis given to those periods w hen ERM m em bership was 
actively discussed w ithin the Prime Minister-Chancellor-Foreign Secretary 
triangle.
In  considering these periods of decision-m aking, the aim  is to 
reconstruct the choices facing the government given its range of possible 
interests on the issue and against this background to describe the core
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executive's subsequent activity. The specific objectives are threefold. First, I 
seek to assess the costs and benefits of ERM m em bership for the 
governm ent in  economic policy and in EC policy given the preferences of 
the Prime Minister, Chancellor and Foreign Secretary and the governm ent's 
overall electoral position. In term s of economic policy, the analysis 
considers the effects of membership on the governm ent's ability to pursue 
all three of its monetary and exchange rate and fiscal objectives. In terms of 
EC policy, the analysis identifies the governm ent's overall aim  given its 
domestic considerations and the im pact of ERM non-m em bership and 
possible m em bership on its relations and bargaining pow er w ith  other 
member states.
Second, I outline and examine the likely effects of ERM entry on 
particular capital groups and the efforts of those groups to influence policy. 
By exam ining the governm ent's ow n attitude to capital accum ulation 
priorities, it is possible to assess the likely effect of particular capital interests 
on policy outcomes. Third, I identify and explain the positions taken by and 
the interactions betw een the Prime Minister, the Chancellor, the Foreign 
Secretary, the Treasury, the Foreign Office, and the Bank of England, in the 
process analysing the terms and assumptions in which those actors saw the 
membership debate and related issues. Periods of core executive decision­
making are systematically examined in roughly the same way. However, as 
the decision making process itself became less well defined and more ad 
hoc, this approach becomes more difficult and a less rigid structure is used.
Such a 'th ick ' rational actor approach to the key aspects of core 
executive decision-m aking does ru n  into some po ten tia lly  serious 
methodological problems and difficulties. The effort to make policy choices 
and changes understandable in these terms can easily degenerate into a 
rationalisation of events in which the ultimate message is no more than 
'whatever is, is rational.' The problem for 'thick' rational actor accounts is 
especially serious in the case of ERM policy because there were m ultiple 
policy constraints and a constantly shifting background of relevant policy 
variables (such as international interest rates, flows of capital in the foreign
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exchange m arkets, dom estic economic conditions, and the fluctuating 
fortunes of the ERM itself.) Despite the inherent push  in Chapters Two to 
Six for a 'th ick ' rational account of the complex and m ultiple causation 
processes at w ork, the partially conditional character of this analytical 
narrative needs to be borne in mind. Consequently, in Chapter Seven, I step 
back from the detailed circumstances of this or that conjuncture and look 
instead at the broad sweep of policy and the fit between actors' interest and 
their behaviour over a longer period of time. This amounts to using a 'th in ' 
rational actor model to provide a more critical insight into core executive 
decision-making, by suggesting that strong limits should be placed on the 
range of benefits, costs and constraints that are allowed to feature in social 
science explanation.
M ethodology
The study is based on both published and non-published sources. The main 
published sources provide the basis for examining the ERM's operation and 
assessing the costs and benefits to the government of membership and non­
m em bership at any particu lar time. Key sources were: a system atic 
examination of all coverage of the ERM membership issue in the Financial 
Times, the  Times an d  the Economist; the general accounts of governm ent 
economic policy from 1979-1990 given by major commentators; academic 
studies of the ERM and discussion of the Thatcher governm ent; the 
relevant reports and m inutes of evidence of the House of Commons and 
House of Lords select committees; the reports of international economic 
organisations such as the OECD; and, biographies and memoirs of involved 
political actors, particularly those of Nigel Lawson and Margaret Thatcher.
Of these sources the Lawson and Thatcher memoirs are the m ost 
problematic. W hilst both authors present their accounts as the authoritative 
record  of the Thatcher governm ents, at tim es they offer d irectly  
contradictory analysis of ERM policy and related issues. In this thesis, 
neither memoirs are taken at face value. However, an im portant distinction 
is draw n betw een them. W hilst Lawson and Thatcher's interpretation of 
events can be jointly criticised, Lawson's offer a depth of detail about day-to-
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day policy-m aking on ERM m em bership and  a general consistency 
strikingly absent in Thatcher's. The former Prime M inister's memoirs are 
generally top heavy on glamorous overseas trips and often ahistorical on 
ERM m em bership.102 The thesis regularly draws upon Lawson's account of 
internal meetings w ithin the core executive as at least a starting point for 
discussion even if it is subsequently challenged. By contrast, Thatcher's 
memoirs tend to be used only as an account of her own struggle w ith  
Lawson and as insight into her motives.
In addition, 26 non-attributable interview s were conducted w ith  
those involved in the decision-making process. (For a further discussion of 
the use of these interview s see A ppendix I.) For the m ost part, the 
interviews are used in conjunction w ith Lawson's and Thatcher's memoirs 
to analyse the core executive operation itself. Used w ith  due caution and 
cross-checked against other sources, they provide detail both of the processes 
by which decisions were made and the motivations and assumptions of the 
central actors.
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CHAPTER 2
THE FIRST CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT AND ERM 
MEMBERSHIP
This chapter traces the evolution of the Conservatives' policy on ERM 
m em bership during  their first term  in office. Section 2.1 describes the 
operation  of ERM during  the whole period. Section 2.2 examines the 
governm ent's handling of the issue from its entry into office in May 1979 to 
the first Prime Ministerial meeting on membership in October 1979. Section 
2.3 analyses the brief discussions on ERM membership which took place in 
M arch 1980. The final section considers developments betw een June 1981 
and the 1983 general election focusing on the choices which confronted core 
executive actors between October 1981 and January 1982.
2.1: ERM AS A DIRTY FLOATi 
Between 1979 and early 1983, the ERM operated as a 'd irty  float' w ithout any 
currency dom inating the system on a perm anent basis. In 1979-1980 balance 
of paym ent differentials were the p rim ary  determ inants of currency 
m ovem ents w hich initially left the lira as the strongest currency. By 
contrast, the Deutschmark was often relatively weak due to a large German 
external deficit. Member states sought to maintain their currency parities by 
m onetary policy adjustment. However, they made no effort to co-ordinate 
fiscal policy and accepted realignments of the parities w hen those parities 
came under serious pressure. The first realignment occurred in September 
1979 six m onths after the system 's b irth  w hen the Danish krone was 
devalued and the Deutschmark revalued. Two m onths later, the krone was 
devalued again.i
In February 1980, France and Germ any agreed to postpone the 
creation of a European M onetary Fund and the use of the ecu as a reserve 
asset. D 'Estaing and Schmidt partly blam ed the UK's non-m em bership of
i The endnotes are organised so that the endnote at the end of each 
paragraph contains all the references for that paragraph unless there is a 
direct quote. In this case, all references before the quote are endnoted 
together, then the quote itself and finally all references after.
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ERM for the decision bu t neither government saw any incentive for further 
institutional development. Nevertheless, after a year's operation, both the 
ERM states and commentators generally heralded the system a success. The 
E uropean  Com m ission reported  tha t in  a generally  poor econom ic 
environm ent ERM was cutting exchange rate instability betw een EC states 
by two-thirds. Despite the two realignments of the krone, intra-Community 
exchange rates were more stable than at any time since 1972.2
In the sum m er of 1981, the ERM came under pressure from the 
meteoric rise of the dollar which began in November 1980 and continued 
through 1981 as a result of the Reagan adm inistration 's tigh t m onetary 
policy and benign neglect of the exchange rate. The Deutschmark bore the 
b run t of the dollar's rise forcing the Bundesbank to raise its interest rates. 
W ith  th e ir  cu rrencies subsequen tly  u n d e r p ressu re  ag a in st the 
Deutschmark, the other ERM states ultimately followed suit. W hilst 1980 
passed w ithout any realignments, the lira was devalued twice in 1981, the 
French franc w as devalued  and the D eutschm ark and guilder w ere 
revalued. The combination of high interest rates and the disruptive effects 
on trade of exchange rate instability threatened the fragile recovery of the EC 
economies from recession. Neither was there any likelihood of a change in 
American policy in view of the volume of the budget deficit and the size of 
the domestic m arket which allowed the USA to w ithstand a high dollar.3
As a result, in the latter half of 1981, the ERM states became 
increasingly enthusiastic about developing ERM further. In November 1981, 
the French Finance Minister Jacques Delors set out proposals for extending 
the use of the Ecu and defining an 'agreed zone' across the Atlantic in which 
the dollar w ould be m aintained in a stable relation to other currencies 
w ithin that zone. However, the ERM states were ultimately unable to agree 
to a dollar policy.4
By the end of 1982, the French franc, the lira, the krone and the 
Belgian and Luxembourg franc were all devalued and the Deutschmark and 
guilder revalued. Against this background of flexibility, overall European 
inflation rates rem ained high and differentials between the ERM's member
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states accelerated. Unlike a fixed exchange rate system, the ERM was not 
p roducing  inflation  convergence. R ather, w ith  all the realignm ents 
occu rring  in  the sam e d irec tion  as in fla tion  it  w as p rev en tin g  
overshooting.5
2.2: CONSTRUCTIVE EUROPEANISM?
The Conservative party  first became involved w ith  the ERM issue in the 
afterm ath of the Bremen Summit. In July 1978 after the sum m it, Thatcher 
condem ned Callaghan in the House of Commons for standing outside of 
the m ainstream  of the EC on the issue. She insisted that there was no way 
out of the w orld recession by standing alone and that the British people 
w ere shocked to find them selves 're legated  to the European second 
division' having been 'the victors in Europe.'6 However, the Conservative 
leadership themselves possessed no developed policy on the m atter. By the 
start of October, Thatcher was expressing no clear view in the House of 
Commons and it was only during that m onth that the Shadow Cabinet 
began intensive talks on the subject. During their deliberations a group of 
twenty-seven Europhile Conservative MPs led by Julian Critchley signed a 
m otion supporting the formation of EMS.7
O n 15 Novem ber Geoffrey Howe led the Shadow Cabinet into 
supporting the principle of the proposed ERM not as an ideal b u t as a 
possible w ay forw ard.8 However, the position did not secure unanim ous 
support. John Biffen, shortly to return  to the Shadow Cabinet after illness, 
declared that m em bership w ould  be incom patible w ith  a free m arket 
economy, money supply targeting, and reform of CAP. John N ott expressed 
similar views. He argued that priority should be given to the abolition of 
exchange controls and that w ithout exchange controls the ERM w ould be 
unw orkab le .9 Nevertheless, w hen Callaghan announced in the House of 
Commons on 6 December that the UK w ould not join the ERM, Thatcher 
declared, 'This is a sad day for Europe.' She charged that the Prime Minister 
w as content to have 'B ritain classified am ong the poorest and  least 
influential countries' in  the Community.10 The attack was later renewed by
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Francis Pym who argued that the UK's non-membership left it dangerously 
isolated in  the EC. However, these criticisms of the governm ent d id  not 
contain  any im plicit prom ise tha t a Conservative governm ent w ould 
reverse the decision. Indeed, the 1979 general election Conservative 
manifesto did not m ention the subject at all.11 
M onetary Targets
The Conservative governm ent came into office publicly com m itted to 
reducing inflation as its fundam ental macro-economic objective. It w ould 
reduce inflation by controlling the grow th of the m oney supply , as 
m easured by the m onetary aggregate, sterling M3 (£M3). Sterling M3 is a 
broadly  defined m onetary aggregate consisting of cash and current and 
deposit bank accounts of which the two main counterparts are bank lending 
and the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR). The PSBR w ould be 
reduced by cutting public expenditure and bank lending would be controlled 
by using interest rate policy. In theory then the government wanted to direct 
bo th  m onetary  and fiscal policy so as to reduce inflation. W hat the 
governm ent renounced on the counter-inflationary front was an incomes 
policy, preferring to revert to free collective bargaining.12
In practice the government's policy as manifested in its first budget in 
June 1979 w as m ore am bivalent. In term s of m onetary  policy, the 
governm ent honoured its counter-inflationary comm itm ent by tightening 
the £M3 range inherited from Labour and increasing interest rates by 2 per 
cent. It further reduced the volume of public spending in 1979-80 by £1.5 
billion and  set cash lim its on expenditure to squeeze out another £1 
billion.13
However, other aspects of policy were inflationary. First, the budget 
increased dem and by a three per cent cut in the standard rate of income tax 
and a reduction in the top tax rate from 83 to 60 per cent. Second, the 
income tax cut was financed by increasing VAT from 7 per cent to 15 per 
cent w hich boosted the inflation rate figure for the next year by four per 
cent. Third, the government cut subsidies to nationalised industries which 
responded by raising their prices adding another 2.5 per cent to the inflation
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rate . Fourth , the governm ent im plem ented the Clegg Com m ission 
recom mendation on public sector pay awards which led to an increase of 25 
per cent in the wage bill. Private sector claims correspondingly shot up.14
In term s of the exchange rate itself, the governm ent sim ply left 
sterling to the market. Sterling swiftly appreciated responding to its new 
status as a petro-currency as the second oil price shock hit in 1979 and to the 
governm ent's high interest rates. As a result, the exchange rate operated as a 
counter-inflationary bias in the government's stance.
As sterling appreciated further than the 2.25 per cent range allowed 
to ERM currencies, and the governm ent m ade no effort to halt that 
appreciation, UK policy towards the exchange rate was incompatible w ith 
ERM membership. In addition, firm m onetary targets and an exchange rate 
target w ould to a certain extent simply have been contradictory as objectives. 
The central bank intervention which is necessary to keep a currency w ithin 
a fixed range means that money will enter and leave circulation according 
to the policy requirements of that objective. W hen a currency appreciates, its 
central bank will have to sell that currency and so add to that state's money 
supply, w hatever the consequences for m onetary growth. In 1977 the UK 
governm ent w ished to hold sterling below a rate of $1.70 to $1.75 whilst 
m oney supp ly  targets w ere in use. How ever, the Bank of E ngland 's 
exchange m arket operations m eant that £M3 overshot its target. As a result, 
the attem pted ceiling on sterling was abandoned. Similarly, Switzerland 
tem porarily abandoned m onetary targets in 1978 to stop the Swiss franc 
rising too m uch.15
The conflict in policy objectives between money supply and exchange 
rate control was intensified by the policy instrum ent which the government 
chose to lim it money supply growth. W ith bank lending an im portant 
component of £M3, £M3 could be controlled prim arily either by interest 
rates or by some form of qualitative credit controls. Rationing credit in some 
fashion w ould  have m ade it possible to reach some accom m odation 
between strict monetary targets and ERM membership. Yet the government 
chose to rely on interest rates which prevented any simultaneous pursuit of
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both policies. During July some exchange controls were lifted and in October 
all rem aining controls apart from  those pertaining to Rhodesia were 
abolished. As a result, the corset which set a lim it on the growth of banks' 
interest-bearing liabilities became redundant since banks could by-pass the 
controls by lending to UK customers from overseas subsidiaries. Interest 
rates were left as virtually the exclusive instrum ent of a m onetary policy 
directed at a money supply target, whilst the ERM states used interest rates 
as the exclusive policy instrum ent of m em bership. By contrast, ERM 
membership w ould not have posed a problem for the UK in fiscal terms. 
Since the ERM w as not w orking through fiscal adjustm ent or inflation 
convergence, there was no reason why the governm ent's fiscal policy could 
not have been pursued inside ERM.16 
No Accumulation Strategy
The governm ent's priorities towards capital accumulation were ambivalent. 
Before 1979, both the manufacturing sector and the City declined relative to 
in ternational com petition w ithout governm ent taking any significant 
in itiative to galvanise them. W hilst m any believed that the UK was 
deindustrialising, it was not compensating in invisible earnings. Between 
1970-1980, the UK's share of world trade was falling. Invisible earnings grew 
in volume by only 4 per cent over the decade compared w ith 16 per cent for 
its major W estern com petitors. One particular invisible earner losing 
competitiveness was the Stock Exchange. The only new area of growth was 
N orth  Sea oil.17
The new  Conservative governm ent did not offer any alternative 
program m e for accumulation. Rather, it looked to m anufacturing industry 
to increase its international competitiveness. To this end, regional aid and, 
subsidies to ailing nationalised industries were cut and exchange controls 
w ere abolished. A t the same time, there was no program m e either to 
revitalise the City or to stimulate the service secto r .1^
M anufacturing industry w ould generally have benefitted from the 
lower exchange rate and interest rates that ERM membership w ould have 
brought in  comparison to the policy that the governm ent was pursuing.
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Nevertheless, there was no pressure from industry for entry. In 1978, the 
CBI believed that m em bership w ould run  the risk of leaving sterling 
overvalued and overall policy deflationary. However, by September 1979 
sterling was far higher than it could have been inside ERM.19
The implications for the City of non-membership are more difficult 
to assess. In 1978 the Midland stood alone among the clearing banks in being 
completely opposed to the system. The other three considered that the time 
was not opportune for ERM because of the volatile m onetary environm ent 
produced by the falling dollar. They argued that the UK should stand aside 
in the short term  bu t make it clear that it w ould eventually participate. 
Whilst there were no City voices for membership during the Conservative's 
first four m onths in office, the City's support for the governm ent's actual 
policy was m uted. A high exchange rate and high interest rates benefitted 
some City firm; bu t other firms which were them selves dependent on 
borrow ing or relied on m anufacturing clients w ere disadvantaged. In 
addition, there was some general disaffection from the volatility which 
policy entailed.20 
Budget Contributions
The UK's membership of the EC at this time was largely dom inated by the 
issue of the fairness of the UK's large budgetary contributions. On taking 
office, the governm ent signalled both a willingness to link the issue w ith 
other outstanding m atters, and in contrast to the Labour governm ent a 
general desire to be more communitaire. By August, the governm ent m ade 
significant concessions over farm price rises, EC authority over industry 
subsidies, nuclear energy research and pollution. It also implicitly accepted 
that the EC states should have some special rights in regard to N orth Sea oil. 
On ERM itself, in  June the government agreed to contribute 20 per cent of 
its gold and dollar reserves to the European Monetary Co-operation Fund in 
exchange for Ecus. The next month, the governm ent dropped the Labour 
government's claim for an automatic interest rate subsidy if the UK were to 
join and accepted that this would depend on the UK's economic position on 
entry.21
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\The problem  for the government in using ERM entry to im prove its 
chances of securing a deal on the UK's budgetary contribution was that once 
sterling started to appreciate, none of the other EC member states were keen 
for sterling to enter. They believed that sterling's strength, especially as a 
petro-currency w ould  d isrup t the m echanism . France now  actively 
preferred that the UK stay out of ERM and was at the same time the most 
reluctant to com prom ise over the budget. M eanw hile, the Thatcher 
government m ost w anted to engage Germany as an ally over the budget. 
H ow ever, the G erm an governm ent w as m ost in terested  in  gaining 
concessions over access to N orth Sea oil in view of the second oil price 
shock. By embracing an appreciating exchange rate as a counter-inflationary 
weapon, it was difficult for the UK government to use ERM membership as 
an instrument in its general European p o l i c y .22 
Foreign Office Weakness
W ithin the core executive, the Foreign Office was most enthusiastic about 
the policy review. Senior officials were still convinced that m em bership 
made sense on economic and political grounds. They believed that if the UK 
were to adjust its economic policy, it would increase the chance of an early 
settlement on the budget. One diplom at commented that 'w e w ould have 
had less of a battle over the Budget if we had been more accommodating on 
the E R M . '23 A member of the European Secretariat at the Cabinet Office 
commented:
H ad we been a full participant in the ERM our general standing could 
have m ade our task on the budget that much easier. ... It w ould have 
reduced the antagonism. 24
However, it was difficult for Foreign Office officials to make this case 
successfully to the Prime Minister and Chancellor. First, the officials did not 
receive the support of either the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, or his 
m inisterial team . C arrington identified Rhodesia as the fundam ental 
problem  facing the departm ent, and he w as not w ell-versed in  the 
economic issues involved in  ERM. Second, the Treasury dism issed the 
Foreign Office's case on the EC budget and was able to virtually exclude the
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Foreign Office from the economic debate about membership which meant 
that its political argum ent lacked credibility. 25 According to a Foreign Office 
official:
Although it [the FCO] has consistently had  some very bright people 
on the economic side, who understand the issue as well as anybody 
else, the Foreign Office is perceived both  in N um ber 10 and the 
Treasury and elsewhere in Whitehall, as sort of stepping outside of its 
own parish if it gets involved in financial and m onetary discussions. 
And it is always quite difficult for the Foreign Office to influence that 
although they have had people w ho understand  the issue just as 
clearly in economic terms as anybody else. It's part of the W hitehall 
one-upmanship. In the same way, the Foreign Office will tend to say 
to people, 'Oh, you don 't understand the foreigner' and so on. The 
Treasury will always say to the Foreign Office: 'You d o n 't really 
understand finance, you're amateurs dabbling in this game. W e're the 
real professionals.'26
The Treasury rem ained firmly opposed to m em bership and was 
supported by the new Chancellor, Geoffrey Howe. To the case it m ade 
against membership in 1978, the Treasury now added that ERM entry would 
be incom patible w ith  the m oney supply  policy which the governm ent 
wished to pursue. ERM was no longer simply undesirable but precluded by 
government policy. Neither d id  the Foreign Office find real support for its 
economic case at the Bank of England. A lthough the Governor of the Bank 
Gordon Richardson publicly expressed cautious support for the objectives of 
the ERM, in June he was not firmly committed to m em bership.27 According 
to one Foreign Office official, Richardson was not prepared to 'p u t its [the 
Bank's] head very far "above the parapet" on the issue.'28
Overall, core executive actors engaged in little systematic discussion 
of the issue and the review was low key in tone. On 22 July, the government 
announced that the final decision on m em bership w ould be postponed 
from September until October or November. After rum ours in the exchange 
markets from 14-17 September that the UK w ould enter by the end of the 
month, the government made it publicly clear a few days later that the UK 
w ould not be joining ERM. According to Thatcher, she then  held  a 
meeting in October w ith Richardson, Howe and other Cabinet officials to
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discuss the issue. They quickly agreed that ERM m em bership w as not 
appropriate bu t devised a formula that the governm ent w ould join the 
system when the 'time was right/29
2.3: ERM RESURFACES 
On 5 March 1980 Chancellor Schmidt told Thatcher that ERM membership 
could increase the UK's chance of securing a satisfactory budget deal and 
Thatcher reopened the question. In March 1980 sterling was continuing to 
rise steeply w ithout the government taking action to curb the trend. At the 
sam e tim e, the governm ent was pu tting  the finishing touches to its 
M edium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS). It presented in the budget that 
m onth, and setting ou t a firm  economic strategy for the rest of the 
Parliament. The aim was to control inflation by progressively reducing the 
rate of m onetary growth measured by £M3 through cutting the PSBR over 
four financial years. The strategy attem pted to concentrate both m onetary 
and fiscal policy on the problem of inflation which rose from 10.3 per cent 
in  May 1979 to 19.8 per cent in March 1980 following the 1979 budget. 
M onetary policy w ould be set according to £M3 growth and fiscal policy 
w ould remain tight so that any further cuts in taxation would be left to the 
future. There was no mention of an exchange rate objective.30
Overall, the governm ent's m onetary policy rem ained incompatible 
w ith ERM membership. Since monetary targets were so central to the design 
of the MTFS, it is difficult to conceive how the strategy could have been 
pursued inside ERM. With sterling already appreciating and the UK having 
the most favourable external deficit in the EC, sterling would probably have 
come under heavy upw ard  pressure inside ERM. If as a resu lt it was 
necessary to revalue sterling, then the ERM states w ould have had to 
revalue an inflationary currency which was just the kind of overshooting 
which they sought to avoid.
Schmidt and the Budget
The context of the government's European policy rem ained defined by the 
budget issue. At the Dublin Summit in December 1979 Thatcher's insistence 
on 'ou r m oney back' reduced the chances of a settlem ent w ith in  the
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im m ediate future. After the summit, the French press reported that France 
did  not care w hether the UK stayed in or left the Community. In 1979, 
Schmidt was the most sympathetic of the EC's leaders to the UK's case, bu t 
by the start of 1980 he felt that increased German security expenditure in the 
wake of the Afghanistan crisis placed the EC budget negotiations in a 
different perspective. Now, another summit loomed in Brussels at the end 
of M arch w ithout sight of an agreement on the budget. At the same time, 
the economic advantages to the UK from EC m em bership were at their 
low est since UK entry in 1973. Labour was starting to commit itself to 
w ithdraw al from the Community and could possibly make electoral gains 
from such a stance.3*
Schmidt offered Thatcher a potential deal on the UK's budgetary  
contributions because he believed that sterling's participation in  the ERM 
w ould balance the system and reduce the pressure on the Deutschmark as a 
reserve asset.32 Nevertheless, in practice there w as no clear trade off 
betw een ERM m em bership and a budget solution. G erm any w anted  
concessions on a common energy policy as well as ERM in return  for its 
support. Led by France, the other member states still believed that UK 
m em bership w ould be disruptive to the system  and w anted  different 
concessions. France saw progress on the budget as inexorably linked to a 
common lamb policy. Meanwhile, Denmark and Holland w anted an early 
agreement on a common fisheries policy rather than UK entry to ERM.33 In 
sum , ERM m em bership offered lim ited benefit to the UK governm ent's 
European policy objectives. There were no guarantees that m em bership 
w ould resolve the budget issue and allow the governm ent to pursue the 
active European policy it initially envisaged. A t the sam e tim e, the 
governm ent's incentive to be more communitaire was diminishing.
The Bank Shifts
W hilst ERM resurfaced in the context of the governm ent's European 
objectives, the Treasury remained firmly opposed to membership. The only 
significant shift in domestic opinion from 1979 was at the Bank of England 
and was based on economic policy considerations. Gordon Richardson and
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some of his senior officials wanted to replace the strict m onetary targets of 
the MTFS w hich they opposed w ith ERM mem bership. In their opinion 
ERM m em bership would serve as a means to devalue sterling and restore 
industrial competitiveness, and make intra-European trade easier. 34
H ow ever, o ther Bank officials rem ained  firm ly opposed  to 
mem bership particularly in the domestic m onetary division. Insiders argue 
that these officials saw ERM as eroding the active role which they enjoyed 
under the existing discretionary m onetary regime. N evertheless, their 
scepticism was som ewhat irrelevant to the Bank's formal position in the 
core executive debate which was defined by Richardson. As one senior 
Bank official pu t it on an issue like ERM, 'In  a way all that matters is w hat 
the Governor says'.35
For its part, the Foreign Office was unable to build on Schmidt's offer 
and influence Thatcher or Howe. Thatcher generally d id  not like trade-off 
bargaining on EC issues. One Foreign Office official commented: 'it was a 
constant difficulty to try and persuade her to see things that way... She 
w ould say that was typical Foreign Office stuff.'36 On the budget, Thatcher 
appeared particularly reluctant to horse-trade, believing that the UK's case 
should be resolved on its ow n its merits. In addition, the cost to the 
governm ent of Europeanising the ERM issue in terms of the Conservatives' 
macro-economic objectives was even greater than in 1979. As Thatcher told 
French television on 10 March, sterling's perform ance gave rise 'to  very 
considerable difficulty.'37 Richardson's support on ERM m em bership did 
not in itself constitute economic back-up to the Foreign Office's political 
argum ents since, in part, he saw ERM as an alternative to the governm ent's 
economic policy.
Despite a Prime-Ministerial meeting in March 1980 and some support 
for entry in the Cabinet, there is no evidence that either Thatcher or Howe 
ever seriously contemplated taking up Schmidt's offer. In her ow n words, 
T hatcher's view  w as tha t 'dom estic  m onetary  policy m ust rem ain  
p a ra m o u n t.'38Towards the end of March, Howe told a German financial 
magazine that the time was not ripe for membership because of sterling's
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volatility, the UK's high inflation rate and the possibility of further capital 
outflows following exchange control abolition. On 28 March, after another 
sum m it w ith Schmidt, Thatcher declared that control of the money supply 
m ust have priority. At the same time, she was articulating a different way 
forw ard in  European policy. She told the House of Commons that the UK 
m ight w ithhold part of its EC payments if a satisfactory budget agreement 
was not reached. Such an action w ould have breached the Treaty of Rome 
b u t France's recently successful violation of EC law in banning UK lamb 
im ports m ade this a more reasonable possibility than it otherwise w ould 
have been. At the same time, playing tough had the advantage of allowing 
the Conservatives to present themselves as the nationalist defender of UK 
interests w ithin the Community and remove Labour's possible charge of
pro-Europeanism.39
2.4: HOW CLOSE TO ENTRY?
By the sum m er of 1981 the governm ent was displaying a new attitude 
tow ards the exchange rate and ERM membership resurfaced as an issue 
w ithin the core executive. The first sign of an economic U-turn came in the 
previous year w hen in November 1980 the governm ent cut interest rates 
from 16 to 14 per cent despite the fact that £M3 was rising rapidly. The cut 
came after the CBI prom ised the governm ent a 'bare knuckle fight' over 
sterling 's appreciation and ICI announced a third-quarter loss. It was a 
recognition that the strength of sterling was badly dam aging industrial 
competitiveness and deepening the recession. The governm ent proceeded 
to commission the Swiss economist Jurg Niehans to investigate the cause of 
sterling's appreciation. He concluded that sterling's rise was largely due to 
excessively high interest rates and that sterling's status as a petro-currency 
was responsible for only 20 per cent of the appreciation. If monetary policy 
was too tight, then the strict pursuit of the £M3 targets was the problem.40
The Niehans Report inspired the 1981 budget. The budget combined 
cuts in public expenditure and an increase in  income tax w ith a 2 per cent 
cut in  interest rates to 12 per cent. The aim was to use m onetary policy to 
bring sterling dow n to stimulating growth and switching the emphasis of
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counter-inflationary strategy to fiscal policy. The government now accepted 
that the exchange rate did matter as a determinant of economic policy and 
sterling began to fall.41
By the sum m er of 1981, the government believed that sterling was 
falling too steeply, reacting not only to the lower level of UK interest rates 
bu t to the strength of the dollar. As a result, rising inflation seemed likely. 
The Bank of England intervened unsuccessfully to protect sterling. On 16 
September, the government raised interest rates from 12 to 14 per cent and, 
then  on 1 October by a further 2 per cent despite the risk of producing a 
secondary recession. As sterling stabilised, the governm ent then reversed 
the increases in four half a per cent stages betw een 14 October and 22 
January.42
Henceforth, it was evident that despite its claims to the contrary, the 
governm ent was using a fairly narrow  exchange rate target rather than a 
£M3 target as the basis of its m onetary policy. Between October 1981 and 
October 1982, sterling averaged 88 to 92 on its effective index against other 
currencies and changes in interest rates clearly occurred w ithin the context 
of sterling's performance. The government's attitude w as determ ined both 
by its acceptance that exchange rate policy was im portant and its failure to 
ru n  a successful policy around £M3. The money supply targets were never 
achieved, and by the end of 1981 the government could no longer offer the 
distorting effects of the corset abolition and the civil service strike as credible 
excuses. A lthough the governm ent examined other possible m onetary 
targets such as money GDP (GDP in current prices) and MO (cash plus banks 
deposits w ith  the Bank of England) as different m ethods of m onetary 
control, it did not elevate them to the status previously held by  £M3. The 
governm ent's experiment w ith strict monetarism was o v e r .43
ERM m em bership w as now  m uch m ore com patible w ith  the 
governm ent's apparent economic objectives. First, and most fundam entally, 
the governm ent was com m itted to the general aim  of exchange rate 
stability. Whilst the government was pursuing an exchange rate target based 
on sterling's effective index (which included its performance against non-
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ERM currencies), ERM membership would not have required a significant 
shift in  policy. Second, the governm ent accepted in the 1981 budget that 
m onetary and fiscal policy could be used for different purposes. In assigning 
the form er to the exchange rate and the latter to controlling domestic 
expansion, it assigned them  in the way m ost com patible w ith  ERM 
membership. Third, in the autum n of 1981 sterling was falling against the 
dollar in the same way as the ERM currencies and the UK governm ent 
responded in a similar way to the ERM states. Rather than the UK having 
singular interests as a petro-currency state, the new situation revealed 
certain shared interests between the UK and the ERM states.
A t the same tim e, ERM m em bership offered the governm ent 
positive benefits in achieving its objectives if the UK had joined. Sterling 
should have become established as a strong ERM currency because of the 
im portance of balance of paym ent d ifferentials w ith in  the system . 
Membership was likely to mean that sterling could be defended at a chosen 
rate w ith  lower interest rates and w ith reserve intervention by the Bank 
supported by other ERM states.
Support for Industry
In  term s of accum ulation  p rio rities , the governm en t w as now  
dem onstra ting  a m ore positive and in terven tion ist stance tow ards 
m anufacturing industry. In m aking its U-Turn in economic policy, the 
governm ent was at least partly motivated by a desire to alleviate the effects 
of sterling's appreciation in worsening m anufacturing competitiveness. In 
the first quarter of 1981, the government gave financial assistance to British 
Leyland (BL) and International Com puters Lim ited (ICL) respectively. 
W hen Patrick Jenkin took over from Keith Joseph at the D epartm ent of 
Trade and Industry  (DTI) in September 1981, he developed a positive 
industrial policy w ithout ever nam ing it as such. It involved actively 
prom oting rationalisation and re-industrialisation in declining industries, 
help for small firms w ith loans, and support for innovation in sunrise high 
technology industries such as fibre optics and telecommunications.44
By the second half of 1981 ERM m em bership offered potential
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\benefits to most of manufacturing industry. If membership could deliver a 
m easure of exchange rate stability and lower interest rates, m anufacturing 
industry  stood to benefit. At the beginning of October, sterling was lower 
than  at any time since the government came to office. Whilst the chemical 
industry , for exam ple, w anted sterling to go low er, there w as some 
consensus in industry  that the exchange rate was tolerable. Even if 
industrialists did w ant a lower rate, the governm ent was not prepared to 
allow sterling to fall (at least in the short term) and m em bership w ould 
have reduced the risk of a new appreciation in sterling. Nevertheless, the 
CBI remained opposed to UK entry to ERM.
EC Presidency
In July 1981 the UK assumed the Presidency of the European Community. 
At the same time, UK electoral politics was being transformed by the rise of 
the Alliance. The governm ent now faced two opposition parties; one 
strongly committed to the EC at the same time as public opinion seemed to 
be shifting back tow ards m aintaining EC m em bership and the o ther 
comm itted to w ithdraw al from the EC which rem ained the majority view 
of the electorate. After securing a tem porary two year agreem ent on its 
European budgetary contributions in May 1980, the governm ent was now 
enm eshed in a further dispute w ith the other m em ber states over UK 
trading practices. Overall, although the government saw the UK Presidency 
of the Com m unity as an opportunity  to create goodwill w ith the other 
m em ber states, it appeared quite content to avoid a final settlement on the 
budget issue so as to strike a nationalist chord w ith the electorate .45
Sterling's depreciation and the desire of the ERM states in  1981 to 
develop the system m eant that the UK's non-m em bership of ERM was a 
m ore salient issue w ithin the Community than in  1979-1980. In June the 
Commission President, Gaston Thorn, publicly called for the UK to enter 
ERM to help strengthen  the EC zone against the dollar. A nother 
commissioner, Christopher Tugendhat made a similar call three m onths 
later. More im portantly, the other member states were now displaying a 
new interest in UK entry. In September, Delors reversed previous French
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antagonism on the issue when called on the UK to enter the ERM. A m onth 
later the Bundesbank chief, Karl Otto-Pohl, argued that UK entry w ould 
protect sterling and was necessary for the system to develop. If the UK 
governm ent w ished to make an active effort to resolve its EC budgetary  
contributions, then there were considerable incentives for the UK to enter 
ERM.
Howe Moves
In June 1981, the influential Financial Secretary, Nigel Lawson, then th ird
m inister in line at the Treasury tried to initiate a new Whitehall debate on
joining ERM. Lawson believed that membership was likely to operate as a
more successful monetary discipline than the discredited m onetary targets.
According to one Treasury official, Lawson's attitude was that if the UK
could not successfully run  m onetary targets as a counter-inflationary
discipline, w hy not let the Bundesbank fight inflation and tie sterling to the
D eutschm ark?46 in  his memoirs, Lawson recalls that on 15 June, he sent a
memo to Howe outlining his case:
I have no doubt that ideally a straightforward m onetary discipline is 
superior. But we are now getting onto that phase, which will become 
increasingly evident as the election approaches, w hen the political 
pressure for relaxation of m onetary discipline will start to m ount. 
This raises the question of whether, in practice, we may not be able to 
m aintain a greater degree of effective financial discipline if w e were 
to embrace the exchange rate discipline, for all its imperfections. ... 
Essentially w hat this would mean is tying the pound to the German 
mark. You will not be surprised to know that I have very mixed 
feelings about the course I have sketched out.4?
In July and August, the press reported that the governm ent was
considering ERM m em bership again. However, at this stage, there is no
evidence that Lawson's views were having a significant im pact on either
Howe or his senior officials. On 14 September Lawson joined the Cabinet as
Secretary of State for Energy and was removed from the policy debate.48 He
left a final memo to Howe on the subject:
[We are] receiving increasing evidence of the weakness of £M3 as a 
reliable proxy for underlying m onetary conditions, w ithou t any 
greater confidence being able to be attached to any of the other
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m onetary aggregates. This clearly strengthens the case for m oving 
over to an exchange rate d iscip lined
Howe appeared to remain unconvinced, claiming to the press that sterling's
depreciation did not alter its petro-currency status and that the other ERM
states did not wish the UK to jo in .5 0
The reconsideration of policy was given its real im petus by the
increase in interest rates on 16 September and 1 October to protect sterling
and there is some evidence that Howe's position on ERM began to shift at
this time. In his memoirs, Lawson suggests that no-one else at the Treasury,
Howe or the officials, took up the case for ERM after he left. According to
Lawson, Howe did not become a full supporter of ERM mem bership until
he became Foreign Secretary. Similarly, Thatcher states in her memoirs that
H ow e w as still opposed to m em bership in au tum n 1981. Yet if Howe
continued to oppose m em bership, it begs the question of w hy ERM
membership remained on the agenda after Lawson's departure to Energy. 51
One official personally close to Howe commented:
It was the overvaluation of the pound in 1980 and 1981 and Geoffrey 
H ow e's experiences outside the E R M , w hen he had to pu t interest 
rates from  12 per cent, in  the au tum n just before the party  
conference, to 16 per cent in order to protect the pound as the pound 
had  started to decline. [Why they w anted to do that I don 't know 
because the pound was still far too high.] It was that that convinced 
him  that stability of exchange rates was an aim that w as w orth  
pursuing in the E R M .52
In his only public pronouncem ent on the issue, Howe told the House of
Commons on 11 November:
The EMS question  is a serious one w hich  deserves careful 
consideration. Difficult questions are involved. As we have one of 
the major international currencies and because of our self-sufficiency 
in oil, the effects of world events on sterling tend to be diametrically 
opposite to their effects on other EMS currencies. How ever, w ith  
some prospect of increased stability in the price of oil, it is right that 
the question should be kept under constant review.
... One other message is clear. W hether sterling is pegged to some 
other currency or currencies, or w hether we sim ply continue to 
regard the exchange rate as one of the factors to be taken into account 
in the conduct of monetary policy, if we try to borrow too m uch we
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cannot avoid putting up interest rates.53
The extent to which the Perm anent Secretary at the Treasury, Sir 
Douglas Wass shared in the development of How e's views is difficult to 
assess. Certainly, some time before he retired at the start of 1983 he dropped 
his earlier opposition to membership without becoming an active supporter 
of ERM entry. He came to believe that the system  was durable, the 
provisions for realignm ents w ere being used, and  that w ithou t strict 
m onetary targets, UK policy was no longer fundam entally incom patible 
w ith  ERM m em bership. However, this changed situation did not make 
entry imperative. According to one Treasury official Wass did not believe 
'we were losing much by not being in.'5*
M eanw hile, the other two m ost senior Treasury officials, Sir 
K enneth C ouzens and  the Chief Economic A dviser, Terence Burns 
rem ained firmly opposed to membership as did lower level policy staff. The 
Treasury 's overseas finance division which was m ost directly concerned 
w ith the issue, maintained a comprehensive critique of membership. They 
still believed that sterling was a petro-currency. They judged that the current 
strength of the Deutschmark in ERM w ould produce short-term  instability 
and make it costly for the UK to tie sterling to the Bundesbank's m onetary 
policy. They considered that at some stage a further depreciation in sterling 
was necessary to assist competitiveness, and this devaluation could be better 
achieved outside ERM. In addition, they were sceptical of the Bank of 
England's ability to intervene effectively on the scale required to m aintain 
an ERM parity. Finally they believed that the government could successfully 
pursue exchange rate stability whilst avoiding the inflexibility of setting 
another public target which could become a hostage to fortune.55
At the same time, it is clear that the Treasury did not w ant to publicly 
adm it that a policy compatible w ith ERM membership was already being 
pursued. The Bank of England was not allowed in  its press releases on 
changes to interest rates to even mention the exchange rate as a supporting 
reason for the action.55 Eleven years later one Treasury official declared that
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the policy pursued from autum n 1981 was not centred on the exchange rate
b u t involved 'looking at all the dials' from m onetary aggregates to the
exchange rate.57 Even to itself, the Treasury w as reluctant to adm it the
failure of monetary targeting. In the words of one senior official:
[Even by 1983], I don 't think the exchange rate had become the 
dom inant factor. There was still a great deal of lip service being paid 
to £M3 and the MTFS was still the article of faith.58
Another official commented that the Treasury very m uch wanted to believe
that the m onetary targets w ould come right in the end.5? In combination
w ith  their view that sterling was a currency w ith singular interests, civil
servants consequently did not connect the stable exchange rate policy they
were indeed pursuing w ith ERM membership.
Foreign Office officials still supported ERM entry, particularly given
the UK's Presidency of the EC. However, The Foreign Office rem ained in a
weak position in the debate in two respects. First, by the second half of 1981
Foreign Office officials believed that Thatcher 'tended  to discount Foreign
Office advice completely.'60 In 1980, Thatcher 'resented the feeling she was
being pushed around by the Foreign Office' to settle on Rhodesia and
became guarded in her relations w ith the departm ent.61 In the words of one
Foreign Office official:
There is no doubt that the Foreign Office were a kind of bunch of 
dem ons w ho were trying to sell Britain dow n the river a t all 
occasions and w ith great enthusiasm. She became extremely attached 
to and  respected the advice of individual senior Foreign Office 
people. ... I can think of a whole number of individuals whose advice 
she profoundly respected. I don 't say she took it always. But she 
respected them and liked them and recognised that these were people 
of quality. But once they became submerged in the 'Foreign Office' 
they became highly suspect and basically insidious agents for foreign 
powers.62
Second, whatever the Treasury's doubts about non-membership, the 
Treasury still claimed ERM as its exclusive dom ain and appears to have 
kept the Foreign Office away from its thinking. A Foreign Office official 
commented: 'I never saw any sign that the Treasury or the Prime Minister 
were seriously interested in making a move.'63 The Treasury's attitude fitted
71
in  w ith a long pattern of behaviour. According to one Foreign Office official, 
w hen the UK joined the EC the Treasury considered that nobody outside 
their ranks should have any view on matters affecting the Treasury. Tt was 
always the Treasury which was reluctant to share their thoughts w ith the 
Perm anent Representative at the Foreign Office; that was still persisting in 
the early 1980s.'64 W ithout an effective inside briefing on UK economic 
policy, both the Foreign Office and the UK's Perm anent Office in Brussels 
w ere in a weak position to make a joint European and economic policy 
argum ent for ERM entry.
Neither was the Foreign Office in a position to make a strong alliance 
w ith  Richardson and his supporters at the Bank. The Foreign Office's 
relations w ith the Bank on such issues were very informal. In the words of 
one official, 'the Treasury regarded the Bank as their usurer.'65 As a result, 
the Foreign Office believed that there was little chance of successfully 
pressing their case and were now pre-occupied w ith finding a solution to 
the EC Budget issue in isolation from other problems:
[Our attitude was] let's not waste too m uch time trying to persuade
the Treasury and the Prime Minister that we ought to be in this thing.
Let's go on with the [EC] budget and leave it till later.66
Outside the core executive, sections of the Conservative Party began 
to p u t pressure on the governm ent to enter ERM. In July, Conservative 
Euro-MPs called for membership. After the Cabinet reshuffle of 1981, two of 
the ministers sacked, Ian Gilmour and Lord Soames came out in favour of 
entry. Gilmour argued for m em bership as part of a general package of 
reflation and Soames that entry was necessary to provide industry  w ith 
exchange rate  stability  and to provide discipline in  the  econom y. 
Meanwhile, Edward H eath called for the UK to enter the ERM so that a 
fortress could be built around EC money and capital markets to prevent vast 
capital outflows to the United States.67
By December, a certain m om entum  appeared  to be developing 
towards membership. On 7 December, the Financial Times reported that the 
Cabinet was 'inching towards membership in the Spring' although the final
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decision was yet to be made. A senior m inister previously opposed to 
m em bersh ip  to ld  the Financial Times th a t m em bership  w as now  
"probable/68 According to one policy-maker, at the beginning of 1982, the 
core executive was working to a date for entry which the governm ent got 
w ithin ten days of reaching.69 
Thatcher slams the door
W hatever provisional decisions were made, presum ably by Howe, on 22 
January  1982 Thatcher held a full Prim e M inisterial m eeting  on 
membership. Having m inuted Thatcher on the issue through the autum n, 
A lan W alters, the Prim e M inister's personal economic adviser, now  
prepared  Thatcher's brief for the meeting. W alters was well know n as a 
fierce opponent of pegged exchange rates in general and of ERM in 
particular. His brief attacked the system on several grounds. ERM produced 
overvaluation of its currencies. It depended on undemocratic leadership by 
the Bundesbank. It required exchange controls to work. In addition, it was 
inflationary because Germany was allowed to spread its inflationary costs, 
and high inflation states ended up  w ith lower real interest rates than low 
inflation states.70
The meeting itself was attended by Thatcher, Howe, Lord Carrington,
Douglas W ass, A lan W alters, G ordon Richardson and his deputy , Kit
MacMahon. By common consent among those w ho have comm ented on
the meeting, Richardson and MacMahon expressed strong support for ERM
entry. They believed that stability for sterling was im portant in itself and
that the ERM provided the best framework for using the exchange rate as a
m onetary discipline.71 However, despite the Foreign Office's position Lord
Carrington's did not offer them support. According to one source:
I think that the Foreign Office was pretty keen. I'm  not sure that Peter 
Carrington was keen. The Foreign Office was claiming that if we 
joinedthe ERM, the budget issue would be resolved. ... W e'd find that 
the French and Germans were m uch more amenable to all Britain's 
suggestions and so on, a big list of w onderful results. I rem ember 
Peter Carrington said: 'A nd that's w hat my advisers tell me, bu t I 
don 't believe a word of it.' 72
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Geoffrey Howe's contribution to the meeting is a m atter of dispute.
According to Lawson, who admits that he did not know of the m eeting
until some time afterwards, Howe did not argue for membership:
At the [January] 1982 meeting, he could see the attraction bu t was 
worried that the ERM might conflict w ith domestic monetary policy. 
He also sym pathised w ith  industry 's  view  that the prevailing  
exchange rate [of around DM4.30] was too high a level at w hich to 
join. His m ost percipient objection [from the view point of the 
committed European he always was] was that people might be turned 
off the whole EC ideal if the ERM were, rightly or wrongly, held 
responsible for high British interest rates.73
Similarly, Thatcher states that Howe believed that the time was still 
no t right for m em bership. 74 However, at least one participant in the 
meeting stated that to the contrary, Howe argued the case for entry w ith 
'm o d est en th u s iasm .'73 This recollection fits w ith  the suggestion that 
How e's views on ERM began to change in the autum n of 1981 and that 
some initial provisional Treasury decision about m em bership was taken 
before the meeting. Another interviewee recalled that after Thatcher left 
office she told him that Howe had 'started hankering after mem bership as 
early as 1982.'76
W hatever the na tu re  of H ow e's advice, Thatcher rem ained
im placably opposed  to m em bership. According to Lawson, Thatcher
sum m ed up by declaring that she was not convinced of the advantages of
ERM, did not w ant to lose the existing 'freedom of m anoeuvre' and that the
case would be stronger once UK inflation and interest rates were closer to
German level.77 One participant commented that 'She destroyed the Bank's
case.'78 In the words of another:
She really slammed the door seven or eight times. The argum ents 
were very m uch in her m ind as to w hy we should not join. ... The 
door was slammed and that was it.79
Thatcher herself comments:
I said that I was not convinced that there would be solid advantage in 
joining the ERM. I did not believe that in practice it w ould provide 
an effective discipline on our economic m anagem ent. Rather, it 
removed our freedom of manoeuvre. I accepted, however, that w hen
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our inflation and interest rates moved m uch closer to those of West 
Germany the case for joining would be more powerful. For the time 
being, we w ould maintain our existing position on the issue.80
Thatcher's opposition to membership can perhaps best be understood 
in  term s of the particular economic electoral benefits w hich continuing 
non-m em bership offered. First, membership w ould have constituted a very 
public repudiation of the previous £M3 policy and Thatcher w anted to be 
seen as the resolute leader w ho was 'no t for tu rn ing .' A lthough the 
governm ent was already pursuing an exchange rate policy, neither Thatcher 
nor the Treasury had any interest in proclaiming the fact given the political 
significance attached to the M edium  Term Financial Strategy. This 
governm ent was supposed to be distinguished from previous governments 
by  its willingness to stick to an articulated economic p lan w hatever the 
short term  cost not by its U-Turns. So, in these terms, a disguised exchange 
rate target was more beneficial than ERM membership.
Second, Thatcher's claim for freedom of m anoeuvre outside ERM 
m ade some sense in terms of the government's electoral position. A utum n 
1981 represented the lowest point in the governm ent's political fortunes 
betw een 1979 and 1983. On the economic front, the rise in interest rates 
risked a secondary recession, inflation was pred icted  to rise again, 
unem ploym ent was heading towards the three million m ark and the PSBR 
was way above target for the year. Correspondingly, between September and 
December 1981, there was a steep fall in the governm ent's already weak 
position in the opinion polls culminating in a Conservative poll nadir of 
less than 20 per cent in December. During this period the governm ent also 
lost tw o by-elections in  C roydon and Crosby to the A lliance, and  
com m entators concluded that the governm ent w as heading for a huge 
electoral defeat. By the time, Thatcher decided not to enter the ERM, the 
governm ent was recovering some ground but still stood below 25 per cent 
in the opinion polls.81
In try ing  to reverse the situation  and w in  the election, the 
governm ent faced conflicting imperatives. On the one hand, it needed to
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reduce inflation since its credibility w as fundam entally tied to inflation 
rather than unem ploym ent (which the governm ent successfully blam ed on 
external forces.) On the other hand, ministers w anted to stim ulate some 
kind of recovery through manufacturing industry w ith tangible benefits for 
voters. The crucial question was w hether the governm ent could afford to 
tighten fiscal policy again if inflation was to rise given the need for an 
economic upturn. If the government was not prepared to raise taxes or cut 
expenditure, then some other policy instrum ent w ould have to be assigned 
to the task. W ith an incomes policy and credit controls already repudiated. 
ERM m embership w ould have cost the government the opportunity to use 
an appreciation in sterling as a deflationary policy weapon. By contrast, non­
m em bership left the government w ith the discretion if they w ished to use 
in te res t rates for counter-in fla tionary  pu rposes w ith in  th e ir ow n 
com m itm ent to an  exchange rate  policy. A t the sam e tim e, n o n ­
m em bership offered the governm ent the opportun ity  of devalu ing  to 
recapture competitiveness and stimulate the economy once inflation was 
under control. Outside ERM, the governm ent possessed the freedom  to 
allow sterling to appreciate w hen necessary for its ow n purposes w ithout 
obligations to others.
ERM as a Non-Issue
In practice, the government did not need the counter-inflationary discretion 
which non-membership offered because inflation began to fall. From 12 per 
cent in January 1982, it fell to 4.5 per cent by the end of the year. This decline 
was due to the lagged effect of the government's deflationary policy in 1979- 
1981 and a fall in w orld commodity prices. Consequently, the governm ent 
was able to pursue its effective exchange rate target for sterling and to 
significantly reduce interest rates w ithout having to pursue restrictive 
policies elsewhere. Indeed, the bias of the governm ent's policy w as now 
firmly expansionary. In July 1982, it abolished hire purchase controls which 
boosted consum er spending. Then, in the 1982 A utum n Statem ent, the 
governm ent exhorted local authorities and nationalised industries to meet 
their capital spending targets.82
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In  Novem ber w ith  inflation falling, the Chancellor in itia ted  an 
internal debate about whether there was scope for a devaluation in  sterling 
to boost competitiveness. Despite the economic stimulus provided through 
1982, the governm ent did not believe that sufficient recovery w as taking 
place w ith  dem and rising faster than  output. The A utum n Statem ent 
forecast a zero balance of payments surplus at the existing exchange rate in 
1983 despite the huge positive contribution of oil. However, w hen  the 
exchange markets learned of the debate, sterling fell steeply. The Bank of 
England quickly spent 10 per cent of the UK's foreign exchange reserves in 
intervention but it was not sufficient to protect sterling. The governm ent 
was unw illing to countenance a further devaluation in this w ay and the 
Chancellor raised interest rates by 1 per cent on 26 November and a further 
1 per cent on 12 January. 83
In deciding against the devaluation option, the governm ent chose 
not to use part of the freedorq of manoeuvre which non-m em bership gave 
them. By continuing to pursue a stable exchange rate policy backed by 
m onetary policy, the governm ent em braced the costs of m em bership, 
nam ely a m anaged higher rate for sterling, and  the costs of non ­
membership in a unilateral loss of the reserves and probably higher interest 
rates. However, the costs of non-membership in these circumstances were 
not great enough to force a re-examination of the ERM issue. Following the 
Falklands victory in June 1982, the governm ent was now in a strong 
position in  the polls and planning an election in  1983 so there w as no 
incentive to make any major policy changes. 84
Nor did the government face an imperative from its European policy 
to re-examine ERM at the end of 1982. The governm ent's EC relations 
reached a nadir in May 1982 w hen the other member states overrode the 
UK's veto on farm price increases, the first failure of a national veto since 
the 1965 Luxembourg Compromise. Afterwards, the governm ent looked to 
repair relations, w ithout reaching a deal on the budget or reconsidering 
ERM m em bersh ip . A lthough  the E uropean  C om m ission  becam e 
increasingly exasperated by the UK's non-membership, the other m em ber
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states did not exert the kind of pressure on the governm ent to enter ERM
which they did towards the end of 1981.85
Conclusions
In 1979 and 1980, the Conservative government had some incentive to re­
examine the UK's non-m em bership of ERM to further its objectives in 
European policy. However, during this period, ERM m em bership w ould 
have p u t paid to the governm ent's economic strategy. At the same time, 
non-membership did not impose any costs on the governm ent in  terms of 
its relations w ith the capital groups it wished to support. By June 1983, the 
governm ent was left w ith an economic policy which it could have pursued 
inside ERM bu t at Thatcher's insistence was now pursuing it alone in 
tandem  w ith an isolationist EC policy.
Despite non-entry, the terms of the new core-executive debate on 
ERM mem bership as macro-economic policy w hich emerged betw een 1979 
and 1983 were highly significant. The debate centred around the question of 
whether m onetary targets or exchange rate stability were the best means of 
using monetary policy as a counter-inflationary discipline. It was the failure 
of the former policy in the form of the MTFS which underlay the position 
of both those who opposed and supported membership. The opponents of 
ERM were in part simply unwilling to adm it or accept the failure of the 
MTFS as term inal. M eanwhile, ERM supporters either never really 
believed in the MTFS (Gordon Richardson and other Bank of England 
officials); or they believed that after the failure of m onetary targeting, ERM 
m em bership represented  an alternative counter-inflationary monetary  
fram ework (Lawson and Howe). Lawson, for example, conceived of ERM 
m em bership as m eans of pursu ing  exchange rate stability th rough  a 
disciplined interest rate policy to reduce inflation. Similarly, Richardson 
argued at the Prime Ministerial meeting in January 1982 that ERM w ould be 
beneficial in stopping sterling from depreciating and inflation from rising. 
These actors judged the advantages of UK entry to ERM as if sterling would 
enter either a relatively fixed rate system or at least UK m onetary policy 
w ould be operated as if this were the case ignoring the ERM's flexibility.
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They believed that w hat monetary targets could not deliver as a counter- 
inflationary m onetary discipline, could be achieved through exchange rate 
stability and ERM membership. This view stood in direct contrast to the 
more flexible benefits that ERM membership actually offered currencies at 
this time.
Despite the prospect of a new Conservative term  in office and the 
possibility that offered for policy renewal, it appeared likely that the core 
executive ERM debate w ould remain w ithin the terms of reference induced 
by the MTFS. By June 1983, senior officials uncomm itted to the MTFS had 
either left their post or were soon to depart. They were replaced w ith people 
for w hom  the MTFS represented a greater personal investm ent. At the 
Treasury, Douglas Wass retired in April 1983 and Peter M iddleton took over 
as Permanent Secretary. Wass was always sceptical about the m oney supply 
policy w hereas M iddleton  w as consum m ately  invo lved  w ith  the 
developm ent of the MTFS, despite his more junior position at the time. 
Indeed, Thatcher supported  M iddleton 's prom otion  over m ore likely 
candidates precisely because of the commitment he showed to the MTFS. At 
the Bank, Thatcher did not renew Gordon Richardson's term  as Governor 
of the Bank of England. She was angry at his apparent failure to achieve the 
MTFS m onetary targets and w anted a more like-minded Governor. In July 
1983 Robin Leigh-Pemberton took over at the Bank. Although he supported 
ERM entry in his previous position as Chairm an of National W estminster 
Bank, his lack of central banking experience meant that at least in the short 
term  he w as unlikely to either challenge Thatcher or the intellectual 
assumptions of the Treasury. As a result, the way was open for a return  to 
some form of m onetary targets policy. If that w ere to fail, then ERM 
membership was likely to be re-discussed as an alternative w ithin the same 
terms as in 1981 and 1982.
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CHAPTER 3
THE STERLING CRISIS AND THATCHER'S VETO
This chap ter exam ines the developm ent of policy from  the 
Conservative party 's June 1983 election victory to the end of 1985. The 
crucial developments on ERM membership in this period took place after a 
sterling crisis in January 1985. To understand these developments, it is first 
necessary to consider both the operation of the ERM itself (3.1) and the 
governm ent's macro-economic policy and the views on ERM m em bership 
in the core executive prior to the sterling crisis (3.2).
3.1 A COUNTER-INFLATIONARY ERM 
Between M arch 1983 and June 1985, there were no realignments of ERM 
currencies. Indeed, by 1985 the ERM was akin to a relatively fixed exchange 
rate system after operating more as a 'dirty float' between 1979 and 1983. In 
July 1985, the lira was devalued bu t the devaluation was not interpreted as 
a sign of weakness in the new order. Although the realignm ent coincided 
w ith  a bout of dollar weakness which was previously the achilles heel of 
the system, the adjustment was actually caused by the pressure of the Italian 
budge t deficit on the lira. At the same time, there were none of the 
acrim on ious d isp u tes  over the term s of the d ev a lu a tio n  w hich  
characterised previous realignments.1
The ERM now  contained a counter-inflationary bias, bo th  in 
m onetary and fiscal terms. In m onetary terms, the bias operated through 
G erm an leadership  of the system. Rather than  the relatively neutra l 
divergent indicator demonstrating currencies position within the exchange 
grid, the Deutschm ark was now the anchor currency of the system. The 
Bundesbank set its monetary policy to fit its counter-inflationary objectives 
and the other ERM states adjusted their monetary policy accordingly. A rise 
in German interest rates usually meant that the other states w ould also raise 
their rates so as to m aintain a prem ium  over German rates, and w ith it the 
parity  of their currencies against the Deutschmark. Similarly, in terms of 
in terven tion  by central banks, the em phasis shifted from  obligatory
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in terven tion  in the fluctuations m argins signalled by the d ivergen t 
ind icator to 'in tra-m arg inal7 intervention in  D eutschm arks. By in tra ­
m arginal intervention, states aimed to act before currencies came under so 
m uch pressure in the fluctuation margins that speculators possessed a one 
w ay option on the direction of a currency's future movement. 2
In fiscal terms, the member states were now prepared use restrictive 
fiscal policies to defend parities, rather than resort to devaluation w hen 
those parities came under pressure. As early as 1981, Italy and Ireland started 
to make more rigorous efforts to reduce their budget deficits and allowed 
their currencies to appreciate in real terms to reduce inflation. Then in 
M arch 1983 the French socialist governm ent abandoned its efforts at 
unilateral expansion and em barked on a policy of fiscal adjustm ent to 
reduce inflation.
The socialist governm ent came into pow er in 1981 com m itted to 
reducing unem ploym ent by increasing public expenditure. However, w ith 
its competitors reducing dem and to combat inflation, France soon faced a 
m assive balance of paym ents crisis which p u t pressure on the franc. 
Devaluation in October 1981 and June 1982 accompanied by some m ild 
defla tionary  m easures failed to avert the pressure. By M arch 1983, 
M itterrand faced the choice of withdrawing from ERM and pursuing a neo­
protectionist policy, or retaining m em bership and acceding to Germ an 
dem ands for further and drastic public expenditure cuts. Despite internal 
opposition, M itterrand chose the latter option. The franc was devalued by
2.5 per cent and the Deutschmark revalued by 5.5 per cent and the France 
drew up a fiscal austerity plan to reduce inflation.3
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Figure 3.1: Comparative Inflation Differentials with 
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As figure 3.1 indicates, the new deflationary bias in policy produced a 
gradual convergence in inflation among the ERM states towards German 
levels. Whereas in 1980, German inflation was 5.8 per cent compared to an 
EC average of 12.9 per cent, in 1985, German inflation was 2.1 per cent 
compared to an EC rate of 4.3 per cent. Overall, the ERM states were gaining 
a new long term credibility in the counter-inflationary process through their 
individual and collective unwillingness to accommodate inflationary 
pressure through devaluation.
3.2: A SLEEPING ISSUE 
After the 1983 general election, Geoffrey Howe went to the Foreign Office 
and Nigel Lawson became Chancellor of the Exchequer. On taking office, 
Lawson quickly initiated a Treasury review of m onetary policy in
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collaboration w ith the Bank of England. As part of the review, Sir Geoffrey 
Littler, the new Second Permanent Secretary and Head of Overseas Finance, 
w rote a paper assessing the value of ERM m em bership as a m onetary 
fram ew ork . He argued  tha t France w as dem onstra ting  th a t ERM 
m em bership could bring considerable benefits. The UK should look to join 
the ERM in 1984 on the conditions that the oil m arket rem ained stable, the 
UK and German economies continued to converge, progress was m ade on 
the negotiations on the EC budget, and that the dollar fell against the 
Deutschm ark. However, neither Lawson nor M iddleton and Burns were 
interested in Littler's proposal. Certainly, Littler was not typical of other 
senior Treasury officials. He long considered him self a European in  a 
departm ent in w hich such a conviction was rare and he had  a strong 
background on the international side of policy.4
By contrast, M iddleton and Burns had little experience of European 
finance m inisters meetings. Along w ith Lawson, they were steeped in the 
intellectual culture of domestic monetary policy and the MTFS. All three 
used the policy review to try and find an operational framework for another 
m oney supply policy, rather than as a means of developing the implicit 
exchange rate policy which the governm ent operated betw een 1981 and
1983.5
The Bank of England played a minimal role in the policy review. The 
Bank w as in a period of transition since Leigh-Pemberton was new  to 
central banking. Kit MacMahon, the Deputy Governor, was in  effective 
charge at Threadneedle Street but he had poor relations w ith  Lawson. 
Consequently, w hilst both Leigh-Pemberton and  M acM ahon favoured  
membership, neither were in a position to lend support to Littler's proposal. 
6
After rejecting ERM m embership, the problem  for Lawson w as to 
decide upon which money aggregate to target in the wake of the previous 
failure of £M3. After a debate on the respective m erits of £M3, MO, M2, 
(money available for transaction purposes) Non-Interest Bearing M l (cash 
plus non-interest bearing deposits withdrawable on demand) and M onetary
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Base Control (targeting banks' reserves w ith the Bank of England), Lawson
tentatively  concluded that MO 'could have a m ore im portan t p a rt in
m onitoring m onetary conditions.' In the 1984 budget, Lawson announced
five year m onetary targets for both £M3 and MO as part of his effort to
rekindle m onetarism .7
In practice, from July 1983 to the end of 1984, the government did not
consistently run  m onetary policy according to the m onetary targets any
m ore than  betw een 1981 and 1983. In the year from  June 1983, the
governm ent reduced interest rates and allowed sterling to depreciate. W hen
sterling began to slide more rapidly against the dollar towards $1.30 in July
1984, Lawson raised interest rates twice. Such action suggested that the
governm ent was keen to loosen m onetary policy to try  and stim ulate
growth but that it was also not prepared to ignore the exchange rate.8
After July 1984, the government changed to a policy of benign neglect.
W hen sterling fell below $1.20 in November, the governm ent cut interest
rates to 9.5 per cent. It appears that the cut was driven neither by the
perform ance of MO nor by the exchange rate b u t the desire bo th  to
stim ulate an economy threatened by the miners strike and to create an
environm ent conducive to the success of the British Telecom share issu e .9
By the end of 1984, the financial markets were unwilling to attach
m uch credence to the MO target and the governm ent was unw illing to
exclude other considerations from m onetary policy. Yet Lawson and the
Treasury were not prepared to admit the failure.10 In October 1984 Lawson
declared in his Mansion House Speech:
It is the monetary aggregates that are of central relevance in judging 
m onetary conditions and determining interest rates. That has always 
been our policy and remains so. We take the exchange rate into 
account w hen its behaviour suggests that the dom estic m onetary 
indicators are giving a false reading, which they are not. Provided 
m onetary  conditions are kep t under firm  control, excessive 
m ovem ents w hether in  money or exchange m arkets in  response to 
outside influences, will tend to correct themselves relatively quickly, 
n
However, as Lawson himself admits:
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This line was a fiction even w hen I uttered it, as the exchange rate 
played a much larger part in policy than I was prepared to adm it in 
public. But there was genuine difficulty about any alternative 
presentation. ... The idea of giving weight to the exchange rate as a 
factor in monetary policy decisions, but not having an exchange rate 
target, was extremely hard to pu t across.12
Yet any suggestion that the exchange rate was the determ inant factor in 
m onetary policy was also a fiction in view of the loosening of policy at the 
end of 1984. M onetary policy and its presentation w ere ridd led  w ith 
inconsistency.
The government's aim in fiscal policy in 1983-1984 was to reduce both 
the PSBR and income tax w ithout cuts in public expenditure, combined 
objectives m ade possible due to the additional revenue created by the 
privatisation programme. In the 1984 autum n statement, Lawson declared 
that tax cuts of £1.5 billion should be possible in the 1985 budget and that the 
governm ent's aim was now to 'really get down to the business of reforming 
tax a tio n / In the rem ainder of 1984 Thatcher and Lawson used every 
opportunity  to celebrate the likelihood of even greater tax cuts of £2-3 
billion.13
In sum, by the end of 1984, the governm ent's economic policy was 
totally  incom patible w ith  ERM m em bership. The C hancellor w as not 
pursu ing  exchange rate stability and m onetary policy w as not clearly 
assigned to the exchange rate. The government conceived fiscal measures as 
ends in  them selves, rather than seeing them  in the counter-inflationary 
term s w hich characterised the fiscal polices of the ERM states. And 
acquiesence to the fall in sterling and a relatively loose m onetary policy both 
suggested that the governm ent's m ain priority was not inflation as ERM 
mem bership w ould demand.
ERM Stirrings
H aving found his feet at the Bank of England and  uneasy  w ith  the 
am bivalence of the governm ent's m onetary policy, Leigh-Pem berton 
publicly declared support for ERM membership in late October 1984. In a
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university lecture he cast doubt on the utility of monetary aggregates and
argued that despite 'some technical difficulties' there were 'a  num ber of
attractions' to ERM membership.14
In ad d itio n  to his long-standing  personal judgm ent, Leigh-
Pem berton's views reflected an increasing interest in ERM m em bership in
financial circles. In August 1984 the Lloyds Bank Economic Bulletin argued
that the UK should enter ERM since the fall in  sterling in the previous
m onth could have been avoided inside ERM. In November a prom inent
City broker w ent on the record in favour of ERM entry and a group of City
bankers and economists published a report which highlighted the benefits
of m em bership given that inflation was converging throughout the EC.
They argued that sterling could no longer be considered a petro-currency.15
Leigh-Pemberton's growing willingness to assert himself on ERM
m em bership coincided w ith Lawson and Howe tentatively re-exam ining
the issue for themselves. During the Christmas and New Year break of 1984-
1985, Lawson concluded that ERM m em bership was seriously w orth
considering. In his memoirs, Lawson states that his support for membership
ran in  a continuum from 1981 when he was Financial Secretary to 1985 and
that he d id  not believe that the 'right opportunity ' to persuade Thatcher
arose until 1985.16 However, one of his officials recalled that during the 1983
review of m onetary policy, Lawson was 'rather dispassionate' about ERM.
Only at the very end of 1984 and start of 1985 did he begin 'to  see real
positive m erit' in entry. 17 Indeed, Lawson himself admits that problems in
policy during this period contributed to his support for entry:
I had become increasingly concerned both  w ith  the weakness of 
sterling and w ith  the continuing problems I was having w ith  the 
conduct and presentation of a domestically based monetary policy.18
In 1983 and the first half of 1984, ERM did not surface as an issue of 
EC policy. Despite continued w rangling  over the UK's budge ta ry  
contributions, ERM m em bership w as neither offered by the UK nor 
dem anded by the other states as a means to advance negotiations. The other 
m em ber states led by France and Italy dem anded that the UK should
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acquiesce to a VAT rise as the price of a budget deal. For its part, the UK 
governm ent preferred the threat of non-paym ent of its budget contribution 
to obtain its goal. In June 1984, at Fontainebleau, the EC finally reached a 
settlem ent on the issue w ithout reference to ERM. The C abinet now  
believed that non-paym ent w ould provoke a Conservative back-bench 
rebellion and did not w ant to be left behind as the other states pushed 
forw ard w ith  a new agenda for integration. However, by autum n 1984 
m onetary co-operation was moving to the top of the EC's new agenda as 
some m em ber-states sought new ways to strengthen the EC's economic 
performance in relation to the US and Japan. It was against this background 
in  Novem ber that the European Commission and the Germ an Finance 
M inister called for UK m em bership of ERM to im prove m onetary co­
operation. As a result Howe, already convinced an economic case for ERM 
entry, concluded that if the UK stayed out of ERM, this stance was likely to 
assume a more direct salience in EC affairs in the future.19
In sum, at the start of 1985 the Chancellor, the Foreign Secretary and 
the Governor of Bank of England were all independently giving thought to 
the question of ERM membership. W ithin tw o weeks, a massive sterling 
crisis w ith  very significant implications for the governm ent's economic 
policy fortified their individual conviction and precipitated a new and broad 
debate on ERM w ithin the core executive. To understand that debate, it is 
first necessary to examine the crisis and its implications.
3.3 THE STERLING CRISIS OF 1985 
At the start of 1985, the dollar was rising against all currencies and sterling 
in particular. By the end of the first week of January, sterling was headed 
tow ards $1.15 w ithout a floor in sight. In continuing its policy of benign 
neglect from the autum n, the government decided neither to intervene nor 
to raise interest rates. In public, ministers argued that sterling's fall w as not 
due to its weakness bu t to the strength of the dollar and a fall in the price of
oil. They also claimed that there was no inflationary risk attached to the fall 
since the rise in the price of imports w ould be offset by lower oil prices. On 
the basis of the governm ent's actions and statements and a briefing from
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Bernard Ingham, Thatcher's chief press officer, the Sunday Times ran a story 
on 6 January that Thatcher and Lawson were determ ined to m aintain a 
hands off policy even if sterling fell to 1-1 parity against the d o l la r .20
As a result, sterling fell further. Thatcher and Lawson responded 
angrily. They were indeed practising benign neglect but they did  not w ant 
the m edia to report policy in this way. To avoid a repetition of the story, 
they insisted that all future questions about sterling be referred to the 
Treasury. In fact, neither Thatcher nor Lawson were indifferent to sterling's 
depreciation, bu t they did not w ant to take action to stem it. Rather, they 
hoped  that the publication of good £M3 figures on 8 January w ould  
convince the markets that there was nothing fundam entally w rong w ith  
the UK economy, and that the problem w ould then  go away. However, 
w hen the £M3 figures were published, sterling continued to fall. Still, the 
governm ent took no corrective action and declared that the fall d id  not 
matter. 21
On Thursday 10 January, sterling fell further to $1.13 and lost four 
pfennigs against the Deutschmark despite the price of oil stabilising. Both 
the m arkets and financial comm entators blam ed sterling 's fall on  the 
governm ent's unwillingness to demonstrate that it accepted the importance 
of a floor for sterling as a counter-inflationary discipline. The next morning, 
Lawson discarded benign neglect and raised interest rates by 1 per cent to
11.5 per cent. It was a recognition that monetary policy could not be divorced 
from the exchange rate in the circumstances. Moreover, in view of the fall 
in £M3, the rate increase dem onstrated the irrelevance of the m onetary 
targets as the guiding principle of monetary policy. 22
The new policy was soon underm ined by Bernard Ingham. D uring 
the afternoon of 11 January, Ingham told the lobby that foreign reserves 
w ould not be 'th row n ' at sterling and that no particular rate w as being 
defended. This view was in obvious direct contradiction to the m orning's 
events. Ingham  appeared to assume that having no formal exchange rate 
target, and the continued government resistance to large scale intervention 
on the m arkets were the same as government indifference about sterling.
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W ith the exception of the Observer, the Sunday papers and the BBC all
carried the Ingham line. The Sunday Times led w ith the headline, 'Thatcher
ready to let one pound equal one dollar.' The effect of the interest rate rise
was effectively w iped out and the governm ent's commitment to sterling
again was throw n into disarray. To try and avert the damage, the Treasury
hau led  governm ent inform ation officers ou t of their beds and in to
W hitehall to call around financial journalists to urge them  to ignore the
m orning's newspapers.23
The M onday newspapers reported that the governm ent w ould raise
interest rates again to defend sterling. Ministers hoped that such an explicit
commitment w ould avoid the need to actually raise rates. At the same time,
Lawson ordered the Bank to intervene in  the m arkets on a large scale.
H ow ever, sterling  continued  to fall as the m arkets p u n ish ed  the
governm ent for its apparent indecisiveness. To demonstrate the strength of
the com m itm ent to sterling, Lawson to ld  the Bank to reactivate the
M inimum Lending Rates for the day to raise rates by a further 1.5 per cent.
Lawson himself declared that inflation was now the overriding priority.24
In the House of Commons on 13 January, Lawson w ent on to accept that
confusion and  am biguity  w ith in  the governm ent itself w as partly
responsible for the crisis:
I am  afraid tha t there w as a feeling in  the m arkets tha t the 
governm ent had lost their willingness and ability to control their 
affairs so as to maintain the downward pressure on inflation.25
D uring the rem ainder of the week, sterling steadied. At the same 
time, Thatcher persuaded President Reagan of the need to take some action 
to ho ld  dow n the dollar. O n 17 January, the G5 finance m inisters 
announced an unprecedented agreem ent to act to together to stabilise 
exchange m arkets through intervention where necessary. It was the first 
time that the Reagan administration recognised that the dollar's rise was an 
in te rn a tio n a l problem . H ow ever, in  the fo llow ing w eeks, the US 
adm inistration failed to match its words w ith actions. By contrast, the Bank 
of England joined other European and the Japanese central banks in co­
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ordinated action against the dollar. 26
At home, the governm ent continued to dem onstrate its resolve to 
defend sterling. Thatcher and Lawson respectively declared that sterling was 
'far too low ' and that the dollar 'w as grossly over va lued .'27 However, 
sterling continued to fall. On 28 January, after oil prices weakened and 
speculation against sterling increased, the government raised interest rates a 
further 2 per cent to 14 per cent. Lawson declared that speculation against 
sterling 'was greatly overdone' bu t the government would not 'ru n  any risk 
of m isapprehension as to our continuing resolve to conquer inflation/28 
The Costs and Lessons of the Sterling Crisis
The sterling crisis was a defining m oment for the second Conservative 
governm ent because it completely exposed the previous inconsistency in 
both the practice and presentation of monetary policy. In just over a week, 
the governm ent was forced to totally reverse its policy. After rejecting the 
idea of 'throw ing ' money at sterling, the government proceeded to broker 
an  in ternational agreem ent to 'th ro w ' m oney against the dollar. The 
governm ent m oved from  benign neglect tow ards sterling  (and the 
inflationary consequences of sterling's depreciation) to place the exchange 
rate and the reduction of inflation at the centre of its economic strategy. If 
the MTFS was designed as a particular monetary means to reduce inflation 
w hich denied the importance of the exchange rate, then the sterling crisis 
viv idly  dem onstrated that this proposition w as untenable. A counter- 
inflationary framework could not exclude the exchange rate.
After raising interest rates by 4.5 per cent very obviously to defend 
sterling, the government could no longer credibly present m onetary policy 
as determ ined by the m onetary targets. In 1980-1981, the governm ent was 
able to claim that the MTFS was being maintained at the same time that the 
policy w as abandoned to manage sterling dow nw ards. However, in the 
wake of the sterling crisis, no such an option for covering the end of the 
post-1983 MTFS existed. Not only was the exchange rate central to the 
governm ent's m onetary policy bu t it was essential that the governm ent 
publicly present policy in these terms to the financial markets and media.
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The crisis im posed significant political costs on the governm ent. 
First, a t a conservative estim ate, £100 m illion w as lost in  reserve 
in terven tion . 29 Second, the UK was left w ith exceptionally high nom inal 
and real interest rates. Real rates stood at almost ten per cent which was a 
serious blow to the government's efforts to stimulate growth. A lthough the 
dollar rose against all currencies during January, as figure 3.2 indicates only 
the UK government was forced to raise its interest rates. Indeed, France and 
Italy both cut their rates in the same period.30
Figure 3.2: Comparative Prime Lending Rates January-February 1985 
(Prime Lending Rates are UK base rates plus one per cent)
20
1
cwv
CU
10  ■
UK
Germany
H olland
Italy
Belguim
France
19.1.85 26.1.85 2.2.8512.1.855.1.85
(Source: Economist Economic Indicators: January and February 1985)
99
Third, after heralding tax reform and tax cuts of £2-3 billion for the 
1985 budget, Lawson was forced to tell the H ouse of Commons on 15 
January that as a result of the sterling crisis the tax cuts were at risk and 
public expenditure cutbacks might be necessary. The crisis im posed a new 
fiscal constraint on the governm ent. The City w as suspicious that the 
government desire to cut taxes lay behind its benign neglect towards sterling 
because a depreciating pound increased oil revenues (since oil is priced in 
dollars). To maintain its counter-inflationary credibility in  the markets, the 
governm ent needed to renounce the tax-cutting option. A t the same time, 
the increase in interest rates raised the cost of financing the national debt 
and  lim ited the governm ent's room  for fiscal m anoeuvre. The budget 
which Lawson eventually delivered in March 1985 was reduced to a series 
of supply side measures on national insurance and expanding the Youth 
Training Scheme without tax cuts or reforms.31
The lessons of the sterling crisis directly related to the issues which 
ERM sought to address. Primarily, the crisis ram m ed home the fact that no 
UK governm ent could afford for the markets to believe that it d id  not have 
an opinion on the exchange rate. It was not sufficient for the governm ent to 
have a private view on sterling. Rather, to deter excessive speculation it 
was necessary that the exchange markets be able to take for granted the 
governm ent's commitment. At the same time the fiasco w ith  Bernard 
Ingham 's briefings dem onstrated the cost of any am biguity w ith in  the 
governm ent itself. The Prime Minister, Chancellor and their officials and 
the Bank of England needed to speak with one voice on the subject.
In February the benefit of the government's new public commitment 
to an exchange rate policy was well demonstrated. The dollar continued to 
rise against all currencies including sterling. In one week, the dollar rose 3.5 
per cent against other currencies, w ith the Deutschmark taking the brunt. 
On 25 February, the dollar climbed 1.5 per cent and sterling fell to a low of 
$1.03. The Reagan administration appeared content to let the dollar rise and 
did not abide by the G5 agreement. At the end of the month, concerted and 
co-ordinated intervention by European central banks finally succeeded in
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pushing the dollar d o w n .3 2
The significance of the episode was twofold. First, sterling fell to 
lower levels than during the January crisis w ithout the government having 
to raise interest rates further, since the markets now  believed that the 
governm ent was committed to sterling. Second, despite the Deutschm ark 
and other ERM currencies bearing the brunt of the dollar's rise in February, 
their depreciation did not result in the kind of crisis which befell sterling in 
January. The Bundesbank raised its Lombard rates by 0.5 per cent bu t not its 
base rate. Of the other ERM states, only Holland raised its base rates and, 
then, by just 1 per cent. The ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the ERM 
states was not their performance against the perennially volatile dollar. By 
contrast, w ith  sterling falling 6 per cent against the dollar bu t only 1.8 per 
cent against the Deutschm ark, the British governm ent w as severely 
punished for sterling's fall despite the decreasing importance of Atlantic 
trade to the U K .3 3  
Initiation of Policy Review
Inside the core executive, ERM m em bership resurfaced early on in  the
sterling crisis. On 11 January, the day of the first interest rate hike, Lawson
brought up  the issue at an internal Treasury m eeting w ith  his senior
officials and the Economic Secretary, Ian Stewart. In Lawson's view 'the case
for buttressing the pound and firmly dispelling the increasing uncertainty
over m onetary policy was c le a r . '34 Both Stewart and the senior Treasury
officials, w ith  the exception of Littler, rem ained opposed to membership.
One senior official commented:
Nigel Lawson decided he w anted to join for reasons that none of us 
were terribly clear about. It was almost as though having pursued a 
successful policy, he w anted to pursue an unsuccessful one for a 
s p e l l .3 5
The m eeting concluded with an agreement that officials would examine the 
mechanics of ERM membership and make contingency plans to increase the 
foreign exchange reserves. 36
On 28 January Thatcher and Lawson met to discuss the final interest
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rate rise. Thatcher told her Chancellor that she had  discussed the UK's 
currency turbulence w ith  the right-w ing D utch Prim e M inister, R uud 
Lubbers. Lubbers suggested that the guilder was a more stable currency than 
sterling because of its m em bership of the ERM. O n the basis of this 
conversation, Thatcher asked Lawson to exam ine w hether in  p resent 
circumstances, the UK should enter the ERM.37
For Leigh-Pemberton, the sterling crisis added vigour both  to his 
belief tha t the governm ent's m onetary fram ew ork w as confused and 
unsatisfactory and to his support for ERM membership. On 30 January he 
publicly stated that in  his view, sterling m ight be suffering less from 
speculative attacks and would be easier to defend inside ERM. At the same 
time Leigh-Pemberton pressed for a new core executive debate on ERM. 
M eanwhile, on 3 February, in a bilateral meeting w ith  Thatcher, Lawson 
suggested a Prime Ministerial seminar on the issue before the budget, to 
which Thatcher agreed. Lawson discussed the issue again w ith his officials 
on 8 February. He hoped to reach a quick agreem ent in principle, w ith  a 
view to entering ERM in the summer.38
Outside the core executive, various sections of the Conservative party 
drew  a connection between the sterling crisis and ERM membership. On 15 
January H eath m ade the first of several calls for UK entry to help counter 
American dominance. On the same day, H enry Plumb, the leader of the 
Conservative MEPs, declared in the European Parliament that the effects of 
the fall in  sterling w ould be less acute within ERM. He also m ade it clear 
that the Tory MEPs as a group w ould increase their pressure on  the 
governm ent to enter the system. In February, tw enty-four backbench 
Conservative MPs led by Geoffrey Rippon signed a motion in the House of 
Commons calling on the government to enter ERM.39
The Prime Ministerial meeting itself took place on the 13 February 
and w as attended by Thatcher, Lawson and his senior officials, Leigh- 
Pem berton and other Bank officials, Howe and John Redwood as H ead of 
the Prime M inister's Policy Unit. Alan Walters, Thatcher's former economic 
adviser and now in the US, was invited bu t did not attend. Lawson, Howe
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and Pemberton all argued that membership w ould be beneficial. Although 
they believed that immediate entry was not appropriate, they concurred that 
w ithin  a fairly short time, it w ould be right to act. Thatcher showed less 
enthusiasm  for m em bership and was also concerned that the exchange 
reserves were very low in comparison to the ERM states. Nevertheless, she 
agreed that once the reserves were increased, ERM m em bership could be 
reconsidered. 40
The core executive now geared itself up for another review of policy 
w ithin a few months. However, in public, Thatcher and Lawson denied the 
relevance of ERM membership to the sterling crisis. On 30 January, Lawson 
to ld  the H ouse of Commons that ERM m em bership w ould  no t have 
protected sterling. The next day, Thatcher declared that m embership w ould 
not have prevented the interest rate hike and could make no difference to 
sterling 's perform ance against the dollar. According to Thatcher, the 
governm ent had its own financial discipline and did not w ant to forfeit its 
freedom  of action. A m onth later, Thatcher insisted in  the House of 
Commons that the crisis did not justify ERM entry.41 
A Procession for M embership
The governm ent was not alone in reconsidering its attitude tow ards ERM 
m em bership in the wake of the sterling crisis. In the preceding m onths, a 
succession of business groups, economic organisations and  financial 
commentators came out in favour of ERM entry. On 20 February the CBI's 
policy-making body voted for the first time by an overwhelming majority to 
support ERM entry, and strongly recommended m embership in  its annual 
budget submission. The CBI believed that there was both an economic and 
political case for entry. In economic terms, the CBI's members disliked the 
existing level of exchange rate volatility. They invariably pu t exchange rate 
stability as the first item on sensitivity analysis in investm ent projects. 
Although firms were able to hedge against exchange rates in the short term, 
they saw no consolation in this over the long term. 42
The sterling crisis brought the issue of currency volatility to a head 
for industry. Previously, firms valued exchange rate stability bu t believed
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that it could be better achieved outside than inside the ERM. Now, they
believed that the UK was suffering from a uniquely dam aging level of
volatility. One CBI official commented on the sterling crisis:
There was a surprising degree of unanimity, that if we were going to 
set up Britain on a proper basis, if British industry was going to be set 
up satisfactorily, w e'd  got to have something better than this.43
Kenneth Edwards, the Deputy Director General of the CBI told the Treasury
and Civil Service Select Committee:
There has been a m arked change in their [CBI members] views 
recently and they are now strongly in favour of ERM membership. 
This has been based on a particular concern about exchange rate 
volatility for the last twelve months. It is at least arguable that full 
m em bership of the EMS or adoption of a complete exchange rate 
target might have enabled us to avoid the exchange rate crises of July 
1984 and 1985. In the event we had the w orst of both worlds - a 
combination of exchange rate volatility and interest rate volatility - so 
that m ust be seen as the background to the change in thinking.44
At the macro-level, the CBI believed that ERM m em bership could
achieve the convergence of UK inflation tow ards the lowest EC levels
which was necessary for the UK to participate successfully in the EC trading
bloc. If the costs of UK companies went up faster than keeping the exchange
rate in a relatively fixed parity w ould allow, then those companies w ould
lose profits and decline. At the same time, the ERM w ould act as a counter-
inflationary discipline on the government.45 One CBI official said that 'the
CBI had no confidence in  the UK governm ent's ability to m anage our
m onetary affairs.'46 In sum, the CBI believed that ERM mem bership could
cure the UK's inflationary habits.
In political term s, the CBI's m ain concern was that UK business
w ould not reap all the benefits of EC m em bership until the UK was a
member of all its institutions. Kenneth Edwards told the Treasury and Civil
Service Select Committee:
We are desperately concerned that we are m oving to a two-speed 
Europe situation, and there are a num ber of factors to which we can 
draw attention. First of all in regard to broader controls, we tend to be 
excluded from the internal marketing arrangements. In the case of 
standards, there is an agreement between W est Germany and France
104
about the recognition of each others' standards over a particular band. 
There is also the question of the satellite broadcasting sector where 
the Germans and the French are getting together in  the area of 
technical co-operation. We are outside that, as we are sitting outside 
the EMS. We believe that we are in danger of losing the advantage of 
being in the Community and I think that if you look at the experience 
of the large companies, they are very pre-occupied w ith  that
dimension of the problem The EMS is another example of a two-
speed Europe developing.47
The political concern was central to the CBI's case. In Edwards' view:
It may be suggested that the economic arguments for entry into the 
ERM are finely balanced. Certainly, the CBI believes that, at worst, 
there is no economic disadvantage and at best the UK will secure 
significant economic benefits from full m em bership of the EMS. 
How ever, the political argum ents seem to be overw helm ingly in  
favour. Real and significant progress, in areas of major importance to 
UK business, is not only possible but very likely if we join.43
By depreciating the currency, the sterling crisis also opened up  the 
prospect of entry to ERM at a rate at which the CBI considered m ore 
competitive than w hen the organisation previously discussed the issue in 
O ctober 1983. On the day that the CBI announced its su p p o rt for 
m em bership, sterling stood at DM3.62. Certainly, some businesspeople in 
the CBI rem ained doubtful that industry could compete at this ra te .49 
Edwards adm itted to the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee that 
'm any companies would like to see a different parity .'50 Nevertheless, in the 
view of Terence Beckett, the CBI's Director General, 'exchange rate volatility 
w as more serious to industry than the level of rates.51
Throughout 1985, Beckett, in the words of one CBI official, 'thum ped 
the d rum  very hard  about E R M '.52 W ith other CBI officials Beckett 
continually stressed industry 's view that membership was essential at the 
NEDC, at d inners w ith  governm ent m inisters and  in  m eetings w ith  
Conservative MPs. CBI representatives also directly brought up  the issue 
w ith Thatcher and Lawson on several occasions, bu t neither displayed any 
interest in entry on these occasions.53
At the same time the sterling crisis increased support for membership 
in the City. For example, in March Lloyds of London called for entry. It
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argued that sterling's volatility w ith the dollar was causing problems to the 
insurance trade and that ERM membership w ould reduce the volatility. 
Generally, City institutions believed that the sterling crisis dem onstrated an 
absence of counter-inflationary will in the government. They believed that 
politicians should be kept as far away from monetary policy as possible and 
that ERM membership was the best means to discipline governments. City 
institutions did not appear to lobby the government on the issue as m uch as 
the CBI. City interest groups tend to be weak and an organisation such as the 
British Bankers Association, for example, does not seek to organise a 
collective view on an issue like ERM. Rather, the individual institutions 
transm itted their views to the Bank of England to pass on to the T r e a su r y .5 4
The general support expressed in  1985 by bo th  financial and 
m anufactu ring  capital w as m atched by a succession of econom ic 
organisations and financial commentators. In August the National Institute 
of Economic and Social Research said that m em bership w ould provide 
greater financial discipline. The London Chamber of Commerce argued that 
entry was necessary to stabilise sterling and to take full benefit from  EC 
m em bership . In N ovem ber, the London Business School called for 
m em bership to reduce exchange rate volatility. In the same m onth, the 
influential Financial Times commentator, Sam Brittan came out in  favour 
of entry. During the sterling crisis, he scathingly rejected m em bership on 
the grounds that sterling was a volatile petro-currency. He now believed 
that ERM m embership was the only way of injecting some credibility into 
counter-inflationary policy and restraining the Chancellor against fiscal 
expansion.55
The Institute of Directors (IoD) was perhaps the only significant 
economic organisation which did not support m em bership in 1985. John 
H oskyns, the Director-General, believed that the ERM w as 'abso lu te  
nonsense' and that the pursuit of exchange rate stability only induced more 
dam aging instability elsewhere. His view was shared by the IoD's Policy 
Unit, if not its less influential European Advisory Council which tended to 
favour m em bership.56
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However, despite the strength of Hoskyns' views, the IoD's position 
becam e com prom ised. In the sum m er of 1985, Geoffrey Howe asked 
H oskyns if the IoD could w rite him a letter stating  th a t in certain  
circum stances, m em bership m ight make sense. H oskyns agreed as a 
personal favour to Howe. On 30 August the IoD sent Howe its assessment of 
the pros and cons of membership. Howe presented to the media the part of 
the letter w hich m ade the potential case for m em bership and ignored 
Hoskyns' argum ent that membership might be unsustainable and damaging 
to the domestic economy. On 4 September the press reported that Hoskyns 
believed that there were strong financial and political reasons for joining 
and that business would benefit from a more stable currency framework and 
the future development of the ECU. To all intents and purposes, it appeared 
that the IoD was another passenger on the ERM bandw agon against which 
the governm ent's own review of policy took place.57
3.4 THATCHER'S VETO 
The core executive debate on ERM membership precipitated in February 
1985 reached its climax in November of the same year. The ensuing analysis 
sets ou t the im plications of ERM entry at that tim e in term s of the 
governm ent's economic objectives, capital accumulation priorities and EC 
policy. The discussion then traces developments w ithin the core executive 
itself between February and November 1985.
Exchange Rate Stability
In the m onths after the sterling crisis, the governm ent aimed to stabilise 
sterling w hilst reducing interest rates whenever this was possible. By the 
end of July interest rates stood at 11.5 per cent. Thereafter, no further cuts 
were possible. On 22 September the G5 finance m inisters announced the 
Plaza agreement to reduce the value of the dollar by 10 per cent through co­
ordinated intervention. It was the first active commitment by the Reagan 
adm inistration to sustained international intervention. At the same time, it 
institutionalised the UK government's exchange rate commitment. Overall, 
Plaza created a new climate for international exchange rate managem ent. 
One economic commentator asked whether the w orld was indeed m oving
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towards 'a new Bretton W oods'.58
At the end of October Lawson announced the suspension of the £M3 
target for the rest of the financial year. A lthough £M3 was no longer an 
operational guide to policy, it did retain some importance to the markets as 
a symbol of financial discipline. Lawson declared that the exchange rate and 
MO were the dual guide to policy. However, in practice, the markets did not 
take MO seriously as a target. At the same time, the absence of a formal 
exchange rate  target left the governm ent w ithout a credible financial 
framework. In the autum n statement of 1985, the government announced a 
twofold increase in the target for privatisation receipts over the next three 
years. W ith increased room for fiscal manoeuvre, public expenditure would 
be stabilised (after having risen by 4 per cent across the two previous years) 
and tax cuts w ould follow. Thus, the governm ent was looking to protect 
sterling and achieving limited fiscal expansion.5?
The governm ent's objectives w ere now  com patible w ith  ERM 
mem bership at least for the immediate future. The governm ent was again 
committed to exchange rate stability and its monetary policy was assigned to 
that end. M em bership w ould rule out the flexible > approach w hich the 
government used after it first assigned monetary policy to the exchange rate 
in November 1980. Monetary policy would be assigned on a long term basis 
to countering inflation through matching the discipline of the Bundesbank.
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H ow ever, m em bership w ould not necessarily  com m it the 
government to a tighter monetary policy than it might otherwise choose. 
Rather, since the government was already committed to keeping sterling 
stable, ERM membership would probably lead to a reduction in interest 
rates. With the ERM's growing collective credibility, it was possible to 
defend currencies at lower rates of interest than those prevailing in the UK. 
Throughout 1985, the UK had high nominal and real interest rates in 
comparison to the ERM states. As figure 3.3 shows (page 109), in November 
1985, only Italy with its consistently below average inflation performance 
had higher nominal and real interest rates among the major ERM states 
than the UK. Although France had a higher inflation rate than the UK in
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1985, it enjoyed lower nominal interest rates w ithout the franc coming 
under pressure. Overall, m em bership offered both counter-inflationary 
exchange rate control and the stimulus for grow th which the governm ent 
w anted to provide.60
The governm ent's fiscal policy was also compatible w ith membership 
in  that there was no excess dem and in the UK economy. In 1985 UK 
inflation was 5.5 per cent compared to 5.8 per cent in France, 9 per cent in 
Italy and 5.5 per cent in the EC as a whole. Since inflation was predicted to 
fall below 3.3 per cent by mid-1986, the UK appeared to have made the same 
fiscal adjustm ent on the inflation front as the ERM states. Furthermore, in 
contrast to Italy, for example, the UK governm ent was in control of its 
budge t deficit. In the short term , m em bership w ould not require the 
governm ent to pursue a more deflationary fiscal policy. At the same time 
membership w ould place a constraint on inflationary fiscal expansion in the 
fu tu re .6!
D uring the th ird  and fourth quarters of 1985, sterling averaged 
DM3.90 and DM3.71 respectively. Even m any of those w ho advocated 
m embership believed that there were competitive disadvantages to entry at 
DM3.70. The UK's manufacturing trade deficit w ith the EC in 1985 was £9.1 
billion tw o-thirds of which was w ith Germany. ERM m em bership w ould 
have m ade it difficult at least in the short term  to devalue against the 
Deutschm ark to improve the current account. At the same time, grow th 
w as already  d isproportionately  taking place in  the oil sector w ith  
m anufacturing investm ent and ou tpu t still below the levels of the late 
1970s. In sum, in terms of competitiveness, ERM membership was likely to 
act as a constraint on export led-growth.62 
The Ascendancy of the City
By 1985 the governm ent was pursu ing  a new policy tow ards capital 
accumulation. The City of London was central to the governm ent's strategy, 
functioning both  as a service and a site for international investment. The 
aim was to recreate London as the prime European centre of finance. This 
process began in July 1983 w hen the government agreed to stop the Office of
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Fair Trading's Case against the Stock Exchange on the condition that the 
Stock Exchange reform itself. From late 1983, there was a flurry of activity in 
which both UK and foreign big banks took over stock exchange firms. At the 
sam e tim e the governm ent in tervened  to s ta rt dereg u la tin g  and  
m odernising City practices: the governm ent combined w ith  the City to 
rem ove price competition restrictions; allowed options m arkets to expand 
and the creation of a screen based market; developed a new regulation 
system; allowed the opening up of the Securities Exchange; and deregulated 
the banks and build ing  societies. As a resu lt, the C ity becam e an 
unparalleled site for international capital operations w ith Japanese banks 
lending more from the City than UK banks.63
The governm ent also increased support for non-financial services 
during  its second term. In 1984 the Treasury m ade services eligible for 
Regional Development grants for the first time, despite the general move 
tow ards selective rather than automatic assistance in  regional aid. In 1985 
the DTI extended the Business and Technical A dvisory Service to the 
service sector where it was previously confined to m anufacturing industry. 
The governm en t's  com m itm ent to p rivatisa tion , dereg u la tio n  and  
liberalisation also disproportionately benefited the service sector. At the 
international level the governm ent sought to liberalise trade in  services 
both in the EC and GATT. In this climate, the service sector's share of GDP 
increased by 2.1 per cent as a proportion of GDP between 1979 and 1984 and 
by 6.8 per cent between 1984 and 1989M
In its second term , the governm ent also gave unpreceden ted  
encouragem ent to internal investment, especially from Japan. In 1984 the 
governm ent reached an agreement for a plant in the UK w hich heralded 
grow th in  investm ent, particularly in the electronic component sector. By 
1986 one in  seven of the UK workforce was em ployed in  foreign m ulti­
national companies. As Jessop argues, the government was now identifying 
itself w ith  capital operating in the UK and the operation of UK capital 
overseas. It did not have a national strategy for capital restructuring as other 
EC states did. Accordingly the governm ent did no t give assistance to
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m anufacturing industry  apart from high technology areas. Rather, the 
governm ent was content to leave the UK with very few significant sectors 
of m anufacturing capital which were secure in  either the hom e or the 
export market. The UK's role in m anufacturing was increasingly becoming 
that of branch part assembler of Japanese, American and German goods.65
The im plications of ERM m em bership for the groups of capital 
favoured by the governm ent were mixed. Certainly, the City w anted the 
benefits of reduced exchange rate volatility and a counter-inflationary 
discipline. At the same time, non-membership did  not directly threaten the 
City as the prime European financial site. For the City, m em bership was 
beneficial rather than fundamentally necessary.
For the non-financial service sector, the exchange rate is relatively 
unim portant since much of the sector cannot export. For those service firms 
w hich do export, membership w ould commit sterling at a relatively high 
rate and  act as a constraint against future adjustm ent. M ulti-national 
companies operating in the UK benefitted from a relatively high rate for 
sterling because of their reliance on im porting components from abroad. 
C onsequently  ERM m em bership offered certain  benefits for inw ard  
investors since sterling w ould enter at a relatively high rate and  that 
membership would probably strengthen sterling against the dollar.
Avoiding a Two Speed Europe
During 1985 the UK government wished to play a positive role in the Inter- 
Governmental negotiations which w ould lead to the creation of a Single 
European Market. However, ministers did not support dem ands by other 
m em ber-states for the introduction of qualified majority voting nor the 
expansion of Community expenditure programmes. At the same time, the 
government did not w ant to be left behind in a second tier of states as a core 
group of states moved towards greater integration.66
The issue of ERM membership was directly related to the desire to 
avoid a two-speed Europe. In March 1985, Spain decided to rem ain outside 
the ERM after it joined the EC in 1986 which raised the possibility that ERM 
membership itself m ight come to demarcate the tiers of EC integration. In
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addition since the major EC states and the Commission w anted to promote 
closer integration, they were increasingly in terested  again in the UK 
entering ERM. Through 1985, Jacques Delors, the Commission President, 
m ade a series of calls for UK membership. In evidence to the Treasury Select 
Com m ittee in  1985, two Commission officials outlined the reasons w hy 
they saw UK entry to ERM as important. UK membership was necessary for 
a genuinely com m on m arket to develop. Sterling 's non-m em bership 
detracted from the credibility of the ERM system. If the UK were to join 
ERM, Norway and Sweden w ould move much closer to the system which 
w ou ld  expand the E uropean zone of m onetary  stability. A nd, UK 
membership would force the system to have a common dollar policy.67
Among the other member states, the German governm ent and the 
Bundesbank w ere particularly  keen on UK m em bership. The Finance 
Minister, Dr Gerhard Stoltenberg, the Bundesbank chief, Karl Otto-Pohl, and 
the Deutsche Bank, all made public pleas for UK entry. Indeed the German 
governm ent m ade it clear that UK membership was their condition for any 
future developm ent of the EMS. The Germans w anted sterling to relieve 
the burden of the Deutschmark as the unilateral reserve currency in ERM 
and believed that the UK w ould be a free market ally in future debates about 
the system, particularly in regard to capital movement.68
In sum, ERM m embership offered considerable potential benefit to 
the governm ent in the pursu it of its EC policy. If the governm ent was 
w orried about a two-speed Europe, then entry to the ERM w ould thw art the 
threat of ERM becoming the catalyst of that development. And, w ith  the 
other mem ber states led by Germany having a significant interest in UK 
m em bership, then, ERM membership was a significant bargaining card in 
the Inter-Governmental negotiations.
Lawson Converts the Treasury
After the meeting of 13 February, Lawson and his officials examined ways to 
bu ild  up  the foreign exchange reserves so that a decision on ERM 
membership could be taken later in the year. In the months which followed, 
Lawson did not waver in his support for ERM entry. He asked his officials to
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w rite papers on the implications of m embership rather than the case for
e n try .69 As one official said, '(Lawson) did not require a trem endous
am ount of advice on all this '.70Another official comm ented that Lawson
'w as not a m an who relied on the advice of his officials.'71
By the summer of 1985, Middleton, Burns and other senior officials
were converted to membership. In part, this reflected the sheer dominance
of Lawson and his views within the Treasury. Lawson recalled:
I gradually brought my officials round to my way of thinking on the 
ERM. Since in the end Civil Servants have to support their Minister, 
they had no real choice.72
Similarly, one of his senior officials commented:
If he says, I want to join the ERM, you talk about it to him, all the rest 
of it, but you're not going to say no, you don 't think so. You've got to 
try and help him do it.73
At the same time, the Treasury's capacity to resist Lawson was diminished
by the absolute nature of his commitment to membership. Once Lawson
m ade his commitment a senior adviser commented that:
He was a perm anent problem from then on. He basically lost interest 
in the w ay we were running economic policy and proceeded to try 
and run  it in a different way, based primarily on the exchange rate.74
N evertheless, to a greater or lesser extent M iddleton, Burns and other
senior officials eventually  came to believe for them selves tha t ERM
membership was the best way forward. Lawson states that 'as far as I could
see their conversion was genuine, if in some cases unenthusiastic.'75
In the imm ediate afterm ath of the sterling crisis, some senior civil
servants showed a definite reluctance to give up on the m onetary targets
once and for all. For example, Terry Burns w anted to try and re-anchor
monetary policy around a MO target. According to Lawson:
They [the senior officials] felt that the governm ent - and  they 
personally - had invested a great deal of intellectual capital in the 
existing monetary policy framework and were loath to abandon it.76
However, the officials finally concluded that there were two fundam ental 
problem s w ith  the m onetary targets. First, they w ere not p rovid ing
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inform ation w hich was useful in deciding on m onetary policy. One
Treasury official observed that 'there was some disillusionm ent w ith  the
m onetary  targets because we d id  not understand  the relationships.'77
According to another, 'the m onetary side of things had got very difficult,
mainly because velocities were all over the sh o w /7 8
Second, the Treasury officials believed that their conception of
m onetary targets in government policy was difficult to present in public:
We came to the conclusion that there was no single definition of 
money supply which is of any utility to a policy operator. The only 
thing w hich you can do is to hold very firmly to the underlying 
concept of w hat it is you w ant to control, get the m axim um  inpu t 
data on w hat you can get, w ith the greatest subtlety of definition and 
w atch how  it is changing. And then [you] make almost a kind of 
analogue judgement, rather than a digital calculation, to get the feel 
of w hen it is getting a bit too much and you can rein back, or w hen its 
tight and ought to be loosened. But you can 't explain that to the 
gentlemen of the press. They'll say at once, 'D on't know w hat you are 
talking about, no control, lost all sense of direction.' It translates that
w a y . 79
By contrast, ERM membership was an effective and presentable anchor:
Given that background, it was becoming increasingly attractive - 
seeing incidentally that the European [monetary] system itself was 
becom ing more self-confident, more robust and giving a stronger 
im pression to the markets. It was terribly tem pting to say : 'Look 
suppose we latched into that [ERM] in the right set of circumstances 
and then continued our m onetary policy, we [the Treasury] w ould 
not have this problem  of presentation. We could go on doing 
monetary policy, liaising closely with the Bank as u s u a l /8 0
As regard their previous case against ERM membership, the Treasury
now believed that the UK economy was not unique in the EC either in the
status of its currency or in its inflation performance and, consequently, it
was necessary to resolve the issue. A senior Treasury official w ho became
converted to membership in this period recalled:
We had to take decisions of some sort. We could not just say, w e'll 
continue to think about. That was becoming increasingly untenable. 
The other thing that we began to think by 1985 was that the UK 
economy was getting into the position where it could join the ERM. 
The inflation basis looked not unreasonable.8*
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At the same time, Treasury officials believed ERM m em bership
offered the positive benefits of exchange rate stability and lower interest
rates for a given inflation rate. In Lawson's view, low interest rates were
now a clear policy goal for Treasury officials:
I had always regarded interest rates as a vitally im portant instrument 
of policy. But during my absence at Energy, the Treasury had come to 
elevate low interest rates into an objective of policy. The m andarins 
w ere not helped to break out of this m ould by the fact that low 
interest rates had an unfailing appeal for Margaret.82
At the top of the Treasury, support for ERM m em bership became 
uniform  during  the first half of 1985. However, at lower levels, some 
scepticism rem ained. O pponents of m em bership generally fell into two 
groups. The first, and larger group, was of econom ists w ho rem ained 
w edded to the idea of a domestically based m onetary policy around some 
form of m onetary targets. In the view of one supporter of m em bership 
w ithin the Treasury, 'one or two felt almost that their metier in life was 
being  challenged  because they  saw  it as g iv ing  policy  to  the 
B undesbank.'83The second group was made up of administrators who 'just 
had hackles about Europe.'84 Neither group of officials were able to make an 
impact on their seniors or Lawson himself.
A Divided Bank
In the m onths after the sterling crisis, Robin Leigh-Pemberton and  Kit 
MacMahon rem ained as firm supporters of ERM mem bership as Lawson. 
Both believed that the crisis could have been avoided inside ERM and that 
some financial discipline needed to be injected into the governm ent's 
m onetary framework. Before the end of 1985, Kit MacMahon was due to 
retire w ith  Eddie George taking over as Deputy-Governor. D uring the 
course of year, George shifted from being an opponent to a supporter of 
membership partly in deference to the Governor.88
O pinion lower dow n at the Bank of England was fairly evenly 
divided betw een strong supporters and strong opponents of membership. 
As in 1980 and 1981, the greatest opposition to m em bership came from
116
people in  the domestic m onetary division. These officials believed that
sterling was still too volatile a currency to become a stable member of ERM
and  that the convergence of UK inflation tow ards the low est levels in
Europe m ight well prove to be a tem porary phenom enon.86 One sceptic
commented on his perception of the UK's continuing economic divergence
from the ERM states:
Am ong those m ost directly and professionally concerned w ith  
m onetary management, there was quite a degree of misgiving over 
the timeliness of fixing an ERM parity at the time. ... [Some of us 
believed] de facto a parity system of that sort w ould have a tendency 
to become very much a fixed rate type of arrangement. Or at least that 
any departure from fixity w ould come to have the characteristic of 
failure. And [so we came] to feel that it w ould not be wise to get 
committed to it unless and until we could be reasonably confident 
that that would be a discipline that we w ould both be able to and w ant 
to observe. W hat that starting point led to was self-evidently a 
questioning of the extent to which we could regard the optim al 
currency area conditions as being satisfied by the UK w ithin the ERM 
economic area. [There were] two particular areas w hich we were 
immediately concerned at the lack of fulfilment of those conditions. 
One was the then divergence in patterns of external trade betw een 
ourselves and the continental countries w ith  m uch greater [UK] 
involvement and exposure to other parts of the w orld - dollar and 
Pacific area - than they had. A nd the other was the difference in 
resource endowm ent which was most notable in our N orth Sea oil 
resource.87
Nevertheless, despite the divisions within the Bank, Leigh-Pemberton and 
M acM ahon were determ ined to take a higher profile supporting  ERM 
w ithin the core executive than the Bank had between 1980 and 1983.88
Conception of ERM membership.
By the summer of 1985, there were for the first time more supporters than 
opponents of ERM m em bership w ith in  the institu tions of the core 
executive m ost directly concerned w ith economic policy. M oreover, the 
supporters were led by a Chancellor w ith a very strong view on the issue. 
W hen ERM m embership first became an issue of economic (as opposed to 
EC policy) in 1981, the debate was defined by the immense difficulties of 
keeping to the MTFS. The question in 1981-1982 was whether sticking to the
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m onetary targets of the MTFS or opting for exchange rate stability was the
best means of using m onetary policy as a counter-inflationary discipline.
Those decision-m akers w ho then  opposed ERM m em bership  w ere
unwilling to finally abandon the MTFS. By the end of the first half of 1985,
there could be little dispute about the failure of the MTFS as either an
effective or credible monetary framework. Now, opponents of m embership
d id  not envisage a retu rn  to a strict m onetary target policy bu t rather
contested the viability or desirability of entry to ERM itself.
At the same time, the failure of MTFS defined the position of those
w ho suppo rted  m em bership as it d id  in 1981-1982. Supporters of
m embership were explicitly claiming that because money supply targets had
not worked as a counter-inflationary monetary framework, the way forward
was to pursue exchange rate stability through ERM as a similarly defined
framework. It was the means used in MTFS not the policy end itself which
was responsible for its failure. Lawson himself declares:
As I said to her, the significance of the MTFS was that it represented a 
public com m itm ent to the pursu it of an anti-inflationary policy. 
Linking the pound to the Deutschmark via the ERM would represent 
exactly the same sort of public commitment to an anti-inflationary 
policy, and one that would by that time carry greater conviction.89
For ERM supporters, membership would be the formal replacement of one 
set of m onetary means to control inflation w ith  another. They d id  not 
conceive of m em bership as a significant shift in  policy. Two senior
f
Treasury officials commented:
We never saw it as a fundamental shift in policy. It's just a question 
of how  you go about the same thing.
It became very attractive simply as a device consistent w ith w hat we 
w anted to do but a damn sight easier to e x p la in .9 0
However, by 1985 the ERM was decidedly more than a collective 
counter-inflationary m onetary framework. The ERM states believed that 
there were m ultiple causes of inflation from rising levels of domestic 
dem and, to large wage increases and unfettered credit expansion. As a 
result, they were committed to using a range of policy tools, including fiscal
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policy, to m aintain stability and control inflation. Yet such a commitment 
was absent in the conception of ERM membership held by Lawson and his 
officials and at the Bank of England. Asked how Lawson perceived the 
relevance of fiscal policy to ERM m em bership, a Treasury policy-maker 
replied:
In Nigel Lawson's mind, the ERM was principally a w ay of setting 
interest rates - of tying British m onetary policy to well-established 
German credibility.^
In sum , the operation of the ERM denied the underlying prem ise of the 
MTFS th a t inflation is fundam entally  a m onetary  phenom enon b u t 
Lawson and officials at the Treasury and Bank of England clung to that 
prem ise in their conversion to ERM membership.
Demobilising the Foreign Office
In May 1985, Lawson got the green light from Thatcher to borrow foreign 
currency through the issue of floating rate notes (FRNs) to build  up  the 
reserves. After a similar EC issue flopped, Lawson was advised by the Bank 
of England that the UK issue should be postponed. Finally, on 16 September, 
the governm ent announced a $2.5B FRN issue.92 Thatcher's initial green 
light on the issue in May allowed Lawson to step up the level of the ERM 
debate. Lawson believed that the key factor in the debate was Thatcher's own 
attitude as did his senior officials: 'We believed that it w ould be extremely 
difficult to convince Thatcher.'93 Consequently, Lawson geared the tone of 
w ork w ithin the Treasury towards assembling a case for membership which 
could convince Thatcher. Treasury officials who Thatcher was known to get 
on w ith were sent to brief her.94
Lawson and the Treasury were did not w ant to involve either the 
Foreign Office or the European Secretariat of the Cabinet Office in  the 
debate.95 In part, Lawson recognised that the continuing support of Geoffrey 
Howe and the Foreign Office for membership were counter-productive to 
the real task of convincing Thatcher on the issue. According to one Treasury 
official:
We pu t a lot of effort into mobilising allies and that included actually
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demobilising the Foreign Office.... They were such an easy target for 
her and poor Geoffrey Howe was an easy personal target for h e r."
At the same time, the Treasury continued to believe that the issue
w as its territory and expressed disdain about the political nature of the
Foreign Office's argum ents in favour of m em bership, one senior official
commented disparagingly that: 'The Foreign Secretary sort of always wants
to join organisations.'97 Lawson himself clearly w anted the economic policy
case for ERM entry to stand on its own merits:
Certainly, I was conscious that our self-imposed exclusion from the 
ERM greatly dim inished our authority  and influence w ith in  the 
Community. But that was never why I w anted to see sterling w ithin 
the ERM My case as readers will be aware, was wholly in terms of the 
balance of the economic argument, [italics added]98
In August, Howe gave Lawson a Foreign Office paper which advocated entry 
to ERM w ith in  the next few m onths. Lawson w as unim pressed by its 
assum ption  of regu lar and autom atic realignm ents inside ERM. H e 
proceeded to operate with the still sceptical Thatcher on a bilateral basis and 
Lawson agreed to Thatcher's proposal of a Prime Ministerial seminar on the 
30 Septem ber."
Lawson instructed his officials to develop the Treasury paper for the 
sem inar in close collaboration w ith the Bank explaining both the case for 
en try  and the best w ay to present m em bership in public. The Bank's 
m onetary un it did  a significant am ount of w ork to provide supportive 
analysis to the Treasury's case.100 In the words of one Treasury official, 'it 
was a prerequisite that the Bank should be on side' since for Thatcher its 
opposition w ould have been 'a cast-iron argum ent' against joining.101 At 
the same time, Lawson was particularly concerned to pre-em pt any use by 
Thatcher of the 'W alters scenario' argument. W alters claimed that inside 
ERM, a poor Conservative government showing in an opinion-poll during 
a general election campaign would pu t sterling under pressure forcing the 
governm ent to raise interest rates and handing the election to Labour. 
Lawson dismissed the argum ent himself, bu t he asked Geoffrey Littler to 
find a way around the alleged problem. Littler suggested the 'conge' plan. In
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extremis, the governm ent could formally declare tha t sterling w ould be 
allowed to float until polling day and that on re-election, the governm ent 
w ould immediately restore sterling to the system at the previous parity.102
Outside the core executive, there remained considerable support for 
ERM m em bership w ithin the Conservative party beyond the im m ediate 
afterm ath of the sterling crisis. In March the former m inister David Howell 
m ade the first of a series of public calls for m em bership Similarly, both 
H eath  and  the Conservative MEPs continued to p u t p ressu re  the 
governm ent on the issue through 1985. In May, the MEPs formally met 
Lawson to discuss the subject and argued that m em bership w ould reduce 
interest rates. By autum n 1985, it appears that there was a firm majority 
w ithin the parliam entary party willing to support m em bership.103 
The Lawson-Howe-Leigh-Pemberton Assault
O n 30 Septem ber, Thatcher chaired a Prime M inisterial sem inar on 
m em bership attended by Lawson, Ian Stewart and  officials from  the 
Treasury, Leigh-Pemberton and other Bank representatives, Howe and 
Brian Griffiths, the Head of the Policy Unit. Lawson argued that entry was 
absolutely necessary to reinforce the government's anti-inflationary strategy 
given tha t the 'm onetary  indicators proving increasingly difficult to 
in terpret.' Leigh-Pemberton supported Lawson and stated that only ERM 
m em bership could provide a credible m onetary policy. Similarly, Howe 
argued on economic policy grounds that membership w ould strengthen the 
MTFS, rather than that membership w ould increase the UK's influence in 
the EC Thatcher concluded that she remained unconvinced of the case for 
entry and that further discussion at ministerial level was necessary before a 
decision could be taken. She w ould decide which ministers to invite to take 
the decision and circulate a list of questions which needed to be answered 
before the meeting.104
After the 30 September meeting, Lawson asked the Treasury to 
prepare a further paper for the second meeting to be circulated in advance to 
all those who were to attend. He set up a joint Treasury-Bank team both to 
write the paper and to respond to the questions from Num ber 10. He recalls:
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W hen the Number 10 questionnaire arrived, it proved to contain no 
fewer than twenty three questions and read rather like a rag-bag of 
every objection to ERM membership that anybody could come up 
with. In so far as there was an underlying theme, it was that sterling 
would be subject to greater pressure inside ERM than if it remained a 
non-member and that the economy was not strong enough to sustain 
a fixed parity against the Deutschmark.i°5
Lawson's own paper again stressed the benefits of membership as a counter-
inflationary m onetary framework in view of the problems w ith the policy
based on monetary targets:
After grappling with these problems as Chancellor for over two years 
now, I have come to the conclusion that joining the ERM of the EMS 
w ould  deal w ith  both  the issue of substance and  the issue of 
presentation, and is the only practicable means of doing so. The 
exchange rate is more readily comprehensible than m onetary targets 
and we are already relying on it to a major extent as an indicator. To 
join the EMS w ould  reinforce the discipline and com m itm ent 
inherent to the MTFS, and be seen to do so. The interested public 
seem ready for it. Industry certainly is."106
Lawson sent the paper to Thatcher as a memo on 11 November, tw o days 
before the ministerial meeting was to be held.
Between September and November, optimism grew in the Treasury 
about the chances of success in convincing Thatcher. One Treasury official 
com m ented:
I think I got personally to the point of believing that there might be a 
slightly  better than  evens chance. Because we had  done our 
hom ew ork well; the sem inar had  gone no t too badly; and  the 
question of Alan Walters, I was inclined to dismiss and som ething 
that I still am. ... One of the things that actually persuaded me that 
there m ight be a chance was the Hong Kong issue. ... The idea that 
the Hong Kong dollar could be linked to the American dollar was not 
one that we thought was a natural subject of enthusiasm  for Mrs 
Thatcher on any count or indeed for Alan Walters. The odd thing 
was that it happened to be a former pupil of his who in Hong Kong 
had begun to raise the whole issue and got A lan's ear and Alan 
persuaded the Prime Minister of this. ... After she gave the green 
light, I could not help thinking: 'H er antipathy to any sort of fixed 
exchange rate is not total.'107
The m eeting to decide on whether to enter ERM took place on 13 
N ovem ber. W ith m inisters and  officials bo th  in  attendance, it w as
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essentially an ad hoc meeting organised at the Prime M inister's discretion.
The officials present were M iddleton and Burns from the Treasury and
Leigh-Pemberton and George from the Bank of England. In addition to
Thatcher, Lawson and Howe, the ministers attending were Willie W hitelaw
(Deputy Prime Minister), Norm an Tebbit (Conservative Party Chairman),
Leon Brittan (Trade and Industry), John Biffen (Leader of the House) and
John W akeham (Chief Whip). Brian Griffiths and one of Thatcher's private
secretaries were also present. In Lawson's view, Thatcher asked W hitelaw
and Brittan to attend because she could not exclude them, and the other
three ministers were invited on the grounds that she supposed they were
opponents of membership. Although invited by Thatcher, Lawson himself
saw all the ministers w ith the exception of Biffen prior to the meeting to go
over his p a p e r .  108
Lawson, How e and Leigh-Pem berton m ade the sam e case for
m em bership which they presented in September. They were supported by
Brittan w ho said that having previously been an opponent of m embership,
he now  believed in  the need for a credible alternative to m onetary
aggregates and that the petro-currency argum ent against m em bership no
longer applied. Brittan's position also reflected the view of DTI officials
w ho w ere keen supporters of m em bership although never asked to
contribute to the debate. Of the ministers invited by Thatcher as likely
opponents of membership, only Biffen argued against entry as a committed
free floater. Tebbit and Wakeham spoke in favour of membership and both
declared that membership would be a positive benefit in the governm ent's
relations w ith  the party and its back-benches. Thatcher responded that, to
the contrary, mem bership w ould divide the party, leave the governm ent
w ith no control of interest rates, and that the conge plan would not work.10?
According to one Thatcher confidante:
Lawson said: 'How can you stand up against it, w hen your Chancellor 
and Foreign Secretary are both agreed, that it is most urgent that we 
en ter the ERM?' She rep lied  th a t it w as her constitu tional 
responsibility to choose policy.110
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Finally, W hitelaw declared his support for membership. For himself
W hitelaw  believed that it m ust m ake sense to have some m eans of
regulating currencies in the EC which included sterling. At the same time,
he believed that w hen the Chancellor, Foreign Secretary and the Governor
of the Bank of England were united on entry, then it was extremely hard  to
understand  w hy the governm ent should do otherw ise.111 In Lawson's
description of the end of the meeting:
[Whitelaw] declared, 'If the Chancellor, the Governor and the Foreign 
Secretary are all agreed that we should join the EMS that should be 
decisive. It has certainly decided me.' I suspect he was as surprised as 
the rest of us w hen M argaret instantly replied, 'O n the contrary: I 
disagree. If you join the EMS, you will have to do so w ithout me.' 
There was an awkward silence, and the meeting broke u p .m
Clearly not intending to resign, Thatcher was exercising an effective Prime 
M inisterial veto against ERM entry over the rest of the core executive 
concerned w ith the issue.
Thatcher's O pposition
During the second half of 1985 up to November, the governm ent trailed 
Labour in the opinion polls by between 1 and 5 per cent in the Guardian 
average of m onthly polls.113 For Lawson, Howe and the other Cabinet 
ministers who supported membership, ERM entry offered certain potential 
benefits to the government's position. In Chapter 2, it was argued that non­
m em bership allowed the governm ent to m anage the 'sterling problem ' 
according to the balance of the inflation performance and the governm ent's 
electoral tim etable. In part, this m eant the freedom  to devalue w hen 
inflation was reduced so as to stimulate the sluggish economy. After the 
1983 election, the governm ent did  indeed use the freedom  of non­
membership for this purpose. However, in January 1985 the policy ended in 
d isaster because the governm ent could neither control the extent of 
sterling's fall nor accept its inflationary consequences. There now appeared 
little alternative bu t to m aintain a commitment to exchange rate stability 
and assign m onetary policy to the task of securing it. ERM m em bership 
offered a means to this end combined with lower interest rates to stimulate
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grow th and benefit mortgage-holders. M em bership w ould also provide
benefits for some of the types of capital which the governm ent w ished to
encourage particularly, the City. At the same time, m embership was likely
to strengthen  the governm ent's influence w ith in  the EC bo th  on the
Com m unity's broad and monetary future development.
A ny p lausib le  explanation  of T hatcher's opposition  to ERM
m em bership m ust first recognise her rejection of the most fundam ental of
these benefits w hich m em bership w ould have brought, nam ely low er
interest rates for a given rate of inflation. Certainly, it cannot be argued that
Thatcher d id  not understand this particular benefit of membership. A pro-
ERM official recalled:
I remember her saying at some moment w hen it seemed to me to be 
completely inappropriate that the great thing about ERM is that it 
w ould allow you to have lower interest rates than you w ould have 
otherw ise.114
W hilst all Prim e M inisters and governm ents have an in terest in  low
interest rates, if Lawson is to be believed, then Thatcher had a passionate
desire to cut rates whenever possible. It is a point which Lawson returns to
again and again in his memoirs. For example:
Low interest rates had an unfailing appeal for Margaret. Despite her 
reputation as a diehard opponent of inflation, and her dislike of it 
was undoubtedly genuine, she was almost always in practice anxious 
to reduce interest rates, and thus, the mortgage rates.
It was hard enough to persuade Margaret of the need to raise interest 
rates w hen I had the Bank w ith me.
She was positively soft on interest rates.115
Thatcher herself admits:
Nigel apparently  now thinks that I was 'so ft' on in terest rates. 
Anyone w ho recalls our decisions from 1979 to 1981 will find that 
implausible. ... Nevertheless, Nigel and I did have rather different 
starting points w hen it came to these matters. I was always more 
sensitive to the political im plications of in terest rate  rises - 
particularly their timing - than was Nigel. Prime M inisters have to 
be. I was also acutely conscious of what interest rate changes m eant 
for those w ith mortgages.116
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W hatever benefit Thatcher saw in ERM m em bership had  to be strong 
enough to override her clear preference for lower interest rates.
By contrast' Thatcher did not accept that ERM m em bership w ould  
bring any real benefits in EC policy. As in 1982, Thatcher did not w ant to 
trade one EC issue against another. She was not comfortable w ith  the 
European Council as a decision making forum. In the words of one former 
cabinet minister:
She hated  all those Council m eetings. She w ould  come back 
absolutely fuming....they were all waffle,waffle,waffle, and I can just 
imagine that she had to sit there crossing her legs and uncrossing her 
legs and w ondering how long she had to go on listening to all the 
bloody people from Greece and Portugal and all the rest.117
At the same time she believed that the UK was generally in a weak position
w ith little to no bargaining power. A Foreign Office official commented:
I used to argue w ith her. She w ould say, 'Those crafty French, they'll 
w in again, they always win.' I remember saying to her: 'W hy are you 
so defeatist? It's an extraordinary attitude...You know we've got a very 
good case here. W e've got a lot of support, w hy do you think the 
French line will w in?'11®
The budgetary  negotiations dem onstrated that Thatcher w as far
happier playing the nationalist card in EC policy than developing an active
strategy and negotiating to secure her ends. As Gilmour com m ented in
respect of the budgetary issue:
To her, the grievance was more valuable than its removal. Not for 
the last time during her term of office, foreign policy was a tool of 
party  or personal politics. However badly things w ere going in 
Britain, Mrs Thatcher could at least win some kudos and popularity 
as the defender of the British people against the foreigner. Hence a 
running row w ith our European partners was the next best thing to 
war; it w ould divert public attention from the disasters at hom e."119
Thatcher's ow n explanations of her opposition  to m em bership 
centred on economic policy and were som ewhat contradictory. O n two 
different occasions, she declared that membership w ould be too deflationary 
and too inflationary respectively. Then, in June 1986,Thatcher argued that 
the UK needed to retain the option of letting the exchange rate take the
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strain  w hen there was speculation against sterling rather than m onetary
policy or 'precious reserves'. Later in the year, she told the Financial Times:
I w ant to be absolutely certain that there can be no repetition of what 
happened before, when we came out of the snake [in 1972]. W hen we 
go in, we will go in strong and stay in.120
In her memoirs she declares about the 13 November meeting:
By now I was more convinced than ever of the disadvantages of the 
ERM. I could see no particular reason to allow British m onetary 
policy to be determined largely by the Bundesbank rather than by the 
British Treasury, unless we had no confidence in our ability to 
control inflation. I w as extrem ely sceptical about w hether the 
industrial lobby w hich was pressing us so hard  to join the ERM 
w ould m aintain its enthusiasm  once they came to see that it was 
m aking their goods uncompetitive. I doubted w hether the public 
would welcome w hat might turn out to be the huge cost of defending 
sterling  w ith in  ERM - which, indeed, m ight well prove to be 
impossible in the run-up to a general election and so be compounded 
by a forced devaluation.121
N either is it plausible to explain Thatcher's opposition m ainly in
terms of the influence of Alan Walters. Lawson noted in his memoirs that
in the questionnaire before the 13 November meeting that 'curiously, about
the only objection that was not included in the list of questions was that
dubbed (by Alan Walters) the 'Walters critique'.122
One Treasury official commented:
The question of Alan W alters, I was inclined to dism iss and it is 
som ething I still am. She never actually did w hat Alan told her or 
followed Alan's advice, bu t she found him absolutely a marvellous 
m an to brief her w ith arguments to combat others w ith bu t she was 
never a slave to his views.123
Most people involved in the decision-making process understood 
T hatcher's opposition  in  vary ing  term s. One Foreign Office official 
com m ented:
Her m ain argument against the ERM was one of practicality. She was 
always telling one how Ted H eath had had  to come ou t of the 
snake.124
At least one Bank of England official believed that it was the problem  of 
m anaging m onetary policy in the pre-election period w hich concerned
127
Thatcher:
In the run  up to an election, if there was a sterling crisis,the 
government w ould have to raise interest rates and she did not w ant 
to be dictated to by the Bundesbank.125
However such an argum ent for non-membership w ould only make sense if 
Thatcher was prepared to adopt an attitude of benign neglect w hich she 
m anifestly w as not. For example, six m onths before the 1983 general 
election, the governm ent raised interest rates twice to combat sterling's 
weakness. Later, in November 1986, the governm ent m ade it clear that it 
w ould not countenance a devaluation of sterling in the run  up  to the next 
election. As Sam Brittan argued in dism issing the argum ent, a m uch 
smaller rise in rates might be necessary in ERM than outside where doubts 
w ould exist about the governm ent's exchange rate objectives. M embership 
w ould act as an insurance against the re-occurring feature of all sterling 
crises since 1973 where the markets have felt that there is no floor in  sight 
and that sterling could go almost an y w h ere .^
Most people involved in the decision-making process understood 
T hatcher's opposition to m em bership in term s of her conception of 
sovereignty in relation to economic policy:
She though t tha t it w as giving too m uch aw ay in term s of
sovereignty. !27
She just did not like the idea of the Europeans getting involved in 
sterling....I think she always feared too m uch European m eddling in 
British affairs. She thought that the Bank and the pound and all the 
rest were things they should not be allowed to meddle in .128
It w as the sense of sovereignty that she had, surrendering  your 
political power to some outside b o d y .129
She stood out on grounds of sovereignty, a concept she had  read 
about somewhere but could never tell you where.130
[She saw it] as losing control over the economy. The governm ent 
should not sacrifice that degree of ability to run the economy.131
Nevertheless, a question rem ains about how Thatcher's particular 
conception of sovereignty related to her understanding of the governm ent's
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electoral interests. W hat particular freedom of m anoeuvre outside ERM did 
Thatcher believe was of benefit enough to the governm ent to outweigh the 
benefit of lower interest rates for a given rate of inflation? Certainly, ERM 
m em bership w ould not have been the 'shift in em phasis' w hich Lawson, 
the Treasury and the Bank of England took it to be. As a fundam entally 
different w ay of operating economic policy, ERM m em bership w ould  
ultim ately have reduced the governm ent's freedom of m anoeuvre beyond 
the area of monetary policy. The most likely cost in electoral terms for the 
governm ent in the short to m edium  term  was the potential conflict 
betw een the fiscal constraint inherent in the ERM and the governm ent's 
desire to reduce income tax. In the next five years, fu rther costs of 
m em bership in areas beyond m onetary policy became apparent and are 
discussed in the next two chapters.
W hilst Lawson and those ministers who supported m em bership in 
Novem ber 1985 clearly did not trade off interest rates cuts against income 
tax cuts in making their judgement, it is less clear whether Thatcher herself 
m ade the calculation. Certainly, there is no evidence that Thatcher ever 
articulated a detailed understanding of the relation between the constraints 
of ERM m em bership and the governm ent's objectives. N evertheless, 
analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 w hen the costs of ERM m em bership to the 
governm ent extended beyond fiscal policy will suggest that she had  an 
instinctive grasp of a difference which she wished to hold on to between the 
governm ent's economic policy and those of the continental states. 
Acquiesence?
After the 13 November meeting, Lawson was left to decide how to respond
to Thatcher's veto of his proposal to enter ERM. Three courses of action
w ould appear to have been open to him. He could either have resigned or
carried on fighting on the issue or simply accepted Thatcher's decision.
Lawson describes how he ruled out the resignation option:
At the end of the meeting Margaret swept out, w ith Griffiths trotting 
behind her. I asked Willie, Geoffrey and N orm an to accompany me 
next door to N um ber 11 to discuss w hat had  happened. I was 
extremely depressed and told them that, in the circumstances, I saw
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little point in carrying on and probably ought to resign. Willie, too, 
had clearly found it a depressing as well as embarrassing occasion, 
b u t urged me not to resign, as d id  both  Geoffrey and Norm an. 
N orm an said he was convinced that she w ould eventually come 
around and Willie agreed.
...After m uch reflection [I] decided to accept the advice of Willie, 
Geoffrey and Norm an not to throw in the towel. 132
However, w hat Lawson does not explain is on w hat basis he saw himself
staying in office: did he accept Thatcher's decision as final or not?
As one Cabinet opponent of membership adm itted Lawson together
w ith  Howe w ould have been w ithin their rights to dem and a Cabinet
meeting on the issue.133 They would have been backed in their dem and by
W hitelaw who was prepared to act on their behalf in this regard if they so
wished. Two ministers in Cabinet at the time commented that there was a
reasonably good chance that Lawson and Howe w ould have been backed by
the m ajority of the Cabinet.134 Indeed Thatcher herself rem arks that: 'I
knew that I was in a very small minority within the Cabinet on this matter,
though m ost of m y colleagues were probably no t overinterested in it
anyw ay.'135 There are three possible reasons for Lawson's and Howe's lack of
action. First, they were sim ply not prepared to act together. Certainly,
Lawson's demobilisation of Howe and the Foreign Office in the sum m er
suggested a general unwillingness to make common allies w ith  Howe and
his officials. For Lawson and the Treasury to have combined w ith Howe
and the Foreign Office w ould have flown in the face of the Treasury's
understanding of its raison d'etre. One Foreign Office official commented:
I dare say there was a bit of reluctance of Treasury officials to plot w ith 
Foreign Office officials. The Treasury's view usually is that w hat is 
required is for the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the day to be 
absolutely at one...and [not] of allowing the Chancellor to plot w ith 
the Foreign Secretary.135
Second, Lawson and Howe might have considered that the Cabinet
was irrelevant to the issue and that there was no choice but to let the matter
rest. As one former Cabinet minister commented on the situation:
The nature of British government invests enormous authority in the 
Prim e M inister and if the Prime M inister is a bad  loser - and I
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promise you the previous Prime Minister was a very bad loser - then 
I think she could have probably survived.137
In general terms, Lawson recognised that it was harder to persuade Thatcher
at Cabinet level than in a meeting of the 13 November genre:
She was in practice at her best in bilaterals and other small gatherings. 
The larger the num bers, the greater her tendency to play to  the 
gallery,either showing off her ow n knowledge on the subject or 
rounding, in  a profoundly  em barrassing way, on some hapless 
colleague whom she felt either bullyable by nature or objectively in a 
weak position at a particular time. Geoffrey Howe was a favourite 
v ictim .133
At the same time, neither Lawson nor Howe appeared to believe that
economic policy should be decided in Cabinet.
Third, Lawson and Howe may have believed that Thatcher's position
as Prime Minister was vulnerable and, hence, that Thatcher's veto was only
a tem porary problem. There is indeed some evidence that Lawson and
Howe did  not view the 13 November meeting as the end of the m atter. In
his memoirs, Lawson describes how in December he gave the green light to
a secret mission of officials to Germany which he had planned in the hope
of a favourable outcome to the 13 November meeting. On 7 December,
M iddleton, Littler and Anthony Loehnis (from the Bank) w ent on a highly
confidential mission to Bonn to discuss contingency planning in the event
of the UK deciding to enter ERM. They talked to both Finance Ministry and
B undesbank officials w ith  Loehnis exam ining w ith  the B undesbank
possible sw ap arrangem ents (a substantial line of short term  credit) to
support UK entry. Lawson offers no explanation of the purpose of this
meeting in view of Thatcher's veto nor how he reconciled w ith his belief
expressed on the next page that: 'I could not see M argaret changing her
m ind so soon after the drama of 13 November.'139
One Thatcher confidant, at least, believed that Lawson and Howe
reconciled their continuing tenure in office after her veto by supposing that
Thatcher's own tenure in office was limited. He commented:
W ithin the highest reaches of the Conservative party  and Cabinet, 
they were always anxious to get rid of her. They thought they w ould
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sit it out and that they would be in a powerful position w hen she was 
ru ined  by something or other. W estland was only just around the 
corner.140
Certainly, Lawson has made publicly clear that at least by February 1986, the 
W estland  affair cou ld  have fin ish ed  T h atch er's  p re m ie rsh ip .141 
Nevertheless, w hether Lawson and Howe hoped that the W estland affair 
w ould deliver them ERM membership or not, Thatcher did survive and the 
veto rem ained.
The Luxembourg Sum m it
After debating ERM m embership on 13 November exclusively in term s of
econom ic policy, the governm ent w as quickly forced to face the
consequences of non mem bership in term s of its EC policy. In the final
negotiations towards the Single European Act (SEA), three issues stood out:
the completion of the Single Market; the extension of majority voting in  the
Council of Ministers; and the Community's future monetary development.
O n the m onetary issue, mem ber states were deciding w hether to
write the EMS in the Treaty of Rome and the objective of m onetary union
into the SEA. To inscribe the EMS into the Treaty w ould m ean that any
future development of monetary policy affecting EC institutions was subject
to  the full reform  process of In ter-G overnm ental Conferences and
ratification by national parliam ents. O n 14 November, Lawson m inuted
Thatcher on the issue of monetary union:
The inclusion of EMU [economic and m onetary union] as a Treaty 
objective w ould  be a political com m itm ent going w ell beyond 
previous references to EMU, which have been non-binding European 
Council resolutions or solemn declarations. It would be perceived in 
political terms as a major change.
O ur objective in my view should be to avoid any am endm ent to 
Article 107 [the article in the Rome Treaty concerning exchange rates]. 
The Delors proposal is unacceptable both politically and in substance. 
So is any reference to EMU.142
On 18 Novem ber the UK and Germ an Governments com bined to 
oppose w riting the EMS into the Treaty of Rome on the grounds tha t it 
w ould  restrict the autonom y of their central banks to control m onetary
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policy. However, Lawson was more concerned about the issue of m onetary 
union. W ith the negotiations due to be finalised at the Luxem bourg 
sum m it in December, Lawson again urged Thatcher to stand firm against 
any com m itm ent to  m onetary  union. Law son believed tha t such a 
commitment w ould be taken very seriously both  by the major m em ber 
states and the Commission. By contrast the Foreign Office told Thatcher that 
such a commitment would be rhetorical rather than substantive. In part this 
m ay have reflected the Foreign Office's belief that it was necessary to 
underplay this dimension of the Treaty if Thatcher were to accept it rather 
than  their objective assessment of the situation.143 One form er m inister 
commented on the Foreign Office's attitude: 'they felt that you know, Christ, 
if she knew w hat we were up to, it would be like getting our money back all 
over a g a in .'144Certainly, the Com m ission d id  regard  any po ten tial 
comm itm ent to m onetary union as serious.145 However, it is not evident 
that this view was shared by the other member states at least for the short to 
m edium  term.
After a bilateral meeting in London between Thatcher and Chancellor 
Kohl, Thatcher w ent to Luxembourg convinced that the governm ent had 
continuing German support to oppose writing the EMS into the Treaty of 
Rome. However, at the summit, Kohl backtracked on the issue after a 
heated exchange w ith Thatcher on the UK's non-membership of ERM. Kohl 
then proceeded to broker a compromise deal in which the EMS entered the 
Treaty of Rome together w ith a lim ited commitment to the 'progressive 
realisation of economic and monetary union.' The UK was left isolated and 
Thatcher reluctantly signed the resulting deal. Thus, the governm ent was 
forced to pay a price for continuing non-membership in its EC policy.146
In the short term, the government's effective defeat on the m onetary 
issue was of little significance. W riting the EMS into the Treaty changed 
no th ing  in  practical term s and there w ere precedents of p revious 
com m itm ents to m onetary union stem m ing back to 1972 w hich never 
produced any firm action. Neither was there any evidence that m onetary 
union w as on the foreseeable agenda of either the French or Germ an
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governments. Nevertheless, the potential costs of the defeat in the m edium  
to long term  were considerably greater. The SEA strengthened both  the 
transnational element of the EC and its sense of direction and so increased 
the likelihood of further integration. Consequently the EC's m onetary 
arrangem ents were likely to reoccur as an issue again in  the future. 
M oreover, if any m ember-states were to become actively interested in 
m oving tow ards m onetary union on economic grounds, then  the SEA 
provided  a basis for arguing that this was a fundam ental p a rt of the 
C om m unity 's development.
At the same time, the SEA raised additional questions about the 
viability of the UK's non-membership in  the future. First, if the ultim ate 
objective of the Single M arket was to improve the efficiency of resource 
allocation in the EC, then did not sterling staying out of ERM produce 
inefficient exchange rate volatility? To go further, was it logical to have a 
Single Market w ithout a common currency? Second, the prospect of a single 
financial m arket opened up the possibility of banks and other institutions 
conducting business in one EC state w hilst being subject to central bank 
regulation  in  other states. In these circumstances, there w ould  be an 
increased onus on co-operation among central banks to ensure effective 
national m onetary policies whilst the UK w ould rem ain apart from  the 
C om m unity 's m onetary institution. 147 
Conclusions
The government ended 1985 outside the ERM despite intense pressure both 
from  w ithin  and outside the core executive for entry.The sterling crisis 
created a new debate on new terms w ithout resulting in ERM membership. 
This was entirely due to the power of the Prime Minister w ithin the core 
executive. Nevertheless, Thatcher's veto could not resolve the issues which 
m em bership raised. In term s of EC policy, m em bership w ould  alm ost 
inevitably  rem ain  an issue as long the EC m oved tow ards fu rther 
integration. In terms of economic policy, the government was forced to re­
examine m em bership after the crisis caused by its am bivalent attitude 
tow ards the exchange rate and it now ended 1985 further divided on  the
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same issue by its internal schism over ERM. An underlying question about 
the UK economy remained: could the UK core executive agree on its 
exchange rate policy? W ithout such agreement further sterling crises were 
likely to occur and the issue of ERM membership w ould resurface.
135
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER 3
1. D. Smith, (1992) From Boom to Bust: Trial and Error in British 
Economic Policy, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 55; Economist, July 27, 1985, 12; 
Financial Times, August 22, 1985.
2. H. Ungerer et al. (1989)The EMS Developments and Perspectives, 
W ashington: IMF, 2; Economist, September 19, 1987, 86; Guardian, April 5, 
1991.
3. P. Hall, (1986) Governing the Economy: The Politics o f State 
Intervention in Britain and France, Cambridge: Polity, 198-202; M. Guitzan 
et al., (1988) Policy Co-ordination in the European Monetary System, 
W ashington: IMF. 48-49.
4. N. Lawson, (1992) The View From No 11: Memoirs of a Tory 
Radical, London: Bantam, 450-451; N on-attributable  in terv iew  w ith  
Treasury official.
5. Lawson, Memoirs, 451; Non-attributable interview w ith  Treasury 
official.
6. Lawson, Memoirs, 450-451; Smith, Boom to Bust, 51.
7. Lawson, Memoirs, 450-453.
8. D. Smith, (1987) The Rise and Fall of Monetarism: The Theory and 
Politics of an Economic Experiment, H arm ondsw orth: Penguin, 119; W. 
Keegan, (1989) M r Lawson's Economic Gamble, London: H odder and 
Stoughton, 122, 135.
136
9. Smith, Monetarism, 119-120; Keegan, Economic Gamble, 122, 135.
10. Lawson, Memoirs, 457.
11. Lawson, Memoirs, 464.
12. Lawson, Memoirs, 464-465.
13. Sm ith, M o n eta r ism , 118; Keegan, Economic Gamble, 117; 
Economist, January 19, 1985, 13; Financial Times, February 9, 1985; Hansard, 
November 12, 1984, 418,428.
14. Smith, Monetarism, 51; Times, October 27, 1984.
15. Financial Times, Novem ber 26, 1984; Times, A ugust 6, 1984; 
Financial Times, October 24, 1984.
16. Lawson, Memoirs, 484-485.
17. Non-attributable interview with Treasury official.
18. Lawson, Memoirs, 485.
19. S. George, (1990) An Awkward Partner: Britain in the EC, Oxford: 
U niversity Press, 157-158; Financial Times, October 24, 1984; Financial 
Times, Novem ber 30, 1984; Times, October 22, 1983; Economist, December 
24, 1983, 50; Economist, March 17, 1984, 59; Economist, March 24, 1984, 1; 
Economist, March 31, 1984, 36; Economist, July 7, 1984, 52.
20. R. H arris, (1990) The Good and Faithful Servant: The 
Unauthorised Biography o f Bernard Ingham, London: Faber and Faber, 123; 
Financial Times, January 7, 1985; Times, January 7, 1985.
137
21. Financial Times, January 8, 1985; Financial Times, January 14, 
1985; Times, January 27, 1985 ; Times, January 7, 1985, 1.
22. Smith, Monetarism, 121; Financial Times, January 11, 1985, 1, 18; 
Financial Times, January 12, 1985; Times, January 12, 1985.
23. Harris, Bernard Ingham, 125; Smith, M onetarism, 121; Financial 
Times, January 15, 1985; Times, January 14, 1985.
24. H arris, Bernard Ingham, 125; Financial Times, January 14, 1985; 
Financial Times, January 15, 1985; Times, January 15, 1985.
25. Hansard, 13 January, 1985.
26. Financial Times, January 25, 1985. Financial Times, January 19,
1985.
27. Financial Times, January 25, 1995.
28. Financial Times, January 25, 1985, 1; Financial Times, January 29, 
1985; Economist, February 2, 1985, 15, 19.
29. Harris, Bernard Ingham, 125.
30. Economist, February 2, 1985, 15; Financial Times, January 30, 1985.
31. Smith, M onetarism , 123; D. McKie ed., (1992) The Election: A  
Voter's Guide, London: Fourth Estate, 79; Times, January 15, 1985; Financial 
Times, February 2, 1985; Financial Times, February 9, 1985.
32. Financial Times, February 1,1985,1; Financial Times, February 12,
138
1985; Financial Times, February 13,1985; Financial Times, February 14, 1985; 
Financial Times, February 20, 1985; Financial Times, February 23, 1985; 
Financial Times, February 25, 1985; Financial Times, February 26, 1985; 
Financial Times, February 28, 1985.
33. Economist, February 9, 1985, 90; Economist, February 23, 1985, 104.
34. Lawson, Memoirs, 485.
35. Non-attributable interview w ith Treasury official.
36. Lawson, Memoirs, 486.
37. Lawson, Memoirs, 487; Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 695.
38. Keegan, Economic Gamble, 156; Lawson, M em oirs, 488; Tim es, 
January 31,1985.
39. Financial Times, January 16, 1985; Financial Times, February 19, 
1985; Times, February 8, 1985; Times, February 19, 1985.
40. Lawson, Memoirs, 488-499; Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 694-
695.
41. Financial Times, February 1, 1985; Financial Times, February 27, 
1985; Times, 31 January, 1985..
42. Financial Times, February 21, 1985; N on-attributable interview  
w ith CBI official.
43. Non-attributable interview with CBI official.
139
44. House of Commons, (1985) Select Committee on the Treasury and 
the Civil Service Minutes of Evidence, London: HMSO, 4.
45. House of Commons, (1985) Select Committee on the Treasury and 
the Civil Service Minutes of Evidence ,16; N on-attributable interview  w ith  
CBI official.
46. Non-attributable interview with CBI official.
47. House of Commons (1985) Select Committee on the Treasury and 
the Civil Service Minutes of Evidence, 1985, 8, 11.
48. House of Commons (1985) Select Committee on the Treasury and 
the Civil Service Minutes of Evidence, 1985, 3.
49. Financial Times, February 21, 1985.
50. House of Commons (1985)Select Committee on the Treasury and 
the Civil Service Minutes of Evidence, 13.
51. Financial Times, February 21, 1985.
52. Non-attributable interview with CBI official.
53. Non-attributable interview with CBI official.
54. Financial Times, March 22, 1985; Financial Times, April 13, 1985; 
Times, June 24, 1985; Economist, November 23, 1985, 35; Non-attributable 
interview w ith City official.
55. Financial Times, A ugust 22, 1985; Financial Times, October 21, 
1985; Financial Times, November 14, 1985; Times, November 4, 1985.
140
56. Non-attributable interview with IoD official.
57. Financial Times, September 4, 1985; Times, Septem ber 4, 1985; 
Non-attributable interview with IoD official.
58. A. Britton, (1991) Macro-Economic Policy in Britain 1974-1987, 
Cambridge: U niversity Press, 140; W. Keegan, (1986) 'Tow ards a New  
Bretton W oods', The Royal Bank of Scotland Review, 149 (6) 6; Keegan, 
Economic Gamble, 61, 161, 173. McKie ed., Election, 73.
59. Keegan, Economic Gamble, 177, 180; Smith, M onetarism  , 125; 
Financial Times, November 14, 1985.
60. D. Lomax, (1987) 'The UK Case' in P. van den Bempt, The  
European M onetary System Towards More Convergence and Closer 
Integration, Louven: Acco, 198; House of Commons (1990) Select Committee 
on the Treasury and the Civil Service Minutes of Evidence, 1985, 62.
61. C. Johnson, (1991)The Economy Under Mrs Thatcher 1979-199, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 281.
62. Keegan, Economic Gamble, 171-172, 182; House of Commons, 
(1985) Select Committee on the Treasury and the Civil Service T h irteen th  
Report, London: HMSO, xix, 5; House of Commons, Select Committee on 
the Treasury and the Civil Service Minutes of Evidence ,61; Financial 
Times, February 21, 1985.
63. B. Jessop et al., (1988) Thatcherism, Cambridge: Polity, 171; B. 
Jessop, (1986) 'Thatcherism 's Mid-life Crisis', New Socialist, 36, 1986. 15 B. 
Jessop, (1990) Conservative Regimes and the Transition to Post Fordism: 
The Case of Great Britain and West Germany, Essex: W orking Paper. 23; K.
141
Middlemass, (1991) Power, Competition and the State, Vol 3: The End of the 
Postwar Era: Britain Since 1974, London: Macmillan, 387-388; M. Reid, (1988) 
All Change in the City, London: Macmillan, 44-45; M. M oran (1991) The 
Politics of the Financial Services Revolution, London: Macmillan, 76-78.
64. D. Gibbs, (1989) 'G overnm ent and Industria l Change: An 
O verview ', in D. Gibbs, ed., Government Policy and Industrial Change, 
London: Routledge, 10; J. Bachtler and P. Davies, (1989) 'Economic 
Restructuring and Services Policy', in D. Gibbs, ed., Government Policy and 
Industrial Change, London: Routledge, 157-161; Johnson, Economy Under 
Thatcher, 268.
65. Jessop et al., Thatcherism, 173; Jessop, 'Mid-Life C risis/ 15; J. 
D unning, (1986) Japanese Participation in UK Industry, London: Croom 
Helm, 20.
66. George, Awkward Partner, 164-5; Economist, February 16, 1985, 
59; Economist, March 9, 1985, 60; Economist, June 29, 1985, 60.
67. House of Commons (1985) Select Committee on the Treasury and 
Civil Service Minutes of Evidence, 98-99; Times, January 16,1985; Financial 
Times, January 16, 1985.
68. Financial Times, March 28, 1985; Financial Times, Septem ber 12, 
1985; Financial Times, November 8, 1985; Times, November 30, 1985.
69. Lawson, M em oirs, 489-490; N on-attributable in terview  w ith  
Treasury official.
70. Non-attributable interview w ith Treasury official.
71. Non-attributable interview.
142
72. Lawson, Memoirs, 486.
73. Non-attributable interview w ith Treasury official.
74. Non-attributable interview with Treasury official.
75. Lawson, Memoirs, 486.
76. Lawson, Memoirs, 486.
77. Non-attributable interview with Treasury official.
78. Non-attributable interview with Treasury official.
79. Non-attributable interview w ith Treasury official.
80. Non-attributable interview with Treasury official.
81. Non-attributable interview with Treasury official.
82. N. Lawson, Memoirs, 478.
83. Non-attributable interview w ith Treasury official.
84. Non-attributable interview w ith Treasury official.
85. Lawson M emoirs, , 486; Keegan, Economic Gamble, 156; Non- 
attributable interviews with Bank of England official.
86. Smith, Monetarism, 52.
143
87. Non-attributable interview w ith Bank of England official.
88. Non-attributable interview with Bank of England official.
89. Lawson, Memoirs, 496.
90. Non-attributable interview with Treasury official.
91. Non-attributable interview with Treasury official.
92. Lawson, Memoirs, 489-491; Times, September 17, 1985.
93. Non-attributable interview w ith Treasury official.
94. Smith, Monetarism, 56-57.
95. Non-attributable interview with Treasury official.
96. Non-attributable interview with Treasury official.
97. Non-attributable interview with Treasury official.
98. Lawson, Memoirs, 888.
99. Lawson, Memoirs, 491-493.
100. Non-attributable interview with Treasury official.
101. Non-attributable interview with Treasury official.
102. Lawson, Memoirs, 491-492.
144
103. Lawson, M em oirs, 499; Financial Times, June 13, 1985; Times, 
March 23, 1985; Times, May 24,1985, 8.
104. Lawson, Memoirs, 494-496; Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 697.
105. Lawson, Memoirs , 496-497.
106. Lawson, Memoirs, 1056.
107. Non-attributable interview with Treasury official.
108. Lawson, Memoirs, 497-498.
109. Lawson, Memoirs, 498-499; Non-attributable interviews.
110. Non-attributable interview.
111. Lawson, Memoirs, 499; Non-attributable interview.
112. Lawson, Memoirs, 499.
113. McKie ed., Election, 287.
114. Non-attributable interview.
115. Lawson, Memoirs, 478, 666, 686.
116. Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 698.
117. Non-attributable interview w ith Cabinet Minister
118. Non-attributable interview w ith Foreign Office official.
145
119. I. G ilm our, (1992) Dancing With Dogma: Britain Under 
Thatcherism London: Simon Schuster, 240.
120. S. Brittan, (1989) 'The Thatcher Government's Economic Policy' 
in D. Kavanagh and A. Seldon, eds., The Thatcher Effect, Oxford: University 
Press. 33; Financial Times, June 11 1986; Financial Times, Novem ber 19, 
1986.
121. Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 696.
122. Lawson, Memoirs, 496-497.
123. Non-attributable interview with Treasury official
124. Non-attributable interview with Foreign Office official.
125. Non-attributable interview with Bank of England official.
126. Financial Times, October 21, 1986; Financial Times, N ovem ber 
14, 1985; Financial Times, May 29, 1988.
127. Non-attributable interview w ith Treasury official.
128. Non-attributable interview.
129. Non-attributable interview w ith Treasury official.
130. Non-attributable interview.
131. Non-attributable interview.
146
132. Lawson, Memoirs, 500.
133. Non-attributable interview.
134. Non-attributable interviews.
135. Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 698.
136. N on attributable interview w ith Foreign Office official.
137. Non-attributable interview w ith Cabinet minister.
138. Lawson, Memoirs, 129.
139. Lawson, Memoirs, 501.
140. Non-attributable interview.
141. Lawson, Memoirs, 679.
142. Lawson, Memoirs, 893.
143. Lawson, M em o irs , 893; Tim es, N ovem ber 19, 1985; N on- 
attributable interview.
144. Non-attributable interview with Cabinet minister.
145. Non-attributable interview w ith Commission official.
146. Financial Times, November 28, 1985; Financial Times, December 
2, 1985; Financial Times, December 3, 1985; Times, Novem ber 19, 1985; 
Times, December 3, 1985; Economist, December 7, 1985.
147
147. F. McDonald, and G. Zis, (1989) T h e  EMS: Towards 1992 and 
B eyond', The Journal of Common Market Studies, 27 (3), 192; Financial 
Times, June 16, 1988.
148
CHAPTER 4 
TRYING TO SOLVE THE STERLING PROBLEM
This chapter examines the evolution of policy from the start of 1986 to the 
Conservative party 's election victory in 1987. Section 4.1 exam ines the 
opera tion  of the ERM during  the period. Section 4.2 contrasts the 
governm ent's economic policy from January to A ugust 1986 w ith  the 
actions of the ERM states. Section 4.3 analyses the choices which m inisters 
faced and made about ERM membership in September and October 1986. 
Section 4.3 considers the period from October 1986 to June 1987 and the 
decision to shadow  the Deutschmark. Finally, section 4.4 examines the 
relation of the shadowing policy to ERM membership.
4.1: COMPETITIVE DISINFLATION AND THE FRANC FORT 
In 1986 and the first half of 1987, the ERM continued to operate as a 
relatively fixed-exchange rate system w ith a counter-inflationary bias in 
both  fiscal and m onetary terms. Member states were determ ined to retain 
their parities against the Deutschmark whenever possible. On 6 April 1986, 
there was a general realignment of currencies in which Germany, Holland, 
Belgium and Luxembourg all revalued and France devalued. The French 
devaluation  w as essentially a pre-em ptive strike to p reven t the franc 
coming under pressure after a new right-w ing governm ent came into 
power in March. At the same time, the Italian government dem onstrated its 
commitment to its parity by refusing to devalue despite some pressure on 
the lira. On 2 A ugust Ireland devalued. As w ith  France, this was not a 
competitive devaluation against the other member states. Rather, the Irish 
governm ent reluctantly asked for a devaluation to offset the problem s 
caused to its currency by its appreciation against sterling.1
The ERM states' determination to maintain their parities against the 
Deutschmark in 1986 was given added significance by a dramatic fall in  the 
price of oil between the first and second quarters of the year. There was an 
opportunity to use that fall to offset other inflationary pressure. However, 
the ERM states, led by Germany m aintained tight m onetary and fiscal
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policies and allowed the full benefit of the fall to feed through into a lower 
inflation rate.2 As figure 4.1 shows, France, Germany and Italy all achieved 
a substantial fall in inflation 1986 and Italy secured a further fall in 1987.
Figure 4.1: Inflation in ERM States 1985-1987
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In 1987 France demonstrated the full extent of its commitment to 
m aintaining the franc. After the devaluation in April 1986 the French 
government renewed its efforts to reduce wage costs. By January 1987 wage 
costs were indeed rising more slowly in France than in Germany. 
Nevertheless, the franc came under pressure against the Deutschmark. The 
French government refused to devalue citing the positive comparative 
fundamentals in the real economy, and insisting that the situation was a
■  1985 
B  1986 
B  1987
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problem  for the Deutschmark. It allowed the franc to fall through its ERM 
floor w hich obliged the Bundesbank to intervene to support the franc. The 
Bundesbank ended up selling DM5 billion w hich w as its largest sum  of 
intervention to date within ERM at considerable cost to the German money 
supply. This experience was enough to convince both the Bundesbank and 
the Germ an governm ent that the Deutschmark should be revalued rather 
than  the franc devalued. On 11 January, Germany, Holland, Belgium and 
Luxembourg all revalued and no state devalued. From now on, the French 
governm ent was determ ined to hold out against any depreciation of the 
franc against the Deutschmark whether by revaluation or devaluation. The 
guiding force of French economic policy would be 'competitive disinflation' 
and the means to achieve it would be the franc fort.3
4.2: DEVALUATION AND NON-MEMBERSHIP
In N ovem ber 1985 Thatcher denied Lawson and the T reasury their
p referred  m onetary option w ithout offering an a lternative m onetary
fram ew ork either in term s of the exchange rate or m onetary targets.
Consequently, at the start of 1986, the government was left in  a m onetary
policy vacuum. One Treasury official saw the problem as how to best make
do w ith  the existing policy of an non-credible and unused MO target and a
de facto aim of exchange rate stability:
In a sense, anything that one might have done as an alternative, we 
were already by definition d o in g .... The problem became how can you 
present this stuff better w ithout the advantage of ERM.4
D uring the first weeks of January 1986 and w ith  oil prices dram atically 
falling, sterling came under pressure. On 9 January, Lawson proposed to 
Thatcher a 1 per cent rise in interest rates to protect sterling to which she 
reluctantly agreed. In the following weeks, sterling continued to fall. On 24 
January Thatcher acquiesced to another Lawson proposal for a 1 per cent rate 
rise. How ever, before the announcem ent was due to be m ade, Leigh- 
Pemberton told Lawson that sterling was recovering and Lawson rescinded 
the rate rise.5
Having sought to stabilise sterling for these weeks in line w ith  the
151
1985 policy, the governm ent now filled the vacuum  w ith a new policy.
Between the first and second quarters of 1986 the price of oil halved. The
governm ent took the opportunity  to substantially devalue sterling and
offset the inflationary consequences against lower fuel prices. Between the
fourth quarters of 1985 and 1986, sterling's effective rate fell by 16 per cent
and its Deutschmark rate by 25 per cent. In the fourth quarter of 1986 sterling
averaged DM2.86 compared to DM3.71 a year previously. At the same time
inflation fell during the year to a low of 2.4 per cent in August.6
In his memoirs, Lawson rejects any suggestions that the government
either sought or welcomed the devaluation in sterling. Rather, he claims
that w hilst recognising that some fall in sterling was inevitable w ith  oil
prices falling, he mistakingly acquiesced to sterling's depreciation, caught in
the m onetary vacuum left by Thatcher's veto of ERM membership.
W hile I accepted that a halving of the price of oil m ade some 
exchange rate depreciation inevitable and necessary, I soon came to
the view that sterling was falling too far too fast My confidence
that sterling had  w eathered the storm  [after January 1986] w as 
distinctly prem ature. Not only had I acquiesced in  the relatively 
modest depreciation that had already occurred, bu t the second half of 
1986 was to see a much more serious sterling slide. As a result, I lost 
the opportunity to lock in the m arked fall in  inflation that the oil 
price collapse had temporarily secured, and allowed policy to become 
looser just as the credit boom was taking off. Needless to say, I 
disliked intensely sterling's depreciation, in  the second half of 1986; 
but there was a limit to what I could do, outside the ERM, particularly 
given M argaret's profound hostility to raising in terest rates or 
maintaining any kind of exchange rate target. 7
Thatcher herself under a heading 'Interest rates and Inflation: 1986' does not 
actually accord a single w ord to the decisions about interest rates and the 
exchange rate and their implications for inflation during the year.8
H ow ever, despite Lawson's subsequent claims, it is apparent on 
several scores that devaluation was an active government policy which was 
in direct contrast both  to the 1985 policy and to w hat w ould have been 
possible inside ERM. First, one Bank of England official adm itted that a 
devaluation policy existed:
We found ourselves, more consciously that at any other time that I
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can remember, saying this is an event [the oil price fall] that actually 
does require us, justifies and requires us, to seek to depress our real 
exchange rate because we have to shift resources into the balance of 
paym ents from other sectors of the economy to substitute for the 
adverse movements in the terms of the trade in the oil sector. That 
was a judgem ent we w ould not have been able to attem pt had  we 
gone into the ERM9
Second, the government's actions as sterling fell during 1986 are hard
to reconcile w ith  Lawson's later description of them. From February to
September 1986, the Bank of England did not intervene to defend sterling
and the government cut interest rates in March, twice in April and in May.
Rather than acting to avert sterling's fall, the governm ent encouraged it
further. 10 During the second half of 1986, as sterling's decline accelerated,
Lawson on his ow n admission made no attem pt to convince Thatcher that
an interest rate rise was necessary. At the same time, Lawson offers no
explanation of w hy Thatcher's perennial dislike of interest rate increases
should act as a 'lim it on w hat (he) could do' in 1986 and not at other times
w hen sterling was under pressure.
Third, the governm ent clearly benefitted from  the devaluation
policy. In allowing sterling to fall and so boosting the competitiveness of
exports, the governm ent provided a significant stimulus to the previously
sluggish economy. As Keegan comments:
The beauty of the 1986 devaluation from Lawson's point of view was 
that it was an essential prelude to the burst of grow th in  the real 
economy which led up to the 1987 general election, but there was no 
great political dram a attached to it in the way that affects Labour 
governments on such occasions.11
Indeed, w ith a one per cent cut in the basic rate of income tax in the 
1986 budget, the governm ent's obvious aim was to push  for grow th in  all 
respects. As a result, the UK economy grew faster than any other G7 
economy during 1986 and unemployment finally began to fall in the second 
part of the year.^
In using  the oil price fall as a vehicle for grow th  th ro u g h  
devaluation, the government stood apart from the ERM states.
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Figure 4.2: Comparative Effective Exchange Rates 1985-1986
(Source: Economic Outlook)
Figure 4.2 shows that from 1985 to 1986, the effective exchange rate of 
all the ERM states rose whilst that of the UK fell. Given sterling's 
depreciation, inflation did not fall as fast in the UK as in France, Germany 
or Italy as figure 4.3 (page 155) indicates. Correspondingly, UK growth was 
over one per cent higher.
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Figure 4.3: Comparative Falls in Inflation 1985-1986 and Growth in 1986
■  Percentage Fall in Inflation 
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(Source: Economic Outlook.)
Lawson and Howe Go Public
Despite the discongruence between the governm ent's macro-economic 
policy and ERM membership, ERM did not disappear as an issue within the 
core executive. Opinions vary as to how m uch internal discussion 
continued in 1986. One senior Treasury official commented that in 1986 and 
1987 the Treasury 'd id  not try to keep the issue alive very much.' 13 By 
contrast, another senior official said: 'the thing was never off the tap. It was 
always there.'14
On 16 April, Lawson and Howe broke public rank with Thatcher on 
the issue when both made speeches expressing supporting for membership. 
Lawson later claimed that the timing of the speeches was co-incidental but 
the press assumed that the moves were co-ordinated by the Treasury and 
the Foreign Office. In his speech to the Lombard association, Lawson 
declared:
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In the right circumstances membership of a formal fixed exchange 
rate  system  can itself provide a very effective fram ew ork for 
m onetary policy. ... Of course the exchange rate will not signal the 
right policy action every time, any more than m onetary aggregates. 
But over the medium term, maintaining a fixed exchange rate against 
countries who share our resolve to reduce inflation is a pretty robust 
way of keeping domestic monetary policy on the rails.
But I see no role for an exchange rate target outside a formal exchange 
rate system, shared by other countries, and supported  by a co­
ordinated approach to economic management and intervention. And 
that, for the UK, means outside the exchange rate mechanism of the 
EMS.15
He then added that 'the government does not believe that the time is yet
right for us to join the ERM/16
For his part, How e argued that the UK could not postpone
indefinitely a decision on m em bership and suggested that the final say
should be left to the Treasury. On 6 June Howe w ent further and said that
some reasons for rem aining outside ERM such as the petro  currency
argum ent were now diminished:
There are still some reasons which remain, and these perhaps are 
based as m uch on the habit of not belonging as anything else....the 
position is not whether we are going to join. But that is an answer we 
cannot go on giving indefinitely.17
According to Lawson, their public intervention on the issue did not
lead to further confrontation w ith Thatcher w ho was now  in a stronger
position than during the W estland affair:
Geoffrey was keen to follow up our speeches w ith  more private 
pressure on Margaret. I told him I thought it best to w ait a little before 
return ing  to the charge. N ot that I w ould have objected in  the 
slightest had I thought that his proposed approach w ould have been 
productive, bu t unfortunately it was far more likely to be counter­
productive. ... His relationship w ith M argaret had  never been a 
particularly close one, and even by 1986 the signs of tension were 
beginning to become apparent. 18
However, at least as plausible an explanation of Lawson's inaction was that 
the governm ent was currently benefiting from an economic policy which 
was incompatible w ith entry to ERM. The real significance of Lawson and 
H ow e's public action was that it dem onstrated that they w ould  pu t
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m em bership back on the agenda if and w hen the governm ent decided it 
w anted to defend sterling again.
4.3: ANOTHER THATCHER VETO 
In September and October 1986, membership did resurface as an active issue 
of economic policy betw een Thatcher and other core executive actors. 
D uring early September, sterling was falling tow ards DM3.00 for the first 
time. The government now decided that any depreciation beyond that level 
was undesirable and ordered the Bank of England to start to defend sterling. 
To help the process, on 3 September the governm ent made a record $4 
billion FRN issue to boost the reserves.19 The governm ent could no t 
continue the devaluation  policy indefinitely. W ith the price of oil 
stabilising further depreciation in sterling w ould translate into an increase 
in inflation. Indeed the inflationary costs of sterling's weakness were already 
increasing since the weakness of UK manufacturing industry was leading to 
a grow th in imports. At the same time, inflationary pressure was m ounting 
elsewhere. Despite the fall in inflation in previous years, from 1984 average 
earnings growth rem ained at 7.5 per cent. In 1986, real disposable incomes 
rose by 42 per cent. Similarly, there was a significant increase in consumer 
dem and caused by the cut in income tax and a credit boom induced by 
financial deregulation.20
After the Bank of England's intervention, sterling continued to fall. 
On 23 September it came under further pressure after the publication of a 
record  m onthly  curren t account deficit of £886 m illion for A ugust. 
However, the governm ent did not w ant to raise interest rates before the 
Conservative Party conference. Instead, it turned to the Bundesbank for 
help. On 28 September Lawson and Leigh-Pemberton m et w ith Stoltenberg 
and Pohl during the annual IMF and W orld Bank meetings in Washington. 
Pohl was reluctant to offer any assistance. Lawson ended up suggesting a 
standby swap arrangem ent of a kind the Bundesbank had w ith the ERM 
states under which it effectively lent Deutschmarks for a specified period. 
Pohl agreed to consider the proposal.21 Lawson comments:
I telephoned M argaret to pu t her in the picture. She was furious that
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the Germans were not being more helpful, and w ent into her gut 
anti-German mode, which was never far below the surface. If the 
Germans would not play ball, she declared, she w ould pull the British 
Army out of the Rhine. More practically, she endorsed m y proposal 
to secure a substantial swap a r r a n g e m e n t .22
The next day Stoltenberg and Pohl agreed that the swap deal should 
go ahead and that the Bundesbank w ould act as an agent of the UK 
governm ent in the foreign exchange markets. It  was the first time since 
Bretton W oods that the Bundesbank was asked to act in this way. 
Immediately it became apparent on 30 September that the Bundesbank was 
acting to defend sterling, the currency stabilised only to fall below DM2.90 
w ithin  days. On 14 October, after the Conservative party  conference was 
over, the governm ent raised interest rates to 11 per cent and re-coupled 
m onetary policy to the exchange rate. At the same time, in  the 1986 
A utum n Statement the government committed itself to fiscal expansion. It 
planned an average increase in the volume of public expenditure of 1.75 per 
cent year over the following four years and promised further tax cu ts .2 3
The government's monetary and exchange rate objectives were again 
com patible w ith  ERM m em bership. Indeed, even m ore than  in  1985, 
m em bership offered clear monetary benefits. As figure 4.4 indicates, after 
the interest rate hike in October, the UK along w ith  Spain continued to 
suffer from  higher nom inal interest rates than  the ERM states. The 
governm ent was having to raise rates at a time w hen rates were falling 
elsewhere. In terms of real rates, the UK rem ained in an even poorer 
position  w ith  real rates over 2 per cent higher than those in  France, 
Germany, Holland and Italy. By contrast, as another non-member of ERM, 
Spain enjoyed low real rates. On long term government bonds, figure 4.5 
shows that the UK and Spain both had substantially higher rates than the 
ERM states.
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Figure 4.4: Comparative Nominal and Real Interest Rates
October 1986
■  Nominal Interest Rate 
□  Real Interest Rate
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(Source: The Economist Economic and 
October 25,1986)
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Figure 4.5: Comparative Long Term Government Bonds November 1986
(Source: The Economist Economic and Financial Indicators, 
November 1, 1986)
Financial commentators were very alert to the differential between
UK interest rates and those of the ERM states and argued that the markets
were demanding an UK interest rate premium because monetary policy was
unclear. For example, the Economist commented:
Higher than average interest rates means that Britain loses all the 
advantages that the anti-inflationary zeal of Mrs Thatcher and her 
ministers should have won for it. Just a few years ago, nobody would 
have believed that Italy with a budget deficit equal to 14 per cent of 
GDP, and a happy go-lucky record on inflation, would in 1986 be able
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to have lower interest rates in its long term governm ent bonds than 
Thatcherite Britain. The moral is unmistakable: those countries w ith 
currencies inside the EMS gain twice over by having fairly steady 
exchange rates and also relatively low interest rates.2*
As in 1985, ERM membership offered the governm ent the benefit of 
low er interest rates for a given rate of inflation at a time w hen it was 
struggling  to secure its re-election. Despite rising grow th and falling 
unem ploym ent, in September 1986 the governm ent trailed Labour in the 
opinion polls by 4 per cent and was tied w ith Labour on 39.5 per cent in 
October. After November 1985 devaluation proved an alternative stimulus 
to the economy bu t this option no longer existed. Only ERM membership 
could provide lower interest rates and relative competitiveness which was 
likely to prove a further stimulus to the economy.25.
The governm ent's fiscal policy was far less compatible w ith  ERM 
membership because the commitment to fiscal expansion diverged from the 
fiscal constraint of the ERM states. With the balance of payments m oving 
into deficit because of rising imports, credit booming and wages rising, fiscal 
expansion was likely to add fuel to an inflationary fire. By contrast, the ERM 
em phasised inflation convergence. With sterling averaging DM2.86 in  the 
fourth  quarter of 1986 m embership w ould impose less cost in term s of 
competitiveness than was the case in 1985. Nevertheless, despite the 1986 
devaluation, the UK's general manufacturing trade performance continued 
to deteriorate. If m em bership w ould no longer have been the obvious 
constraint on export-led growth that it was in 1985, it w ould still have 
created a balance of paym ents problem for the period after the general 
election.26
In the short term , the governm ent faced an apparent trade off of 
macro-economic objectives. ERM membership w ould m ean lower interest 
rates, fiscal restraint and a counter-inflationary commitment. Continuing 
non-m em bership  offered higher in terest rates b u t allow ed for fiscal 
expansion  and its in fla tionary  consequences. In  these term s, the 
governm ent faced a choice about whether lower interest rates or further
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income tax cuts were more necessary to secure its re-election.
In term s of its capital accum ulation priorities, the governm ent 
consolidated the position of the City in 1986 with the Financial Services Act. 
The City itself remained in favour of ERM membership and believed that it 
w o u ld  inject some financial discipline in to  the UK econom y. For 
m anufacturing industry, membership now offered the consolidation of its 
new  international competitiveness, in addition to exchange rate stability 
and reduced interest rates. During the year, the CBI continued its campaign 
for ERM entry: although it welcomed sterling's fall, business leaders quickly 
became restive about the accompanying increase in volatility. By contrast, 
for the multinational companies, membership was less advantageous than 
in  1985 because of their interest in a strong pound. 27 
The UK Presidency
As in  1985, the governm ent w anted  to play a positive role in  the 
developm ent of the EC. In July 1986 the UK took over the EC presidency. 
The government had a threefold agenda: first, and foremost to speed up the 
completion of the Single Market; second, to liberalise transport; and, third, 
to develop em ploym ent policy. By October the governm ent w as only 
making real progress on the Single Market.
At the same time the Commission and the other m em ber states, 
especially Germany, pu t renewed pressure on the UK to enter ERM. As the 
governm ent struggled  to defend sterling in  Septem ber and October, 
C om m ission officials became sharp ly  critical of the UK 's m onetary  
performance. At central bank level, Pohl vociferously insisted throughout 
the year that there w ould be no ecu-denom inated accounts in Germ any 
until the UK entered ERM. Later, the President of the Dutch Central bank, 
Wim Dulsenberg made a further call for membership and declared that: 'M y 
feeling is that the time is becom ing riper every day .'28 One official 
commented on how the Bank of England saw the attitude of the ERM state 
central banks:
I think there was generally a feeling that our recent and current
economic, inflation and exchange rate experience meant that we were
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not likely to be a comfortable bedfellow in the ERM. So from  the 
point of view of continued smooth operation of the ERM, they were 
not terribly anxious to welcome us in the near future. But there 's 
always among the member states a feeling of common purpose and 
the need to develop that common purpose in an institutional way. 
And there was a feeling I think, even at that time, that it was going to 
be difficult to move beyond the then present degree of integration to 
som ething at that time not specified w ithout UK m em bership of 
ERM.29
After Ireland was forced to devalue in August, the Irish government made 
its first public comment on the issue. The Finance Minister, John Bruton, 
declared  that the Irish pound  w ould continue to be vulnerab le  to 
devaluation so long as sterling rem ained outside ERM. Ireland's problem  
was that it needed to compensate against the ERM currencies for its large 
appreciation against sterling since more than 30 per cent of its exports were 
going to the UK.
Meanwhile the Commission and member state agricultural officials 
blam ed the UK's non-participation in ERM for increasing problem s w ith 
CAP. As a result of sterling's depreciation against the ERM currencies in 
1986, French lamb farmers suffered as the UK was able to export more lamb 
to France. For the same reason, UK beef producers were undercut by Irish 
farmers taking advantage of the devaluation of the Irish green pound. The 
agricultural ministers eventually reached a compromise agreement, b u t the 
ERM member states tended to believe that the situation was an unnecessary 
problem created by the UK government's intransigence over ERM.30
Thus, ERM m em bership continued to offer considerable potential 
benefit to the government in terms of its EC policy. It w ould have been a 
com m unitaire  gesture at a time w hen the governm ent was looking to 
develop a specific agenda for action.
Thatcher Vetoes Debate
After the interest rate rise on 9 October, ERM membership assumed a new 
salience in the political arena. For the first time the Labour party sought to 
make some political capital out of the issue On 15 October, Roy Hattersley, 
the Shadow Chancellor declared that Labour would support entry to achieve
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greater exchange rate  stability  on certain  conditions including: a
com m itm ent to expansion and fuller em ploym ent inside ERM; further
convergence in the financial and economic approaches of m ember states;
and, increased m utual currency support and co-ordination of trade policies
to protect countries which wished to expand. Clearly, Labour's conditions
w ould have transformed the ERM. However, Labour's move was significant
because it contrasted w ith  the governm ent's profession of support in
principle for membership but unwillingness to specify any conditions. On
the same day, David Owen and the Liberal Treasury spokesman, David
Penhaligon, dem anded m em bership in view of sterling 's recent fall. In
addition, the Conservative MP, David Howell, advocated entry to stabilise
sterling. Howell's intervention followed calls for membership earlier in  the
year in the House of Commons by the Conservative backbenchers, Stephen
Dorrel and Peter Hordern.31
W ithin the core executive itself, Lawson was anxious for Thatcher to
reconsider her position after the interest rate rise. Lawson believed that the
cost in interest rates of the current policy was too high:
As the autum n of 1986 w ent on and my political and  personal 
standing started to rise, I remained w orried about the low level of 
sterling. I did not see how it could be stabilised at a reasonably 
satisfactory level on the basis of any politically feasible interest rate 
changes in the run-up to an election - or even on the basis of a level 
of interest rates justified by the state of the domestic economy as we 
saw it at the time. I was convinced that we needed to bolster the effect 
of interest rate policy by a public commitment to a stable exchange 
rate system such as the ERM, not the least of whose virtues was an 
obligation to engage in short term intervention on the part of the 
central bank of the strong currency as well as that of the weak 
currency.32
A pparently , no longer believing in his ow n ability to persuade
Thatcher, Lawson turned to the Bundesbank chief, Pohl:
For some time Pohl had been arguing in public in favour of British 
membership of the ERM, and I knew that Margaret held him in high 
- perhaps exaggerated - regard. 33
Pohl was to come to London on 20 October and Lawson asked him to talk
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w ith  Thatcher on the issue. Speculation in the m edia m ounted that the
talks w ould lead to the UK entering ERM. However, at the start of her
m eeting w ith  Pohl, Thatcher made it clear she w ould not discuss the issue.
Im m ediately afterw ards, Ingham  told the lobby that the UK had no
in ten tion  of entering ERM before the next general election and that
sterling's current weakness was not caused by non-membership.3*
On 21 October Lawson tried to discuss membership w ith Thatcher in
a regular bilateral meeting but she dismissed him and made it clear that the
issue was off the agenda until after the election. Again, Lawson appeared to
renounce the option of confronting Thatcher in  Cabinet or another broad
core executive forum. Lawson claims that he lacked allies:
I was feeling increasingly frustrated. I was also becoming somewhat 
isolated, since m y senior officials had come to the view that the 
Prime Minister had vetoed entry, and that was that - at least for the 
foreseeable future.35
However, there were potential allies beyond the Treasury. At the Bank of
England, Leigh-Pemberton and his supporters rem ained com m itted to
m em bership as did Howe and the Foreign Office and other Cabinet
ministers. Lawson could also draw on significant support for his position
from  w ithin the Conservative party as a whole. Between September and
December, Lawson chaired the economic policy manifesto group. Of twelve
m em bers, all except John Redwood supported ERM m em bership as a
m anifesto comm itm ent dividing only between those w ho favoured entry
before or after the election.
As in  November 1985 Lawson decided not to take advantage of the
potential alliance w ith Howe to force a Cabinet meeting. At least one official
close to both men and a firm supporter of membership was exasperated by
their lack of action at this time:
I tried to 'ho t' Nigel Lawson and Geoffrey Howe up to dem and a 
Cabinet session on the subject. Because I thought it w ould be very 
difficult for her to refuse a firm demand for a Cabinet discussion on 
the basis of a firm paper from the Chancellor and the Foreign 
Secretary. And that she w ould find herself w ith  not too m any 
supporters. I don 't know why the hell they d idn 't do that. They never
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did.36
Apparently, Lawson and the Treasury did not w ant to use Howe and the
Foreign Office to further their case any more than in 1985. At the same time
Lawson appeared to collude w ith Thatcher in excluding other interested
parties from the decision-making process despite their likely support for his
position. MAFF and the Commission estim ated that non-m em bership of
ERM cost the UK 500 million ecus a year in CAP and Michael Jopling and
his officials supported ERM entry. However, the departm ent were not given
and so did not press for a voice in the decision-making process. One MAFF
official commented:
W hen the British Minister of Agriculture w anted to have a bigger 
devaluation  in  o rder to get higher prices to UK farm ers to 
compensate for UK inflation, the Commission w ould always propose 
a sm aller devaluation . A nd A ndriesson w ho w as th en  the 
Commissioner for Agriculture w ould trot out the argum ent that if 
Britain were in the ERM then it would be m uch easier. In that sense 
it made life harder for MAFF. But we w ouldn't go back [to Number 10 
or the Treasury] It w ould not have carried any w eight since the 
Treasury did not w ant to give more money to farmers anyway.3?
4.4: SHADOWING THE DEUTSCHMARK 
Thatcher second veto of ERM m em bership left a vacuum  in m onetary 
policy far greater than in 1985-1986. One of Thatcher's confidants' believed 
that the problem  was the lack of Prime M inisterial pow er in  economic 
policy:
They [Prime Ministers] can give the Chancellor guide lines. But 
you've got open market operations, debt issues, I m ean a whole host 
of issues which impinge on this and the Prime Minister is just not set 
up  to control w hat the Treasury is doing. The thing is that the w ay to 
control it is to fire the Chancellor.33
By contrast, the Treasury believed that the problem  was rather that 
Thatcher did not have an alternative policy to impose. One Treasury official 
com m ented:
She really, as far as I know, did not address the question of an 
alternative because the obvious alternative w as a m oney supply  
target bu t she knew we were in great difficulties w ith that. We were 
left in a kind of vacuum.39
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As a result, during November the main core executive protagonists
entered into public conflict. On 12 Novem ber Leigh-Pemberton told a
conference of Bundesbank officials and German business people that the
reasons for the UK's non-membership of ERM were 'entirely political.'40
One week later, the Financial Times published an interview w ith Thatcher
in  which she accepted that ERM membership w ould be reconsidered after
the election but gave full rein to her instinctive opposition to membership.
In an hour long interview ... she said the economy was not 'quite 
strong enough yet' for EMS. 'We are getting stronger and one day we 
will go in.' She said repeatedly that entry w ould not be an easy or a 
soft option. ... Mrs Thatcher also argued that other EC countries 
should reconsider the rules, particularly the retention of exchange 
control in most cases. She also expressed concern about 'hitching our 
w agon to a Deutschmark standard and all the problems we used to 
have w ith devaluation if it comes.' She thought the pound w ould be 
tested and that w ould mean 'swinging up interest rates very sharply' 
since 'there is no way you can intervene to that great an extent.'41
At the same time, she demonstrated her ambivalence about the whole idea
of assigning monetary policy to the exchange rate:
Mrs Thatcher thought the pound had gone low enough against the 
Deutschmark. She underlined her dislike of increasing interest rates 
and m arket intervention. 'We m ay believe it [the pound] has gone 
enough bu t it is w hat the m arket believes and you know w hat the 
m arket is: 95 per cent of the movement is speculation and the other 5 
per cent is trade.42
In response Lawson told the Treasury and Civil Service Select committee
the next day that: 'I think there is clearly a case for being part of an explicit
regional fixed exchange rate system .'43 On 26 Novem ber Howe again
publicly declared his support for membership in a speech to the CBI council:
The phrase 'w hen the time is right' should be seen as a declaration of 
intent rather than the reverse. ... It is a legitimate expectation of the 
business community that politicians should try to increase domestic 
price stability. The EMS does represent a fram ew ork in w hich it 
w ould be possible to produce at least a measure of stability.44
Such public conflict was just w hat the Treasury always w anted to 
avoid. In the view of one Treasury official:
It is absolutely essential that there should be agreement between the
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Prime Minister and the Chancellor on really im portant things. If and 
w hen they don 't agree, you carry on until they do.45
This a ttitude left an unansw ered question about w hat m onetary policy
should be until the Prime Minister and Chancellor could agree especially
since the public conflict in Novem ber created pressure on sterling. In
December, sterling did strengthen bu t the am biguity in policy rem ained.
According to Lawson, he believed that monetary conditions m easured by
MO still w arranted an increase in interest rates. On 10 December Lawson
and Thatcher met to discuss his proposal for a one per cent rate rise. Lawson
states that Thatcher was dismissive of the proposal:
However, she conceded w ith the utm ost reluctance that it m ight 
nevertheless be right to raise interest rates - bu t if, and only if, there 
was 'a clear trigger' for an increase.46
Presum ably, a 'clear trigger' m eant a further fall in sterling. If Lawson's 
version of events is to be accepted, the policy situation at the end of 1986 was 
ridd led  w ith  inconsistency. Lawson w anted sterling to enter ERM bu t 
outside ERM he wanted to assign monetary policy to a monetary aggregate. 
M eanw hile, Thatcher rejected bo th  ERM m em bership and  assigning 
m onetary policy to a monetary aggregate, which was the main alternative if 
policy was not going to operate on an ad hoc basis.
W hose Decision to Shadow?
At the start of 1987, the policy vacuum  left the governm ent w ith a new 
dilemma. Sterling was strengthening as the short term outlook for the UK 
econom y im proved. The governm ent could now either use m onetary  
policy and intervention to place a cap on sterling and operate a stable 
exchange rate policy outside the ERM. Or it could allow sterling to 
appreciate and wipe out the gain in competitiveness achieved during 1986. 
Precisely how the governm ent chose to resolve this dilemma became an 
issue of political dispute in itself.47
W hat is indisputable is that at the G7 meeting of 21-22 February in 
Paris, the UK governm ent signed the Louvre international accord on 
exchange rate management. The G7 agreed to try to stabilise the dollar
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against the yen and the Deutschmark, and by implication against the ERM 
currencies. Although no target rates were published, the G7 central banks 
were to take co-ordinated action if and when there was divergence from the 
rough prevailing rates. At the same time, the agreement aspired to greater 
co-ordination of fiscal policy to try and combat the w idening external 
imbalances betw een the G7 states which logically could not be rectified by 
exchange rate adjustment. Germany and Japan agreed, nominally at least, to 
provide greater stim ulus and the US to restrain policy. In term s of the 
practice of UK policy, the Louvre Accord was ambiguous. Whilst the aim of 
Louvre was to stabilise the dollar (which included its rate against sterling), 
the means for achieving this goal was defined in terms of the Deutschmark 
to which sterling was not tied as a non-ERM participant.48
In practice, the outcome of Louvre was tha t the governm ent's 
exchange rate policy was to shadow the Deutschmark between a range of 
about DM2.90 to DM3.00 using both  m onetary  policy and  reserve 
intervention. Between 22 February and the budget on 17 March, sterling 
rose to over DM2.90. In response, the government cut interest rates on 10 
M arch to 10.5 per cent, and the Bank of England sold sterling and took 
massive sums into the foreign exchange reserves. As the upw ard pressure 
continued in the run  up  to the general election which the Conservatives 
looked certain to win, the government cut interest rates to 10 per cent on 19 
March, 9.5 per cent on 29 April and 9 per cent on 11 May. The overall effect 
was to lock-in the gain in competitiveness achieved in 1986A9
The governm ent did not publicly declare the new exchange rate 
target. Indeed, its public presentation of monetary policy rem ained riddled 
w ith  inconsistency. In his 1987 budget speech Lawson declared that money 
GDP w as the operational guide to the governm ent's counter-inflationary 
m onetary policy. He set a target for MO as a means to achieve control over 
M oney GDP w hilst noting that other indicators w ould be m onitored of 
which the most im portant was the exchange rate.50 By contrast, he later told 
the Treasury Select Committee that keeping sterling in  line w ith  the 
Deutschm ark was likely to be over the m edium  term  'a pretty good anti­
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inflation discipline.'54 Meanwhile, Thatcher told the Financial Times that
There is no specific range - we are always f re e /52 In April at the NEDC,
Lawson said that sterling rates of about $1.60 and DM2.90 were about right
and that industry could base its plans on these rates. However, the next day,
Lawson told a conference that these were in no way targets and he was
simply stating the exchange rates prevailing at the time.53
W hat has been disputed is the process by which the shadowing policy
was arrived at and how such ambiguity in policy presentation occurred.
Thatcher and some of her acolytes have claimed that Lawson usurped the
economic policy decision-m aking process and decided to shadow  the
Deutschm ark w ithout Thatcher's knowledge or consent. Thatcher herself
states in her memoirs:
Extraordinarily enough, I only learnt that Nigel had been shadowing 
the Deutschm ark when I was interviewed by journalists from the 
Financial Times on Friday 20 November 1987. They asked me w hy 
were shadowing the Deutschmark at 3 to the pound. I vigourously 
denied it. But there was no getting away from the fact that the chart 
they brought w ith them bore out what they said. The implications of 
this were, of course very serious at several levels. First, Nigel had 
pursued a personal economic policy w ithout reference to the rest of 
the government. How could I possibly trust him again? Second, our 
intervention in  the exchange markets might well have inflationary 
consequences. Third, perhaps I had allowed interest rates to be taken 
too low in order that Nigel's undisclosed policy of keeping the pound 
below DM3 should continue. 54
Nicholas Ridley claimed that Lawson deceived Thatcher over the Louvre
Accord and decided for himself to use monetary policy and intervention to
achieve exchange rate stability:
Unable to prevail, bu t far from persuaded, he resolved to join it 
unilaterally and unofficially. ... The Bank was a willing, nay, keen 
accomplice: they had always longed for the good old days of fixed 
parities, and this at least was a step in the right direction. ... M argaret 
Thatcher could do little about all this. Nigel Lawson's stock was rising 
high. A lthough she no doubt disapproved, the Chancellor and the 
Bank alone were responsible for managing the currency day to day. ... 
I suspect Nigel Lawson just did it and bolted his doors against the 
protests coming from his neighbour at No 10.55
Keegan contends that Lawson did em bark on a unilateral policy
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w ithout consultation w ith Thatcher:
Increasing ly  fru stra ted  by T hatcher's con tinued  refusals to 
countenance the EMS, Lawson decided to go it alone, by secretly 
conducting policy so that the pound would shadow the West German 
D-Mark. That way he hoped to prove to Thatcher, w ith a dry run, that 
she need have no fears about sterling's chance of stability w ithin the 
EMS. ... There were two notable omissions from the list of people in 
on the decision to shadow the German mark: they were the Prime 
Minister, and her part-time economic adviser, Sir Alan Walters. 56
Similarly, Smith suggests that Lawson decided upon the policy by himself
before the Louvre Accord:
It is inconceivable that he [Lawson] had not already made up his own 
m ind about the desirability of a target for sterling well before setting 
off for the Paris meeting. ... It is also inconceivable that Lawson w ould 
have stuck so doggedly to the policy, which in the end degenerated 
in to  a full-blow n battle betw een the Treasury and the Bank of 
England mainly on one side, and the markets on the other, had the 
Deutschmark target for sterling merely been a residual m atter arising 
out of the wider Louvre Accord.5?
After Louvre, in Smith's account, Lawson implemented the sterling target
w ithout Thatcher's knowledge:
By keeping the policy within a tight Treasury circle, Lawson was also 
able to avoid the awkwardness of explaining to Thatcher that the 
G overnm ent w as operating an exchange rate  target. This w as 
surprisingly easy. Thatcher did not pore over the newspapers each 
morning. She relied on a summary of the day 's press prepared by 
Bernard Ingham, her press secretary. Ingham, who had a blind spot 
w hen it came to economic and financial policy, w ould not have 
troubled the Prime Minister w ith the m inutiae of foreign exchange 
m arket reports or the speculation of City editors and  economic 
correspondents about Deutschmark targets for sterling.58
By contrast, Lawson has always argued that Thatcher was fully party
to the Louvre Accord:
For we had agreed to hold meetings of the G5 and G7 at the Louvre in 
Paris in February, w ith a view to ending the dollar's long decline and 
ushering in a period of stability. And just as the pound had been 
falling w ith  the dollar, so there was a reasonable prospect that 
stabilising the dollar would also stabilise the pound - just w hat was 
needed in the approach to a general election, w hen markets always 
tended to be nervous. Before going off to the Louvre, I discussed all 
this w ith Margaret, who was in full agreement w ith my objective. On
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my return  I sent her a minute, explaining w hat had been agreed. ... 
C ontrary to m uch subsequent insinuation, I was scrupulous in  
keeping M argaret fully informed about the Louvre.59
A fter Louvre, Lawson says that he and Thatcher agreed to roughly
stabilising sterling against the Deutschmark w ithout a specific target in line
w ith  the Accord. 60 Lawson saw the policy as a prelude to ERM membership:
It was a helpful prelude to the election itself, but I saw it essentially as 
an interim  measure. My hope was to replace the policy w ith full ERM 
membership of the EMS as soon as the election was out of the way.61
The m arkets soon began to assume that the government was defending a
target of DM3.00. In Lawson's words:
At the markets meeting I held on 18 March, at which the reduction to 
10 per cent was agreed, I told the senior Treasury and Bank officials 
present that this market view was useful, and that we should validate 
it, by being ready to intervene as and when necessary. ... Thus it was 
that the policy of shadowing the Deutschmark, as DM3 to the pound, 
was born.62
Lawson admits that there was no formal meeting w ith Thatcher w hen the 
DM3.00 target was agreed but says that Thatcher was kept fully informed of 
the new policy:
It was always an implausible insult to her formidable intelligence to 
suggest that she could possibly have been unaware of it, even if I had 
wished to keep her in the dark, which, of course I did not. In fact we 
discussed it openly on a number of occasions.63
Indeed, Lawson claims in its initial stages, Thatcher was positively
enthusiastic about the policy since it added to the foreign exchange reserves.
In a television interview, Lawson declared:
We w ere bu ild in g  up  our foreign exchange reserves very  
substantially and she was very pleased with that. W henever she saw 
the Governor of the Bank of England she said 'Tell me, Mr Governor, 
how m uch have we taken in today?' That's to say taking in  of the 
foreign exchange, the reserves. So she liked that policy.64
Lawson's account of the decision is significantly more plausible than 
those w ho suggested he acted alone. Certainly, it is true that the Prime 
M inister is no t involved in  the day to day opera tion  of reserve
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intervention policy. The Bank of England possesses a general authority to 
intervene in the foreign exchange markets on behalf of the governm ent 
through the 1979 Banking Act as it relates to the Exchange Equalisation 
Account. The Bank does not require legal approval for any specific 
intervention on any one day. The Bank keeps the Chancellor informed by 
telephone about its activities through any day. Accountability for the Bank's 
actions is based on trust between the Bank and the Chancellor and the 
Treasury. 65However, the Prime Minister does not have to ask to see the 
reserve figures. Rather, each night, the Prime M inister's economic private 
secretary receives the Treasury's daily market report. 66One Treasury official 
com m ented:
W hether she w ould actually see them  depends on  the private  
secretary. But I am pretty sure that given the size of the movements 
that were in there, the private secretary w ould say, here you better 
have a look at this.67
Lawson's account of the relationship between the Louvre Accord and
the DM3.00 target has been supported by Treasury officials. In a television
interview, Geoffrey Littler, the Second Permanent Secretary, stated:
To the best of my recollection, we never though t of three 
Deutschmarks as being a ceiling until the combination of the m arket 
sensing that it m ight be, and the press of course choosing that as an 
obvious target w ith  sex appeal in journalists' term s, m ore or less 
forced our hand. We found ourselves then in a band of sort of 2.80 or 
so up to three Deutschmarks willy-nilly. And if w e 'd  failed to stay 
w ith in  that band, then the headline w ould  have been 'Policy 
Collapses.'68
H ow ever, the conclusive point in favour of Law son's account of the 
shadowing decision was provided by Thatcher herself when she adm itted to 
the Times in June 1991 that she had known about shadowing but said that 
allowing it was her 'great mistake.' 6$
Rather than Thatcher, it was evidently the Bank of England which 
was left out of the formulation and subsequent discussion of the shadowing 
policy. Lawson himself omits to discuss the issue of the Bank's role and the 
Treasury have generally dism issed any suggestion that the Bank was
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excluded from policy-making. One senior Treasury official told Smith:
I do not believe there was any stage where the Bank developed a 
significantly different view from ours. If they did, they certainly did 
not say so at the time.70
How ever, another senior official acknowledged that 'the commonality of
view  broke up over th a t.'7* Indeed, according to Bank officials, Lawson
w ould  never even privately adm it the operation of the policy to them
desp ite  relying on them  to im plem ent it. In a television in terview ,
Anthony Loehnis, a Director of the Bank of England from 1981-1989 said:
My recollection is that there was never any official admission of it 
[shadowing]. I mean clearly there was no public admission that that 
was w hat we were doing but as I've already said, I don 't think that 
there was any reference to it, you know in private between Bank and 
Treasury officials. You were just sort of intuitive that it was in terms 
of the responses that one got to tactical options that there m ight 
actually be.72
The Bank's ow n view, according to one Bank official, was that
shadowing was a 'total disaster.'73 In the words of another former official:
Shadowing was the worst of both worlds because the markets don 't 
really believe it. ... You have to defend the target w ithout credibility. 
You have to p u t more effort into defending it because they [the 
markets] can't really believe you should be defending it.74
A lthough the Bank believed that Thatcher did reluctantly acquiesce to
shadowing, it laid the blame for its exclusion from the decision-making
process on Law son's inability to positively convince Thatcher of the
policy.75 One Bank of England official commented:
He [Lawson] could not give it the proper airing and debate in  the 
decision-making process that should norm ally attend these things 
because he was actually wanting to do something which he knew his 
neighbour next door would not actually agree to. ... It was a private 
enterprise attempt to be a proxy member of ERM.75
Thus, shadow ing emerged as a response to the economic policy 
vacuum  left by Thatcher's veto of ERM membership and in the process it 
created new divisions w ith in  the core executive on exchange rate  
management. First, Thatcher, Lawson and the Treasury agreed to a policy
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w hich they were not prepared to discuss with the Bank of England. Whilst 
the Governor and majority opinion in the Bank rem ained com m itted to 
ERM m em bership, they w ere now asked to im plem ent a particu lar 
exchange rate policy which they could not countenance. Second, Thatcher 
and Lawson clearly decided to shadow the Deutschm ark for different 
reasons. Lawson w anted to pursue a stable exchange rate policy and to 
demonstrate to Thatcher that sterling was fully ready for ERM membership. 
Meanwhile, Thatcher was prepared to accept pursuing stability against the 
Deutschmark so long as the policy was not broadcast in public. Rather than a 
p relude  to m em bership, Thatcher evidently  saw  shadow ing as an 
alternative, a means of accruing some of the benefits of exchange rate 
stability w ithout conceding defeat on membership.
The Response to Shadowing
For those business interests which supported m em bership, shadow ing
offered m ixed benefits. For companies involved in  international trade,
shadow ing reduced exchange rate volatility even if it did not provide the
general security of a formal exchange rate target. For its part, the CBI
welcomed the stability which shadowing provided and refrained from any
public campaign for ERM entry during the first half of 1987. However, it
continued to believe that membership was necessary in the m edium  to long
term .77 The City did not believe that shadowing addressed its fundam ental
concerns about m onetary policy since it d id  no t provide an explicit
comm itm ent to financial discipline. From March, City rum ours persisted
that the government would enter the ERM soon after the general election.78
Since shadowing was designed to fill the monetary vacuum caused by
Thatcher's veto of ERM membership, it did not address non-membership as
an issue of European policy. According to one Treasury official involved
w ith  the policy, the Treasury did want to demonstrate its stable exchange
rate credentials to the ERM states:
The policy evolved from our concern that the exchange rate was 
falling too far and too fast in 1986, and this evolution ran through to 
the time when we locked into the DM. Once we had got to a situation 
where sterling was stable, we were concerned to dem onstrate to the
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EC that, even if we were not in the ERM, at least give us credit for 
achieving stability outside the s y s t e m .79
H ow ever, the Foreign Office saw little merit in  shadowing. One Foreign 
Office official commented that shadowing 'proved very unsatisfactory - it 
b ro u g h t all the inconveniences of m em bership  w ith  none of the 
a d v a n ta g e s /80 Certainly, shadowing did not abate the pressure for ERM 
entry from the other member states especially from the Bundesbank. On 29 
May 1987 Pohl declared that 'Britain's membership would certainly give the 
EMS more weight and a new quality. We shall change the previous stance 
of rejection.'81 Shadowing did not make further institutional developm ent 
of the ERM any easier for the ERM states. Consequently there is no evidence 
that shadowing secured any additional influence for the UK within the EC.
4.5: SHADOWING AND ERM MEMBERSHIP 
Lawson and the Treasury believed that shadowing was a second best means 
to procure the economic benefits of ERM membership. However, the day-to- 
day operation of the policy incurred several disadvantages in comparison to 
membership. First, shadowing did not provide the UK access to the short 
borrow ing facilities of the ERM or guarantee European Central Bank 
intervention to support sterling. The essentially informal arrangem ent of 
coordinated intervention under Louvre was not the same as the obligatory 
su p p o rt p rov ided  by ERM. Second, shadow ing created a d ifferent 
relationship  betw een the speculators and sterling than  w ith  the ERM 
currencies. As H utton notes, it is very likely that sterling w ould have come 
under far less upw ards pressure inside ERM than it did under shadowing. 
W ithout a form al cap on sterling 's upper lim it backed by collective 
in tervention, speculators were given a likelier option on the upw ard  
movement of sterling from which they sought to profit.82
Third, in terms of monetary policy, shadowing was at best a quasi 
form  of m em bership. It com m itted the governm ent to exchange rate 
stability against the ERM anchor currency and used both m onetary policy 
and central bank intervention to achieve that end. However this d id  not 
mean that the relationship between sterling and monetary policy worked as
176
it w ould  inside ERM. If relatively high interest rates w ere the prem ium  
dem anded in autum n 1986 for non-membership, then shadow ing d id  not 
abolish that premium. Although it provided an exchange rate target and an 
effective floor for sterling, this position was not explicitly communicated to 
the financial markets. The absence of a formal target, combined w ith  the 
public  divisions betw een Thatcher and Lawson continued  to cause 
uncertainty and did not provide the security necessary to reduce interest 
rates. Rather, the government was able to loosen monetary policy because of 
the m arkets' new found faith in the strength of the UK economy and the 
likelihood of the governm ent's re-election. At the same time, if and w hen 
sterling came under pressure again, shadowing as an unannounced policy 
could not reduce the interest rate premium on the ERM states necessary to 
defend sterling. 83
Nevertheless, the differences between the governm ent's shadowing 
policy and ERM membership w ent beyond these practical and inevitable 
difficulties. If Lawson and the Treasury saw shadowing as 'a  dry ru n ' for 
ERM membership, then it threw some interesting light on Lawson and the 
T reasu ry 's  peculiar conception of ERM m em bership . The question  
shadow ing left unansw ered was how Lawson and the Treasury believed 
that the governm ent could match the counter-inflationary perform ance of 
the ERM states in view of its attitude towards fiscal policy, credit controls 
and wage restraint.
Shadowing and Fiscal Policy
Shortly after shadowing began, the government used the 1987 budget to cut 
the basic rate of income tax to 27 per cent. 84 As figure 4.6 (page 178) indicates, 
in  both  1986 and 1987, the governm ent gave a fiscal stim ulus to the 
econom y at a time w hen France, Germany and Italy w ere pursu ing  
deflationary fiscal policies to control demand. The UK governm ent's move 
tow ards fiscal expansion was all the more distinctive because it occurred at 
the same time as m onetary policy was being loosened. Inside ERM, there 
w ould have been an obligation to tighten fiscal policy to offset the lower 
in terest rates p roduced by sterling 's appreciation. Rather than  using
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monetary and fiscal policy in tandem as the ERM states did, shadowing was 
an exchange rate policy exclusively defined in monetary terms.
Figure 4.6 Comparative Fiscal Stimulus as a Percentage of GNP 1986-1987
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If shadowing was a 'dry run' for ERM membership, then how did Lawson
and the Treasury believe they could reconcile the government's fiscal policy
with actual ERM membership? Certainly, there is no evidence that Lawson
envisaged using fiscal policy differently once inside ERM. Fiscal expansion,
particularly through income tax cuts, was not incidental to the 1987 budget
but central to the government's electoral strategy. The government believed
the issue of taxation was fundamental to its appeal compared with the
Labour party. In a radio interview in January 1987, Lawson declared:
There is a fundamental difference of philosophy between the Labour 
Party and the Conservative Party. The Conservative government
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believes in bringing tax down and the Labour Party quite clearly 
believes in putting income tax up.85
Similarly, the 1987 Conservative Campaign Guide stated:
There are compelling economic argum ents for lower taxation. But 
there are also fundamental considerations of political principle. If the 
governm ent does not trust a family to spend its ow n money, w hat 
will it trust the family to do? It is no accident that the Conservative 
Party, the only political party committed to the family and opposed to 
the encroachm ent of the state, is also the only political party  
committed to bringing taxes down.86
In their study of the 1987 general election, Butler and Kavanagh concluded 
th a t taxa tion  w as the probably  the m ost effective issue for the 
governm ent.87
At the same time, the low income tax regime was an im portant plank 
of the governm ent's efforts to make Britain the centre of inw ard  
investm ent in  the EC. As figure 4.7 (page 180) shows, by June 1987 the UK 
possessed easily the lowest marginal tax rates on average wages among the 
major EC states. In the whole Community only Greece and Portugal levied 
less m arginal tax. Although ERM membership w ould not categorically rule 
out further income tax cuts, it would place taxation policy in the context of 
exchange rate management. Inside ERM, cuts w ould have to be related to 
the state of monetary policy and possible increases countenanced.
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Figure 4.7: Comparative Marginal Tax Rates on Average Wages
June 1987
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Neither can it be said that fiscal policy was decided by Thatcher at
Law son's expense. Lawson himself publicly rejected fiscal dem and
management. In a speech in July 1988 he declared:
Inflation is pre-eminently a monetary phenomenon. Interest rates are 
the essential instrument of monetary policy. ... The notion that fiscal 
policy should be used to fine-tune demand is to hark back to the 
failures of the 1960s and 1970s.88
Lawson similarly rejected the idea that changes in taxation levels could be 
part of a counter-inflationary fiscal policy telling the Treasury Select 
Committee in 1988 that '[tax changes as part of fiscal policy] are extremely
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inflexible ... very slow acting and the reversal of them  is extrem ely 
com plicated/89
Indeed, if Lawson is to be believed, he w as the architect of the 
governm ent's fiscal policy rather than Thatcher. In October 1986, Thatcher 
w as w orried that fiscal policy was too lax in view of the PSBR whereas 
Lawson was unconcerned.90 Lawson states that whereas he planned the 1987 
income tax cuts in this period, Thatcher was prepared to raise taxes.91 His 
account leaves the paradox that Lawson supported ERM membership and a 
fiscal policy incom patible w ith it, w hilst Thatcher rejected both  ERM 
m em bership and the m ain constraint it would have placed on economic 
policy.
For its part the Treasury was less enthusiastic about the 1987 cut in
income tax and initially argued for a cautious budget.92 Lawson comments:
The Treasury m andarins never sought to prevent me from cutting 
income tax .... None the less there was no disguising the fact that they 
disliked it, and hoped that I would do as little as was consistent w ith 
governm ent policy.93
However, there is no evidence from the comments of Treasury officials that
the Treasury's view of income tax cuts was determ ined by an alternative
conception of ERM membership to Lawson's. According to Lawson himself:
The ethos of the official Treasury is unrem ittingly austere. They 
disapprove of tax cuts almost as much as they dislike increases in 
public spending. They cannot imagine w hat the public have done to 
deserve tax cuts, which will inevitably be pu t to frivolous use.94
Thus, Lawson and the Treasury were apparently  unaw are of the 
con tradiction  betw een their support for ERM m em bership  and  the 
governm ent's fiscal policy. The origins of this peculiarity can be traced back 
to the conception of the benefits of membership which they developed in 
1985. After the sterling crisis, ERM membership represented an alternative 
counter-inflationary m onetary means to achieve the ends of the MTFS. 
They retained the assum ption of the MTFS that inflation was essentially a 
m onetary phenomenon. Consequently, in contrast to the ERM states, they 
did  not believe it was necessary to manage aggregate dem and in order to
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control inflation. Indeed Lawson did not appear to believe that fiscal policy 
in  1986-1987 was expansive and denied that increasing dem and w ithout a 
parallel increase in supply was inflationary. Rather, he m easured the scale 
of fiscal policy by the PSBR which the government was reducing through 
p riv a tisa tio n  revenues.95 In so doing, he clung to the vestiges of the 
proposition of the original MTFS that the impact of fiscal policy on inflation 
occurred through the relationship between the PSBR and £M3.
Credit Controls and ERM membership
From 1985 to 1987, there was an inflationary explosion of credit in the UK 
econom y. In the early 1980s the governm ent rem oved a variety  of 
restrictions on lending. However, after a surge in 1981, sterling bank lending 
to the private sector rem ained relatively steady. Then, betw een 1985 and 
1986, bank lending doubled to reach a level about 25 per cent higher in real 
term s than  the previous peak in 1972.96 The expansion in credit during 
1985-1987 was further reflected in the grow th of the broad m onetary 
aggregate £M3 which includes sterling current accounts of the UK private 
sector w ith banks, deposit accounts and public sector accounts. As figure 4.8 
(page 183) shows the annual percentage increase in £M3 shot up  from 9.5 
per cent in 1983-1984 to 18.7 per cent in 1986-1987.With large mortgages 
easily available, rising house prices became a significant source of 
inflationary pressure. In the six quarters from January 1986 to June 1987 
indexed house prices rose 34 percentage points com pared to 17 in the 
previous eighteen months.
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Figure 4.8: Sterling M3 Growth 1980-1987
(Source: The Economy Under Mrs Thatcher, p. 274)
The government did not act to restrain the credit boom. Indeed, in the 1987
budget, it did not even set any kind of broad money target as a yard-stick to
measure its e x p a n s io n .9 7  The government's view, shared by the Treasury,
was that in a deregulated financial world it was impossible to directly
control credit. Lawson's view was:
It was absurd to imply that introducing controls on hire purchase or 
credit cards would do anything significant to reduce the growth of 
consumer credit, or allow interest rates to be one whit lower. In any 
event such controls would have been simplicity itself to get around 
in a deregulated financial market without exchange control. As for 
direct controls on bank lending, these had proved increasingly 
ineffective even before exchange controls were abolished. By the late 
1980s they would have been simply a field day for foreign lending
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institutions.98
At the same time, the government and officials privately tended to
the view that the credit expansion was not dangerous. One Treasury official
commented on the prevailing attitude:
You had gone in for deregulation. You had got a m uch more efficient 
financial system out of it. There was a stock adjustm ent going on 
while people adjusted their debt-asset ratios to the new deregulated 
environm ent. And as soon as that stock adjustm ent was over, 
everything w ould sort of come back and you 'd  be on a rather golden 
path w ith the stock of credit higher but the growth of credit from then 
on no higher. The problem was that we had absolutely no idea how 
long that stock adjustment was going to take ."
D uring the governm ent's second term  of office, only a consum er 
credit tax emerged briefly as a possible method of control. Lawson recalls 
that he first proposed such a tax in 1985 but dropped the idea after Thatcher 
refused to countenance applying it to m ortgages. In January 1987, in 
preparation for the budget, Lawson and the Treasury agreed to a 5 per cent 
tax on all consumer credit payments except mortgages. However, after the 
Bank told Lawson that a tax announced in M arch 1987 could not be 
introduced until July 1988, Lawson 'dropped the whole idea w ithout even 
bothering to put it to Margaret.'i°o
By contrast, all the ERM states controlled credit to a lesser or greater 
extent in this period and did not incur the same kind of credit boom. From 
1985 to 1987, the UK had easily the highest broad money growth among the 
G7 European states as figure 4.9 (page 185) indicates. Lawson and the 
Treasury, or indeed the Bank of England, did not believe that there was any 
contradiction betw een their attitude tow ards credit expansion and their 
support for ERM membership. In their view, Germany did  not use credit 
controls, and since Germany was the ERM benchmark, there was no need 
for the UK to control credit if it were to join. One Treasury official 
com m ented:
We d idn 't think that Germany practised credit controls. They had a 
different way of running their monetary system. ... They ran a form of 
m onetary base control. I don 't think we regarded it as equivalent to
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control of credit. 101
Figure 4.9: Comparative Broad Money Growth 1985-1987
(Measured by M3 except for Italy by M2)
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Lawson and the officials were particularly dismissive of any suggestion that
the Bundesbank operated effective monetary reserve requirements, a system
in which banks are required to lodge a fixed percentage of their deposits as
cash with the central bank. Lawson states:
In essence the German system was little different from that operated 
in the UK by the Bank of England. ... The only substantive difference 
between Britain and Germany was that in Germany there were 
mandatory, and much larger reserve requirements - idle balances as 
far as the banks were concerned. The high German reserve 
requirement did not make German interest rates any lower: it merely
0  September 1985 - September 1986 
B  September 1986-September 1987
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encouraged the Frankfurt banks to escape the impost by challenging 
business through offshore centres such as Luxembourg, to the 
annoyance of the Bundesbank. This explanation had, in fact, been 
given num erous times in the Bank o f  England  B u l l e t in .  But the 
m yth was so much more attractive than the bleak reality that it 
seemed indestructible.102
Figure 4.10: Household Debt to Disposable Income Ratio in Germany 
and the UK 1983-1987
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However, Lawson and the Treasury's position on the relationship 
between UK membership and credit controls was based on two fallacies. 
First, w hilst it is true that the Bundesbank ceased to attach m uch 
operational significance to its monetary reserve requirements in the 1980s, 
this did not mean that Germany shared the UK government's laissez-faire 
attitude towards credit. As the utility of its monetary reserve requirements 
declined, the Bundesbank turned to open market policy instruments. It used 
short-term purchases and sales of government bonds and other securities to
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regulate liquidity in the banking system .!03 At the same time, Germ any 
m ain tained  a b road  m oney target to m easure credit after the UK 
governm ent decided that such targets were not reliable.104 W hen the 
outcome of German and UK policy towards credit expansion is compared, it 
is very difficult to sustain Lawson's argument that 'the German system was 
little different than that which operated in the UK.' As figure 4.10 (page 186) 
shows w hilst the German ratio of household debt to income rem ained 
relatively stable between 1983 and 1987, the UK ratio increased dramatically.
Second, whatever Lawson's and the officials' assessment of German 
credit policy, in  term s of ERM mem bership, it w ould have been more 
appropriate to compare UK policy with ERM states other than Germany. To 
sustain their currencies, these states needed to reduce inflation to as near 
German levels as possible by whatever means they could. Certainly, all the 
o ther ERM states controlled credit practising bo th  m onetary reserve 
requirem ents and continuing to set a broad money target throughout the 
decade.105 Since credit expansion was an inflationary problem for the UK, it 
was rather irrelevant as to how low inflation Germany did or did not 
control credit. Inside ERM, the onus would be to reduce inflation whatever 
its cause.
Wage Control and ERM membership
W age rises were a further source of inflationary pressure in the UK 
economy in 1986 and 1987 which the government did not seek to control. 
Figure 4.11 (page 188) shows that in these years the differential betw een 
increase in  average earnings and inflation in the UK was significantly 
higher than  betw een 1981 and 1984. At the same time, the UK neither 
achieved the steady low level percentage increase in wage costs of Germany 
or the reductions secured by other states notably France. As figure 4.12 (page 
189) shows, w hilst the annual increase unit labour costs fell from 1985 to 
1987 by 3.15 per cent in France and 5.05 per cent in Italy, they fell only 0.5 per 
cent in the UK.
187
Figure 4.11: Increases in Average Earnings Compared
to Inflation 1980-1987
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Unlike the ERM states, the UK government did not have a policy to 
control wage increases, having renounced any form of incomes policy on its 
entry to office in 1979. With the Heath government's statutory incomes 
policy blam ed for its defeat in 1974, formal wage restraint was an 
unthinkable option for the Thatcher government. One Treasury official 
recalled:
Wage restraint was certainly not on the agenda. ... The whole history 
of the 1970s led to the view that incomes policies had been singularly 
ineffective for two reasons. Firstly, they just led to a wage explosion 
as soon as they ended. And secondly, that, a wage policy would lead to 
inflexibilities in the economy. ... The only time I ever heard incomes 
policy seriously mentioned was in the Cabinet in 1981.106
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Figure 4.12: Comparative Percentage Annual Increase in
Unit Labour Costs 1985-1987
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The Treasury was just as opposed to formal wage restraint as ministers.
They too regarded the 1970s experience as an unmitigated failure. 107 in  the
view of one Treasury official, the only cure possible cure for rising wage
increases was recession:
We tried it [an incomes policy] and it does not seem to have 
succeeded. If it works, you don't need it and if you need it, it doesn't 
work. ... It is a tragedy of the British economy that it appears to require 
quite deep recession to check even to 'check' whatever that means, 
wage inflation.108
To the extent that Lawson and the Treasury did recognise that the 
level of wage increases in 1986 and 1987 would translate into inflation, they 
believed that ERM membership itself was the most effective policy
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instrum ent to combat the problem. One Treasury official commented:
We seem to be stuck w ith earnings increase of 7 per cent plus. ... It 
[the wage problem] led back to the need to have a more competitive 
labour m arket and I think it led back to the ERM too. We were 
impressed by the wage experience of France and Germany and we felt 
th a t m em bership  of the ERM had had  an im pact on  w age 
negotiations. In the sense that wage negotiations were helped w hen 
there was not a devaluation option to override an inflationary wage 
settlem ent. i°9
However, such an attitude stood in contrast to the actual experience
of France and Germany which had institutional structures designed to
restra in  w age increases independent of ERM m em bership. In effect,
Germany practised, w hat Johnson describes as 'a  covert form of voluntary
incomes po licy /110 The Bundesbank and the Council of Economic Experts
(CEE) set implicit parameters for wage bargaining. The CEE was specifically
charged w ith  the means of m aintaining price stability, and m ade wage
restraint the central objective of its policy recommendations. Meanwhile, at
the end of each year the Bundesbank announced a rate at which the money
supply w ould be allowed to expand over the subsequent year and w hat this
entailed  for w age settlem ents. Through a netw ork of inform al and
collaborative business-labour forums, the exhortations of the CEE and the
Bundesbank were generally accepted by wage bargainers on both sides.111 In
France, the government concentrated on a public sector pay policy.
O ne sen io r CBI official com m ented  on  the  in te lle c tu a l
incompatibility betw een Lawson's support for ERM membership and the
absence of formal wage restraint:
I d o n 't th ink  they properly  understood just w hat convergence 
involved. I think they thought that by being in it [ERM] that itself 
w ould impose the [wage] discipline. Because clearly if our costs w ent 
up quicker than the exchange rate in a fixed parity w ould allow us to 
go up, then those companies w ould lose their profitability, they 
w ould be in decline and jobs w ould be lost. ... I think they were 
putting  in the end result w ith the hope of controlling one of the 
inpu ts.112
Fiscal policy, credit controls and wage restraint all raised questions 
about how Lawson and the Treasury believed they w ould be able to match
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the counter-inflationary performance of the ERM states in the m edium  to 
long term  whilst renouncing the means they used to achieve it. Indeed, in 
the face of rising inflation, the only option the government left for itself was 
to allow sterling to appreciate to reduce import prices - which was the one 
counter-inflationary policy ruled out per se by ERM membership. W hilst 
revaluation rem ained possible w ithin ERM, it is difficult to see how  a 
relatively inflationary currency w ould come under enough appreciatory 
pressure to w arrant an upw ards realignment. In sum, for all the support 
w ithin  the core executive for ERM entry, inside the counter-inflationary 
ERM the governm ent w ould be left w ith  a bare counter-inflationary 
cupboard.
Thatcher's View of Non-M embership
Was Thatcher aware of the difficulties in counter-inflationary policy which
the governm ent w ould have faced in ERM in 1986-1987? And did such an
awareness of them  form any part of her opposition to ERM membership?
Did Thatcher's conception of sovereignty on ERM membership involve the
w ish to hold onto a peculiarly British approach to counter-inflationary
policies? Such an explanation of Thatcher's position w ould be dependent on
her possessing a better understanding of the ERM's operation than Lawson,
the Treasury or the Bank of England. In the case of fiscal policy, this
argum ent is hard to sustain at least if Lawson is to be believed that Thatcher
was less committed to fiscal expansion than himself. If Thatcher preferred a
more restrained fiscal policy than Lawson, then it can hardly stand as a
reason for her rejecting Lawson's case to enter the ERM w ith its emphasis
on fiscal restraint.
Only in the case of credit controls is there evidence that Thatcher saw
a contradiction betw een ERM membership and governm ent policy. Asked
about w hether Thatcher was aware that ERM m em bership m ight be a
backhand path to credit controls, a close adviser replied:
Yes, very much so; nannying she called it. I don 't think it was a major 
part of her objection to it. I think she took the view that if we w ent in 
we w ouldn 't have credit controls, they would have to change to our 
way.113
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Alan W alters in an article in the Evening Standard, in April 1991 said that 
he had been expecting Lawson to raise credit controls ever since 1985-1987 
since all the other ERM states practised them.H4
Clearly,Thatcher's views on credit controls are not enough to explain 
her opposition to ERM entry. However, it is not difficult to conceive that 
Thatcher's view on credit controls fitted into a general belief that there was 
'our w ay' and a 'continental way' of running the economy. For example, in 
h e r  Financial Times interview in November 1986, she railed against the 
exchange controls of certain ERM states in comparison to the absence of 
controls in the UK. It is similarly easy to understand how Thatcher could 
see electoral benefit in presenting the government as preserving 'our w ay' 
of economic management against outside forces.
Conclusions
In 1986 and 1987 the core executive was only really forced to confront ERM 
m embership as an issue of economic policy. Although the pressure for entry 
from  the ERM states remained, non membership im posed no significant 
costs on the governm ent's EC policy. After the initial ambivalence about 
m onetary policy in 1986, the government took full advantage of Thatcher's 
veto of ERM membership to stimulate the economy in preparation for the 
general election. In so doing, the government dem onstrated the short term 
flexibility of non-m em bership w hich the Prim e M inister w ished  to 
preserve. However, once the governm ent w anted to stabilise sterling in 
September 1986 the benefits of non-membership in terms of m onetary and 
exchange rate policy diminished. Divisions re-emerged betw een Thatcher 
and her senior Cabinet colleagues, the Treasury, the Foreign Office and the 
Bank of England. With Thatcher loath to concede defeat on membership but 
unable or unwilling to provide an alternative, the economic policy making 
process broke down. Lawson was left to operate a monetary and exchange 
rate policy which because of its perceived proximity to ERM membership 
was never openly discussed within the core executive. As a result, the Prime 
M inister-Chancellor axis was not re-established and the Bank of England
192
was marginalised from the decision making process.
As a compromise policy, shadowing could not provide a long term  
solution to the governm ent's problem  over ERM m em bership. Indeed, 
Lawson was likely to resume battle w ith Thatcher as soon after the general 
election as possible. Yet w ithout new alliances there was no reason to 
suppose that he would be any more successful than in 1985 and 1986. A t the 
same tim e, renew ed public divisions betw een the Prime M inister and 
Chancellor w ould  in the m edium  term  make operating any k ind  of 
exchange rate policy difficult Even if Lawson were to be successful, 
fundam ental questions remained about how actually the UK governm ent 
was going to act as a viable member of ERM.
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CHAPTER 5
ECONOMIC DIVERGENCE AND MONETARY UNION
This chapter traces the evolution of policy from the Conservatives' general 
election victory in June 1987 to the M adrid European Council in June 1989. 
Section 5.1 examines the operation of the ERM during the period and the 
growing dissatisfaction of some ERM states w ith German dominance of the 
system. Section 5.2 looks at developments in the UK economic and  EC 
policy from June 1987 to June 1988. Specifically, it considers how  ERM 
m em bership rem ained dorm ant w ithin the core executive despite a new 
im perative for entry in order to have influence in the EC's debate on 
m onetary union. Section 5.3 analyses the period from July 1988 to March 
1989 primarily covering the UK's participation in the Delors Committee on 
m onetary union. Section 5.4 examines a renewed round of m inisterial 
conflict on ERM m embership from the publication of the Delors Report in 
April 1989 to the M adrid European Council.
5.1: ERM DISSATISFACTION 
Between June 1987 and June 1989 the ERM operated w ith  a greater 
commitment to fixed rates than ever before and no realignments took place. 
In circumstances w hich previously produced realignm ents, the m em ber 
states were determ ined to m aintain existing parities. For exam ple, in 
October 1988 during  a bout of dollar weakness w hich boosted the 
D eutschm ark, the franc fell to the bottom  of its band. The French 
governm ent w ould not countenance an end to its franc fort policy and 
raised interest rates despite the consequences for the sluggish French 
economy. W ith unit labour costs relative to Germany m oving in France's 
favour, the French governm ent was determ ined to reap the credibility 
rewards in the exchange markets of its counter-inflationary policy.1
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Figure 5.1: Comparative Annual Unemployment Rates 1983-1988
(Standardised OECD figures).
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Most ERM states incurred significant economic costs in the post-1983 
effort to maintain their currencies with counter-inflationary monetary and 
fiscal policies. D uring 1987 and 1988 the costs in term s of both 
competitiveness and unemployment increased. First, for states with higher 
inflation than Germany, to maintain a roughly stable nominal exchange 
rate against the Deutschmark was to accept a currency appreciation in real 
terms. The majority of ERM states now faced a deteriorating external 
account as the German trade surplus with the rest of the EC increased from 
DM30 billion in 1986 to DM46 billion in 1988. From 1986-1987, the French
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m anufacturing trade deficit w ith Germany increased from DM15.1 billion to 
DM16.3 billion. Although the French external account started deteriorating 
as early as 1985, the fall in the dollar from its mid-1980s peak now reduced 
the opportunity to balance the deficit with Germany w ith surpluses w ith the 
U SA .2 Second, as inflation converged among the ERM states tow ards 
Germ an levels, figure 5.1 (page 204) shows that unem ploym ent in France 
and Italy rose to and rem ained at the highest levels w ithin the G6. By 
contrast, unemploym ent in the USA and the UK fell.From June 1987 some 
member states led by France and Italy began to suggest that these costs were 
unnecessarily imposed by the particular nature of Germ an leadership of 
ERM. So long as German monetary policy remained tight in the face of low 
inflation, high unem ploym ent w ould continue. Similarly, w hilst German 
fiscal policy remained restrictive, the other ERM states would face a further 
deterioration in their current accounts if they were to unilaterally expand 
their economies to reduce unemployment. Neither was there any provision 
for co-ordinated fiscal action to achieve successful collective expansion. At 
the same time, it was impossible for France, for example, to m aintain the 
franc fort w ithout high interest rates unless the balance of payments looked 
sustainable in the long term  w hich w ould only be possible w ith  
devaluation.3
In the second half of 1987 the French governm ent started m aking 
public calls for a new power sharing arrangem ent in ERM. Backed by 
Belgium and Italy, it initiated a series of negotiations which led to reform of 
the system. The reforms were agreed by central bank governors in Basle in 
Septem ber and endorsed by finance m inisters later in the m onth  at 
Nybourg. The most im portant change was to licence the financing of non 
obligatory intra-m arginal intervention through recourse to a Very Short 
Term Financing Fund. The Fund allowed weak currency states to borrow 
reserves from other member states subject to certain quantitative limits and 
other conditions. In practice, this created a p resum ption  th a t the 
Bundesbank would lend Deutschmarks to weak currency states before its 
currency reached its fluctuation margins. Previously the Bundesbank only
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lent Deutschm arks w hen the fluctuation margins were breached. The aim 
of the reform s was to share the burden  of intervention m ore equitably 
betw een member states and to save the reserves of weak currency states.4
Even as the agreement was signed, there was little evidence that the 
reform s could resolve the tensions betw een G erm any and the w eak 
currency states. The head of the Banque de France, Larosiere, spoke of the 
agreem ent as being 'presum ably automatic'. Similarly, the Belgian Finance 
M inister said that creditor central banks would bear 'the burden of proof' 
should  they at any time refuse the necessary credits. By contrast, Pohl 
asserted the creditor central bank's right to assess the m onetary situation, 
including  its ow n dom estic environm ent, before giving any funds for 
in te rv en tio n .5
In  the afterm ath of Basle-Nybourg, m onetary co-operation d id  
increase. For example, in Novem ber 1987 Germ any and France jointly 
announced interest rate changes in opposite directions. Nevertheless, the 
fundam ental issue of restricted grow th w ithin a Bundesbank-dom inated 
system  rem ained. France soon tried a bilateral approach to increase its 
influence on policy. During Novem ber 1987, the Germ an and French 
governm ents negotiated a draft treaty which would create a new policy co­
o rd inating  m echanism  betw een the two states know n as the Franco- 
German Council. The Council which was expected to meet four times a year 
placed bo th  central banks on an equal footing and bound each to co­
ordinated objectives to be determined by the Council. This was an apparent 
success for France because the Council could decide for itself the yardstick 
for co-ordination rather than simply accept the primacy of price stability as 
defined by the Bundesbank.6
However, the Bundesbank, excluded from the pre-treaty negotiations, 
was able to blunt the effect of the treaty. Under Bundesbank pressure, the 
G erm an governm ent ultim ately am ended the treaty  so that it explicitly 
stated that the autonom y of the Bundesbank and its legal commitment to 
the maintenance of price stability was protected. W ith the eventual Franco- 
German council placing no constraint on the actions of the Bundesbank, the
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French problem  w ith  ERM remained.7
In January 1988 faced w ith the lim itations of the Basle-Nybourg
reform s and  the Franco-German council, the French governm ent m ade a
series of calls for the development of a single European currency and a
E uropean central bank. It believed that there w as no solution to its
problem s of high interest rates, unemployment and the external account
deficit w ith in  the existing ERM. Monetary union w ould be a m eans of
reta in ing  the credibility of ERM m em bership and the franc fort while
reducing the pow er of the Bundesbank in monetary and fiscal policy. 8As
Ellen Kennedy comments:
Policy-m akers [in France], chafing at lim itations im posed by the 
Bundesbank standard on their national economic policy, hoped to 
achieve th rough  inter-European co-operation w hat they had  not 
secured alone or in bilateral negotiations: access to policy-making in 
the Bundesbank itself. 9
At one level, m onetary union was not new to the EC agenda. The 
issue was first discussed in the late 1960s as Bretton W oods weakened. In 
1970, the EC states agreed to the Werner plan for union by 1980. However, 
the plan quickly died amidst the exchange rate instability of 1971-1973 and 
was formally abandoned in 1974. In 1977, the Commission President, Roy 
Jenkins, rek indled  the issue in a lecture w hich proposed  a common 
currency and a European central bank. There was little response from the 
mem ber states. Schmidt and Giscard later used Jenkins initiative as part of 
the presentation of their own proposals for ERM but the original ERM was 
far rem oved from any idea of monetary union. Only w ith  the French 
initiative d id  m onetary union become a serious m edium  to long term  
proposition  as a proposal rooted in the experience of the existing 
C om m unity  m onetary  institu tion . France w as su p p o rted  by Italy. 
U nsurprisingly, the Germ an governm ent and the Bundesbank, d id  not 
welcome the proposal. However, with Germany holding the EC presidency, 
Kohl and Genscher ensured that the issue remained a serious item on the 
agenda over the next six months.*0
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5. 2: THE END OF SHADOWING AND THE RISE OF MONETARY
UNION
D uring the first half of 1987 Lawson believed that a general election victory 
w ould  translate shadowing the Deutschmark into ERM membership. Four 
days after the election, Lawson told EC finance m inisters that the debate 
w ith in  the governm ent w as m ore open. Law son hoped  th a t the 
governm ent could take advantage of the proposed Basle-Nybourg reforms 
and enter ERM in the autumn. In a bilateral meeting w ith Thatcher on 27 
July, Lawson declared that he w anted further discussions on membership 
after the sum m er break. Thatcher refused and stated that she w ould not 
countenance further discussions before January 1988 and, then, there w ould 
be no broad core executive discussion of the kind which took place in 1985.11
Faced w ith  another Thatcher veto, Lawson was left to continue to 
shadow  the Deutschm ark. The shadow ing com prom ise rem ained until 
M arch 1988 w hen the tensions betw een Thatcher and Lawson became 
im possible to contain. As a result, the governm ent was again left w ith a 
vacuum  in  its economic policy. Com bined w ith  a new im perative to 
examine ERM membership because of European m onetary union proposals, 
fu rther discussion of the ERM option w ould have seem ed inevitable. 
However, the issue was barely discussed. To understand the non-decision 
on ERM membership in  the second quarter of 1988, it is first necessary to 
examine the government's economic and EC policy in the period from June 
1987 to March 1988.
The End of Shadowing
In July 1987 the upw ard  pressure on sterling abated after the re-elected 
governm ent announced a significant current account deficit for May. W ith 
inflation rising, on 7 August the government used the opportunity to raise 
interest rates from 9 to 10 per cent. In the subsequent months, the upw ard 
pressure on the currency returned and the Bank of England used substantial 
intervention to stabilise sterling.12
The continuity in post-election policy could not mask increasing 
divergence betw een Thatcher's and Lawson's positions. Lawson was still
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pre-occupied w ith  the pursu it of international exchange rate  stability.
During the sum m er assisted by Terence Burns, he developed a proposal to
institutionalise the Plaza and Louvre Accords into a perm anent world-wide
regim e of "managed floating/ To Thatcher's annoyance, he presented the
proposal to the annual IMF meeting in September 1987.13
M eanw hile, Thatcher was grow ing uneasy w ith  the p u rsu it of
international exchange rate stability. After September Thatcher expressed
increasing concern at the level of Bank of England intervention necessary to
sustain the policy. She now believed that intervention w as causing extra
liquidity and w ould lead to renewed inflation/4 Lawson comments:
During the first half of the period of shadowing the M ark, up to my 
Septem ber 1987 IMF speech, she positively  loved the steady  
accum ulation of reserves. Alan W alters, how ever, w ho deeply  
disapproved of my IMF speech got on to her about it and thoroughly 
pu t the w ind up her; as a result of which she completely changed her 
tu n e .15
After the stock m arket crash of 20 October and fu rther upw ard  
pressure on sterling, the governm ent cut interest rates on 26 October, 5 
Novem ber and 4 December leaving them at 8.5 per cent. The aim was to 
m aintain both the DM3.00 target and liquidity in the wake of the crash. 
Despite the rate cuts, by December defending the target w as becoming 
increasingly difficult. Lawson concluded that intervention w ould  be more 
effective in Deutschmarks rather than dollars as hitherto. Leigh-Pemberton 
refused the request after the Bundesbank reacted angrily to the proposed 
developm ent on the grounds that it contravened the EMS agreem ent on 
purchases of other member states currencies.16
On 8 December Thatcher took up the general issue of intervention 
w ith  Lawson. Both recall in their memoirs that Thatcher expressed deep 
concern about the scale at which the Bank was intervening. Nevertheless, 
they agreed to order the Bank of England to intervene in  Deutschm arks 
irrespective of the EMS agreement. With the Bundesbank, Pem berton and 
now the Banque de France still unhappy, a com prom ise w as reached 
whereby the Bank of England intervened in a range of currencies including
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Deutschmarks but not dollars.17
The new intervention was not initially sufficient to curb the flow of 
capital into the UK. On the 11 December sterling traded at DM2.997. Lawson 
states that he and the Treasury considered abandoning the policy bu t before 
any decision was taken, sterling started to fall. A further respite in sterling's 
appreciation  came in February and allowed the governm ent to raise 
interest rates to 9 per cent.18
At the start of March, the upw ard pressure on sterling returned. 
Despite massive intervention, sterling hovered slightly below DM3.00. The 
financial m arkets convinced of the DM3.00 ceiling now believed that they 
possessed a one w ay bet on sterling's appreciation. In his memoirs, Lawson 
states that he hoped that the ceiling could be m aintained at least until the 
budget on 15 March. However, on Friday 4 March Thatcher dem anded that 
Lawson abandon the sterling target and end intervention w hen the markets 
re-opened on the following Monday. Lawson accepted Thatcher's principal 
dem and and Thatcher agreed that some limited intervention to sm ooth the 
m arkets could continue on the condition that she was given half-hourly 
reports on developments. On Monday 7 March, sterling surged and w ithin 
days stood at DM3.10.t9
Thatcher was backed in ending shadowing by both the Treasury and 
Bank of E ngland officials w ho believed tha t the policy w as now  
unsustainable. 20As Lawson himself comments, he was in no position to 
resist:
It was an unpleasant meeting, and I particularly resented her m anner 
on the eve of a Budget that was to achieve so many of the objectives 
we shared. Equally, there was no way in which I could contemplate 
resigning then: I was determined to introduce the 1988 budget for 
which I had laboured so long and hard. And Margaret knew this.21
Yet neither was Thatcher in a position to sack him:
The question arises whether at some point now or later I should have 
sacked Nigel. I would have been fully justified in doing so. He had 
pursued a policy w ithout my knowledge or consent and he continued 
to adopt a different approach from that which he knew I wanted. On 
the other hand, he was widely - and rightly - credited with helping us
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w in the 1987 election. He had complete intellectual m astery of his 
brief. He had  the strong support of Conservative back-benchers and 
m uch of the Conservative press who had convinced themselves that 
I was in the wrong and that only pettiness or pig-headedness could 
explain the different line I took .22
Lawson and the Treasury hoped that sterling could be restabilised at a
level around DM3.08 w ith  further intervention and interest rate cuts if
necessary. W hilst Thatcher was unrelenting on the former she was prepared
to accept the latter to limit sterling's a p p r e c ia t io n .2 3  Lawson states:
The rows I had w ith her at the end of 1987 and in the early part of 
1988 were entirely about intervention....She at no time suggested that 
interest rates should be higher, which she should have done if she 
had  really w anted a strong counter-inflationary stance. Indeed, she 
m ade it clear that, if we stopped intervening and let the pound rise, 
one of the attractions for her was that this m ight enable interest rates 
to come d o w n .2 4
On 17 March the government did indeed cut interest rates from 9 to 
8.5 per cent and left itself w ith half an exchange rate policy.25 The end of 
shadowing created a new public row between Thatcher and Lawson w ith the 
media reporting that Thatcher forced Lawson to abandon a policy to which 
he was committed. On 8 March Thatcher told the House of Commons that 
'there is no way in which one can buck the market' and  hammering home a 
very public wedge between herself and Lawson. Two days later, with sterling 
at DM3.06, Lawson responded by w arning against any further rise in 
s te r lin g .26 He then  told the Treasury Select Committee: 'A ny further 
significant rise in the exchange rate, certainly against the DM would, in my 
opinion, be unlikely to be sustainable.'27As Smith comments: 'The markets 
were therefore faced w ith the bizarre situation of a Chancellor trying to talk 
his currency down, while the Prime Minister appeared to be relishing its 
rise .'28 To add to the conflict, on 24 March Howe m ade a speech firmly 
backing Law son's case for exchange rate stab ility  and  praised  'the  
increasingly valuable experience of stability in the ERM/29
A lthough the 1987 autum n statement p lanned for a fall in  public 
expenditure, the governm ent's fiscal policy in 1987-1988 continued to be
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expansive. The 1988 budget provided  a big boost to dem and. The
governm ent introduced income tax cuts totalling £6 billion p er annum
reducing the basic rate from 27 to 25 per cent and the top rate from 60 to 40
per cent. For the future it set a target of a 20 per cent base rate. By limiting
m ortgage tax relief to one allowance per household from A ugust 1988, the
governm ent inadvertently  gave a further huge stim ulus to the housing
m arket as people rushed to take advantage of the old regulations.30
Expansion was possible because revenue w as flooding in to  the
Treasury through increased tax payments, a reduced social security budget
and, prim arily , privatisation. For 1987-88, the governm ent possessed a
budget surplus of £3.2 billion and the budget projected a surplus of £14.4
billion for 1988-89. Lawson used the Public Sector Debt Repaym ent, as he
dubbed it, to deny that fiscal policy was expansive:
The budget was in no way an attempt to give the economy a boost. 
Nor, in any strict economic sense did it.... The purpose of the 1988 
budget was simply and solely to improve the supply side performance 
of the economy through tax reduction and reform, w hich is w hat 
Budgets ought to be about.31
In reality Lawson was denying the most elementary relationship betw een 
taxation and demand.
In terms of ERM membership Lawson could certainly have pursued  
his m onetary aims more successfully within ERM since the ambivalence in 
exchange rate policy only made stabilising sterling more difficult. However, 
w ith  sterling strong and nominal and real interest rates low in comparison 
to previous years, m em bership no longer offered the clear m onetary  
benefits that it did in November 1985 and autum n 1986. As figure 5.2 (page 
213) shows, UK nominal rates were now lower than those in Italy and real 
rates were lower than those in Belgium, France, Holland and Italy. Only on 
long term  government bonds was the UK in a relatively poor position.
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Figure 5.2: Comparative Interest Rates March 1988
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Unwilling as it was to accept the causal relationship between domestic 
dem and and inflation, the governm ent's fiscal policy rem ained 
incompatible with ERM membership. With fiscal and monetary policy both 
expansive, the UK was taking inflationary risks in comparison with its ERM 
competitors. As Johnson comments, 'what ERM rules would have required 
to offset easier monetary policy was not just static but tighter fiscal policy.'32
By March 1988, ERM membership posed a new difficulty for the 
government in that a large balance of payments deficit loomed which
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would make it hard to sustain sterling at a fixed rate in the medium to long 
term. In July 1987, the government announced a £500 million balance of 
payments deficit for May and by the end of 1987, there was a deficit of £4.182 
billion. The 1988 budget optimistically forecast a further £4 billion deficit for 
that y e a r . 33 The deficit appeared to be structural rather than temporary. 
Im ports were growing at twice the rate of exports and the UK's 
m anufacturing base was nowhere near strong enough to provide for 
domestic demand. Figure 5.3 shows that the manufacturing trade deficit 
expanded from £3 345 million in 1985 to £11 223 million in 1987 and £21 078 
million in 1988.
Figure 5.3: Exports and Imports 1983-1988
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New Isolation
In June 1987 the UK government entered into a new conflict w ith the other 
EC m em ber states. At the European Council in Belgium, the UK alone 
opposed the Delors plan for the reform of the budgetary process, CAP, and 
regional and social policy. The other member states were more irritated 
th an  usual over the UK's intransigence since they believed tha t the 
proposals accomm odated more of the UK's dem ands than  those of any 
other mem ber state. For the rem ainder of 1987, the Thatcher governm ent 
refused  to reach a deal w ithout tough limits on farm  expenditure, a 
guarantee that the UK w ould not be worse off in  any new  budgetary  
arrangem ent than under the existing rebate system and a detailed plan on 
farm  price stabilisers. However, in February 1987 the governm ent was 
forced to accept a reform plan w ith major UK concessions on Community 
spend ing , budgetary  procedures and increased regional and  social 
expenditure.34
At the same time, during the second half of 1987 and the first quarter 
of 1988, m onetary and financial affairs moved to the forefront of the EC's 
agenda and the other member states pu t renewed pressure on the UK to 
enter ERM. As the final Basle-Nybourg agreem ents were draw n up in 
Septem ber 1987, the other EC finance ministers pressed Lawson for UK 
entry. They argued that the UK was free riding on the benefits of the ERM 
system  w ithout accepting the cost of m em bership. In public, the Irish 
governm ent repeated its earlier criticism of sterling's non-m em bership as 
particularly damaging to Ireland.35
After the Basle-Nybourg reforms, capital liberalisation emerged as the 
next m onetary issue on the EC agenda. In Novem ber, the Commission 
presented comprehensive proposals to liberalise capital movements which 
the Council of Ministers considered over the following m onths. The other 
m em ber states believed that it was illogical to create a m ore cohesive 
financial area w ithout UK participation in ERM.36
W ith the advent of the monetary union debate, the pressure for UK 
m em bership m ounted further. W hen the French Prime M inister, Jacques
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Chirac, first proposed a European Central Bank in January 1988 he urged UK 
entry to ERM so that the EC could move forward monetarily. In February 
the Italian and German governments, the Dutch and German central banks 
and the Commission all m ade similar calls. Italy said it w ould give up  its 
uniquely w ide six per cent bands w ithin ERM if the UK w ere to join. In 
M arch, the Germ an Finance Minister, Stoltenberg m ade tw o unusually  
strong  calls for UK m em bership. He argued tha t the governm ent's 
intransigence was delaying the general process of European integration and 
the developm ent of pooled reserves w ithin EMS. In sum, the governm ent 
already lacking allies faced a European sum m it in H anover at w hich its 
non-m em bership of ERM was likely to further isolate the UK from  the 
mainstream  of EC debate.37 
Non-M em bership as Economic Policy
W ith Lawson and the Treasury operating a m onetary policy w hich could
not loudly speak its name, there was a reduced scope for any broad debate in
the core executive about overall macro-economic strategy. The Bank of
England was uneasy w ith  the governm ent's fiscal policy since, unlike
Lawson, it believed that the expansion of dem and was dangerous. In its
February 1988 Quarterly Bulletin it implicitly called for a cautious budget:
There m ust, however, be some question about the sustainability of 
grow th of domestic dem and in this country at a rate  above that 
currently being achieved by most other major countries....It will also 
be im portant for the preservation of bo th  in ternal and external 
balance that the anti-inflationary burden  continues to be shared 
between monetary and fiscal policy.38
However, it was difficult for the Bank to make its case that w ith
m onetary policy loose, fiscal policy should be tighter w hen Lawson and the
Treasury would not openly discuss monetary policy w ith them. As a result,
the Bank was m arginalised from the decision making process. One former
bank official commented:
It was clear that the Bank of England was at the end of its tether at 
w hat Lawson w as doing.... The Bank felt they w ere p u t in  an 
impossibly compromised position by the inflationary boom. It was a 
disastrous policy. Some of them may have come close to resigning ,1
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think.3 9
W ith the Bank m arginalised and Thatcher, Law son and  H ow e
feuding in public, Thatcher called a meeting of herself, Lawson and Leigh-
Pem berton for 25 March to hammer out future monetary and exchange rate
policy. In preparation for the meeting, Lawson and the Treasury produced a
paper laying out three options for the future conduct of policy: first, that
sterling be a factor among others in monetary policy; second, to announce
an explicit com m itm ent to exchange rate  stab ility  b u t w ith in  an
unpublished band; third, to enter ERM. Lawson still believed that ERM
mem bership was the most preferable option. However, he did not press the
case.40 He comments:
There was no point in exploring the ERM case in depth  since there 
was no chance at that time of persuading M argaret to accept it. The 
im m ediate purpose of including the th ird  option w as to try  and 
persuade her to reinstate the second option, an  informal target range 
supported by both interest rates and in te r v e n t io n a l
At the meeting the onus was on a compromise between Thatcher and 
Lawson. Thatcher accepted that exchange rate stability was desirable w ith 
some role for intervention and Lawson accepted that there w ould  be no 
exchange rate target as the objective of policy. In no w ay d id  this 
arrangem ent constitute a formal monetary framework. The net result was a 
cap on sterling's appreciation w ith future interest rates cuts if necessary. The 
concordat effectively excluded Leigh-Pemberton w ho was firmly against any 
further loosening of m onetary policy whatever sterling 's position. It also 
removed any possibility of ERM entry in the short to m edium  term .42
In the second quarter of 1988, the governm ent's economic objectives 
m oved ever further away from ERM membership. On 11 April Thatcher 
and Lawson agreed to cut interests rates to 8.5 per cent after sterling rose 
above DM3.12. A m onth later a new public row  broke. O n 12 May, 
responding to a question from Kinnock, Thatcher failed to support Lawson's 
view that any further appreciation in sterling w ould damage industry. The 
next day, Howe departed from his press released text to say that the
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governm ent could not 'go on for ever' d iscussing ERM add ing  the
qualification of 'w hen the time is right' to the underlying comm itm ent to
enter the system. 43
Thatcher recalls that after his comments Howe asked her to meet
Lawson and himself to discuss their conflict. Thatcher refused and she met
Lawson alone on 16 May.44 Their discussion at this meeting is a m atter of
dispute. Lawson states that they agreed an answer for Thatcher to give at
Prime M inister's question time if pressed again on sterling. Then, Thatcher
suggested a half per cent interest rate cut to strengthen the appearance that
they were both committed to an exchange rate policy:
To my eternal regret, I accepted this poisoned chalice. While nothing 
had been farther from my mind than a further interest rate reduction, 
I could see w hen M argaret suggested it tha t it w ould  clearly 
dem onstrate that we took sterling into account in our interest rate 
policy; and I was confident that I could reverse it fast enough to 
prevent it from bringing about a reduction in mortgage rates.45
By contrast, Thatcher claims that Lawson proposed the interest rate cut:
I had been told by the Treasury in advance of the meeting that Nigel 
wanted a further interest rate cut. ... I had got part of what I w anted ... 
in  that sterling had been allowed to rise to DM3.18. So I w as not 
unhappy to have the suggested interest rate cut I knew he wanted. ... 
Above all, however, this reduction of the interest rate on Tuesday 17 
May by half a point to 7.5 per cent was the price of tolerable relations 
w ith  my Chancellor, who believed that his whole standing w as at 
stake if the pound appreciated outside any 'band ' to which he m ight 
have semi-publicly consigned it.46
Certainly, others saw the third interest rate cut in two months as part
of Lawson's effort to circumvent Thatcher's refusal to allow any significant
intervention to stabilise sterling. Smith comments:
The Chancellor having lost the battle to keep the pound below DM3, 
refused to accept that he had lost the war over m anaging sterling. 
Colleagues say that this, and pride, offer the only explanations of why 
in the weeks after the 15 March budget, he again embarked on a policy 
of cutting interest rates to restrain the pound. 'It became an obsession 
w ith him ', said one adviser. 'He believed he was right and he was 
determined to prove it.'47
In her next appearance in the House of Commons, Thatcher agreed
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that there was 'u tter unanim ity' between herself and Lawson over economic 
policy. Yet beyond the rhetoric, the conflict remained. Thatcher's former 
econom ic adviser, Alan W alters started to give interview s and  w rite 
new spaper articles criticising Lawson's m onetary management and arguing 
for an increase in interest rates. Rather than renounce W alters criticism, 
Thatcher asked him to return as her adviser to start in May 1989.48
By June 1988, the inflationary pressure created by the governm ent's 
policies since 1985 translated into rising inflation. Having stood at 3.3 per 
cent in January, inflation rose to 4.6 per cent in June. House price inflation 
was running at 30 per cent and the growth of narrow and broad money was 
accelerating. Demand was growing much faster than domestic supply and 
w ages were rising far above prices. At the same time, the balance of 
paym ents was plunging further into deficit, standing at £12 billion for the 
first half of the year.49
In the space of a few days at the end of May and the beginning of June, 
sterling fell from DM3.19 to DM3.09. Thatcher and Lawson united to raise 
interest rates again to 8 per cent on 3 June, 8.5 per cent on 6 June, 9 per cent 
on 22 June, and 9.5 per cent on 29 June. Their apparent aim was not simply 
to stabilise sterling b u t to encourage its appreciation as a counter- 
inflationary weapon. In so doing they rejected the alternatives of curbing 
the housing m arket, controlling credit, encouraging wage restra in t or 
increasing taxes - all of which would have directly addressed the sources of 
inflation.so
By choosing a tight monetary policy and an appreciating exchange 
rate as its sole counter-inflationary tool, the government rejected the whole 
approach  of the ERM states to economic m anagem ent and m ade its 
m onetary as well as fiscal policy incompatible w ith ERM m embership. A 
year earlier Italy faced a similar problem of rising demand, a deteriorating 
current account, and pressure on the lira. After a rise in interest rates to try 
and stabilise the lira, the Italian government introduced a package of tax 
m easures w hich included a rise in VAT and then im posed additional 
qualitative controls on bank lending. In 1988, it raised taxes again, in sharp
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contrast to UK policy. 51
Such further divergence from the ERM states raised a fundam ental 
question for Lawson and other ERM supporters: if the UK were to  enter 
ERM, how w ould the government control inflation? At the same time, the 
balance of payments was likely to make it difficult for the governm ent to 
pursue its new counter-inflationary policy beyond the short term. Such a 
large deficit w ould pu t a limit on sterling's appreciation, how ever high 
interest rates went, because the markets would ultim ately expect that the 
governm ent would allow sterling to depreciate to restore competitiveness.
Nevertheless, Lawson and the Treasury were now  as p repared  to 
ignore the threat to successful ERM membership posed by the balance of 
paym ents deficit as the incom patibility of their counter-in flationary  
framework. In a speech to the IMF in 1988, Lawson declared that the balance 
of payments was no longer an important economic indicator and it was not 
necessary for it to be in equilibrium  for policy to be successful. He 
com m ents:
In today's world, [by contrast], an advanced industrial country that can 
maintain a reasonable degree of confidence in its currency can finance 
a current account deficit for a considerable num ber of years - as for 
example the United States did - by importing capital from overseas. 
At any given period, those countries whose capacity to generate 
savings exceed their indigenous investm ent o p p o rtu n ity  w ill 
experience a capital outflow, which will finance the current account 
deficits of those countries whose capacity to generate savings falls 
short of their indigenous investment opportunities.52
Only if a balance of paym ents deficit reflected excessive governm ent
borrowing and spending was corrective action necessary otherwise a deficit
would correct itself:
The m ain source of fluctuations in net savings is changes in  the 
am ount of borrowing by the private sector. There is a lim it to the 
amount of debt which the private sector will be willing - or can afford 
- to undertake. Once that limit has been reached, the savings ratio 
will rise again. M oreover, higher debt m eans h igher in terest 
paym ents in the future, which will reduce disposable income and 
consum ption. ... It is only in the unlikely even t that the self- 
correcting mechanisms threaten to stretch over so long a period that 
the creditworthiness constraint to which I have alluded comes into
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play [so] that it w ould be appropriate for the governm ent to run  a 
large budget surplus in order to offset the lack of private sector 
savings.53
W hat Lawson's doctrine ignored was how the UK could m aintain a 
reasonable degree of confidence in its currency given its balance of payments 
deficit. International investors were not being asked to use their savings to 
finance domestic investm ent as m uch as domestic consumption. Beyond 
the short term, this situation was a disincentive to export capital to the UK. 
At the same time, investors could only believe that the UK governm ent 
w ould  not allow sterling to depreciate to the extent to which they could 
believe that the government w ould accept the consequent costs in interest 
rates, lost ou tpu t and employment. W ithout that confidence, it w ould 
ultimately prove difficult to pursue exchange rate stability.
Non-M em bership and EC Policy
In the same period, there appears to have been little discussion about ERM
m em bership as an issue of EC policy in the run  up the Hanover summit.
W hilst Thatcher does not discuss the subject, Lawson claims that little
debate took place because Thatcher refused to consult him  due to their
conflict over economic policy. Instead, she chose to rely almost entirely on
Charles Powell, her Private Secretary on foreign affairs. 54Thatcher and
Powell decided that the government could not oppose the establishment of
a committee on m onetary union even though no-one in the governm ent
supported the idea of a single currency. Indeed, one person close to Thatcher
commented on the proposed committee:
There was no option. The trouble was always w ith these things in the 
Community, you get carried along step by step. A t each stage you try 
to minimise it, bu t there was always enough there to get to the next 
stage.55
Rather, the Thatcher-Powell strategy was to try and expunge any mention of 
a European central bank from the terms of reference and ensure that the 
committee was comprised of central bank governors rather than experts.56 
A Thatcher adviser recalled that Chancellor Kohl assured her that a 
committee of central bankers would oppose monetary union: 'We were told
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- "Push these guys in there. They'll all hate it. They'll kill it stone dead."57
Lawson describes it as 'extraordinary' and 'innocent' that Thatcher
and Powell believed that monetary union was possible w ithout a European
central bank. In his view, it was a disastrous decision for which they alone
bore responsibility:
I claim no great prescience in recognizing the reality of Hanover as I 
did. W hat amazed me was that Margaret, and those to whose advice 
she chose to listen, could have got it so wrong....She simply failed to 
understand w hat she was about.58
However, Lawson's account is open to serious dispute. Certainly the
Foreign Office was involved in the decision-m aking process. In  1989
Thatcher told one m inister that the only reason that she agreed to a
committee on monetary union was because the Foreign Office assured her
that its conclusion w ould be of little consequence. W hether this w as a
genuine Foreign Office position or w hether it hid its true views from
Thatcher is difficult to assess. At least in public Howe did not draw  any link
betw een his economic policy case for ERM m em bership and  any new
imperative in terms of EC policy.59
A senior Treasury official asked about Lawson's claim responded that
Thatcher d id  in fact take Treasury advice in the run  up  to H a n o v e r .60
Rather, it appears that Lawson and the Treasury did not believe that the
other mem ber states were serious about m onetary union. If the Bank of
England thought differently, then it did not im pose its view  on  the
Treasury. One Treasury civil servant commented:
I don 't think in m id 1988, we [the Treasury] were taking it [monetary 
union] very seriously. I don 't think we began to take it very seriously 
until we actually got to the Delors report.61
According to another official there, the Treasury was in a weak position to
assess the monetary union debate because Delors kept the issue out of the
Economic and Finance Council (Ecofin) meetings:
One of the problems in the early stages was following discussions. 
Jacques Delors worked extremely hard  to keep it out of financial 
circles. He did his utmost to mobilise the Foreign Affairs Council so 
that we in the Treasury were actually finding it quite difficult to
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discern what was going on.67
The Treasury tended to believe that other finance officials and  central 
banks were not interested in  monetary union. The same Treasury official 
commented that Delors 'knew  that the m onetary committee w ould not be 
en thusiastic /63
The Treasury did not believe it was isolated within the EC monetary
committee on either m onetary union or because of non-m em bership of
ERM. It saw itself as part of an inner group on the committee comprised of
the UK, Germany, France, Italy, H olland and the senior comm ission
official, and selected for technical expertise. According to one Treasury
official: 'The UK representative played a suitably im portant role and was
never kep t out of the evolution of the C om m unity 's m onetary
affairs.'64Another senior official commented:
We negotiated all the financial side of the directives leading up  to 
1993 and I always reckoned we got much more than our fair say. It 
isn 't true that people said 'you're not in ERM so w e're not going to 
listen to you.'65
The Treasury believed that Delors and his Commission colleagues 
were forcing the debate as part of their ow n integration compulsion. One 
Treasury official commented that he could not recall any interest among the 
m em ber states for m onetary union until April 1989. Rather, 'i t  was a 
Commission dream .'66 Another senior official stated that the initial push  
for m onetary  union came from Delors pu tting  political pressure on 
M itterrand as the 'big statesmanlike thing to do; I'm  sure Delors pu t it to 
him on that basis.'67 In his view, France did not become dissatisfied w ith the 
ERM's operation until 1990. A nother respondent recognised France's 
enthusiasm  for m onetary union bu t did not link it to the costs of ERM 
membership: 'The French motive was basically to tie Germany into the EC. 
They detected that it m ight just move off to the E ast.'68 The Treasury 
apparently failed to understand that monetary union was primarily on the 
EC agenda because France and other member states were dissatisfied w ith 
the operation of ERM. Although Delors certainly played a significant role in
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persuading M itterrand that a European solution was the only answer to 
France's economic problem s, this active role in the debate was totally 
dependent on the French government's, in particular support for m onetary 
u n io n .69
The Treasury's view was shared by those w ho directly advised
Thatcher. One Number Ten official commented:
I think that Delors concluded that after the Single Market, this w ould 
be the next big step, not principally for economic bu t for political 
reasons. He saw this as the key to political union and a federal 
Europe. That's w hy he pursued  it so vigorously ... Delors was 
absolutely central to the pressure for economic and m onetary union. 
Now, we all know that the French developed their ow n reasons for 
favouring, it principally because they got fed up  being dependent on 
the Deutschmark and the Bundesbank determ ining their economic 
policy, and w anting to grab a share of that them selves through 
Europe. But that I think was a rationalisation, quite frankly, an 
exploitation of a policy stance that Delors originally took.70
Overall, the evidence suggests that many actors in the UK core executive 
inaccurately assessed the position of the ERM states on m onetary union and 
ignored the question of how the UK could pursue its interests on m onetary 
union outside ERM.
H anover
In mid-1988, the pressure to enter ERM mounted. In May Lord Cockfield, 
the senior UK Commissioner, declared that UK entry  to ERM w as a 
necessary part of the Single Market and capital liberalisation. On 10 June 
M itterrand pressurised Thatcher in bilateral talks w ithout success. Two days 
later France and Germany issued a joint th rea t to block the capital 
liberalisation directive, to w hich the UK governm ent w as com m itted, 
unless the UK reversed its position. It was the first effort by other EC states 
to im pose a direct cost on the UK for its non participation  in ERM. 
How ever, w ith France already starting to remove some of its exchange 
controls, the threat carried little actual power. On 24 June, the EC finance 
ministers reached a final agreement on the directive w ith the provision that 
Ireland would have until 1992 to comply and Spain and Portugal possibly 
until 1995. Lawson successfully struck down a draft declaration which called
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for 'equal participation by 1992 of all countries in the EMS/71
A t the H anover sum m it on 27 and 28 June, the EC states
unanim ously  agreed that an objective of the EC was the 'progressive
realisation of m onetary union' as set out in the SEA. To outline 'concrete
steps tow ards this u n io n / the Council set up the Delors comm ittee
composed of EC central bank governors and co-opted experts w ith  Jacques
Delors as chairman.77
Before H anover, Thatcher told the House of Com m ons tha t a
European central bank could only exist w hen there was a sovereign EC
governm ent.73 Since this was undesirable, there was no point in discussing
the issue. On her return, Thatcher presented the omission of any explicit
m ention of a European central bank from the Delors committee's terms of
reference as a victory for the UK. She told the House of Commons:
W ith regard to the European Central Bank, we have taken part in the 
SEA which w ent through the House and which said that we w ould 
make progressive steps to the realisation of monetary union, and we 
have set up a group to consider that. Monetary union w ould be the 
first step, but progress towards it would not necessarily involve a 
single currency or a European central bank.74
Thatcher's statem ent was in stark contrast to M itterrand 's post- 
H anover comment that a European Central Bank followed from m onetary 
un io n .73 The contrast suggested that Thatcher believed she had agreed to 
som ething less than the ERM states envisaged for the Delors committee. 
One former Foreign Office official commented: 'I am completely amazed 
that Thatcher agreed to the terms of reference of the Delors committee.'76In  
the w ords of one Commission official, 'Thatcher d id  not realise w hat she 
signed up  for at Hanover.'77The net result was that the UK was committed 
to the goal of m onetary union whilst pursuing an independent m onetary 
policy from the states with which it would monetarily unite.
The City and Monetary Union
The establishm ent of the Delors committee renew ed City enthusiasm  for 
ERM entry. One week after the Hanover summit, the chairman of the Stock 
Exchange, Nicholas Goodison, told a group of MPs that outside ERM the
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UK's interests w ould not be considered in the debate on m onetary union. 
As a result, London's position as the leading financial centre in  Europe 
could be threatened. The International Financial Outlook of Lloyds Bank 
similarly w arned that non-membership w ould now run the risk of isolating 
the City. In these circumstances, Frankfurt w ould be the likely host of any 
European Central Bank and w ould displace London as the operational 
centre of exchange and money markets in the EC.78
Isolation within the EC was likely to strike at the heart of London's 
position as a financial centre. Compared to New York and Tokyo, London 
was w ithout a large economic hinterland. It succeeded in transcending that 
weakness through its liberal rules of operation and its claim to the whole EC 
as its economic backyard. However, capital liberalisation w ithin the EC was 
likely to reduce the singular attraction of the City in regulatory terms. At the 
same time, any move towards further EC m onetary developm ent w ithout 
UK participation m ade it less tenable to assert that the EC functioned as 
L ondon 's econom ic hin terland. W ith the City now criticising non­
m em bership as a direct threat to its own interests, the governm ent could 
expect more vociferous pressure on ERM entry in the future.
The City's anxiety increased dissatisfaction w ith non-membership in
the Conservative party. Most significantly, the City's position gave Michael
Heseltine an issue on which to focus his latent leadership challenge. In an
article in the Financial Times in July 1988, he declared:
Technically, the ERM and our attitude to the Delors committee are 
not linked. Britain could leap a stage and w ithout joining still play a 
positive role in the arrangements which will flow from Delors. But 
such clinical simplicity ignores the cause of the controversy over 
EMS. ... Europe believes we have dug in. Psychologically and 
politically, 'they 've heard it all before.' We will never play our full 
role if we stay outside the institutions of Europe and com plain of 
their discrimination. It is almost surrealist to look at Europe's leading 
economies today w ith lower interest rates and lower inflation than 
ours and suggest that Germ an rigidity  underly ing  the ERM is 
incompatible w ith Britain's economic self-interest.79
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5.3: THE DELORS COMMITTEE AND NON-MEMBERSHIP OF ERM
During the period of the Delors committee, the government's m onetary and 
fiscal policy rem ained incompatible w ith ERM membership. After the four 
interest rate rises in June 1988, the government raised interest rates to 10 per 
cent on 5 July, to 10.5 per cent on 19 July, to 11 per cent on 8 A ugust and to 
12 per cent on 26 August. As a result, sterling steadily appreciated. W hen 
ste rlin g  came under dow nw ard  p ressu re  in  N ovem ber after the 
announcem ent of the worst monthly balance of payments deficit on record, 
the governm ent raised interest rates again to 13 per cent. During the first 
quarter of 1989 sterling averaged DM 3.23, reaching a peak of DM 3.27 in
February .80
Although inflation continued to rise, reaching 7.9 per cent in March 
1989, the governm ent still refused to countenance any additional counter- 
inflationary policies. In September 1988 an IMF report recom m ended that 
the UK government consider raising taxes if the growth in dem and did not 
slow down, and warned that otherwise inflation w ould continue to rise and 
the current account w ould deteriorate.81 Lawson dism issed the report 
saying: 'We m ust continue to resist those siren voices who w ant to use fiscal 
policy in a vain attem pt at short term  dem and managem ent.'82indeed, 
rather than tightening fiscal policy, in the 1989 budget the governm ent gave 
the economy a further stimulus, w ith £2 billion w orth of tax cuts through 
change to National Insurance.83 
The Delors Committee
The UK w as represented on the Delors com m ittee by  Robin Leigh-
Pem berton. The Governor and officials at the Bank of England were
sceptical about any m onetary union in the EC w hich did  not emerge
through natural convergence. In the words of one Bank official:
I don 't think the Bank of England was or is opposed to m onetary 
union in principle. Many of us would feel that if that is a destination 
which we reach as a result of having had a really meaningful Single 
M arket which over a period has brought our economies increasingly
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closer together, so that they are practically integrated ... then at a 
certain point in that process, you lose very little and potentially gain 
quite a bit more, by locking in to a m onetary union. It's the notion 
that that process is one that can be used as a driving engine for 
economic integration that I think some of us are pretty sceptical of.84
Nevertheless, they believed that it was necessary for the UK to play a full
role in the Delors committee:
I think we thought it would be absolute folly not to take the debate 
seriously. I think that most of us felt in our bones that the terms in 
which the debate was being conducted were a little bit removed from 
reality. But nevertheless one had to go through the debate, and as 
necessary inject doses of reality when we thought it was lacking88
Thatcher, Lawson and the Treasury were more resolutely opposed to the
w hole principle of m onetary union. Lawson com m ents on  his and
Thatcher's position:
The irony is that this was an issue on which our views were very 
similar...My ow n opposition to the idea of a single currency for 
Europe w ent back a long way...My idea of Europe w as that of de 
Gaulle's Europe des peltries, a Europe of nation-states, rather than the 
single federal superstate, or United States of Europe, w hich some 
espoused. The implications [of the Werner Report] appalled me, since 
it clearly implied doing away w ith  the Com m unity in  favour of a 
single European superstate.88
In their accounts of the Delors comm ittee's operation Lawson and 
Thatcher both stress that they sought to use Leigh-Pemberton to secure a 
report which they could accept. The Prime Minister and the Chancellor saw 
the papers from the start of the committee in September on a sub rose basis 
and felt that the likely report would make recommendations to which the 
governm ent was firmly opposed. On 14 December 1988 Thatcher held the 
first of a series of meetings w ith Leigh-Pemberton, Lawson, Howe, Charles 
Powell and Brian Griffiths. Leigh-Pemberton explained that the Delors 
report was likely to fall into three parts. The first w ould  describe the 
operation of ERM. The second w ould define m onetary union and outline 
the institutional changes necessary to achieve it. The th ird , and as yet 
unfinished section, w ould examine the case for early EC constitutional 
change as a first step to m onetary union. The others agreed that Leigh-
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Pem berton's tactics should be to assemble the w idest possible opposition
w ith in  the committee bo th  to an early EC treaty am endm ent and  to
recom m endations of any particular course of action. They believed that
Leigh-Pemberton should concentrate on an alliance w ith  Pohl and hoped
tha t if these two stood together some of the other governors w ould
eventually join them. 87
According to Lawson, the tactics were unsuccessful because after
prom ising Leigh-Pemberton his support, Pohl refused to seriously engage
him self in the committee's negotiations. As a result, w hen a draft of the
Delors com m ittee's repo rt was circulated in February 1989, the UK
governm ent regarded it as totally unacceptable. Lawson and Thatcher then
tried  unsuccessfully to persuade Leigh-Pemberton to subm it a m inority
repo rt stressing that it w as beyond the com m ittee's com petence to
pronounce upon the shift in  political sovereignty which m onetary union
w ould entail. Instead, Leigh-Pemberton concentrated on removing some of
the prescriptive language from the report. 88
Lawson's and Thatcher's accounts are contradicted on several counts
all of which suggest that the government did not take the Delors committee
seriously. Lawson states that the committee started meeting in September.
W hilst it is true that the formal meetings did indeed start on 13 September,
informal discussions appear to have begun on 12 J u ly .8? According to one
Treasury official: 'The way the committee started was a bit confusing and it
was difficult to get hold of what was actually going to be discussed.'?0 On this
basis, there was no consultation betw een Leigh-Pem berton and  the
governm ent until some five months after the committee began its effective
w ork. One Treasury insider adm itted  that the departm en t h ad  no
discussions w ith Leigh-Pemberton about a strategy for negotiation until
some months after the committee began. Another Treasury official said that
Leigh-Pemberton was very m uch left on his own in the committee.?1 One
former Foreign Office official went further:
Robin Leigh Pemberton did not have any instructions of any kind in 
all that year of the Delors Report. ... He never saw Mrs Thatcher after
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he signed it to discuss it. I mean she just went around saying that he 
was a bloody idiot to go along with it.92
W ithout instructions in the formative stages, Leigh-Pemberton and
the Bank simply informed Lawson and the Treasury about the proceedings
of the committee. A senior Bank official who briefed Leigh-Pemberton for
the committee commented:
The Treasury were kept in touch with what was happening bu t more 
by w ay of letting them know what had happened at each meeting. 
A nd then Governor-Chancellor level to some extent, and to a m uch 
m ore detailed extent as a somewhat more junior level, we were 
sensitised to Chancellor-Treasury thinking.^
In this context, the governm ent was in a weak position w hen it pressed
Leigh-Pem berton to subm it a m inority report. Rather than acquiesce to
governm ent pressure, Leigh-Pemberton believed that it was preferable to
have a unanim ous report w ith some compromises to his scepticism than a
stronger majority report.94
The governm ent's apparent detachment from the Delors committee
w as not matched by the other EC member states. Certainly, Pohl remained,
in  the w ords of one Bank official, 'pretty autonom ous' from the German
governm ent bu t this was the result of the Bundesbank's independence
rather than  the governm ent's lack of attention to the comm ittee's work.
The French governm ent had a similar institutional relationship to the
Banque de France as the UK government to the Bank of England but French
ministers looked to its representative Larosiere to pursue its interests.95 One
Bank of England official close to the negotiations commented:
I don 't know how m uch prior [French] consultation, preparation and 
instruction w ent on. I w ould suspect quite a lot, mitigated only to the 
extent that Larosiere is a fairly powerful figure. Nevertheless, to my 
m ind, it is inconceivable that he would have argued a line on any 
particular aspect of the [Delors] report that w as not deem ed by the 
T reasury  [ie Finance M inistry] to be consistent w ith  French 
governm ent thinking.9^
W hen a draft Delors report to which the governm ent was opposed 
was released, the governm ent apparently  blam ed Leigh-Pem berton's
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personal weakness for the situation.97 One Treasury official commented:
He was a bit out of his depth in central banking circles. ... He saw 
being Governor as a part-time job in his spare time from being Lord 
Lieutenant of Kent.98
A nother official commented:
I think Nigel Lawson was pretty fed up with the way that Robin 
Leigh-Pemberton allowed himself to be carried along .... He spoke 
scathingly of the inability of the Governor to stop it.99
Thatcher, Lawson and the Treasury apparently did not believe that
the UK's non-membership of ERM reduced Leigh-Pemberton's influence in
the com m ittee. Leigh-Pem berton and senior Bank officials believed
otherwise. As one commented:
He did not go into those discussions w ith the best hand. Our non­
participation was a weakness in the hand certainly. ... If you w ant to 
be arguing that the Community should not be advancing as fast down 
the EMU road  as some of the m ore am bitious in stitu tiona l 
developers m ight be seeking, it is very difficult to argue that 
footdragging, a non-Communitaire card as seen by those who w ant 
to rush  ahead if not only are you not wanting to run  the next race as 
far or as fast as the others but you haven 't actually finished the race 
before.... We were not deemed to be a full-time professional player.too
The Bank's view was shared by the Foreign Office. According to a Foreign 
Office official: 'We were very aware that the revival of the EMU objectives 
revived also the political, as well as the economic disadvantages of non­
m em bership of the ERM.'101 Outside ERM, Leigh-Pemberton was in no 
position to make alliances w ithin the Delors committee. Again a Foreign 
Office official commented about the monetary union debate:
I do not recall that we saw the Germans as particular allies on issues 
of m onetary union. In some things they were helpful, for example, in 
favouring economic convergence, bu t not in others. In some areas we 
had more scope for making deals w ith the French who always hoped 
to have us on their side to exert concerted influence on the 
Bundesbank. But w ith either country our absence from the ERM was 
a deterrent to striking alliances. 102
Certainly, during the period of the Delors committee, the pressure 
from w ithin the EC for UK entry continued. A lthough in A ugust 1988 the
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governm ent announced that it would create a unique m arket in short-term 
Treasury bills denom inated in Ecus, the other member states doubted the 
UK's m onetary credentials. In January 1989 Leon Brittan became the UK's 
senior Commissioner and almost immediately started to make regular calls 
for UK entry. On economic grounds, he argued that ERM m em bership 
w ould  reduce inflation and provide the discipline necessary to create a 
fram ework in which UK business could flourish. In EC terms, he declared 
that the UK could pu t at least a temporary break on further institutional 
m onetary developm ent by entering ERM. Brittan's calls were m atched in 
February 1989 by interventions from the Deutsche Bank and the Spanish 
governm ent, which said that it might delay its own entry to ERM until the 
UK was also a member.103
C apital liberalisation placed further indirect pressure  on  the
governm ent. W hilst Thatcher professed that liberalisation w ould destroy
the ERM, practice was increasingly suggesting otherwise. Through the
second half of 1988 Italy started to remove some of its capital restrictions
whilst m aintaining the lira parity: its first attempt to this in May 1987 was
abandoned after the lira came under pressure. The progress now being made
tow ards a single financial m arket made the UK's non-m em bership an
increasing anomaly. 104
Outside the Delors Committee, Thatcher, Lawson and the Treasury
addressed the m onetary union debate in political rather than  economic
terms. As in the first half of 1988, they ignored the link between the ERM's
operation and  support for m onetary union. Thatcher, in particular, saw
m onetary union as part of an alien plot for a federal Europe and  the
abolition of nation-state sovereignty rather than as a means of reducing the
power of the Bundesbank. On 18 September 1988 Thatcher declared that a
central bank w ould mean that:
Each country w ould have to give up control over the future of its 
ow n economy, over its own currency so that neither Parliament, nor 
governm ent would have a say in what happened, in w hat steps had 
to be taken to uphold the value of the currency.105
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Two days later in Bruges, Thatcher delivered w hat became both a celebrated 
and notorious speech attacking m onetary union in even more forthright 
term s:
We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in 
Britain, only to see them reim posed at a European level w ith  a 
European superstate exercising a new dominance from Brussels.106
Similarly, on 25 January 1989, Lawson declared:
It is inevitable that there are those w ho tire of [com pleting the 
internal market] and flutter tow ards the flame of economic and 
m onetary union, or other great ideas. A nd others who have never 
m uch liked hacking at regulation and bureaucracy anyway and are 
only too keen to escape w ith dreams of EMU instead.107
Thus, by failing either to make a connection between ERM m embership and 
the m onetary union debate or to engage w ith the integration issue on the 
same term s as other states, the UK governm ent left itself in a very weak 
position to pursue its interests on monetary union.
An Independent Bank?
D uring the period of the Delors committee, Lawson and Howe apparently 
d id  not p u t any pressure on Thatcher over ERM m em bership. Rather 
Lawson pursued an alternative counter-inflationary option w ith Thatcher. 
In September 1988 he instructed his officials to devise a proposal for an 
independent bu t accountable Bank of England. In Lawson's plan, the Bank 
w ould operate under a completely new legal fram ework w ith  a similarly 
explicit sta tu tory  obligation to m aintain price stability as that of the 
Bundesbank. The Bank w ould be accountable to Parliam ent through the 
select com m ittee system. On 25 Novem ber Lawson sent a m em o to 
T hatcher ou tlin ing  his proposal and recom m ending a w hite paper 
publication on Budget Day 1989 and legislation in the following November. 
W hen Thatcher and Lawson subsequently discussed the proposal, Thatcher 
d isp layed little interest. She stated that the proposal could only be 
considered w hen inflation was low and coming down, since otherwise it 
w ould look as if the government could not reduce inflation itself. For the 
rem ainder of his Chancellorship, Lawson neither took up  the issue again
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w ith Thatcher nor place it on the public agenda.10^
In terms of ERM membership itself, Thatcher and Lawson continued 
to spill their differences in public. On 9 October Thatcher stated that she 
believed that w ith capital liberalisation, the ERM w ould break up. On 23 
January Thatcher used Ingham to declare that she was virtually ruling out 
ERM membership during the rem ainder of the governm ent's term  in office 
and that she did not believe that a further term w ould change her mind. 
The next day, Lawson responded by saying that the obstacles to entry were 
dim inishing and the Single M arket w ould make exchange rate stability 
increasingly im portant.109
5.4: THE ROAD TO MADRID
The Delors Report was published on 17 April as the unanim ous findings of 
its seventeen members. It outlined three stages necessary to reach monetary 
union and argued that a decision to enter upon the first stage should be a 
decision to embark on the entire process. Stage One was to begin in July 1990 
and w ould entail closer coordination of m onetary policy, the abolition of 
rem aining exchange controls and the participation of all member states in 
ERM. Stage Two was to be a transition period and w ould create a European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB) composed of a central institu tion and 
ind iv idual national banks w ith  lim ited power. The ESCB w ould  be 
independen t from  m em ber states and com m unity institu tions and be 
com m itted to price stability. In Stage 3 the ESCB w ould assum e sole 
responsibility for monetary policy and exchange rate m anagement vis a vis 
non-EC currencies. There would be a final fixing of member state currencies 
and a single currency issu ed .110
The report further stated that to make m onetary union successful, 
economic convergence between member states was necessary. To this end, 
the report recommended increased regional aid, im proved macro-economic 
policy coordination and binding rules on the size of member states' budget 
deficits. Finally, the report recommended immediate preparation for an IGC 
to negotiate the necessary changes to the Treaty of Rome.111
Whilst all other member states publicly welcomed the report, the UK
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governm ent vociferously condem ned it. Im m ediately after the report's
publication, Lawson said that the UK could not accept the massive transfer
of sovereignty into a political union which monetary union w ould entail.
He declared that the UK could only accept Stage One and w ould seek to
block any proposal to proceed w ith an IGC. Unlike ERM m embership, all
core executive actors were generally united on the Delors report. Lawson's
expressed opposition was shared by Thatcher, Howe and the Foreign Office,
the Treasury and the Bank of England.112
A lthough the UK was isolated in its response, the other m em ber
states were not unanimous about a timetable for Stages Two and Three. One
group of states led by Germany envisaged a long period of economic
convergence and institu tional consolidation before Stage Three w as
reached. By contrast, France, Italy and Spain w anted to m ove rapid ly
tow ards a single currency. For its part the Bundesbank as the institution
m ost threatened by monetary union, aimed to emphasise the importance of
econom ic convergence to an extent that w ould jeopardise the w hole
project.115 In his book on the Bundesbank, Marsh comments:
Realising that outright opposition to EMU w ould be sterile and 
counterproductive, the Bundesbank opted for a more subtle line of 
assault. If the bank could not bring down the EMU from outside, it 
had  to try to disable the edifice from within...The Bundesbank's 
chosen m ethod was to give ostensible backing to the aim of monetary 
union, but to seek to obstruct it by posing conditions which w ould 
simply not be acceptable to the other countries.114
Turning to Lubbers.
The UK governm ent was now left to decide how to maximise its influence
in the run  up to the M adrid summit in June where a formal decision w ould
be taken about how to proceed w ith the Delors report. Initially, it appeared
very unsure how to act. One senior Treasury official commented:
It was quite difficult after the Delors report was actually published to 
discover w hat the government's attitude actually was and as we were 
supposed to be working for the government, it was a period of some 
confusion.115
For their part, Lawson and Howe believed that any successful strategy to halt
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the m om entum  towards monetary union was dependent on entry to ERM.
Howe decided to pressurise Thatcher on the issue again. He believed that
the person m ost likely to convert Thatcher to ERM m em bership w as the
Dutch Prime Minister, Ruud Lubbers w ith whom  she was personally and
politically close.Whilst Lawson remained unconvinced that Lubbers could
change Thatcher's m ind, Howe arranged a m ini-sum m it w ith  the Dutch
governm ent under the auspices of discussions on NATO modernisation.! 16
The sum m it took place on 29 April w ith defence first on the agenda
and the Delors Report second. To pre-empt Howe and Lawson's effort to use
Lubbers on ERM, Thatcher m ade clear to Lubbers her opposition  to
m em bership before the formal discussions began. According to Lawson, she
then berated Lubbers and his m inisters over m odernisation and tried  to
delay any discussion on the Delors Report for as long as possible. W hen the
Delors Report w as finally discussed, Lawson and Thatcher row ed over
shadow ing leaving Lubbers and his Finance Minister, Ruding, w ith  little
opportunity to participate in the discussion let alone influence Thatcher.117
Lawson took the issue up again w ith Thatcher himself in a bilateral
m eeting on 3 May. Thatcher told Lawson that ERM entry  w ould  not
strengthen the governm ent's hand against m onetary union and that a
deadline for entry as Ruding suggested, w ould be particularly damaging.
Moreover, as far as she was concerned, ERM membership was a dead issue.
n 8Lawson comments:
It was evident to both of us that the discussion was getting nowhere; 
bu t the terms in which she brought it to a close were particularly 
revealing. 'I do not w ant you to raise the subject ever again,' she said; 
'I m ust prevail.' It was those last three w ords that said it all. The 
economic and political argum ents had  become an irrelevance. 
Joining the ERM, as she saw it, had become a battle of wills between 
her and me; and it was to be her will that prevailed.119
Lawson quickly came back to the issue on 20-21 May at an Ecofin meeting to 
discuss the Delors Report. The ministers agreed to a quick start to Stage One 
and to a future decision about whether to call the IGC necessary to proceed 
w ith Stages Two and Three. With UK membership of ERM a necessary part
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of Stage One, Lawson assured his fellow finance ministers that entry 'is not 
a question of whether, it is a question of w hen.'12o
In sum , ERM m em bership now confronted the governm ent as a 
central issue of its EC policy. Other member states were not prepared to co­
operate w ith the UK government over a range of issues and in particular on 
m onetary union so long as it remained outside ERM. If the governm ent's 
ow n policy aim w as to m inim ise the C om m unity 's fu ture  m onetary  
development, then it faced a considerable incentive to enter ERM.
The Price of Conflict
A gainst th is background  the governm ent's effort to m ain ta in  an 
appreciating exchange rate as a counter-inflationary weapon failed. In May, 
sterling  came under sustained dow nw ard pressure as the balance of 
paym ents deficit m ounted and the dollar rose. The Bank of England began 
to intervene heavily. On 17 May, with Lawson and Howe's support for ERM 
m em bership well known, Thatcher declared in  a radio interview  that 
inflation not ERM membership was to remain the overriding priority. As a 
result, sterling weakened. 121 Two days later, in another radio interview, 
Thatcher publicly blam ed Lawson's shadowing of the Deutschm ark for 
rising inflation, and questioned whether the ERM could survive capital 
liberalisation. She then remarked: 'I do not know any serious commentator 
w ho at the m oment has suggested that we go in until we have tackled our 
inflation and got it dow n.'122Again, sterling weakened.123
Furious w ith Thatcher, Lawson considered resigning. However, the 
two reached another accommodation after Thatcher apologised to Lawson, 
saying that her rem arks were taken out of context. A lthough Thatcher's 
apology was widely reported, it did not dispel the impression of a divided 
Prim e M inister-Chancellor axis nor stabilise sterling. Indeed, on 22 May, 
Thatcher attacked ERM again and stated that the UK would not become a 
m ember until inflation was under control and 'm aybe not even then.' Two 
days later, Thatcher and Lawson were forced to raise interest rates to 14 per 
cent to defend sterling against the selling caused by market uncertainty.124
ERM m em bership now  offered the governm ent m ore lim ited
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economic benefits than at any time since 1985. As figure 5.4 (page 239) 
shows, although UK nominal interest rate were significantly higher than 
the ERM states, real rates were lower than those in Belgium, Holland and 
Italy.
Figure 5.4: Comparative Interest Rates May 1989
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However, reduced interest rates were now of dubious benefit to the 
government w ith UK inflation rising. After sterling stopped rising, high 
interest rates became the governm ent's only counter-inflationary tool. 
Inside ERM, interest rates were likely to have to be reduced to keep sterling 
in its band given the premium of UK rates over those of the ERM states. Yet 
as Figure 5.5 (page 239) shows, by May 1989 UK inflation and annual wage 
increase were much higher than those achieved by the ERM states. Without
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other counter-inflationary polices than high interest rates, particulary some 
means of controlling wage rises, the government could not achieve the 
inflation convergence necessary to maintain a sterling parity inside ERM. At 
the same time, the continuing current account deficit raised a further 
question-mark over whether the government could sustain sterling in the 
medium term without a devaluation.
Figure 5.5: Comparative Rates of Inflation and Wage Increases 
May 1989
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The City and the Delors Report
After the Delors Report was published, the pressure on the government 
from business groups to enter ERM mounted. Both manufacturing and the 
financial sector companies and organisations supported monetary union
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and believed that ERM membership was essential to minimise the UK's
isolation. One Treasury official commented on the atmosphere:
You could not meet an industrialist who d idn 't think that it was the 
answer to the world. ... It [ERM membership] was just there all the 
time, day after day after day so the line of saying w e'll join some time 
was becoming increasingly u n te n a b le .1 2 5
For its part, the CBI saw three m ain advantages to m onetary union: it
w ould  reduce the costs of hedging on exchange rate volatility; it w ould
reduce transaction costs; and it w ould dem and of m em ber states the
inflation convergence which the CBI sought. Given these advantages, the
CBI believed that it would seriously damage UK industry if it were forced to
embrace costs that its competitors were a v o id in g .1 2 6
Most of the City welcomed the idea of m onetary union as a means of
strengthening the position of European companies and as a necessary
com ponent of a single financial market. The City believed that the UK's
non-participation in any union represented a direct threat to its m ost
fundam ental interests as a financial centre. In the words of one City official:
If the others went ahead w ith economic and m onetary union, and it 
looked as though the UK were going to stay out, then a whole lot of 
companies, both EC and non EC banks and insurance companies, 
w ould  start thinking if they should still regard  London as the 
financial centre of Europe and where the centre of gravity w ould 
move to. They w ould start hedging their bets by putting some of 
their operations in Paris or Frankfurt.127
W ithin this context, non-membership of ERM assum ed a new m eaning for
the City. In March 1989, a senior National W estminster Bank official wrote
in Banking World::
The uncertainty relating to future UK membership of ERM may limit 
the ability of London, in the future, to claim its rightful place as the 
premier financial centre of Europe. It w ould be easy to be complacent 
and point to the enormous strength of the City and the size of the 
markets, bu t the success of the EMS and ERM in particular, is now 
being accepted by many observers. Increasingly, the UK looks out of 
line on this topic. 128
Later, Barclays Bank told the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Communities:
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The pace of change now facing the EC makes it vital that the UK plays 
its full part in the reshaping of Europe in the 1990s. This it can only 
do effectively as a full participant in the EMS.129
The publication of the Delors Report coincided w ith a general anxiety
in the City about its future competitiveness. The competitiveness of any
financial centre is prim arily determ ined by the regulatory fram ework in
which it operates. During the 1980s London established itself as the financial
centre of the EC through a process of deregulation which culminated in the
Financial Services Act. However, the advent of the Single M arket and
capital liberalisation m eant that the other EC states were now m oving
tow ards UK style deregulation. By April 1989, many of the directives for the
single financial m arket were already in place and other countries centres
w ere well advance in their preparation. Increasing num bers in the City
believed that the Financial Services Act now left the City over-regulated in
comparison to its competitors. The City was threatened in two specific ways.
First, some European business which was previously driven offshore to
London could now be repatriated. Second, harm onisation could give the
potential for each financial m arket to make use of other advantages to
become an international centre.130 In Robin Leigh Pemberton's words:
We can no longer class London as a cheap place to do business; and 
we m ust be sensitive to the cost of operating here. We start w ith great 
natural advantages, not least that we have achieved that 'critical 
m ass' which enables a m arket to function effectively as a major 
international, as well as a domestic, financial centre. But it may be 
that only a small shift in  the balance of advantage w ould be enough 
to start a process of attrition. And I am well aware that other centres - 
in  Europe and elsewhere - are far from devoid of attraction or 
potential.131
As in 1985, City organisations generally did not concertedly lobby the 
governm ent. Rather, ind iv idual mem bers of the City expressed their 
support for ERM entry to ministers and officials. One exception was the City 
European Committee of British Invisibles chaired by Michael Butler, a 
form er Perm anent R epresentative to the Com m unity. The European 
Com m ittee was created in May 1988 at the instigation of the Bank of
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England to examine all EC issues affecting the City from monetary questions 
to Single M arket banking directives. The Bank believed that such a 
committee was needed for the City to increase its collective input into the 
UK's EC policy. The committee operated prim arily as a policy consultation 
body w ith  members joining in a personal capacity from all m ain areas of 
the City's activity.132
A lthough in 1988 the European Committee lacked coherence, during 
1989 it established a collective identity and a voice for itself largely through 
the m onetary union issue. After the Delors Report, Michael Butler w ent to 
Thatcher w ith a m andate from the committee to try and persuade her to 
take a more constructive position on m onetary union and ERM. Although 
the com m ittee considered that im m ediate ERM m em bership w as not 
appropriate in  view of economic conditions, it believed that the UK could 
not have influence on monetary union unless it was regarded as making a 
serious effort to create the conditions necessary for entry.133
By 1989, the financial service sector was the engine of grow th of the 
UK economy employing 2.6 million people. It represented 19.8 per cent of 
GDP in 1989 compared to 11.6 per cent in 1979. In the 1985-1989 period, the 
financial sector grew at an annual average of 8.9 per cent compared to 4.1 
per cent for manufacturing industry and 4.2 per cent for the non-financial 
service sector. As a result, w ith  the City now  believing that non­
m em bership represented a direct threat to its interests, the governm ent 
faced a stronger pressure to enter ERM in terms of its capital accumulation 
priorities than ever before.134 
The Lawson-Howe Axis
By the start of June 1989 and w ith the M adrid sum m it looming, the 
question of ERM m embership posed a direct or indirect problem  for the 
governm ent in terms of economic management, EC policy and the future of 
the City. The changing costs and benefits of membership across these three 
areas of policy redefined the core executive debate. One City official close to 
Thatcher believed that she was very w orried about the C ity's position 
outside any m onetary union, but was still instinctively reluctant to accept
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ERM membership as a means of strengthening the UK's position. 'She was a
funny m ixture of realism and rationality and prejudice on the subject of the
EC and particularly on the ERM.'133
For its part, the Bank of England was more concerned about the City's
position in  relation to m onetary union than any other part of the core
executive and prepared an internal report on the subject. 136According to
one Bank official 'the whole question about London's position as a financial
centre had been preoccupying the Bank.'137 Another policy official described
the Bank's position:
London's position as a financial centre is a factor which clearly does 
w eigh quite strongly w ith everybody in the Bank. We consider the 
City to be a major economic asset and w e're therefore concerned lest 
there be any developm ent that underm ine that, prejudice it in 
anyway. And I think most people w ould agree that the financial 
com m unity, particu larly  financial institu tions from  elsew here, 
happening to locate their European institutions here, or considering 
w hether to locate their European institutions here w ould take into 
account the question of whether we were in a single currency union 
or outside it. ... How im portant it w ould be, different people 
inevitably take slightly different judgm ents. Yes, in principle, it 
w ould be prejudiced but is it just a marginal consideration or is it a 
fundam ental one.... I think probably most people feel short term , 
either uncertainty as to whether we would join or even knowledge 
tha t we w eren 't going to join w ou ldn 't have m uch significant 
adverse effect. But that over time particularly if associated w ith our 
not being part of the union, other policy decisions were taken at a 
Com m unity level by members of the union, our influence over 
events is likely to be eroded. If financial institutions see that, or expect 
that to be the outcome, then that in tu rn  will affect w hether they 
locate themselves in the decision-making centre or in som ewhere 
which is clearly outside the union.138
Outside ERM, the Bank believed, the other member states w ould not listen
to the Bank's concerns. Their view was:
'If you w ant us to listen to your view of the way forwards to further 
m onetary integration, you at least have to come up to where we all 
are at present.' ... It puts one at some disadvantage in all negotiations 
about things which change perm anent arrangem ents. And there 's 
always the potential that we will not be able to carry as m uch weight 
in deciding the outcome as we would wish and as another member 
state w ith  our economic and historical weight, if you like, w ould 
expect to achieve.139
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However, whilst the Bank believed that ERM m embership was vital
to secure influence on monetary union, it now believed that it could not be
justified on economic grounds. Leigh-Pemberton reversed his position to
oppose m em bership. 140in  his view expressed in  the Bank of England
Quarterly Bulletin:
It w ould be a mistake to enter the mechanism  in circumstances 
w here our anti-inflationary policy m ight be com prom ised or 
underm ined. This could happen if we w ished to keep interest rates 
high for domestic reasons but ... we were pushed towards lowering 
interest rates to keep sterling w ithin its band. It would therefore be 
unwise to enter the mechanism w ith the UK economy significantly 
out of balance with other major member countries.141
The 1985 Treasury-Bank axis on membership was now broken. The 
Treasury was far less concerned than the Bank of England that the City 
would be penalised outside a monetary union. Asked about the extent of the 
threat to the City, a senior Treasury civil servant observed: 'it 's  not very 
obvious that it is t ru e /142 Neither did the Treasury share the Bank's view 
that rising inflation made ERM membership untenable. The Treasury still 
supported membership as a means of achieving exchange rate stability and 
as a counter inflationary m onetary framework. A t the same tim e, the 
Treasury believed that membership was necessary to halt the Delors Report. 
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These developments took the Treasury closer to the Foreign Office 
position than ever before. According to a Foreign Office official: 'there was 
no difference of view  betw een the Treasury and  the FCO on these 
m atters.'i44The Foreign Office similarly considered that progress on the 
Delors report would be impossible outside the ERM. Like the ERM states, in 
the view of one Treasury official: 'The Foreign Office regarded it [ERM 
membership] as a litmus test of whether we were serious about E u r o p e . '145 
W ith the Treasury now allied with the Foreign Office rather than the 
Bank, Lawson and Howe moved to act in partnership against Thatcher. At 
the start of June Howe proposed to Lawson that they send a joint memo to 
Thatcher outlining the case for ERM m em bership in the context of the
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decisions to be taken on monetary union at the M adrid Summit. Lawson 
states that he was sceptical about its utility bu t agreed that Treasury and 
Foreign Office officials should draft a paper. The draft memo argued that it 
w ould be very damaging simply to oppose m onetary union at M adrid and 
that the governm ent's aim should be to avoid an agreement to an IGC. To 
this end, the governm ent should give a non-legally binding undertaking 
that sterling w ould enter ERM by the end of 1992 on the condition of a 
reduction in UK inflation and the abolition of all EC exchange controls. The 
governm ent could then seek the postponem ent of any decision on Stage 
Three until work was carried out on how it would o p era te .146
W hilst the memo was being drafted, Lawson returned to a public
offensive. On 11 June Lawson denied that shadowing caused inflation and
claimed that Alan W alters was wrong about ERM m embership. The next
day, giving evidence to the Treasury Select Committee, Lawson declared
that if the other m em ber states believed that the UK w ould enter ERM
w ithin  a reasonable time period, then the UK's influence on the m onetary
union  debate w ould  increase. For the first time he specified a set of
conditions for ERM entry. The conditions differed slightly from those
outlined in the draft joint memo. Whilst the inflation condition rem ained,
the exchange control condition was now restricted to the major EC states.
W ith France and Italy due to abolish controls by mid-1990, the press
interpreted Lawson as stating that entry would occur sometime in 1990.147
O n 13 June Lawson and Howe m et to discuss the joint memo.
Lawson rem ained sceptical about its likely effectiveness. Nevertheless, the
next day he agreed to sign the memo subject to a num ber of amendments
and it being sent on Foreign Office paper.14S According to one Treasury
official who worked on the memo, it was a step into new territory:
W hat was extraordinarily unusual was something that comes out in 
the Lawson m em oirs that he and Geoffrey Howe signed a joint 
minute. That is very, very, rare in Whitehall.149
The memo was sent to Thatcher on 14 June. She viewed the memo as an 
am bush but reluctantly agreed to see Lawson and Howe on 20 June.150
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In the intervening period events conspired to apparently strengthen 
Lawson and How e's hand. On 15 June in the elections to the European 
parliam ent, the Conservatives slum ped to their w orst perform ance in a 
national election in the post-war period receiving just 34.7 per cent of the 
vote and losing 13 (out of 81) seats to Labour. In part, the poor performance 
reflected a grow th in the governm ent's general unpopularity . In  the 
Guardian average m onthly poll, the governm ent fell from a six per cent 
lead over Labour in January to an eight per cent deficit in June. At the same 
time, the party  paid the price of a public perception that the governm ent 
was too negative in  its approach to Europe. Already isolated on m onetary 
issues, in May 1989 the government unilaterally dismissed a Commission 
p lan  for a social charter to protect worker rights in  the EC. W ith other 
member states wanting to act on an issue with which Labour was identified, 
Labour effectively presented itself as the united and pro-European party  
w ork ing  for UK in terests and  the Thatcher governm ent as pe tty  
isolationists. Labour's task was m ade easier by a Conservative cam paign 
w h ich  s tre ssed  the g overnm en t's  n a tio n a lis t and  an ti-E u ropean  
credentials.151
T hroughout the cam paign the governm ent's strategy left m any 
people in the Conservative party unhappy. Both Henry Plumb, leader of the 
Conservative MEPs, and Heath m ade blistering attacks on the style and 
substance of Thatcher's EC leadership. At the end of May, Michael Heseltine 
strongly criticised policy in a book entitled, The Challenge of Europe: Can 
Britain Win? M eanw hile , increasing  nu m b ers  of C o n serv a tiv e  
backbenchers believed that the UK could not retain its European credentials 
ou tside  ERM and  tha t business w as suffering as a re su lt.152 One 
Conservative opponent of m em bership, com m ented that backbenchers 
'believed the UK's problems w ould be ameliorated by a German fixed rate 
regime; their was a very powerful mood disposed to mem bership of the 
ERM.153To add to their case, on the day of the election, Gallup published a 
poll showing that 93 per cent of chief executives of large UK companies and 
City institutions believed that the UK should enter ERM.154
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The election result only compounded the belief in the party  that the
governm ent needed to pursue a more constructive EC policy. Lawson
comments on the situation:
It w as no surprise that the results of the [European Parliam ent] 
elections... were an unm itigated disaster for the Government. While 
the unpopularity caused by the inexorable rise in interest rates had 
probably been the main factor, the nature of the Euro-campaign itself 
had clearly not helped.
M argaret did not see it that way at all. I suddenly realised, w ith  a 
shiver of apprehension, that she saw the Euro-campaign as a trial run 
for the next General Election; and that, w ith  the short term  economic 
outlook unpromising, she saw a crude populist anti-Europeanism as 
her winning strategy. It was a strategy that w ould undoubtedly have 
evoked a considerable response: xenophobia always does. But it 
w ould have been a disaster for the Party, splitting it from top to 
bottom  and making no sense to the voters.
It w as always clear to me that the Conservative Party could be 
successfully led only by someone who took their stand in  the centre 
of the spectrum  on this issue, w here the silent m ajority dwelt. 
M argaret's evident determ ination to lead the Party from one of the 
two extremes of that spectrum spelled nothing but trouble.155
Lawson and How e's hand was additionally strengthened as direct 
pressure from the other member states on ERM m embership m ounted. On 
16 June, Spain announced that it would enter ERM three days later. W ith 
Spain similarly suffering from above average inflation, the decision drew  
atten tion  to the validity of the UK's economic justification for non­
m em bership. Spain also gave voice to the grow ing view in the other 
mem ber states, including Germany, that if the UK did not act quickly on 
ERM entry, m onetary union could be achieved w ithout it. On 19 June 
France and Germ any issued a joint com m unique calling for decisive 
progress on the Delors Report at the M adrid summit.156
On 20 June Thatcher, Lawson and Howe m et to discuss the joint 
memo. Thatcher rejected their case for setting a timetable for membership 
as putting an unwelcome constraint on m onetary policy and stated that it 
w ould  achieve no concessions on the Delors Report. Unable to agree, the 
three agreed to give the matter further consideration. 157
W hat happened next is a matter of dispute between the protagonists.
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Lawson states that the next day Howe received a memo from Charles Powell 
outlining an alternative set of conditions for ERM entry to use at M adrid, 
seemingly devised by Alan Walters. Those conditions were a reduction in 
in fla tion , exchange control abolition, the creation  and  successful 
im plem entation of a level playing field in Europe on the m onetary front 
and the final completion of the Single Market to the UK's satisfaction. 
Lawson and Howe regarded the conditions as totally unacceptable. O n 23 
June, Lawson and Howe sent another joint memo to Thatcher stating that 
they believed the open-ended nature of the 'W alters' conditions w ould be 
counter-productive at M adrid and requesting a further meeting. They also 
agreed that if Thatcher did not adopt these conditions, then they w ould 
resign. 158
By contrast, Thatcher makes no mention of any memo from Powell
and implies that the second Lawson-Howe memo came out of the b lue.159
Thatcher reluctantly agreed to see her Chancellor and Foreign Secretary on
Sunday 25 June before she and Howe left for M adrid in the evening. 160 in
Lawson's description of the meeting:
The atmosphere was unbelievably tense. As before, Geoffrey opened, 
and spoke briefly along the lines of the m inute. M argaret was 
unm oveable. Geoffrey then said that if she had not time for his 
advice, and was not prepared to make the sort of forw ard move at 
M adrid necessary to avoid the disastrous outcome he feared, then he 
w ould have no alternative but to resign. I then chipped in, briefly to 
say, 'You should know, Prime Minister, that if Geoffrey goes, I m ust 
go too.' There was an icy silence, and the meeting came to an abrupt 
end, w ith nothing resolved.151
Thatcher comments:
I w ould never, never allow this to happen again. I refused to give 
them any undertaking that I would set a date. Indeed, I told them that 
I could not believe that a Chancellor and a former Chancellor could 
seriously argue that I should set a date in advance: it w ould be a field 
day for the speculators, as they should have known. I said I w ould 
reflect further on what to say at Madrid. They left, Geoffrey looking 
insufferably smug. And so the nasty little meeting ended.162
Later in the day, Spain warned that it m ight call an IGC whether the UK 
w ould accept it nor not.163
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The M adrid Sum m it
W hen Thatcher and Howe arrived in M adrid, the conflict betw een them 
rem ained unresolved. During the evening, Thatcher m et for discussions 
w ith  Powell on how to proceed w ithout Howe. W hen the sum m it started, 
Thatcher deployed a conciliatory tone to set out a series of conditions for UK 
entry to ERM: the convergence of UK inflation w ith  other EC states; the 
abolition of all exchange controls; further progress towards the completion 
of the Single M arket; free com petition in financial services; and  the 
strengthening  of European com petition policy. How ever, it w as not 
sufficient to defer action on the Delors Report beyond Stage 1. The summit 
concluded w ith an unanimous agreement by member states to proceed w ith 
the Delors Report as the means to achieve m onetary union. They agreed 
that Stage One should start by 1 July 1990, to be followed by an IGC when 
adequate preparation was com pleted.164
The m edia hailed the summit as a major shift in  Thatcher's position 
on ERM m em bership. Yet w ith  Thatcher claim ing that the M adrid  
conditions were based on a paper Alan Walters had given her in May 1989, 
this was open to dispute.165 For his part, Lawson rejected W alters' claim to 
the conditions:
Irrelevant though the last three conditions were to the objective 
question of ERM membership, it was clear that they were as long as a 
piece of string: they could be interpreted as having been satisfied at 
any time. By contrast the original W alters/Pow ell form ulation had 
implied that there could be no ERM membership for some four years 
at the earliest - the single market was not due for final completion 
until the end of 1992, which meant that even in the unlikely event of 
everything going to plan, it would have been well into 1993 before 
the monitoring period had been completed.166
W alters' claim w ould seem more tenable. W hilst conditions 'as long as a 
piece of string' could be interpreted 'as having been satisfied at any time,' 
they could also be interpreted as never having been satisfied. Moreover, the 
M adrid conditions contained no deadline for membership as dem anded by 
Lawson and Howe.
Officials w ho worked on the joint memo saw the M adrid conditions
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as a defeat for Lawson and Howe. One Treasury insider felt:
It was a slight movement. But at the time it seemed to those of us 
who had been working on it all as a grave disappointm ent. ... I 'd  
w orked on the joint paper and the purpose of the paper w as to 
persuade the Prime Minister that ERM m em bership at an early 
stage, not w ith the Single Market, bu t w ithin a m atter of m onths 
w ould be appropriate. It seemed to set up hurdles w hich meant we 
would not be able to join for quite a while. I think those of us who 
were closely involved regarded it as a set back.167
In the w ords of a former Cabinet minister, 'she gave sufficient ground to
make everyone believe she had given more ground than she had done.'168
A Thatcher confidant observed:
I w ould argue that the conditions for our joining ERM were m ade 
more difficult by her statement in Madrid, not brought closer and that 
was a deliberate act of defiance of them. [Lawson and Howe] In effect 
they had to climb dow n w hen she came hom e and pretend to be 
satisfied w ith  w hat they 'd  done ... W hat we did  was spell out the 
conditions which would have to be met if sterling were to join the 
ERM and w hen you actually spelled out the conditions, it became 
quite clear that the hurdles were a good deal higher than the rather 
vague general form ulation that w e'll jo in  w hen the tim e was 
right.169
Indeed, Lawson him self adm its that overall How e and him self w ere 
outm anoeuvred:
I saw Geoffrey .... to discuss w ith  him w here we stood on the 
resignation question. The media, rightly or wrongly, w ere w ithout 
exception hailing M adrid - which Margaret was felt to have handled 
w ith unaccustomed skill - as a major breakthrough on the ERM, and 
our backbenchers, particularly those in the ERM camp, were echoing 
the chorus. He understandably felt that, although she had  rejected 
our deadline proposal, a resignation in those circumstances w ould 
have been bizarre and incomprehensible.170
A Thatcher confidant remarked: 'I think their bluff was called. I don 't think 
they intended to resign or expected to have to.' 171 In effect, Lawson and 
Howe were little closer to persuading Thatcher to accept ERM membership 
than before forging their alliance.
Conclusions
After 1988 the governm ent was forced to face ERM m em bership as a
250
significant issue of both economic and EC policy, and the external pressure 
on it to enter ERM mounted. On economic policy, the governm ent faced a 
continuing of problem about how to operate a monetary and exchange rate 
policy outside ERM which was acceptable to both Thatcher and Lawson and 
w hich could be presented as such. At the same time, the governm ent 
m oved further away from an economic policy which could easily translate 
into ERM mem bership if it so wished. In EC term s, both Thatcher and 
Lawson initially ignored the question of how to effectively oppose m onetary 
un ion  outside ERM. They failed to take the debate seriously and to 
understand the economic interests shaping the im petus towards m onetary 
union. W hen Lawson did finally join forces w ith Howe to tackle Thatcher 
on  ERM as an issue of EC policy, they were not able to achieve any 
significant concession from  the Prim e M inister and the m om entum  
tow ards monetary union increased.
After the M adrid summit m uch the same problems remained. In EC 
policy, the dilem m a was how to influence an accelerating debate on 
m onetary union and ultimately an IGC w ithout any tangible commitment 
to ERM entry. The M adrid conditions did potentially offer a reduction in 
costs to the government's economic policy and presentation. Since Thatcher 
w as commonly believed to have given ground on ERM m em bership, 
w hatever the reality, the exchange markets could consider that Thatcher 
and Lawson had reached more than a tem porary accommodation on the 
issue.
N evertheless, the underly ing  question rem ained of how  the 
governm ent could act as a viable counter-inflationary member of ERM if it 
were to enter the system. W hen Spain decided to enter ERM, it abandoned 
its previous counter-inflationary policy based on a tight m onetary policy 
and an appreciating exchange rate. In May 1989 Spain faced rising dem and 
and  a deterio ra tion  in the balance of paym ents. In response, the 
governm ent cut public expenditure and increased and brought forw ard 
corporate w ithholding taxes to tighten fiscal policy. Shortly after it entered 
ERM, it reintroduced credit ceilings, raised the Bank of Spain's intervention
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rate and increased withholding taxes on personal incomes. Yet there is no 
evidence that Lawson or the Treasury believed that any parallel shifts in UK 
policy w ould be necessary should they finally prevail over Thatcher.172
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE ROAD TO ENTRY.
This chapter traces the evolution of policy from the afterm ath of the 
M adrid sum m it in June 1989 to the UK's entry to ERM on 8 October 1990. 
Section 6.1 examines the operation of ERM during the period in view of the 
ERM states' commitment to monetary union and the prospect of German 
reunification. Section 6.2 looks at how Lawson's and Howe's departure from 
office and the European momentum towards monetary union in the second 
half of 1989 affected the UK debate on ERM m em bership. Section 6.3 
considers the governm ent's problems in economic and EC policy betw een 
January and A pril 1990 w hich resulted in m inisters m aking a public 
commitment to ERM membership. Section 6.4 examines the actions of core 
executive actors from May to early September 1990 in view of the public 
comm itm ent to ERM membership. Section 6.5 analyses the governm ent's 
decision to enter ERM in autum n 1990 given m inisters' policy priorities at 
that time. A final epilogue reviews the UK's m em bership of ERM, the 
M aastricht treaty and the suspension of the ERM's narrow  bands in August 
1993.
6.1: ERM, MONETARY UNION AND GERMAN REUNIFICATION
D uring the second half of 1989 and 1990, the ERM states saw im pending 
m onetary union as an added incentive to m aintain their currency parities 
against the Deutschmark. W ith the financial m arkets believing that there 
was a clear path  to monetary union, interest rates w ithin ERM started to 
converge towards the German level. Since the financial m arkets believed 
that currencies w ould ultim ately be irrevocably fixed, less prem ium  was 
required to persuade them to hold currencies other than the Deutschmark.1 
Figure 6.1 (page 267) shows that from January 1988 to July 1990 the 
differential between Italian and German nominal rates fell by 4.5 per cent 
and between French and German rates by 3.45 per cent. Similarly, as figure 
6.2 (page 268) indicates, the differential between French and German long 
term  governm ent bonds fell by 3.19 per cent and betw een Belgian and
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German bonds by 1.22 per cent.
Figure 6.1: Comparative Nominal Prime Lending Rates 1988-1990
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With monetary union operating as an insurance policy, the major ERM 
states were able to fully liberalise capital. In January 1990 France scrapped its 
rem aining exchange controls six months ahead of schedule and Italy 
dismantled some more of its controls. Four months later Italy removed all 
remaining restrictions. In both cases, the process was accomplished without 
any pressure arising on the respective currencies.2
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Figure 6.2: Comparative Long Term Government Bond Rates
1988-1990
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In November 1989 the ERM faced an external shock w hen the 
destruction of the Berlin Wall created a momentum  towards German 
reunification. The likely cost of reunification was DM200 billion per 
annum. Rather than increase taxes to pay for it, the Kohl government 
retained its commitment to DM725 billion worth of income tax cuts. Given 
the inevitability of increased borrowing, and with West German workers 
demanding higher wages to protect themselves from the two thousand East 
Germans crossing the border daily, Germany faced rising inflation.3
In response the Bundesbank raised interest rates. It also sought an
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appreciation in  the Deutschmark against the other ERM currencies as a 
fu rther counter-inflationary tool. W ithout such an apprecia tion , the 
Bundesbank w ould continue to tighten m onetary policy to a level which 
w ould have serious deflationary consequences for the ERM states forced to 
follow  suit. Between the fall of the Wall and the sta rt of 1990 the 
Deutschm ark gained nearly 11 per cent against the dollar and yen due to 
rising German interest rates and a financial market view that reunification 
w ould  create a new economic superpow er. As a result, all the ERM 
currencies except the Dutch guilder came under sustained dow nw ard  
pressure against the Deutschmark.4
By January 1990 the Bundesbank was publicly expressing its view that 
a general realignm ent was necessary. The French governm ent refused to 
countenance the possibility, committed as it was to the franc fort w hatever 
the circumstances. It strongly appealed to the Germ an governm ent to 
commit itself to the maintenance of the parity and to suppress discussion of 
the subject by the Bundesbank. Kohl backed the French governm ent and 
ruled out any realignment. As a result, on 5 January, Italy alone devalued 
the lira by a marginal 3.7 per cent against the Deutschmark at the same time 
as it moved into the 2.25 per cent ERM bands. Later Holland and Belgium 
started to operate unofficial 0.5 per cent bands to further consolidate their 
currencies parities. 5
A lthough  the m onetary  policy of the ERM states rem ained  
deflationary for the rest of the year to m atch the Bundesbank, Germ an 
reunification did provide some economic stimulus for the ERM states. In 
1990, the German economy grew at a rate of 4.5. per cent which was higher 
than  at any other time during ERM's existence. W ith dem and rising in 
W est Germany and surging in East Germany after m onetary union between 
the states on 1 July, the ERM states m ade spectacular gains in  export 
volum es to Germany as figure 6.3 (page 270) indicates. By dram atically 
cutting their trade deficits w ith Germany, the ERM states w ere able to 
acquire Deutschmarks without deflationary action. The situation weakened 
the Deutschmark and w ith high Spanish interest rates the peseta started to
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become the strongest currency in the system.6
Figure 6.3: Comparative Percentage Growth of Imports 
into Germany Fourth Quarter 1989-Fourth Quarter 1990
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6.2: WHITHER THE MADRID CONDITIONS?
The potential benefit of the Madrid conditions to the governm ent's EC
policy were undermined within days of their inception. Whilst Thatcher
was still in Madrid, she declared that the UK rejected the Delors Report, and
would be putting forward its own alternative proposals for monetary union
even though none existed. Lawson comments:
The first I and my senior officials knew of this proposal was a report 
on the radio from Madrid which stated that the Treasury was already
BELGIUM DENMARK FRANCE HOLLAND ITALY SPAIN
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working on alternatives to Delors. Peter M iddleton subsequently told 
me tha t he heard  the news w hen driving his car, and  w as so 
astonished that he nearly crashed into a tree. About tw enty four 
hours later came the request from Num ber 10 to validate the Prime 
M inister's promise. 7
O n her return  to the House of Commons, Thatcher again speculated that 
the ERM might not survive France and Italy abolishing exchange controls.8
On 24 July, evidently angry at Howe's behaviour in the run  up to the 
M adrid Summit, Thatcher rem oved him as Foreign Secretary and m ade 
him Leader of the House with the honorific title of 'Deputy Prime Minister.' 
In replacing Howe, Thatcher overrode the most obvious candidate Douglas 
H urd, and chose the less European-minded John Major. Major came to the 
Foreign Office w ithout any apparent conviction on ERM mem bership and 
w as un likely  to p ressurise  Thatcher on fu lfilm ent of the M adrid  
conditions.9
At the same time, the M adrid conditions offered the governm ent 
little benefit as it sought to develop and sustain a credible alternative to the 
Delors Report. Left by Thatcher to devise a proposal, Lawson decided upon a 
scheme of competing currencies w ithin the EC. Rather than proceeding to 
Stages 2 and 3 of the Delors Report, the member states w ould make all EC 
currencies fully legally interchangeable. N ational central banks w ould  
rem ain  responsible for currency creation and  w ould  act w ith in  the 
fram ework of ERM. Good currencies would threaten gradually to drive out 
the bad until eventually the EC might theoretically find itself w ith a single 
currency.10
Lawson presented the idea verbally to an informal Ecofin meeting in 
Antibes on 8-9 September. Whilst the press reported that the other finance 
ministers and central bank governors were very hostile to the suggestion, 
Lawson later recalled that they 'regarded it with polite scepticism and w ould 
reserve final judgem ent until they had read the paper.'11 The governm ent's 
problem  was that the plan did not offer the benefits that the other member 
states w ished to secure from m onetary union, especially France. Since 
competing currencies did not address the question of how to reduce the
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pow er of the Bundesbank, there was little chance of the scheme attracting 
future interest.12
Neither did the other member states or the Commission regard the 
M adrid  conditions as a sufficient substitu te for ERM m em bership. 
According to one official: 'The Madrid conditions were received w ith all the 
enthusiasm  of Crystal Palace on a w et afternoon/13 Im m ediately after the 
sum m it Leon Brittan expressed scepticism about the validity of the inflation 
and exchange control conditions and called for early entry. In October he 
declared that there could be no justification for delaying entry beyond the 
sum m er of 1990. In the same m onth the Commission's annual economic 
report expressed concern about high inflation in  the non-ERM states. 
Specifically, it concluded that the UK w ould be better off inside ERM and 
ending its 'excessive reliance' on high interest rates to curb in fla tio n .1'1
In terms of economic policy, the government was not able to use the 
M adrid conditions to create certainty in the m arkets about its a ttitude 
tow ards exchange rate management. During July and A ugust, the press 
reported that Alan Walters was criticising Lawson's monetary policy at City 
lunches. Walters vigorously denied this and claimed that Lawson planted 
the stories himself. W hatever the truth, it was impossible to dispel the 
impression of conflict between the Prime Minister and Chancellor.15
At the start of October, the government announced a £2 billion trade 
deficit for A ugust and sterling weakened despite considerable Bank of 
England intervention. Sterling now hovered just above the DM3.00 level 
for the first time since shadow ing was abandoned. On 5 October, the 
Bundesbank raised its interest rates by one per cent. Immediately, Lawson 
secured Thatcher's consent to a similar rise in UK rates to try and m aintain 
sterling above DM3.00. W ith the Conservative conference due to start on 9 
October, the Sunday Times published a story that Walters opposed the rise 
in interest rates and that Thatcher had 'reluctantly sided w ith Lawson.' It 
further im plied that Thatcher w ould not sanction any further increase in 
rates to defend sterling. A lthough Walters professed ignorance about the 
source of the story, Thatcher herself did not deny its contents. 16
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If indeed Thatcher was prepared to accept Walters advice to decouple 
m onetary policy from the exchange rate again, with the ensuing inflationary 
consequences, then the M adrid conditions for membership w ere effectively 
compromised. Lawson now faced a threat in  economic policy in regard to 
ERM m em bership at the same time as he was completing the paper on 
competing currencies which stated that sterling would become a member of 
a "hard' ERM.17
On 18 October the Financial Times published extracts from an article
by W alters due for publication in an American academic journal in  which
he stated that the ERM was 'half baked' and that the argum ents for entry
'have never attained even a minimum level of plausibility/18 H aving at the
beginning of October fully committed itself to early ERM entry, Labour was
in a stronger position than ever to exploit the differences betw een Lawson
and Walters. On 19 October the Labour front bench called for Thatcher to
distance herself from W alters' stance, declaring that the credibility of the
UK's exchange rate policy was 'being fatally underm ined.'19 W ith Thatcher
silent, Lawson concluded that the situation was untenable:
The problem, as I saw it, was not the difference between M argaret and 
myself over sterling's mem bership of the ERM. I had  been living 
w ith that during most of my six years as Chancellor, and although it 
was far from ideal, I could have continued to do so. W hat m ade my 
job impossible was Number 10 constantly giving the im pression that 
it was indifferent to the depreciation in sterling. I cannot recall any 
precedent for a Chancellor being systematically underm ined in  this 
way.20
Indeed, on 25 October, Lawson succeeded in  securing Thatcher's
agreem ent to the formal publication of the competing currencies proposal.
Lawson comments:
My officials, who had been apprehensive of M argaret's reaction to a 
paper whose proposals assum ed sterling 's m em bership of w hat 
w ould ultim ately become an unequivocally 'h a rd ' version of the 
ERM felt that I had achieved something of a coup.
... In the short term  the paper's value was largely dom estic. It 
contained for the first time, a firm Governm ent com m itm ent that 
sterling w ould join the ERM w hen the M adrid conditions, w hich 
were clearly spelled out in a perfectly acceptable form, were satisfied.
This definitive statem ent meant that w hen M argaret subsequently 
sought to add further conditions as and w hen they entered her head 
it was easier to ignore them as apocryphal.21
The next day Lawson told Thatcher that he could no longer continue
in office so long as Walters remained in his position. After Thatcher refused
to sack Walters, Lawson resigned declaring in his resignation letter:
The successful conduct of economic policy is possible only if there is 
and is seen to be full agreement between the Prime Minister and the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. Recent events have confirmed that this 
essential requirem ent cannot be satisfied so long as Alan W alters 
remains your personal economic adviser.22
In the short time left for trading that day, sterling plum m eted by seven 
pfennigs against the Deutschmark despite repeated intervention from the 
Bank of England. Later in the evening, Walters too resigned.23 
The End of the M adrid Conditions
Despite Lawson's success in securing a new commitment to eventual ERM
m em bership  from  Thatcher p rior to his resignation , his d ep artu re
effectively rem oved m em bership from the governm ent's agenda. For his
part, Howe soon declared that it was essential that the government quickly
reaffirmed the M adrid conditions in order to m aintain the confidence of its
EC partners. However, although nominally 'deputy  Prime M inister,' Howe
w as now  excluded from the ad hoc meetings of senior m inisters w here
influence on the issue lay. Although the new Chancellor, John Major, did
publicly back the conditions on 1 Novem ber, neither he nor the new
Foreign Secretary, Douglas H urd, showed any signs of wanting to push the
issue w ith  the Prime Minister as their predecessors had .2^  One Treasury
official commented:
I don 't think Mr Major was ever pro-ERM, in the sense that he came 
w ith a strong conviction that that was the way we should run  our 
affairs.25
U nthreatened by Major and H urd, Thatcher felt free to publicly 
express her instinctive opposition to m em bership in an interview  w ith 
Brian Walden:
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The various countries in that particu lar exchange rate p lay by 
different rules. That is nonsense. W hen you join any system, you 
m ust all play by the same rules....
You just simply can 't have system w ith a currency like sterling, 
which is a big currency, which has London as the m ost open market, 
freest market in the world, playing under that higgeldy-piggeldy set of 
rules.26
Asked by W alden if it was true that 'the UK shall not be going into ERM for 
quite some tim e,' Thatcher replied: 'That depends on them , on the gap 
between w hat they say and do.'27
In terms of economic policy, the governm ent now abandoned the 
pursuit of exchange rate stability and inflation convergence, as prescribed by 
the M adrid conditions. The governm ent d id  not raise in terest rates to 
defend sterling after it slum ped in the afterm ath of Lawson's resignation. 
After stabilising at the start of November, sterling to fall again in m id- 
N ovem ber trad ing  below  DM2.80 by the end of the m onth. Thatcher 
responded by saying that fifteen per cent interest rates were not there to 
defend sterling. Meanwhile, Major told the Bank not to intervene to protect 
the currency. W hen asked in the House of Commons about his attitude to 
sterling 's sharp fall, Major refused to respond and sim ply w arned that 
inflation m ight now rise and that there was 'm uch to be done' on ERM 
m em bersh ip .28 The financial markets concluded that the governm ent was 
not committed to a floor for sterling or to reducing inflation.2?
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Figure 6.4: Comparative Nominal Interest Rates
November 1989
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As Goodhart states, there was now 'in effect a ceiling on any further 
use of monetary policy as an additional deflationary phase'.30 Thatcher and 
Major did not want any further damaging increases in the mortgage rate, 
and more importantly, they wanted to avoided a recession with an election 
drawing closer.31 Paradoxically, ERM membership would have offered 
them the interest rate reductions which they wanted. Outside ERM, the 
government was not reaping the full counter-inflationary benefit of high
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interest rates because there was not a credible floor for sterling. By contrast, 
the ERM states enjoyed exchange rate stability for a lower rate of interest. As 
figure 6.4 (page 276) shows UK nominal interest rates were significantly 
higher than  in the ERM states w ith the exception of Spain. (The Spanish 
governm ent w as using its w ide ERM m argins to keep in terest rates 
deliberately and unnecessarily high to reduce inflation.) However, w ith  
inflation higher in the UK than in all the ERM states, a reduction in interest 
rates w ould have had to have been accompanied by the kind of counter- 
inflationary measures categorically ruled out by ministers.
The governm ent's policy em braced the risk bo th  of increased 
inflation through a depreciation in sterling and of a recession through tight 
m onetary policy. The policy was based on two premises. First, that the 
m eans by w hich inflation was reduced w as of m ore im portan t than 
reducing inflation itself. H igh inflation could rem ain until 15 per cent 
interest rates started to reduce it. Again, the government was not prepared, 
to trade a reduction in interest rates, for example, for an increase in taxes. 
Second, the policy assum ed that w ith 15 per cent interest rates, sterling 
could not come under indefinite dow nw ard pressure. Ultim ately sterling 
m ust rise and w ould act as a counter-inflationary influence on the 
economy. Neither premise was relevant to the M adrid conditions.32
W hilst the governm ent moved away from the M adrid conditions, 
pressure from  business interests for ERM m em bership m ounted, since 
sterling's depreciation increased the problem of exchange rate volatility. A 
poll published on 18 November showed continuing overwhelming support 
for m em bership among company directors. In the same m onth, the CBI 
declared that unless the UK entered ERM by July 1990, it w ould not be an 
effective participant in the monetary union debate. At the CBI conference a 
significant m inority indicated that they w ould  now  prefer im m ediate 
m em bersh ip  ra ther than  w aiting  un til in fla tion  convergence w as 
achieved.33
Similarly, backbench dissatisfaction w ith non-membership increased. 
M ost im portan tly , H eseltine now stepped  up  his criticism  of the
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governm ent on the issue.34 On 20 November he told a m eeting of the
European League of Economic Co-operation:
Britain's absence from the ERM makes less likely a positive response 
by our partners to our more Atlanticist, free-trade objectives. The 
more we have prevaricated, the longer we have denied ourselves a 
leading and influential role.
Strasbourg
The governm ent was implicitly repudiating  the M adrid conditions as 
another EC sum m it approached in  December. It w as likely th a t the 
Strasbourg sum m it would be dom inated by discussions about w hether to 
hold  an IGC on m onetary union  and the governm ent faced fu rther 
isolation. Certainly common ground did exist between the UK governm ent 
and other member states on monetary matters. On 1 November the UK and 
G erm an  governm en ts jo ined  forces to im pose  changes on  the  
Com m ission's proposals about how finance m inisters and central bank 
governors should co-ordinate policy during Stage One. However, on more 
fundam ental issues, other member states continued to view the UK's non­
m em bership of ERM as a deterrent to allying themselves w ith the Thatcher 
governm ent.35
On 2 November the Treasury published 'A n Evolutionary Approach 
to E urope', detailing its competing currencies alternative to the Delors 
Report, b u t no other m ember state showed any serious in terest in  the 
proposal. On 20 November Leon Brittan declared that ERM m em bership 
was 'the only way for Britain to have a significant influence on the next 
steps to economic and m onetary un ion '.36 In the same m onth, Onno 
Ruding said that Holland would only be prepared to pay attention to the 
UK's concerns on monetary union if it were inside ERM. Similarly, Kohl 
argued that whatever its potential economic problem s w ith  m em bership, 
the UK could not expect to influence the monetary union debate outside the 
system .3?
If the government's aim at Strasbourg was to avoid the creation of an 
IGC, then Germany was its most promising ally. By the start of December,
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the Germ an governm ent faced the prospect of absorbing 17 m illion East 
Germans into its state and economy. As a result, it viewed the prospect of 
m onetary union less favourably than previously, w hich w eakened the 
Franco-G erm an axis. It appeared that if the UK were to im prove its 
m onetary credentials, then an Anglo-German alliance might be possible. On 
1 December, Howe tried to strengthen the government's position by stating 
that there was a 'real possibility' that the UK w ould enter ERM before the 
next general election. However, no similar gesture of in tent came from 
either Thatcher, Major or Hurd. Thatcher and H urd  w ent to Strasbourg 
simply hoping for the best.38
W hen the sum m it opened on 7 December, Thatcher w as unable to 
exploit the pressure placed on Kohl by the Bundesbank to oppose an IGC. 
The next day, the other member states agreed to set up tw o IGCs on 
m onetary  union and political union respectively, despite  T hatcher's 
opposition to the proposal. The conferences were scheduled to begin in 
Rome in  December 1990. Casually dism issed by the o ther heads of 
government, Thatcher was simply left to confirm that the UK w ould attend 
the IGCs.39 As at other summits, Thatcher failed to find m eans to pursue 
her governm ent's policy.
A Shift in Presentation
After the summit, Douglas H urd began to assert himself on the issue since
he believed that it w ould be impossible for the UK to influence the IGC
outside ERM. He quickly persuaded Thatcher and Major to m odify at least
the presentation of their stance on m em bership. On 12 December, the
Financial Times published an interview w ith Thatcher and reported:
It was possible to detect a change of nuance, perhaps an im portant 
one. For the Prime Minister w ould not give way on which if any of 
her well known conditions had to be met, to w hat extent and by 
w hen 'There'11 be no difficulty, for example, in France getting rid of 
her controls on foreign exchange', she said ...'We are obligated to join 
the ERM', she said, adding for a 'w hen ', w hen the term s and 
conditions laid down at M adrid were 'broadly met...' She w ent on, ... 
'I 'm  not looking at it as taking a whole page of graph paper and 
making a dot in each little square. Life isn 't like that.' Was it her view 
that the ERM would break down w ith the end of exchange controls?
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"No, she d idn 't think so'.40
On the same day, Major told the Conservative backbench finance 
committee that he was persuaded that the UK w ould benefit from ERM 
membership bu t now was not the right time for entry. However, in private 
there w as no evidence that either Thatcher or Major were committed to 
entry in the foreseeable future. Indeed, whilst Thatcher professed that the 
M adrid  conditions obliged the UK to enter ERM, the governm ent's 
economic policy was not designed to achieve inflation convergence.41
Elsewhere in the core executive, the Bank of England was determined 
that the M adrid conditions be retained. On 13 December Leigh-Pemberton 
declared that 'p rem ature ' entry into ERM w ould dam age both  the UK 
economy and the system itself. He argued that although the UK had m uch 
to gain from m embership, there would be considerable economic risks if 
entry occurred before UK inflation and interest rates were more in line w ith 
those prevailing in the ERM states. In the Bank's view, the economics of 
mem bership should not be sacrificed to the imperative of entry before the 
start of the IGC.42
6.3: THATCHER PUBLICLY RELENTS
In January 1990 sterling finally stabilised without the government having to 
raise interest rates. By February, it was again trading between DM2.80 and 
DM2.90 bu t it was not strong enough for the governm ent to now cut 
in terest rates. N either was sterling's new stability sufficient to reduce 
inflation. A lthough inflation fell from 7.7 per cent in January to 7.5 per cent 
in February, other government policies were creating further inflationary 
pressure. In the 1989 budget, Lawson broke w ith previous practice and did 
not index excise duties, to try and prevent inflation from rising. Unless 
Major d id  likewise in the 1990 budget, inflation w ould  autom atically 
increase. If the governm ent were to freeze duties again, then consum er 
spending was likely to increase. At the same time, the government was due 
to introduce the poll tax in April 1990. With poll tax bills on average 30 per 
cent higher than the previous year domestic rates bills, the new tax alone
280
w ould increase inflation by more than 1 per cent .43
From the start of March, sterling started to depreciate again. In the 
first two weeks of the m onth, it lost more than 4 per cent on its trade 
w eighted index. The governm ent was left to hope that its budget on 20 
M arch w ould stabilise sterling. Yet w hen the budget came, the government 
simply increased excise duties and so added 0.5 per cent to the inflation rate 
and created new Tax Exempt Special Savings Accounts. 44 As the Economist 
comm ented: 'W hen the City looked at the gap w here macro-economic 
policy should have been, it took fright. Sterling slumped. '45 The financial 
m arkets concluded that the government did not posses a coherent m onetary 
framework and was not committed to sterling. Meanwhile, Lawson publicly 
w arned that sterling would remain weak so long as the government delayed 
ERM m em bersh ip  and th a t sterling 's w eakness w as p u ttin g  the 
governm ent's entire anti-inflationary strategy at risk. After the poll tax riots 
of 31 M arch, w hich were indicative of the governm ent's now  m assive 
unpopu larity , sterling depreciated further, 15 per cent in terest rates 
notw ithstanding. To com pound the governm ent's economic problem s, 
unem ploym ent rose in March for the first time since 1 9 8 6 .4 6
ERM m em bership at this time still offered the governm ent the 
benefit of lower nom inal interest rates for m aintaining exchange rate 
stability. Figure 6.5 (page 282) shows that whilst the strongest ERM states 
were able to maintain a rate differential w ith Germany of less than one per 
cent, UK nominal rates were 5.5 per cent higher. Similarly, the UK suffered 
from high long term government bond rates in comparison to most of the 
ERM states (except Spain and Italy). As in the second quarter of 1989, UK real 
rates were around the average level.
The cost of membership would be that w ith lower interest rates yet 
inflation  still rising, the governm ent w ould  have to use alternative 
counter-inflationary policies to reduce inflation to sustain sterling in  the 
m edium  term. Although Spain continued to use high interest rates they 
w ere used to compeiment its overall counter-inflationary stance. A t the 
same time, after a final balance of paym ents deficit of £23.9 billion, the
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question remained of how the government could sustain a sterling parity 
given the deficit and how the deficit could be alleviated w ithin the 
constraints of membership.
Figure 6.5: Comparative Interest Rates March 1990
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By contrast, a credible commitment to membership offered the 
governm ent overwhelm ing m onetary benefits. W ith the governm ent 
unwilling to raise interest rates or turn to alternative policies, a credible 
com m itm ent to ERM m em bership to strengthen sterling was the 
government's sole counter-inflationary option. If the markets believed that
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the government was committed entry and, hence, a floor for sterling, then it 
was highly probable that they would buy sterling to take advantage of high 
UK interest rates. The governm ent w ould be delivered an appreciating 
exchange rate to bear down on inflation and then could enter ERM w hen 
inflation was reduced.47
Similarly, unless the governm ent sacrificed its counter-inflationary 
objective, a commitment to membership was the only means to ultim ately 
reduce interest rates and lessen the risk of recession. Once a floor for sterling 
was established, then it could probably be defended w ith lower interest rates 
as the ERM states achieved. To all intents and purposes, the governm ent 
now  possessed no m eans of achieving its m acro-economic objectives 
w ithout a genuine commitment to ERM entry in the foreseeable future. 
Facing up to monetary union.
In the first months of 1990, Thatcher appeared to hope that the m om entum  
tow ards monetary union was stalled. She believed that Germany was now 
procrastinating on the issue since it was preoccupied w ith reunification. In 
M arch Germany blocked a Franco-Italian attem pt to bring forward the IGC 
by several months. In the same month, the Commission published its plan 
for m onetary union. The only significant difference from the Delors report 
was that it dropped the latter's insistence on centrally set rules for member 
states' budget deficits and recom mended 'b ind ing  procedures' instead. 
Governm ents w ould have to subm it rules or guide lines on budgetary  
policy to Ecofin that would be written into national law. These w ould have 
to be stringent enough to ensure that states' borrowing did not pu t pressure 
on national or Community interest rates. The Commission hoped that peer 
group pressure w ould persuade member states to comply w ith  Ecofin 
rulings on their budgetary plans which would be taken by majority voting. 
However, at an Ecofin meeting on 31 March-1 April, Germany, supported by 
Holland, opposed the plan. At the insistence of the Bundesbank, Germany 
w anted binding ceilings on budget deficits as prescribed in the Delors report. 
Overall, it was adam ant that m onetary union w ould only be feasible on 
Bundesbank style conditions.48
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Against this background, the UK government did not directly act to 
strengthen its position before the IGC. Meanwhile, Michael Butler (from the 
City E uropean comm ittee), largely on his ow n initiative, m eanw hile 
developed an alternative proposal for monetary union known as the H ard 
Ecu Plan. He proposed that the Ecu basket currency used in  ERM be 
hardened into an international currency backed by a new EMF. The H ard 
Ecu w ould exist as a parallel currency alongside the existing EC currencies 
and w ould never depreciate against them. If there was a m arket for the 
currency, then in the long term it could become a common currency for 
Europe and ultimately a single currency if governments so chose. The EMF 
w ould manage the H ard Ecu eventually setting interest rates for it through 
norm al central bank techniques. The Fund would also coordinate member 
states interventions against the dollar and the yen. At the end of March, 
Butler presented his proposal to Thatcher who took up the idea at least as a 
m eans of giving the UK a voice in the increasingly divisive m onetary 
debate.49
In April the governm ent's strategy of relying on divisions between 
o ther m em ber states on the issue w as jeopard ised . W ithout the 
B undesbank's know ledge, Kohl prom ised the French governm ent that 
Germ any w ould no longer prevaricate on m onetary union. O n 22 April 
Kohl and M itterrand issued a joint communique calling for both m onetary 
and political union to take effect from 1 January 1993. Thatcher dismissed 
the Franco-Germ an initiative as 'prem ature and esoteric'. How ever, in 
practice the initiative recreated an onus for the UK to enter ERM before the 
IGC began in December 1990.50 
The Hurd-M ajor Axis
In the first months of 1990 Douglas H urd set out to recreate the Treasury- 
Foreign Office axis on membership and convince Major that entry before 
the start of the IGC w ould be extremely valuable. One official commented 
that H urd  'never felt as strongly about it as Geoffrey Howe - I think he just 
believed in the inevitability of i t . '51 Over a serious of informal bilateral 
m eetings, H urd  persuaded Major of his case.52 One Treasury official
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described Major's conversion on the issue:
He took a look at the position we were in and more or less decided we 
couldn't go on living this way. I think he was every bit as im pressed 
by the politics as by the economics.55
For his ow n part, Major w as keen to stress the econom ic case for 
m em bership:
The more I realised, day after day, was that the most priceless gift you 
could offer British business over the m edium  term  was a stable 
exchange rate and a stable inflation rate. A nd w hat was the best 
mechanism to achieve this, or the best and m ost proven mechanism 
to achieve it over the years would be the ERM.5*
In March, H urd  and Major both publicly expressed their support for 
membership. H urd declared that there were strong foreign policy reasons 
for entering and 'of course, it is conceivable that a decision could be taken 
during the present parliam ent.'55
In the budget, Major stated that entry was now a question of 'w hen ' 
and not 'if'. Five days later, Major publicly reinstated the M adrid conditions. 
He noted  that 'encourag ing ' progress tow ards their fulfilm ent w as 
occurring. He then redefined the inflation convergence condition declaring 
that it was necessary for UK inflation to be 'proxim ate' to the inflation rates 
of the ERM states. On the same day, Howe stated that the other ERM states 
were fulfilling their side of the M adrid conditions.56
M ajor and H u rd  now  sough t to convince T hatcher th a t the 
governm ent should make a credible commitment to ERM entry w ithin the 
foreseeable future. Rather than initiating another internal core executive 
debate w ith  papers and a formal meeting of senior ministers and officials, 
Major decided to operate on a low key bilateral basis w ith  Thatcher. 
A lthough there was an overw helm ing m ajority w ith in  the Cabinet in  
favour of ERM m em bership, Major apparen tly  did  no t believe tha t 
collective pressure w ould be productive. At the same time, he could no 
longer rely  on support for m em bership from  either the T reasury or 
particularly the Bank of England. Both institutions did share his view that 
outside ERM the UK w ould be in a weak position in the IGC. However,
285
throughout the first half of 1990, officials were preoccupied w ith the concern 
that the economy was not responding sufficiently to high interest rates. 
They believed that membership would pu t an undesirable onus on interest 
rate cuts and that entry should be delayed until a sizeable reduction in 
interest rates could be justified on counter-inflationary grounds. On their 
own calculation, the earliest date for entry would be 1991.57
Largely by himself, Major persuaded Thatcher that the governm ent 
should at least act as if it w ould enter ERM by the end of 1990. Thatcher 
appeared to accept that a credible commitment to m embership w ould be a 
means of securing an appreciation in sterling and ultimately make interest 
rate cuts possible. It would also convince the ERM states that the UK wanted 
to be a full time player at the IGC. W hatever merit Thatcher saw in Major's 
case per se, Major was in a significantly stronger position than that which 
confronted Lawson and Howe in June 1989. The governm ent was now 
trailing Labour by over 20 per cent in the opinion polls and could not offer 
voters more of the same on the economy at the same time as the first poll 
tax bills were arriving. Thatcher believed that Labour support for ERM 
membership now put the government at a direct disadvantage on the issue. 
First, it gave Labour credibility in the City at a time w hen the financial 
markets were showing little faith in the government. Second, it allowed 
Labour to claim that it could make cuts in  in terest rates w hich the 
governm ent could not. At the same time, Thatcher's ow n position w ithin 
the Conservative Party was weaker than in June 1989. She had  been 
challenged for the Tory leadership for the first time in autum n 1989 by a 
'sta lk ing  horse ' candidate. Press and backbench speculation w as now  
growing of a serious challenge to her leadership in 1990, which this time 
w ould involve Michael Heseltine. In the first months of 1990 Conservative 
dissent on European issues and ERM m embership in particular coalesced 
into a new Positive Europe group. Since Lawson and Howe left office as a 
result directly or indirectly of their conflict w ith Thatcher over membership, 
she could ill-afford to lose another Chancellor or Foreign Secretary over the 
issue.58
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Nevertheless w hat Thatcher actually agreed in M arch-April 1990 is
open to dispute. Clearly, she agreed to let it be publicly know n that she now
supported  m em bership. Thatcher herself ignores this fact saying only:
'W hen I saw him [Major] on the morning of Thursday 29 March I said that I
d id  not believe that the conditions for our membership had yet been m e t/5?
Sm ith suggests that Major further secured a genuine com m itm ent from
Thatcher to enter ERM 'a t the earliest possible opportunity ', presum ably
before the IGC began.60 However, evidence from  officials suggests that
Thatcher agreed to far less. One Foreign Office official com m ented that
Thatcher did not change her m ind until far later in the year:
I think that the Prime Minister was only convinced quite late, w hen 
it appeared that joining the ERM would allow us to control inflation 
at lower interest rates at a time w hen the governm ent's economic 
policies were under attack.6!
In the w ords of a Bank of England official, 'I don 't think a decision was 
taken early in the year to do it specifically in the a u t u m n . '62 Similarly a 
Thatcher confidant stated that Thatcher did no t change her m ind on 
membership until September of that year.65 In sum, it appears that Thatcher 
w as prepared  to economically exploit a com m itm ent to eventual ERM 
mem bership w ithout making any firm commitment to Major or Hurd.
6.4: WHAT STRATEGY?
The dilem m a for the governm ent in making a credible com m itm ent to 
ERM m embership was the onus on inflation convergence prescribed in the 
M adrid conditions. Since UK inflation was again moving further away from 
the levels of the ERM states, entry to the system w ithin the foreseeable 
future w ould appear untenable on the terms of the M adrid conditions. To 
rectify the situation, the governm ent redefined the conditions. At the 
Scottish Conservative Party Conference on 12 May, N orm an Lamont, the 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury, noted that if UK inflation was m easured on 
a properly comparative basis to other states, it was only 1.5 per cent above 
the EC average.64 The following day, Thatcher declared that her conditions 
for m em bership were near to being fulfilled and m ade a similar point on
287
inflation to Lamont:
If we calculated our inflation as they do in most countries in Europe, 
it would be almost 3 percentage points lower. So, if you compare like 
w ith like, we are not so far above Europe's average for inflation 65
In the same week, Major told the IMF that UK inflation w ould
significantly fall by the beginning of 1991 and went out of his w ay to show
that this w ould narrow  the inflation gap between the UK and the ERM
sta tes.66 On 17 May, Major told the Wall Street Journal, that 'anyone who
thinks we are playing w ith this as a gesture is w r o n g / 67 The same day, he
told the CBI that 'I am sure we will benefit from joining the ERM and join it
we m ost certainly will w hen our conditions are m e t /6 8  A  week later, Peter
Lilley, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury stated that membership w ould
serve as an anti-inflationary d is c ip l in e .6 9
The government used its public commitment to ERM membership to
try and recover the initiative on the issue from Labour. The governm ent
presented itself as the only party which was tough and credible enough to
manage membership successfully. On 13 May, Thatcher declared that Labour
lacked the financial discipline to make membership work:
The ERM is no soft option. You agreed to keep your exchange rate 
w ithin well defined limits. If it fails you have no choice bu t to raise 
interest rates, which is precisely what Labour attack us for d o in g .7 0
Later, Howe returned to the same theme:
I detect an expedient advocacy by Labour of the ERM as a substitute to 
a counter-inflationary policy, not a complement to it. Labour believes 
that the ERM will bring Britain an economic m argin for manoeuvre 
that can be used to finance higher government spending and lower 
interest rates and so fend off the need for tax increases [under its 
policies.]7i
M inisters' pronouncem ents produced the desired appreciation in 
sterling. After Major's comments on 17 May, sterling rose by 3 pfennigs 
against the Deutschmark. On 23 May sterling initially fell on poor trade 
figures bu t then recovered on speculation that m embership was imminent. 
As the governm ent hoped  the financial m arkets believed th a t the 
com m itm ent to m em bership provided a floor for sterling and  so were
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prepared to take advantage of high UK interest rates. On 12 June Major told
the press that the UK was looking to enter ERM in either September or
October and sterling soared to a four month high in response. Overall from
the budget to the end of June, sterling rose by more than 6 per cent against
the Deutschmark.72
At the start of July at the Dublin Sum m it, Thatcher nearly
condem ned the whole policy when she attacked the 'folly' of fixed exchange
rate systems. Nevertheless, through July and August, Major used carefully
tim ed statem ents highlighting the governm ent's com m itm ent to ERM
m em bership  to sustain the sterling appreciation. For exam ple, w hen
sterling fell after a renewed attack on membership by Alan Walters, Major
reasserted  the governm ent's support for entry. By the end of August,
sterling was trading above DM3.00. The trouble for the government was that
despite sterling's appreciation, inflation continued to rise. Even m easured at
the underlying level, UK inflation was still moving away from the ERM
average in the wake of increased pay settlements and a surge in the price of
oil after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Between March and August 1990 UK
inflation rose 2.5 per cent from 8.1 to 10.6 per cent.73
At the same time, during the third quarter of 1990, the economy
m oved into recession. From July to September GDP fell by 1.4 per cent,
m anufacturing output by 1.6 per cent, private sector investm ent by 7 per
cent and  retail sales by alm ost 1 per cent. U nem ploym ent rose by
approxim ately 20,000 a month. W ith bank lending falling and corporate
profits tum bling, business confidence was shattered. These appeared to
surprise Thatcher, Major and the Treasury, if not the Bank of England who
w ere concentrating on the continuing rise in inflation.74 One Bank of
England official commented:
I rem ember going dow n to a monthly m eeting in  the Treasury in 
May 1990 and finding our Treasury hosts saying 'Well look, we still 
can 't see m uch evidence of the end and this boom actually turning 
down. Inflation is looking set for continuing acceleration. Have we 
really got policy tight enough?' I think in  saying that they knew 
perfectly well that whatever they might recom mend their political 
m asters w ou ldn 't contemplate tightening policy so it w as a free
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option. But we found ourselves saying 'Well for heavens sake there 
m ust be one hell of a lot in the pipeline, surely it can't be right to be 
doing anymore now.' And of course in a couple of m onths, as we 
know, the whole thing had fallen off a cliff.75
According to one banker:
As a clearing bank, we told the Bank of England to tell the Treasury 
that bad debts that started in an onslaught in  the sum m er of 1990 
were a bad omen, because normally bad debts don't get really going 
until the end of a recession. It was perfectly clear that som ething 
serious was happening bu t the Treasury d id n 't see it. They really 
d idn 't see it. The Bank probably did. The Bank got us into recession by 
design, the Treasury by accident. ... The Bank felt they were pu t in an 
impossibly compromised position by the inflationary boom... And 
now even though it was going to be very costly - they no doubt had a 
clear understanding of the costs - believed that we m ust sweat it out 
this time.76
Faced by the reality of the recession, the government publicly denied it. In 
part, this reflected the governm ent's genuine ignorance of w hat w as 
happening . A t the same time, the denial w as necessary since the 
governm ent was not in a position to respond by cutting interest rates, given 
its commitment to reduce inflation through an appreciation in sterling.
The Ridley Affair
In terms of EC policy, the government wanted to use its public commitment 
to m em bership to strengthen its credentials before the IGC. D uring this 
period Major or one of his senior officials visited the finance ministers of all 
the other m em ber-states to im press on them  th a t the UK w anted  to 
participate constructively in the m onetary un ion  debate. A lthough the 
diplom atic offensive earned Major a significant am ount of personal good 
will, it d id not secure the particular benefits he sought. First, some ERM 
states now believed that UK entry to ERM w ould impose costs on them  
given the problems of the UK economy.77 On 31 May Pohl declared: 'Under 
the present circumstances, I don 't believe Britain can be a m ember of the 
ERM w ith its inflation rate and large balance of payments problem .'7^
Second, the other states now believed that it w ould be possible for 
them  to achieve monetary union even if the UK rem ained outside ERM.79
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One Com mission official privately commented: 'W hat makes the British
think they will be doing the ERM such a favour by agreeing to join it? '80 On
20 June the governm ent published its Hard Ecu plan for m onetary union.
A lthough unlike the competing currencies proposal the scheme included
the creation of a new independent monetary institution in the EC, it d id not
strengthen the UK's position. The Italian and Dutch Finance M inisters
im m ediate ly  denounced the p lan  as inferior to the Delors report.
M eanwhile Pohl declared that the proposals w ould not achieve a m onetary
union and were impractical. Having invested so m uch political capital in
achieving monetary union, France and Germany were not prepared to see it
dow ngraded to a possibility rather than a certainty. They believed that the
IGC should accept the goal of monetary union as its starting point, not as its
key subject of debate. In consigning a central bank to an unspecified future,
the H ard Ecu plan did not address the French government's desire to reduce
the influence of the Bundesbank. Neither did the proposal increase the
possibility of an Anglo-Bundesbank alliance, since the Bundesbank tended
to regard parallel currencies as inflationary and so unacceptable.8!
Major and  H u rd 's  ability to sell the H ard  Ecu w as fu rther
underm ined  from  w ithin  the governm ent itself. On 21 June Thatcher
dism issed suggestions in the House of Commons that the Ecu could
eventually replace sterling saying: 'It does not mean that we have approved
a single European currency, it says specifically we have not.'82 Then, the
Trade and Industry Secretary, Nicholas Ridley, in a notorious interview
w ith  theSpectator condemned the monetary union project as:
An all-German racket, designed to take over the whole of Europe. It 
has to be thwarted. This rushed take-over by the Germans on the 
w orst possible basis w ith  the French behaving like poodles, is 
absolutely intolerable. ... If Britain was going to give up sovereignty to 
17 un-elected reject politicians we might just as well give it to Adolf 
Hitler frankly.83
W hen Thatcher only reluctantly accepted Ridley's resignation over the 
remarks, it was commonly assumed that she basically shared Ridley's view. 
A m onth later Thatcher commented that the substance, if not the style of
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some of Ridley's rem arks were in tune w ith peoples feelings. Indeed 
Lawson states:
I have no doubt that the reason that Nick Ridley felt it was safe to 
m ake the anti-German rem arks in his Spectator interview , which 
were to lead to his enforced and reluctant resignation in 1990, was 
that he had  m any times heard M argaret utter precisely the same 
sentiments in private - as, indeed, had I.85
Against this background, it was difficult for Major and H urd to convince the 
ERM states that the UK wanted to be a serious player at the IGC.
No Strategy
Inside the core executive, the question is to w hat extent the public
commitment to membership reflected a coherent strategy for entering ERM.
Thatcher herself states that she told Major on 13 June that she w ould not
resist sterling joining the ERM 'bu t the tim ing was for debate.'86 In  his
account, Smith states that Major 'flirted briefly' w ith entry in July 1990 to
coincide w ith the start of Stage One but Thatcher rejected the option. In the
following weeks, Major and officials decided that entry w ould take place
during the first weekend of October.8? Smith comments:
By the summer of 1990, however, Major and his advisors had a clear 
idea of the timing of ERM entry. There was one instance where, on a 
car journey to a political engagement Major asked one of his advisors 
to write on a piece of paper the best time to take the pound into the 
ERM. He did the same, and the papers were exchanged. Both had 
precisely the same timing, the weekend before the Conservative Party 
conference in October.88
However, evidence from officials suggests that contrary to Sm ith's 
and  Thatcher's accounts respectively, no timetable for m em bership was 
established in  the sum m er and that Thatcher's w illingness to support 
m em bership at all was still open to question. One Bank of England official 
com m ented:
I am not quite sure what was going on in 1990.1 don 't think there was 
a great deal of actual debate about ERM membership or the basis of 
ERM membership, though it is quite clear that the markets in 1990 
were getting hold of the idea that the ERM was something we were 
clearly about to join. ... There were no set pieces that I could recall 
involving the official machine. Obviously in all the institutions w ith
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an interest in the subject, including our own, we were doing our best 
to assemble our ideas. ... But we were not, as it were, concerting on a 
game plan such as would have produced this pretty blatant talking up 
of expectations of membership and thereby of the exchange rate at the 
other end of town. We got to know it was happening. But it was not 
something that I was ever involved in discussing w hether it should 
be done, how it should be done, or whatever.89
The same official saw a continuing conflict betw een Thatcher and Major on
the issue as the reason why no strategic discussion took place:
There were really rather deep divisions w ithin  governm ent w hich 
actually inhibited the proper process of open debate w ith in  the 
governm ent and the official family tha t w ould desirably happen. 
Because those who wanted to move in this [ERM] direction did not 
w ant to show too much head above the parapet for her next door to 
sort of slide back. I suspect that was the position and so that m ade it 
rather difficult to get very close to what was going on.90
In the view of another Bank official:
I get the impression, for example, the Spaniards w hen they entered 
the ERM had more of a strategy in the sense that they talked the 
exchange rate down. One could alm ost see them  leading up  and 
there was a fairly clear indication of w hen in the year they were 
proposing to go. They stage-managed it in  a w ay we did not.9i
W ithout a collective strategy, the respective parts of the core 
executive developed their own agenda on membership. During June, senior 
Treasury officials reversed their previous opposition to membership by the 
end of 1990. The departm ent now believed that entry before the IGC was 
crucially im portant and that it could be justified on counter-inflationary 
grounds. If sterling were to use 6 per cent bands and enter at the bottom of 
that range, then sterling would have considerable room to appreciate before 
any obligation to cut interest rates arose. Indeed, w ith wide margins, holders 
of sterling w ould face a substantial dow nw ard risk w hich could justify a 
substantial interest rate differential w ith other ERM states. In this approach, 
the Treasury looked to Spain which in its first year of ERM m em bership 
successfully combined wide margins w ith high interest rates to bear dow n 
on inflation. In terms of a central rate for sterling, the Treasury d id  not 
believe that this level could be anything other than  around prevailing
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m arket rate at the time of entry. Nevertheless, the Treasury considered that
a central rate of around DM2.95 would be appropriate on the grounds that
this was the average rate over the previous 10 years.92
At the Bank of England, senior officials rem ained sceptical about
whether there was sufficient convergence between the UK and ERM states
to justify entry. They were particulary concerned that UK inflation was too
high. In the view of one sceptic at the Bank: I f  we were going to go in, it
should be on the basis that going in was going to provided a strong anti-
inflationary d iscip line/93These officials believed that w ide m argins w ould
be essential to avoid interest rate cuts. They further considered that entry
should only occur w ith a central rate which w ould squeeze the economy,
preferably around DM.3.20. At all costs, they w anted to guard against
another inflationary boom.9^
For her part Thatcher was certainly open enough to the idea of
m em bership to consider how it m ight operate. If she was to accept
m em bership, then she w anted wide margins for sterling. In the House of
Commons on 1 May, she declared:
It is one thing to join an exchange rate mechanism w ith certain quite 
w ide margins w ithin which the currency can fluctuate, as has been 
necessary. It would be much more unwise to go to locked exchange 
rates.95
After the June Dublin summit, Thatcher emphasised that there w ould have
to be flexibility within ERM for sterling:
You could have one of those weekend sessions w hen you altered the 
valuation of your currency. So there is no locking at all... and it 
w ould not work if there was.95
Thatcher appeared to believe that operating wide margins was a way 
of continuing to operate a de facto floating exchange rate but which allowed 
for interest rate cuts. It was the very opposite reason for which the Treasury 
and the Bank of England wanted wide margins and suggested that Thatcher 
d id  not see potential m em bership as any form  of counter-inflationary 
discipline.97 In sum, there is strong evidence that by September, there was 
no agreed timetable for ERM entry nor any consensus on how membership
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w ould operate. The government had created the expectation that entry was 
im m inent bu t there was no coherent core executive debate about how  to 
make membership a reality.
6.5: ENTRY TO ERM
In analysing the government's decision in October 1990 to enter ERM, it is 
first necessary to consider the implications of m em bership in  term s of 
m inisters' economic, capital accum ulation and European priorities. In 
economic terms, Thatcher and Major faced a crisis during September. W ith 
inflation rising above 10 per cent in August, the government was forced to 
redefine the M adrid conditions to m aintain a credible com m itm ent to 
m em bership to bolster sterling. On 7 September Major stated that entry 
could take place when UK inflation was 'proximate to that of its European 
partners'. However, the financial markets were now unresponsive to the 
g o v e rn m e n t's  announcem en ts . D espite  ea rlie r sp e cu la tio n  th a t 
m embership was only days away, sterling fell on Major's comments. W ithin 
the next week, even the governm ent's commitment to m em bership was 
throw n into doubt. On 19 September Pohl suggested that UK entry to ERM 
was unlikely in view of rising inflation and sterling fell in response. Five 
days later, on a visit to Switzerland, Thatcher was quoted as saying that 
inflation w ould have to fall several points further before sterling could 
enter ERM. Her alleged rem arks pu t sterling under fu rther pressure. 
U nw illing to raise interest rates, Major effectively dropped the M adrid 
conditions to convince the financial m arkets that the governm ent was 
serious about membership. In a speech to the IMF on 26 September, Major 
declared that the key factors in the decision were the prospective rates of 
inflation between the UK and its EC partners. However, his rem arks were 
not sufficient to stabilise sterling. Indeed it took concerted intervention 
from the Bank of England, Bundesbank and the US Federal Reserve to stop 
sterling falling dramatically. It seemed that only mem bership itself could 
now convince the markets of the governm ent's intentions and provide a 
floor for sterling .98
As a result, by the start of October, ERM entry offered the government
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overw helm ing counter-inflationary m onetary  benefits. It alone could 
stabilise sterling and allow interest rates to be reduced. A simple public 
com m itm ent to m em bership was no longer sufficient to achieve the 
governm ent's objectives. Unlike the UK, after March 1990, most ERM states 
were able to reduce interest rates further towards the German rate and in 
H olland's case below it. As figure 6.6 (page 297) shows, UK nominal rates 
were now 3 per cer cent higher than Italy's compared to 2 per cent in M arch 
and 5.5 per cent higer than French rates compared to 5 per cent in March. 
UK real rates which were lower than those in  Spain, Holland and Belgium 
in March 1990 were now higher than in any ERM state.
N evertheless, the governm ent w ould  still be en tering  a fixed 
exchange rate system w ith inflation rising. A lthough Spain entered the 
system in a similar situation, it adopted the kind of counter-inflationary 
policies which the UK government had renounced. Inside ERM the biggest 
potential problem for the UK was with a level of wage increases growing by 
10-11 per cent. By the end of 1990 unit wage costs in manufacturing industry 
w ere rising by twelve per cent a year. The Thatcher governm ent w ould 
have to hope that the recession w ould soon dam pen wage increases, and 
that previous tight m onetary policy and appreciation in sterling w ould  
finally feed through into a lower inflation rate in 1991. Developments on 
these lines w ould make unnecessary any unpalatable policy changes.
In terms of the recession, membership offered the government short 
term  benefit and long term problems. Since the governm ent show ed no 
willingness to sacrifice its counter-inflationary objective, it could not cut 
interest rates to respond to the recession by staying outside ERM. However, 
by entering the system the government w ould be tying monetary policy to 
the exchange rate at the same time as the consequences of high interest rates 
for the real economy were rising. ERM membership would make the ability 
to cut interest rates beyond the immediate future dependent on sterling's 
relationship w ith the Deutschmark. Whilst the recession w ould dem and a 
reduction in  UK interest rates, Germany in terest rates were likely to 
continue to rise.
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Figure 6.6: Comparative Interest Rates October 1990
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Entry at the prevailing market rate between DM2.90 and 3.00 would 
compound the government's problems with the external deficit. Sterling's 
appreciation in the previous months further damaged the competitiveness 
of UK companies and contributed to the fall in output in the third quarter. 
By the end of 1990, the manufacturing trade deficit would stand at nearly 
£18 billion and the overall balance of payments deficit at £13.8 billion, 
making it difficult for the government to sustain a sterling parity in the 
medium to long term. The financial markets were likely to conclude that 
the governm ent would ultimately have to devalue to deal w ith this 
problem. Without a credible central rate for sterling, there was a risk that
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interest rates would have to be higher than they would otherwise be.99 
Entry and Capital Groups
The City still overw helm ingly supported  ERM m em bership to reduce 
exchange rate volatility and provide a counter-inflationary discipline. Most 
im portantly , m em bership w ould reduce the m ost im m ediate th rea t to 
London's long term future as the financial centre of Europe. By October 1990 
it faced gloomy overall prospects. Banks, building societies, stockbrokers, 
fund managers and insurers, were all being squeezed by high interest rates 
and stagnant markets and faced cuts in capital spending and jobs. W ith ERM 
m em bership offering lower interest rates and likely to buoy up  the stock- 
m arket, financial analysts believed that ERM m em bership could breathe 
new  life into the securities business. Financial businesses w hich were 
d riven  by sentim ent, like stockbroking and fund m anagem ent, w ould 
benefit the most. The implications for the City of the central rate for sterling 
were mixed. Since the City does not export goods its competitiveness would 
not be directly affected. However, w ith London the most expensive financial 
centre in Europe a sustained high rate for sterling w ould make the City an 
increasingly expensive place for foreign institutions to operate in.100
S im ilarly , m an u fac tu rin g  in d u s try  rem ained  in  favou r of 
m em bership too. Industry w ould benefit from exchange rate stability and 
the likely reduction in interest rates. However, the high central rate for 
sterling w ould impose costs on industry particularly those companies in the 
international sector. These companies w ould face the combination of falling 
domestic demand and competing abroad at a permanently difficult exchange 
rate, and w ith  unit costs still rising faster than else w here in  the EC. In 
October, ou tpu t was falling faster in services than in the m anufacturing 
sector bu t the risk w ould be that exporters w ould  reduce labour and 
investm ent and drag m anufacturing industry further into recession.101
As relatively low exporters, the service sector w ould be less directly 
affected by ERM membership. Nevertheless, although cuts in interest rates 
w ould be beneficial, the high rate for sterling w ould be likely to have a 
damaging knock on effect on the services' performance. W ith output falling
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quickly in the service sector, it was looking to m anufacturing industry  to 
p rov ide  an up  tu rn  in  dom estic dem and. If jo ining ERM dragged  
m anufacturing industry  further into recession, then dem and for services 
w ould not be generated.
Selling the Hard Ecu
At an Ecofin meeting in September in Rome, the Franco-German axis on 
m onetary union was again fractured. Only France, Belgium, Denmark and 
Italy still w anted a treaty commitment to move to Stage Two from January 
1993. Indeed the Spanish Finance Minister presented a scheme for Stage 
Two to start in 1994 which incorporated some aspects of the H ard ECU plan 
and interested Ireland, Greece and Portugal. ERM entry m ight provide 
greater credibility for the government in pushing its option further.102
However, it did not offer the UK governm ent particular rew ard in 
term s of im proving its relationship w ith either France or Germany. The 
Bundesbank continued to oppose UK entry to ERM in 1990 on economic 
grounds. W ith the Bundesbank determ ined that m onetary union could 
only take place w hen economic convergence was achieved, UK entry  to 
ERM w hen its inflation was rising would not prom ote a UK-Bundesbank 
axis. By contrast on 24 September, Pierre Beregovoy, the French Finance 
Minister urged UK entry as "soon as possible/ According to Beregovoy early 
entry w ould be good both for the UK and the building of Europe. However, 
although entry would strengthen the government's position w ith  France, it 
had  no desire to make common cause w ith France on m onetary union in 
view of France's support for a speedy union.103 
Entry at Thatchers whim
According to Smith, the government began October w ith the clear intention
to enter ERM by the second week of the month. He states:
The go ahead for entry came in a m eeting betw een Major and 
Thatcher on W ednesday 3 October. Thatcher, how ever, had  one 
condition. She w anted the decision to take sterling into ERM to be 
combined w ith a cut in  interest rates, both  because of the intense 
political pressure to reduce rates and because such a move w ould 
soften the objections to entry in the anti-European w ing in the 
Conservative Party.104
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Smith suggests that the government initially planned to announce entry on 
Friday 5 October, the final day of the Labour Party conference, after the 
financial markets closed for the weekend at 5.00pm. However, to squeeze 
Labour's successful conference off the early evening news and the weekend 
press coverage, Major announced at 4.00pm that the UK w ould enter ERM 
on 8 October at a central rate of DM.2.95 w ith 6 per cent margins. At the 
same time, he announced a reduction in interest rates from 15 per cent to 14 
per cent.
How ever, if as previously suggested, the governm ent d id  not 
establish a timetable for ERM entry over the summer, then an alternative 
explanation is needed for the decision to announce entry on 5 October. 
Thatcher herself makes no direct comment on the subject.105 O ther 
evidence indicates that at the start of October, Major and  the Treasury 
concluded that early ERM entry alone could provide a counter-inflationary 
discipline and interest rate cuts. They now decided to actively push for entry 
w ith  Thatcher before the IGC began. In this view, they were supported by 
H urd  and the Foreign Office. At the Bank of England, opinion was split. 
Senior officials were divided between those who positively supported entry 
and  those w ho w ere reluctan t b u t believed tha t con tinu ing  n o n ­
m em bersh ip  w ould  prove in fla tionary  given the expectations of 
m embership already created by the government. One such sceptical Bank 
of England official commented:
We suddenly found ourselves in the autum n of the year w ith  the 
reality of a decision. Either you go in and validate those expectations. 
And if you go in, you go in at about the present exchange rate. Or you 
invalidate the expectations, because if you don 't do it, prior to 
December, given the political focus of the IGC, no-one is going to 
expect it to happen for quite some time. You will get an enormous let 
dow n in the markets. All that premium will once again be dem anded 
and in so far as the appreciating exchange rate has helped you on the 
road towards getting your inflation back under control, so that will be 
lost. And that really was an unappetising choice for those of us who 
still retained some misgivings as to whether this was a timely thing 
to be doing.106
On 4 October Major, and senior Treasury officials and Eddie George,
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Deputy Governor at the Bank of England, went to see Thatcher to seek her
perm ission for entry sometime before the end of the year.10? One senior
Treasury official described the meeting:
We w ent to the Prime Minister for an informal discussion about this, 
- she was going out to dinner somewhere; she had to get into a long 
dress so the whole thing was punctuated by this changing - w ith  a 
view to joining later in the year. The party conference was coming up 
and none of us w anted to join close to the party  conference. I'm  
totally allergic to doing things close to party conference, interest rate 
changes or anything. It was a Thursday night w hen we w ent to see 
her.
She said: "All right, do you think it will be all right?',
'It will certainly be alright for next six to seven m onths.'
The Prime Minister said: 'Could you bring dow n interest rates 
at the same time?'
We said, 'yes' because we wanted to bring dow n interest rates 
anyway.
She then said: 'Well, can you do it [join ERM] tomorrow?'
'Well that would be extremely difficult.'
So we then adjourned to see w hen we could assemble the 
m onetary committee and we said, 'No, we can't do it tom orrow  but 
we can have it done by the weekend.'
And she said: 'Goodness knows how we are joining at 2.95.'108
The suddenness of the decision in this account is hinted at by others. One
Bank of England official commented:
Discussions most immediately associated w ith the decision itself were 
very closely focused on a short period of time. There had been quite a 
lot of fairly general discussion about it in the run-up. But then 
suddenly when things started to coalesce, [and] move very fast, it was 
really a very short period of discussions about things like [the] 
appropriate rate and [the] precise moment.109
A Foreign Office official recalled: 'the Prime Minister's view on ERM entry 
changed only very shortly before we joined in  October 1990.' 110 Another 
official rem arked that 'I think that one of the reasons w hy no decision was 
taken until the very last minute is because a decision is in itself a highly 
m arket sensitive thing.' 111
According to a Thatcher confidant, Thatcher privately reversed her 
position in mid-September during the time she was preparing for the party 
conference. He commented:
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It came as the result of a lot of things, the state of the economy, the 
fact that inflation was going up. She was very keen to start getting 
interest rates dow n and sensed it was a trade-off betw een her and 
John Major and interest rates. If he w ould  announce v irtually  
simultaneously, she w ould accept that it was sensible to join ERM 
providing we did so at a sensible parity.112
Thatcher's subsequent insistence on entry  at such short notice
rendered any strategic discussion within the core executive of the details or
presentation of entry almost impossible. On the question of the central rate
for sterling, Thatcher left the decision to the Treasury. One Thatcher
confidant stated that 'I don 't remember it being a subject of great difficulty
for h e r.'113The Treasury believed that there was essentially no choice and
that entry would have to be around the prevailing m arket rate of DM2.93 at
the end of trading on 4 October.11-1 Nevertheless, asked w hether it w ould
have been possible to go in 10 per cent below the prevailing rate one former
Bank of England official commented:
It w ould have been very difficult politically to do that, bu t it is 
possible to do so. You call a meeting. You call around on a Friday 
afternoon - say we w ant to come in. We spend the whole night in 
Brussels and everybody argues and you probably w ouldn 't be allowed 
the 10 per cent. But since every one thought the rate was high, I 
think they would have allowed it.116
For the Treasury, Thatcher's spontaneous decision for entry created the 
opportunity for membership at the DM2.95 rate which it preferred. A senior 
civil servant affirmed 'I was pretty confident it was a reasonable ra te .'116 
According to a City economist w ith close links to Whitehall: 'The Treasury, 
Terry Burns, was very confident he had got the right ra te .'117 By contrast, 
those Bank of England officials who wanted a rate of DM.3.10 or above were 
disappointed by the decision.
Neither did the core executive generally discuss the appropriateness 
of sim ultaneously  cutting in terest rates and  en tering  ERM. Leigh- 
Pem berton, w ho was absent on the 4 October meeting, and other senior 
Bank officials were m ortified w hen they learnt of the decision. At one 
stroke the decision undermined the Bank's hope that wide margins could be
302
used to m aintain the interest rate differential w ith the ERM states. W ith
rising wage settlements, the Bank of England was far less confident than the
Treasury that inflation would soon fall as the lagged result of the previous
two years' policies. At the same time, it believed that for m em bership to be
successful, it was necessary to send a clear signal to the financial m arkets
that the governm ent understood mem bership to be a counter-inflationary
discipline. Only w hen some credibility had been earned inside the ERM,
could a cut in interest rates be justified. In television interviews over the
w eekend , L eigh-Pem berton critic ised  the decision  as 'p o litic a lly
m o tiv a te d '.118 In the view of one form er Bank official w ho had long
supported membership:
They snatched at the interest rate cut. They could have had  the 
interest rate cut if they had waited a few weeks. But to do it at the 
time made the whole thing vulnerable. They got themselves off on a 
very bad  start. It could not have been a w orsely [sic] hand led  
decision. ^ 9
The Bank's view was not shared by the Treasury w ho believed that an 
interest rate cut was necessary in view of falling output. One Treasury 
official dismissed Leigh-Pemberton's criticism: 'I never really understood 
that. ... We did have a reason for doing it and it worked.'120
Since Thatcher was forced to accept that actual ERM m em bership 
could not begin until Monday 7 October, it is reasonable to assume that she 
insisted on making the announcement on 5 October before the EC M onetary 
Committee could be convened. This action again precluded any discussion 
about consultation w ith the ERM states w hich it appears tha t Thatcher 
in trinsically  w ished to avoid. A Thatcher confidant com m ented on 
Thatcher's position: 'I am afraid the attitude w ould have been "stuff them." 
There w as no need for it [consultation]. It w as our d ec is io n .'121 
Consequently, H urd and the Foreign Office's desire to present membership 
so as to strengthen the UK's credibility in the ru n  up to the IGC was 
underm ined. On hearing the decision, the ERM states w ere quick to 
welcome it and were genuinely relieved that the UK's isolation was over. 
The German government described it as 'extraordinarily positive' and the
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French as 'good news for Europe'. However, in private, the member states
w ere angry that the announcem ent pre-em pted w hat should have been
confidential negotiations in the m onetary committee particularly about a
central rate. Since the ERM represented a collective responsibility to defend
currency parities, they believed that a central rate should be arrived at by a
m utual agreem ent. The UK's unilateral announcem ent was particularly
problem atic in that some member states and central banks, led by the
Bundesbank, believed that DM2.95 was too high a rate particularly in view
of the UK external deficit. One Foreign Office official stated that the
unilateral decision 'created some bad blood'.122 In the view of a former Bank
of England official:
Typical. After waiting after all these years, they just told them. If they 
had actually had a meeting, had a whole weekend, and said in any 
kind of an open sense: 'Look, we are thinking of this kind of rate.' I'm  
sure they w ould have heard from the others, at least privately, if not 
in  open committee: 'Are you sure about this rate?' ... It was an 
extraordinary thing to do.123
Both City institutions and the CBI publicly welcomed the decision.
The C hairm an of Barclays Bank, John Q uinton responded: 'T hank
goodness, I've been advocating this for five years or m ore.'12^  The CBI
issued a statement saying that it was 'delighted':
It gives a clear indication of the commitment of the UK government 
to greater m onetary union. Both ERM m em bership and low er 
interest rates will help to sustain business confidence in a difficult 
economic climate.125
The IoD w as more cautious stating that high inflation w ould  make 
m em bership more difficult.126
Nevertheless, w ithin both sectors, some believed that DM2.95 was too 
high a rate for sterling given the problem of UK competitiveness. Sceptics 
w ithin the City did not publicly condemn the decision since they believed 
that it would jeopardise the government's ability to make a success of ERM 
m em bership.127 M anufacturing companies were more open in their dissent. 
One spokesperson for a large exporting company commented:
We w ould have preferred a rate of DM2.65. The current rate is far too
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high. The internationally tradeable sector will have a very tough 
time, there could be two years of sub-optimal grow th, investm ent 
will be cut and I expect a sharp rise in unemployment.128
A senior executive in another top m anufacturing company described the 
rate decision as "an unmitigated d is a s te r /^
Conclusions
After Thatcher defeated her Chancellor and Foreign Secretary on a timetable 
for ERM entry at the M adrid summit, the Lawson-Howe axis was quickly 
broken. Thatcher was able to sack Howe from his position essentially over 
the very issue on which the axis was based, w ithout Lawson offering Howe 
any support. Then, Thatcher used Walters to underm ine Lawson to the 
poin t w hen he concluded that he could no longer continue in  office, 
w ith o u t How e backing Lawson. W ith Lawson departed  and How e 
marginalised, Thatcher seemed to hope that the ERM issue could be laid to 
rest.
This outcom e proved im possible beyond the short term  since 
Thatcher was neither willing nor able to influence the ultimate imperatives 
for entry in terms of either the government's economic or EC policy. Unless 
the governm ent re-addressed the issue of ERM m em bership in 1990, it 
could not use the exchange rates as any kind of policy tool. W ithout such a 
policy tool, ministers would have left themselves w ith no means to pursue 
their macro-economic goals. Similarly, after the governm ent announced 
that it w ould attend the IGC on monetary union and Germany indicated its 
continued support for the conference, there w ould have been little chance 
for the UK to make any kind of effective contribution on the issue either by 
itself or in alliance w ith other states outside ERM.
During the second and third quarters of 1990, Thatcher was prepared 
to accept that her new Chancellor and Foreign Secretary should create and 
then exploit the expectation that entry was imminent. In so doing, she 
increased the prem ium  for actual membership w ithin the governm ent's 
ow n economic terms of reference since not fulfilling those expectations 
w ould impose new and immediate costs. The problem  for the government
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was that this strategy m eant that it entered ERM at a time and on term s 
likely to involve significant short-to-medium term costs. At the same time, 
those costs and the precise circumstances of entry both underm ined the 
possibility that membership could be used to strengthen the Conservatives' 
EC policy.
AFTERWORD
H aving opposed repeated  attem pts by her Chancellors and Foreign 
Secretaries to enter ERM for nine years, Thatcher presided over only seven 
weeks of the UK's participation in the system. In  preparation  for the 
monetary union IGC, Italy as EC President called an extra European Council 
m eeting in Rome for 27-28 October. Italy's aim was to set a timetable for 
Stage Two, to begin in January 1993, before the content of that stage was 
agreed. Italy also aim ed to secure a formal com m itm ent to achieving a 
single currency and a central bank. The UK governm ent opposed both  
developments, and believed that it was not necessary to consider the issues 
until the summit already scheduled for December.
At the Rome sum m it, the eleven m em ber states m inus the UK 
issued a communique stating that they w ould proceed to Stage Two by 
January 1994 and com m itting themselves to the irrevocable fixing of 
exchange rates but not a single currency. Thatcher dismissed the agreement 
as 'cloud cuckoo land '130 and insisted that the UK government w ould block 
things which were not in the UK's interests.131 O n 30 October Thatcher 
reported  on the sum m it to the House of Commons. In her p repared  
statement, she adopted a more conciliatory tone to the one which she used 
in Rome, suggesting that at the IGC her governm ent w ould press for the 
H ard Ecu option. If people and governments so chose, Thatcher said, the 
H ard  Ecu could one day evolve into a single currency. H ow ever, in 
answering Commons questions, Thatcher m arkedly changed her tone and 
her approach. She declared that in her view, people w ould not w ant to use 
the H ard Ecu, and that the opposition parties were prepared to betray British 
democracy and its currency to foreigners.
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O n listening to her perform ance, Geoffrey Howe concluded that 
Thatcher's behaviour was destroying the government's ability to achieve its 
interests in EC policy particularly on m onetary union. O n 1 Novem ber 
Howe resigned. Although Thatcher and other ministers sought to deny any 
difference of policy betw een Howe and herself, his action touched the 
anxieties of those Conservative MPs, including Michael Heseltine who 
believed that the governm ent's EC policy was too isolationist. O n 13 
November Howe delivered a stunning resignation speech in the Commons, 
which he said that Thatcher's behaviour on monetary union was hopelessly 
compromising the credentials of the Chancellor and the Governor of the 
Bank of England on the H ard Ecu and risking the 'future of the nation .'132 
One day later, Heseltine announced that he was challenging Thatcher for 
the leadership of the Party. After failing to defeat Heseltine by sufficient 
votes to avoid a second ballot, Thatcher resigned the prem iership on 22 
November. Five days later, the Conservative Party elected John Major as 
her successor and Norm an Lamont became Chancellor.
Trying to cut interest rates
By the time that Major assum ed the prem iership, ERM m em bership was 
posing difficulties for the government w ith sterling trading below its central 
parity. Sterling appeared to lack credibility as a currency in part because the 
in terest rate cut which accom panied entry  created uncertainty  in  the 
financial m arkets about the governm ent's com m itm ent to continued 
maintenance of the parity. At the same time, recession deepened. During 
the final quarter of 1990 GDP fell by 0.8 per cent and m anufacturing output 
by 3.3. per cent. Yet w ith the governm ent needing the in terest rate cuts 
w hich it presum ed m embership w ould deliver more than ever, sterling's 
weakness did not allow for any loosening of m onetary policy. Unable to 
respond w ith monetary policy and unwilling to use any other m eans, the 
governm ent was left to deny the full extent of the recession, talking 
optimistically of a mild downturn. 133
On 31 January the Bundesbank raised its interest rates by 0.5 per cent. 
In the aftermath, sterling fell to become the weakest currency w ithin ERM.
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Opposition to the government's policy began to mount. On 13 February, the 
Times published a letter from six m onetarist economists including Alan 
W alters arguing that unless the UK either left ERM or devalued w ithin it, 
'real disaster' w ould strike the economy.134 The governm ent's position was 
finally eased by a cut in Spanish interest rates. Since the peseta was now the 
strongest currency w ithin the ERM system this change reduced the pressure 
on sterling. On the same day as the Times letter Lamont cut rates from 14 to
13.5 per cent. Thereafter, the Deutschm ark started to w eaken against all 
ERM currencies as the do llar rose and the problem s of G erm an 
reunification increased. These shifts sufficiently strengthened sterling for 
the government to cut interest rates in half-per cent stages to 10.5 per cent at 
the start of September 1991.135 
M onetary Union Compromise
On m onetary union Major renew ed the governm ent's efforts to sell the 
H ard Ecu. On 8 January 1991, the Treasury published a draft treaty outlining 
details of how the Hard Ecu could be created and managed by the European 
M onetary Fund (EMF) as a new European m onetary institution. The EMF 
w ould  have m inim al pow ers bu t w ould contribute to the progressive 
realisation of economic and m onetary union. W ithin a few m onths, the 
governm ent concluded that it could not build on the interest w hich the 
proposal gained in the previous autumn. The Treasury was forced to drop 
the scheme as a negotiating tactic.136 By May the governm ent appeared to 
face a choice betw een vetoing any treaty on m onetary un ion  w hich 
emerged, or committing itself to a single currency w ith the other states. By 
choosing the former course, the government would greatly compromise its 
w hole m em bership of the Com m unity given the level of support for 
m onetary union among the other major m em ber states. M eanwhile the 
latter option was contrary to the government's ow n preferences and risked 
fundam entally splitting the Conservative Party.137
In June 1991 Jacques Delors suggested the basis of a compromise. He 
proposed a special clause in a treaty which would allow the UK to postpone 
any final decision on m em bership of a m onetary  union until it w as
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prepared to make such a commitment. Ahead of the Luxembourg Summit, 
the Major governm ent took up the idea. The Prime Minister and Lamont 
indicated that they were not looking to use the UK's veto and stressed that 
they w ould not be sidelined in the talks. At the same time, the governm ent 
w ould not under any circumstances sign any treaty which did not contain a 
clear provision that the UK government and parliam ent w ould only move 
to a single currency if they took a further, separate and explicit decision to do 
so.138 At the Luxembourg summit EC member states agreed to leave any 
firm commitments on both the monetary and political union treaties to the 
Maastricht sum m it in December. In the interim period, the IGC w orked on 
the details of an opt-out clause for the UK on the m onetary union treaty. 
Bank of England officials believed that the compromise worked out in  the 
IGC w ould not have been possible if the UK had remained outside ERM.139 
One Year of ERM M embership
By October 1991 m em bership appeared to have delivered the specific 
economic ends for which the government was looking a year previously. 
D uring the year sterling never fell below 2.25 per cent of its central rate, 
producing a large measure of exchange rate stability. W ith UK interest rates 
at 10.5 per cent and German rates slightly below 10 per cent, the rate 
differential between the UK and ERM states was largely removed. Similarly 
inflation fell steadily to 3.7 per cent in October 1991, leaving it in  line w ith 
the rates prevailing elsewhere. For its part, the governm ent was keen to 
stress that membership was a key part of its anti inflation stance. In practice, 
it is difficult to assess how far the fall in inflation was produced by the 
discipline of membership and how much was due to the full effects of the 
1988-1990 m onetary and exchange rate squeeze w orking th rough  the 
economy.
The problem for the government was that the abstract benefit of the 
interest rate cuts did not produce the tangible economic outcomes w hich it 
desired. Thatcher felt dissatisfied enough w ith the situation to disow n her 
part in  the decision to enter the system. In the US, in June she declared:
If you fix the exchange rate, then in terest rates and dom estic
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m onetary conditions go where they will. A nd finance m inisters are 
left like innocent bystanders at the scene of an accident.140
The four and half per cent cut in interest rates did not stop the UK's 
recession deepening as output fell through the first three quarters of the 
year and  unem ploym ent rose to 8.5 per cent. A lthough indicators of 
business confidence began to improve in September 1991, there w as no 
evidence of any actual upturn  in activity.141
In this respect the governm ent faced two problems. First, although 
interest rates were now within a fraction of German rates, they were still 
high in absolute terms: and German rates were a floor below w hich UK 
rates could not fall. Whilst the Bundesbank set rates at this level to manage 
Germ any's rising inflation, the recession left the UK at the opposite end of 
the economic cycle. With the Bundesbank likely to raise its rates further, the 
UK government would find it exceedingly difficult to give the economy any 
further m onetary stimulus.
Second, the 4.5 per cent cut in rates did not appear particularly  
effective. The extraordinarily high levels of personal and corporate debt 
created by the credit boom left potential mortgage holders and companies 
unwilling to borrow further w hen the boom ended, even w hen given the 
incentive of lower interest rates. The American experience of low interest 
rates and continuing recession indicated that debt overhang was changing 
the dynamics of the macro-economy
The government did not w ant to use alternative policies to stimulate 
the economy, any more than it had previously had a diverse approach to 
controllingl inflation. In the 1991 budget, the governm ent ruled out using 
an expansionary fiscal policy to assisting recovery. Indeed the governm ent 
actually tightened policy by £295 million in the 1991-2 year and £1.89 billion 
for the full year. Similarly, rather than taking action to stim ulate the 
housing market, the government abolished m ortgage tax relief against the 
40 per cent rate of tax. By increasing VAT from 15 to 17.5 per cent to pay for a 
general reduction in poll tax levels, the governm ent further reduced 
consumer demand. W ithout a policy fram ework which extended beyond
310
in terest rates, the governm ent w as left looking to continued  ERM 
m em bership to deliver som ething which it was extraordinarily unlikely 
that it could produce.
At the same tim e, the balance of paym ents deficit rem ained a 
potential problem  both in term s of sustaining the sterling parity  and 
increasing competitiveness. A lthough exports to Europe grew strongly 
during  the year, this change was largely due to m anufacturers taking 
advantage of the excessive grow th in the post- reunification Germ an 
economy. After this particular and finite boost to continental dem and, most 
m anufacturing exporters were again left w ith an institutionalised problem 
of competitiveness. Only the Japanese car m anufacturers operating in  UK 
offered the hope of a sustained rise in exports w ith a continuing central rate 
of DM2.95. For the whole of 1991 the current account w as £6 billion in 
deficit. W hilst this figure was low in comparison w ith 1988-1990, it was a 
large deficit given that the economy was in recession. Even w ith  home 
m arkets depressed and foreign m arkets expanding, UK m anufacturing 
industry  could not provide sufficiently for domestic dem and. W hen the 
economy finally recovered, im ports were likely to surge again w ithout 
exports earning enough to finance them. 142 
M aastricht
At the Maastricht summit of 9-10 December 1991, the government agreed to 
a treaty on m onetary union which did  not commit the UK to a single 
currency and to a treaty on political union which excluded the UK from its 
protocol on the social chapter. The government heralded the agreement as a 
trium ph for the negotiating skill of Major and H urd and the best possible 
deal for the UK and the Community. The UK had preserved the option of 
entering a monetary union w ithout giving any commitment that it w ould  
do so. The monetary union treaty outlined three steps to the achievement 
of a single currency. Stage Two would begin on 1 January 1994. During this 
stage, member states w ould seek to avoid excessive budget deficits, to be 
m onitored by Ecofin and the Commission, and they w ould use narrow  
bands and avoid devaluation within ERM. Each member state w ould start
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steps to make its central bank independent if it was not so already. At the 
start of Stage Two, a European Monetary Institute (EMI) composed of central 
bank governors would be established to strengthen the coordination of 
m onetary policies, with a view to ensuring price stability and to monitoring 
the EMS. By 31 December 1995, the Institute would specify the framework 
for the establishment of the ESCB composed of a European Central Bank 
and the national central banks.
At the end of 1996 the heads of governm ents w ould decide by 
m ajority voting w hether at least seven states had achieved a set of 
conditions for economic convergence:
• an average rate of inflation in the previous year of not more than
1.5 per cent higher than that of the three best perform ing member 
states;
• an annual budget deficit of no more than 3 per cent of GDP and a 
national debt below 60 per cent of GDP;
• no devaluation within ERM for at least two years;
• an average nominal long-term interest rates no more than 2 per 
cent higher than those of the three best performing member states in 
terms of inflation.
If seven states had achieved such convergence, a date would be set for the 
start of Stage Three. If by the end of 1997, the date for the beginning of Stage 
Three had not been set, it w ould start automatically on 1 January 1999 even 
if only 5 member states qualified. Other member states would be able to 
enter on achieving the convergence conditions.143
At the start of Stage Three, the currencies of the m em ber states 
participating would be irrevocably fixed at a chosen set of rates. The Ecu 
w ould  then be substituted for those currencies a t these rates and finally 
w ould become a single currency for those member states under the auspices 
of the ESCB. The primary objective of the ESCB w ould be to m aintain price 
stability, w ith  the European Central Bank and national central banks 
independent from EC institutions and member state governments. In a 
protocol attached to the treaty, the twelve signatories agreed that whether
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they fulfilled the necessary conditions for the adoption of a single currency 
or not, they w ould respect the will of the Com munity to enter swiftly into 
Stage Three.144
The treaty recognised that the UK would not be obliged or committed 
to m ove to Stage Three w ithout a separate decision to do so by  its 
governm ent and parliament. If the UK notified the Council that it w ould 
not move to Stage Three then it would not have voting rights on deciding 
w hether sufficient member states had achieved economic convergence. At 
any time, it w ould have the right to change its m ind and move to Stage 
Three if it satisfied the conditions of economic convergence. The UK w ould 
participate in Stage Two as if it were preparing for Stage Three like the other 
m em ber states: the precise relationship was not clearly specified. The 
protocol is explicit only that the UK would seek to avoid excessive budget 
deficits, submit to a formal review of its m onetary policy and be subject to 
ru les on balance of paym ents problem s. At no stage and under no 
circumstances could the UK use a veto or any other instrum ent w hich 
m ight slow down the process.
The 1992 General Election
A fter the M aastricht sum m it, the governm ent's economic problem s 
m ounted. On 19 December the Bundesbank raised interest rates by 0.5 per 
cent and the Deutschmark soared. W ith all the other ERM states raising 
their rates in response, the UK government faced a dilemma. There was no 
evidence of a recovery and on the same day as the Germ an action, 
unem ploym ent rose above 2.5 million for the first time in alm ost four 
years. To raise interest rates w ould have risked plunging the economy 
further into recession. Yet in deciding as it did to leave rates unchanged, the 
governm ent disregarded the informal rules of ERM and pu t sterling under 
new pressure. By the end of the year, sterling was trading at DM2.83, only six 
pfennigs off its ERM floor. Although the Bank of England was eventually 
able to stabilise sterling, the government lost some further credibility in  the 
financial m arkets.145
Given sterling's weakness, Major and Lam ont were unable to cut
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interest rates in the run  up to the general election in April 1992. A t the 
same time, the prospects for sustaining the sterling parity weakened. During 
the first quarter of 1992 the current account deficit w idened w ith  im ports 
rising by 2.9 per cent as exports fell by 0.4 per cent. The government was left 
to fight the election w ith  the economy still in recession and using high 
interest rates to defend a sterling parity which was becoming increasingly 
uncredible. Only on  inflation could the governm ent claim an economic 
policy success. The governm ent's ultim ate election victory was largely 
dependent on creating fear about the prospect of a Labour governm ent, in 
particular that it w ould add £1,000 to all tax bills and that the PSBR w ould 
increase by £37B a y e a r .  146
The Major Cabinet appeared to believe that their election victory 
w ould produce the necessary boost to confidence to stimulate a recovery and 
strengthen sterling w ithout any change of policy. Although a recovery did 
not materialise, sterling rose sufficiently for the government to cut interest 
rates to 10 per cent on 5 May. This left UK rates only 0.25 per cent higher 
than the German Lombard rate. Within the established framework of ERM, 
there was little room for manoeuvre left.147
On 2 June the Danish electorate rejected the M aastricht Treaty in a 
referendum . The next day, the French government announced that it too 
w ould hold a referendum  on Maastricht, believing that the likely 'yes' vote 
w ould add legitimacy to the now embattled treaty. The financial m arkets 
started to doubt whether the treaty would be ratified. They believed that if 
the m onetary union project were forestalled, then the ERM states w ould 
have less incentive to hold their currency parities against the Deutschmark 
and avoid realignments. As a result, the Deutschmark rose pushing m ost of 
the other currencies, including sterling, towards the bottom  floor of their 
bands.148
Major and Lam ont accepted that the sterling parity  w as now  in 
serious jeopardy. It d id not order the Bank of England to intervene but 
embarked on a dual public and private strategy. In public over the next two 
m onths, M ajor and  Lam ont stressed  the governm en t's  abso lu te
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commitment to ERM m embership at a central rate of DM2.95. On 10 July,
Lamont declared that if the UK left ERM:
The credibility  of our an ti-inflationary  strategy w ou ld  be in 
tatters....W e w ould have surrendered. The ERM is not an  optional 
extra, an add-on to be jettisoned at the first hint of trouble. It is, and 
will remain, at the centre of our macro economic s tra te g y .^
U nder no circum stances w ould the governm ent devalue. Indeed, the 
governm ent's aim was to deliver zero inflation and to turn  sterling into the 
hardest currency w ithin ERM. It also floated the idea of cutting interest 
rates below German rates on the basis that since Germany was no longer the 
best perform ing counter-inflationary state, its rates need no longer be the 
floor for other ERM states.150
In private, the w eek after the Danish referendum , the Bank of 
England began an internal assessment about the desirability of a general 
ERM realignment. On 16 July the Bundesbank raised its discount rate by 0.75 
per cent to 8.75 per cent. Alone among the ERM states Italy raised its rate in 
response. The ERM now  faced its most serious crisis for years. G erm an 
interest rates were set to squeeze inflation out of their post-unification 
economy. Meanwhile the ERM states, some of w hich (including the UK) 
possessed lower inflation rates than Germany, were required to keep their 
interest rates around German levels to maintain their currencies. Stuck in a 
long recession, the UK now had real rates of around 7 per cent. W ith no 
sign of the recession ending, it was becoming increasingly difficult for the 
financial m arkets to believe that the governm ent w ould increase interest 
rates to defend sterling.151
After the German action, the UK governm ent discreetly started  to 
signal its willingness to consider a general realignm ent of all currencies 
against the Deutschmark. If the Deutschmark were to be revalued, Germany 
could switch the balance of its counter-inflationary policy to the exchange 
rate and pave the way for a reduction in German interest rates. G erm any 
itself was particularly keen on a realignment, b u t the French governm ent 
was determ ined to m aintain the franc fo r t . As Bank of England officials
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engaged in bilateral negotiations on the issue, it became apparent that only a 
broad realignment w ould be possible in  which sterling, the lira, the peseta, 
escudo, and perhaps the punt and krone, would all be devalued against the 
Deutschm ark, the guilder and the French and Belgian francs. The UK 
government could not accept such an outcome because it w ould pu t the UK 
firmly into the second tier of the EC's monetary development. M inisters let 
it be known that they w ould not participate in any realignm ent w hich did 
not involve the Franc.152
The situation soon deteriorated further. The UK current account 
registered a deficit of £1.25 billion for July and £1.85 billion for August, twice 
the level at which it was running a year previously and adding  to the 
perception of sterling as a weak currency. A study for Phillips and Drew 
calculated that for every 1 per cent rise in domestic demand, im ports were 
likely to expand by 1.5 per cent. If domestic demand grew at 3 per cent a year 
during the 1990s economic growth would only be 2 per cent and lead to a 
trade deficit of 15 per cent of GDP by the end of the century. O n 25 A ugust a 
poll was published showing a majority of French voters opposed to the 
M aastricht treaty. This news placed the weak ERM currencies including 
sterling under further pressure.153
Three days later, at the UK's behest, the ERM states issued a joint 
declaration that there w ould be no devaluation of currencies. As sterling fell 
th ro u g h  its d ivergent indicator and  then  DM.2.80, the governm ent 
m aintained its policy of non- reserve intervention. Then on 3 Septem ber 
the governm ent changed course and took out a £10 billion ecu loan to add 
to the exchange reserves. Sterling strengthened strongly in response leaving 
the lira as the weakest currency in the system. The next day Italy raised its 
interest rates and the Bundesbank supplied the Bank of Italy w ith billions of 
marks to support the lira.154
W ith the French referendum  looming on 20 Septem ber, finance 
m inisters and central bank governors were due to m eet in  Bath on 5 
September. Before the meeting, Italy told Germany that while it w ould  
refuse to devalue alone, it w ould consider partic ipa ting  in a m ore
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w idespread realignm ent of currencies. The German finance minister, Theo 
Waigel, and the Bundesbank chief Helmut Schlesinger w ent to Bath hoping 
to  persuade as m any states as possible to join w ith  Italy in such a 
realignment, in exchange for a cut in German interest rates. Lamont w ent to 
the m eeting unprepared  to countenance any realignm ent since it w as 
obvious tha t France w ould  not be p repared  to devalue before its 
referendum. As chairman of the meeting, Lamont effectively ruled out any 
open discussion of the subject and pointedly refused to adm it to sterling's 
weakness. Instead he pleaded w ith Germany to make a unilateral cut in 
interest rates but was brushed aside by Schlesinger. The meeting ended w ith 
the EC ministers issuing a statement that there w ould be no realignm ent 
although w ith some states implying that Germany had guaranteed that it 
w ould not raise its interest rates further. 155
Schlesinger was angry at the outcome of the m eeting since the 
Bundesbank would continue to be obliged to defend currency parities which 
it believed were unsustainable. On 8 September Schlesinger told the press 
that the Bundesbank could not indefinitely support the lira. The same day, 
the Finnish marka which was informally shadowing the Deutschmark, was 
allowed to float. By 11 September the lira's position was no longer tenable. 
Italy requested a full meeting of the EC m onetary committee to deal w ith 
the situation. The UK, French and Spanish governm ents refused. The 
Major governm ent d id  not w ant to discuss the possibility of a broad 
realignm ent including sterling. Eventually, Germany and Italy were forced 
to accept a unilateral devaluation of the lira which they negotiated between 
themselves. On 13 September they agreed to devalue the lira by 7.5 per cent 
and that Germany w ould lower its Lombard rate by 0.25 per cent and its 
discount rate by 0.5 per cent.156
The UK governm ent hoped that the cut w ould be sufficient to 
stabilise sterling. Yet by the end of Tuesday 15 September sterling was on its 
floor of DM2.78 and the weakest currency within the system. In the evening 
Lamont held a meeting w ith Treasury and Bank officials to discuss a plan of 
action for the next day. The first line of defence w ould be overt intervention
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by the Bank followed by an increase in interest rates if necessary. However, 
w ithin hours their task was made more difficult by the release of comments 
from  the Bundesbank chief which suggested that sterling needed to be 
devalued.
W hen the financial m arkets re-opened on 16 September, sterling
came under immediate pressure. At 10.30am Leigh-Pemberton told Lamont
that a two per cent rise in interest rates was necessary. Lamont sanctioned
the move and informed Major. By lunchtime, Leigh-Pemberton told Major
and the group of m inisters he assembled as a crisis comm ittee in  the
strongest terms that it was impossible to hold the line. In his experience, the
scale of the selling was totally unprecedented and further action was futile.
According to one Bank of England official:
I can't stress enough the sheer scale of the selling. We had never seen 
anything like it. Every new weapon we brought out seemed to have 
less and less effect. It was as if an avalanche was coming at us.157
However, Major and Lamont insisted that the Bank continue to intervene.
W ithin an hour, Leigh-Pemberton asked Lam ont to  sanction a 
further three per cent increase in interest rates and Lamont gave him the go 
ahead. W ith intervention totalling £11 billion and am ounting to half the 
UK's exchange reserves and 15 per cent interest rates unable to stop the 
flood ou t of sterling, the governm ent decided to suspend  the UK's 
membership of ERM.
After announcing the decision the UK governm ent convened a 
meeting of the EC monetary committee where Treasury and Bank officials 
unsuccessfully requested that the whole ERM be suspended until after the 
French referendum. Instead, Italy decided to suspend its membership and 
Spain to  devalue. After less than two years inside the system , 'Black 
W ednesday' represented the end of the UK's membership of ERM. On 17 
September the government reduced interest rates back dow n to 10 per cent. 
By the end of the week sterling was trading at DM2.61, six per cent below its 
previous ERM floor. Faced with the complete failure of the governm ent's 
entire economic policy, Lamont simply announced: 'We will now have a
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British economic policy for the needs of the British econom y.' Major 
completed the U -turn w hen he declared: 'A growth strategy is w hat the 
country wants and a growth strategy is what we are going to g e t/158 Over the 
next six months, the government reduced interest rates on a discretionary 
basis to six per cent w ith sterling floating between DM2.40 and DM2.60. 
Given the combined stimulus of a loose monetary policy and a devaluation, 
the economy slowly and patchily started to recover in 1993 at the same time 
as inflation continued to fall.
The ERM Suspended
D uring the nine months following sterling and the lira 's ejection from the 
system, the rem aining ERM currencies came under intense pressure at 
different times. As a result, the peseta and escudo were devalued twice and 
the Irish pound once. Significantly, the franc fort which lay at the heart of 
the post-1987 ERM survived the turbulence. Nevertheless, by June 1993, the 
operation of the system was posing huge problems for the ERM states and 
for the French governm ent in particular. The markets believed so firmly 
that the Deutschmark w ould never be devalued that the other ERM states 
could not have lower nominal interest rates than Germany and m any were 
significantly higher. Yet w ith the German economy now having one of the 
highest inflation rates in the EC, the other states were left w ith  very high 
real rates at a time w hen their economies were in r e c e s s io n .1 5 9
After unem ploym ent rose to a record 11.5 per cent and criticism of 
the franc fort m ounted w ithin the RPR and am ong industria lists, the 
French government became increasingly desperate. On 21 June France cut 
its short term  in terest rates below German levels for the first time. 
M inisters talked optim istically that given its consistent low inflation it 
could replace the Deutschmark as the ERM anchor currency. The French 
finance m inister publicly called for coordinated in terest rates cuts in 
Germany and France. The German government responded by cancelling a 
top-level Franco-German economic meeting. By the end of the m onth, the 
franc came under renewed pressured60
The weakness of the French position was revealed on 1 July w hen the
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Bundesbank finally cut its discount rate by 0.5 per cent but France could only 
shave 0.25 per cent off its relevant rates. In the aftermath, the franc slipped 
again and the Bundesbank became notably less firm in its w illingness to 
defend the currency. The financial markets concluded that France w ould 
not raise its rates to defend the franc and that the French economy's future 
was now  dependent on the Bundesbank cutting its rates. All eyes now 
turned to the Bundesbank.161
After the Bundesbank cut its repo rate twice in a week, the markets 
and commentators expected a discount rates cut to follow at the Bundesbank 
council on 29 July 1992. At the meeting, the Bundesbank cut its Lombard 
rates by 0.5 per cent but left the discount rate unchanged. During the next 
day and a half most of the ERM currencies, including the franc, crashed to 
the bottom  of their ranges. By the end of trading on Friday 3 August, it was 
obvious that m ost of the parities could not survive the onslaught they 
would inevitably face during the next week. Over the weekend, EC finance 
ministers agreed that all currencies except the Deutschmark and the guilder 
w ould use 15 per cent bands and the ERM as it had existed for fourteen years 
was de facto suspended. With the freedom offered by such wide bands, the 
ERM countries slowly started to lower interest rates to deal w ith recession 
w hilst seeking to m aintain their currencies as close to their previous 
parities as possible. Although the UK government cried 'W e told you so,' 
the search for exchange rate stability in the EC continues.162
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CHAPTER 7
THE FAILURE OF ECONOMIC POLICY-MAKING
In m any w ays the Conservative governm ent's handling of the ERM 
membership issue was a story of failure: a failure to find a policy on which 
the Prime Minister and Chancellor could agree; a failure to judge the likely 
consequences of particular decisions; and a failure of m any core executive 
actors to understand w hat ERM membership was all about both w hen the 
UK was oustside and inside the system. On occasion decisions were made 
on erroneous assum ptions and claims to knowledge. Eventually decisions 
were made in conditions in which strategic discussion about policy between 
all the relevant core executive actors was impossible. As a result, the- 
governm ent often failed to act in its ow n best interests and significantly 
dam aged the UK's econom ic perform ance and influence w ith in  the 
European Community. This final chapter looks at how this situation arose 
and its implications for our theoretical understanding of core executive 
economic policy making. The first section reviews the behaviour of the 
Treasury, the Bank of England and the Foreign Office as institutional actors 
and the behaviour of the Prime Minister, Chancellor and Foreign Secretary 
as the rational electoral actors analysed in Chapters Two to Six. The second 
section reconsiders the overall performance of these core executive actors 
using a more substantive concept of rationality standing back from  the 
detail so that the failures of the governm ent's policy-m aking become 
apparent despite our understanding  of how w rong decisions could be 
'ra tionally ' made. The final part of the chapter briefly considers the 
uniqueness of the economic policy m aking environm ent and considers 
w hether institutional chanes could help make decision-making less difficult 
in future.
7.1 EXPLAINING THE POLICY PROCESS: NEW 
INSTITUTIONALIST AND RATIONAL ACTOR VIEWS
At the outset of this analysis, I argued that core executive actors at the
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Treasury, Bank of England and the Foreign Office should be understood as 
in stitu tiona l actors in  the new institu tionalist sense. The logic of 
institutionalist action is one of appropriateness, so that actors will endorse 
those policies which are most congruent w ith prevailing institutional rules 
and have the best consequences in m aintaining institutional stability. This 
does not m ean that the institutional actors determined ERM policy, or that 
institutional and bureaucratic constraints and rules can be used to explain 
the shifts and developments in ERM policy. Indeed it w ould be impossible 
to explain, for example, the sudden decision to enter ERM in October 1990, 
in these terms. The Foreign Office m ight prefer stability in the UK's 
rela tions w ith  the o ther EC states bu t the governm ent's un ila tera l 
announcem ent of ERM m em bership was disruptive in this respect. The 
Bank of England will generally endorse policies which are likely to produce 
stable m onetary conditions and stability in the foreign exchange markets. 
However, monetary and exchange rate instability were inevitable w hen the 
UK entered ERM at a central rate of DM2.95 w ith inflation rising, output 
falling and w ith a large balance of payments deficit, Similarly, the Treasury 
will generally prefer policies which function as an automatic pilot. But in 
the economic conditions prevailing in October 1990, ERM m em bership was 
highly unlikely to operate as a routine procedure in the m edium  term.
Nevertheless, in understanding the policy preferences w hich the 
Treasury, Bank of England and Foreign Office developed even w hen they 
were overridden by m inisters' political imperatives, a new institutionalist 
approach yields considerable understanding. From 1979 onw ards the 
Foreign Office supported ERM membership in part because it w ould have 
made the UK's relations w ith the other EC states less awkward. At the same 
time, Foreign Office officials pressed their case most strongly w hen  the 
rew ards in terms of EC relations were greatest, namely after 1988 w hen the 
development of the agendas for monetary and political union threatened to 
leave the UK even more isolated than hitherto.
From 1980 onw ards opinion at the Bank of England on  ERM 
m em bership was divided. Most senior officials tended to be in favour of
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m em bership  a t least un til 1989, w hen doubts about tim ing arose. 
M eanw hile a mix of view s prevailed  am ong o ther Bank officials 
throughout the period. At least in part this complexity and division of 
views reflected the am biguous relationship betw een UK m em bership of 
ERM and the Bank's preference for m aintaining m onetary and exchange 
m arket stability. Both the pursu it of strict m onetary targets and n o n ­
mem bership of ERM produced continuing monetary and exchange m arket 
instability. Yet the underlying weakness of the UK's inflationary and trading 
performance m eant that for the UK ERM membership m ight not produce 
m onetary and exchange m arket stability as effectively as it did for most of 
the ERM states throughout the 1980s. The Bank's dilemma was that w ithout 
an im provem ent in UK economic performance, it was never consistently 
clear and uncontestable that ERM m embership w ould best preserve the 
Bank's institutional stability.
W hat is m ost striking about the institutional preferences of the 
Treasury, both on ERM membership and overall economic policy, was the 
m anner in w hich they came to resemble those of the C onservative 
m inisters whom  they served. Despite W ass's personal opposition during 
the early 1980s, the MTFS was in many ways an 'appropriate ' policy for the 
Treasury because it was a potential automatic pilot and source of autonomy. 
The policy required them  to do effectively no more in macro term s than  
manage interest rates and public borrowing. At the same time, the MTFS 
minim ised the Treasury's relations w ith other departm ents, notably Trade, 
Industry and Employment. It further meant that the Treasury did not have 
to m anoeuvre in  the exchange m arkets, operate  a form al dem and  
m anagem ent policy, or administer an incomes policy w ith all its potential 
pitfalls.
In taking up ERM membership as an alternative counter-inflationary 
m onetary framework, the Treasury, like Lawson, rem ained w edded to the 
theoretical justifications of the MTFS. ERM m em bership even tually  
presented itself as a m ore stable and effective means of reta in ing  the 
T reasury 's departm en tal autonom y and avoid ing  in te rven tion is t or
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im plem entative economic policies. Once the first Thatcher governm ent 
divested the Treasury of the responsibility for operating difficult policies, 
Treasury officials saw no incentive to return  to them. Similarly, although 
the Bank was concerned about the inflationary consequences of the credit 
boom and saw a problem between rising inflation and ERM membership, it 
d id  not advocate a return  to the credit controls which it no longer had  to 
operate. Overall, the Treasury disparaged policies w hich were simply 
'inappropriate ' to its continuing institutional stability w ith  the assertion 
that 'these things do not work.'
C ertain ly , the  congruence betw een  m in is te rs ' and  officials' 
preferences was increased by the m anner in w hich advancem ent in  the 
Treasury took place. M iddleton's appointm ent as Perm anent Secretary in 
1983 was not an isolated incident. Rather it was a clear signal that accepting 
the governm ent's broad policy approach was a key determ inant of career 
success. Some of those closest to the Treasury argue that the people who 
rose in  the departm ent during this period w ere those w ho m ost easily 
accommodated ministers. For example, any official who advocated formal 
wage restraint would quickly have found his or her career sidelined.1 
'T hick ' Rational Actor View
The analysis in Chapters Two to Six used a 'thick ' rational actor model to 
understand the decisional behaviour of the Prime Minister, Chancellor and 
the Foreign Secretary. The aim was to reconstruct the choices w hich faced 
these actors in terms of their perception of the macro-economic benefits 
and costs, capital accum ulation benefits and costs and European policy 
benefits and costs given the constraints on any particular course of action or 
in-action. Using this analytical framework, it has been possible to explain 
how ERM membership surfaced and resurfaced as an issue for top political 
actors at different times.
• May-October 1979: An issue of European policy
• March 1980: An issue of European policy
• October 1981-January 1982: An issue of economic policy
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• February-November 1985:
• September- October 1986:
• July 1987:
• April-June 1989:
• March- October 1990:
An issue of economic and European 
policy
An issue of economic policy 
An issue of economic policy 
A n issue of econom ic, cap ita l 
accumulation and European policy 
A n issue of econom ic, cap ita l 
accumulation and European policy
At the same time, the 'thick' rational actor framework has produced 
plausible explanations of particular decisions made by the Prime Minister, 
Chancellor and Foreign Secretary. Despite ascribing to these actors a unitary 
goal of re-election, it is still possible to account for the different positions 
taken by Margaret Thatcher, Nigel Lawson, Geoffrey Howe, John Major and 
Douglas H urd  on ERM membership. The analysis has show n that it was 
'rational' for Howe (as Chancellor), Lawson and subsequently Major to push 
for ERM membership both as a counter-inflationary m onetary framework 
given the repudiation of the monetary targets; and to provide lower interest 
rates for a given rate of inflation. Similarly, it was 'rational' for Howe, (as 
Foreign Secretary), Major (as Chancellor) and H urd  to support ERM 
membership, given their belief that the UK needed to increase its influence 
w ithin  the EC and that entry to ERM w ould im prove the governm ent's 
relations w ith other member states.
Yet despite the 'rationality ' underlying the position of successive 
C hancellors and Foreign Secretaries, T hatcher's opposition  to ERM 
membership until October 1990 cannot be described as non-rational w ithin 
the 'thick' rational actor framework deployed. Despite the monetary costs of 
non-m em bership, there was a 'ra tionality ' to Thatcher's position since 
participation w ithin ERM w ould have restricted the benefits otherwise 
available to ministers in terms of fiscal expansion and short term growth. 
A t the same tim e, T hatcher's rejection of the argum ent tha t ERM 
m em bership w ould increase the UK's influence in the EC in other policy
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areas simply reflected her view that the costs in terms of membership itself 
outweighed the dubious gain elsewhere.
By factoring into the explanation the broadest possible range of 
considerations bo th  in the objective sense and in  term s of actors' 
perceptions of those considerations, it has been possible to m ake 
com prehensible bo th  internal divisions and the developm ent of policy 
tow ards ERM m em bership. In this sense, the rational actor fram ew ork 
developed in C hapter One proved an effective tool of explanation. 
Nevertheless, in reconstructing decision-making in these 'th ick ' rational 
term, there is a danger of implying that whatever is is rational.
The restrictiveness and unpredictability  of the m acro-econom ic 
policy-making environm ent means that there is a risk of 'w hitew ashing' 
policy-makers by reading back from their apparent mistakes, particularly in 
tim ing, to the strength of the constraints or the complexity of the benefit- 
cost trade offs which they faced. This is particulary true w hen we consider 
the processes by which and manner in which decisions were actually taken.
The 'th ick ' rational actor explanation m akes it possible to 
com prehend w hy Thatcher finally accepted ERM mem bership in October 
1990 since there was no other short term macro-economic option w ithin her 
ow n terms of reference. Yet even within this loosely rational fram ework it 
is difficult to understand the suddenness of the decision or the absence of 
consultation about a central rate for sterling. At the sam e tim e, by 
comprehensively accounting for the basic decisional outcomes in economic 
policy, smaller actions, (especially in relation to the foreign exchange 
markets), which fit very badly w ith any form of rational actor explanation 
are analytically ignored. For example, why did Thatcher impose such costs 
on the government and the economy by treating questions asking for her 
views on sterling almost as an act of existentialist definition? W hilst it is 
understandable that Thatcher's and Lawson's private conflicts affected their 
economic policy judgem ent, it is more difficult to com prehend w hy they 
allowed public feuding to damage their joint interests. Given the huge 
significance of economic policy these considerations make it im portant to
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step back from the detailed explanation of policy and take a broader and 
objective look at the Conservative government's policy choices through a 
more critical 'th in ' rational actor view.
7.2 A THIN' RATIONAL ACTOR PERSPECTIVE
This approach  m oves the analysis aw ay from an open-ended and 
formalistic model of rational action as maximising benefits, net of costs 
given constraints tow ards a more substantive concept of rationality. In 
principle there is nothing a 'thick' rational account cannot explain because 
anything can be labelled as a constraint. By contrast, the utility of a 'th in ' 
approach is to critically evaluate actors' conception of policy problems, the 
factors that they are prepared to accept as constraints, and the costs of 
decisions in terms of actors' own goals and interests. For example, when the 
Conservative governm ent accepted the MTFS that inflation  is only a 
m onetary phenomenon was a constraint on policy, this w as in itself a costly 
decision from a 'th in ' rational actor perspective. W hen the costs of this 
stance m ounted and its benefits receded during the governm ent's th ird  
term  of office, a substantive conception of rationality  w ould  expect 
m inisters to revise their initial view in line w ith experience. In general 
term s if actors do no t adjust their perceptions of costs, benefits and 
constraints in line w ith their experiences, then it is possible to regard their 
behaviour as 'non-rational' in  a 'th in ' rational actor framework.
The aim of th is section is to consider certain  aspects of the 
governm ent's economic-policy-making w ithin  this light. The first part 
evaluates the 'rationality ' of the government's non-membership of ERM in 
term s of the overall perform ance of the UK economy. The second part 
assesses m inisters' performance as actors seeking to secure re-election. The 
th ird  part examines how the breakdow n of the core executive decision­
m aking process on economic and EC issues after 1985 encouraged non- 
rational decision-making. The fourth part considers the m anner in w hich 
ministers held positions on policies and issues w ithout adjusting them  to 
changing economic conditions or contrary empirical evidence. The final
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part seeks to explain some of the non-rationality in decision-m aking 
described above in terms of the particular set of actors involved and the 
specific conditions under which they operated.
The Lost Past and Future 
In trying to assess how UK economic policy would have developed inside 
ERM following a much earlier decision to join there are obvious problems 
of m aking counterfactual judgem ents. A sim ulation produced  by the 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research of w hat w ould have 
happened between 1979 and 1988 if the UK had been a member of ERM 
from 1979 provides a useful starting point for discussion. The analysis 
assumes that membership did not affect the underlying behaviour of the 
economy, that there was no credibility problem for sterling and that the 
UK's m em bership did not change the policies of other m em ber states. 
Between 1979 and 1981 sterling's effective exchange rate w ould have been 
significantly lower inside ERM and at its peak in the first quarter of 1981 20 
per cent lower. Similarly, interest rates would have been around 4 percent 
lower in 1979 and 1980. As a result, the 1980 to 1981 recession w ould have 
been less severe at the expense of higher inflation in these years. Thereafter 
the recovery would have been slightly slower in 1982-83, w ith inflation 
significantly higher in 1982 and marginally higher in 1983. 2
337
Figure 7.1: The Consequences of ERM Membership on 
GDP Growth and Manufacturing Output 1979-1981
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As figure 7.1 indicates, m anufacturing industry  w ould have 
benefitted the most from ERM membership in comparison to other sectors 
of the economy with manufacturing output higher than the GNP figure 
would perhaps suggest, especially in 1981. The National Institute's findings 
support the now widely accepted view that sterling's appreciation was 
largely responsible for the destruction of significant parts of the UK's 
manufacturing capacity in 1980 and 1981 as export dependent firms lost the 
markets which they needed to survive. Whilst some upward movement in 
sterling would have been likely inside ERM given sterling's petro-currency
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status, if interest rates had been targeted at the exchange rate rather than 
£M3 then manufacturing industry w ould have retained its competitiveness. 
Outside ERM it is not surprising that the UK's export performance between 
1979 and 1982 was the worst among the G7 states. 3
W ith more of the m anufacturing sector surviving the 1980-1981 
recession, the sim ulated analysis indicates that the sectors' capacity w ould 
have been greater throughout the 1980s, rising to 2.5 per cent above actual 
levels in 1988. Such a difference w ould have been im portant because a large 
part of the UK's balance of paym ents deficit is due to the lack of a 
manufacturing base broad enough to satisfy domestic demand. At the same 
time the depletion of the manufacturing sector in 1980 and 1981 weakened 
the capacity of the economy to produce export-led grow th and intensified 
the likelihood of prolonged economic slowdown and recession.
Inside ERM a healthier manufacturing capacity w ould not have been 
paid for at the expense of long term inflation control. Inflation in 1983 was 
actually 4.6 per cent compared to a projected 5.3 per cent given ERM 
m em bership .4 As a Treasury paper finally acknowledged in 1987, m uch of 
the fall in  inflation in  the early 1980s was due to a decline in  w orld 
commodity prices. Non-membership of ERM and high interest rates simply 
allowed UK inflation to fall more rapidly than w ould otherwise have been 
the case. From the mid-1980s ERM m em bership w ould have resulted in 
lower inflation and wage increases. Indeed, as figures 7.2 and 7.3 (page 340- 
341) indicate, in 1987 and 1988 inflation would have been negative w ithout 
an overall trade-off in terms of GDP growth and m anufacturing output.
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Figure 7.2: The Consequences of ERM
Membership on Annual Inflation 1984-1988
■ Actual
3 Simulated
^0
-4 -I---------------- 1---------------- 1---------------- 1---------------- 1---------------- -
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Year
Whilst the National Institu te 's  simulation ends in 1988 it seems logical to 
suppose that with lower inflation and ERM membership the UK would not 
have required a tight monetary policy from the second half of 1988 to 1990. 
Consequently the UK would not have entered a unilateral recession in the 
second half of 1990. Nevertheless it is hard to see how the UK economy 
could have performed as well as the most successful ERM states between 
1988 and 1990. Assuming ERM membership in 1979, the National Institu te  
calculated that the current account deficit would have been even higher in 
1988 at 4.2 percent of GNP than its actual level of 3.2 percent. 5
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Figure 7.3 :The Consequences of ERM M em bership 
on M anufacturing O utput and GDP Growth 
1984-1988
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Since the deficit was high in comparison with other ERM states such 
as France (0.4 percent) and Italy (0.7 percent), the UK would probably have 
needed to keep interest rates higher than other member states and pursued 
a more deflationary fiscal policy to maintain the sterling parity.6 Since the 
deficit represented a weakness of the manufacturing sector, UK firms would 
have been in a relatively poor position to take advantage of the 
opportunities created for export-led growth by German reunification. The 
likely overall result would have been an economic downturn in the UK
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before recession hit the other ERM states in 1992 and 1993.
Entry in  1985 and 1986
Com pared to entry in  1979, ERM membership in Novem ber 1985 w ould 
probably have caused serious problems for the UK economy. Sterling would 
have been condemned to a central rate of DM 3.75, nearly 30 percent higher 
than  its eventual rate, w ithout the scope for realignm ents w hich existed 
earlier in the decade. If the UK had devalued in 1986, then as a new ERM 
member it would probably have forfeited a significant am ount of credibility, 
and the government w ould have been forced to tighten policy in response. 
Certainly, the governm ent could not have achieved the nearly 30 percent 
devaluation that it secured outside the system. The boost to grow th and 
m anufacturing production in  1986 and 1987 would have been lost. At the 
same time, membership in 1985 w ould probably have produced a balance of 
paym ents deficit earlier, since the higher rate for sterling in 1986 w ould 
have decreased exporters' competitiveness and intensified the dem and for 
cheaper imports. If a deficit had then destabilised sterling, the UK w ould 
have had to increase interest rates or tighten fiscal policy, both of which 
w ould have been detrimental to growth.
ERM entry in 1986 w ould  have been far m ore beneficial to the 
economy since it w ould have stabilised sterling after rather than before the 
1986 devaluation. Once the current account swung into deficit in  1988, a 
devaluation w ithin ERM m ight have been possible if the UK had  been 
prepared  to take other actions to restore com petitiveness and restrain  
dom estic dem and. Even if the Conservative governm ent had initially 
believed that it could m aintain an expansionary fiscal policy and control 
neither the credit boom  nor wage increases, a reconsideration of policy 
w ould  probably soon have been necessary. Once sterling was an ERM 
member, the foreign exchange markets were likely to view sterling in the 
same light as other ERM currencies. Sterling would have been subject to the 
prevailing inform al rules and  expectations about buying  and selling 
currencies, and would have been a bad bet as an inflationary currency in a 
counter-inflationary exchange rate system. If the foreign exchange markets
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had extracted a price for the inflationary boom earlier, then the disastrous 
expnasionary 1988 budget would not have been possible.
In sum, if ERM membership had been used im aginatively then  it 
could have provided an anchor for grow th w hich was less driven by 
dom estic consum er dem and and more export oriented. W hilst grow th  
m ight not have reached the peaks of the 1987 to 1988 boom, it would have 
been less inflationary and m ore sustainable. C onsequently, the tigh t 
m onetary squeeze of 1989 to 1990 and unilateral recession w ould have been 
avoided.
W hat future in the global economy?
The Conservative governm ent's chosen course of action and inaction will 
have profound long term  consequences for the UK economy. Its attitude 
tow ards exchange rate m anagem ent represented  an unw illingness to 
grapple seriously w ith the central economic question of the 1980s and 1990s - 
how to create sustainable employment given the destabilising effects of vast 
capital m ovem ents around the globe. Through the foreign exchange 
markets, technological advance and the deregulation of capital and financial 
markets pu t a new onus on governments using macro-economic policy for 
anti-inflationary purposes. Whilst unemploym ent has inexorably risen the 
option of countries making a unilateral dash for growth and job creation no 
longer exists w ithout risking a huge capital exodus. By the mid-1980s the 
ERM represented a collective if tem porary defence against the foreign 
exchange markets, a defence which created at least some room for m onetary 
m anoeuvre for a group of highly open and  o therw ise vu lnerab le  
economies. W hatever disastrous misjudgments were m ade after November 
1989, in the 1980s at least the ERM represented a means of minimising the 
costs of destabilising capital inflows and outflow s th rough  collective 
credibility.
By operating unilaterally outside the ERM for so long the UK was 
forced to face the full brunt of capital movements. In the process one-fifth of 
m anufacturing industry was destroyed and significant parts of the service 
sector which was supposed to replace lost m anufacturing capacity were
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decim ated in a second recession. From 1986 to 1988 non-m em bership of 
ERM and good luck allow ed the governm ent some short term  fiscal 
autonom y. Yet even then m inisters threw money at consum ption rather 
than finely targeting expansion on generating employment.
Rather than search for an alternative solution to the problem  which 
the ERM sought to address, the Thatcher governm ent publicly celebrated 
the new "market forces' and  pursued  policies and non-policies w hich 
increased the dam aging consequences of those forces for the UK economy. 
W hilst export-led grow th is generally not destabilising in  the foreign 
exchange markets, ministers preferred growth driven by domestic consumer 
dem and w hich usually will be unstable. Then, w hen the current account 
unsurprisingly w ent into deficit, the government did nothing to reverse the 
situation. As Japan has dem onstrated, a good trade perform ance can be a 
crucial m eans of sustaining em ploym ent by m inim ising the negative 
im pact of capital m ovem ents on a particu lar economy. Yet the UK 
governm ent's economic policies simply ensured that for the foreseeable 
future sterling will be a strong candidate for speculative outflows whenever 
the mood takes the foreign exchange markets.
Since the end of the UK's short-lived m em bership of ERM, UK 
producers are unlikely to find any long-term respite from the costs imposed 
by the governm ent's unilateral and ill-considered approach to the problem 
of capital movements. As an ERM member, the governm ent overvalued 
sterling, failed to abide by the inform al ERM rules and dodged  all 
responsibility  for sterling 's exit from the system . If (one day) a UK 
governm ent wishes to join another fixed exchange rate system, questions 
are bound to arise about sterling's credibility as a participant. In the long 
term, the price of a reputation as a non-credible currency is likely to be an 
interest rate prem ium  over other European states.
A lthough  the M ajor governm ent's post-1992 policies he lped  
stimulate at least a partial economic recovery and  a fall in  unem ploym ent, 
in the long term  they are likely to further weaken the UK's perform ance 
w ithin the global economy. Since autum n 1992 policy-makers have been
344
determ ined to reduce the PSBR through large public expenditure cuts and 
tax increases. Ministers are using a tight fiscal policy both for its ow n sake 
and as a counter-inflationary anchor to m aintain sterling as a credible 
currency. However, using fiscal policy in this way is misconceived As Reich 
argues, it is now illogical to presum e that governm ent spending  and 
borrow ing m ight crowd out private investment or that it is necessary for 
any country to maximise national savings.7 Since capital sloshes freely 
across national borders in search of the highest returns, the UK like any 
other economy has access to a vast pool of capital. Reductions in public 
expenditure will hence have a negligible effect on the level of private 
investment. At the same time, the foreign exchange markets have tended to 
view high budget deficits as an inflationary disincentive to buying a given 
currency only where governm ents increase deficits to finance dom estic 
consum ption.
Yet if the benefits of the Major government's fiscal policy are illusory, 
the costs most certainly are not. The severe public expenditure cuts which 
were im plem ented in 1992 and 1993 and planned for future years will 
further erode the transport networks and educational provision w hich the 
UK economy needs to compete in the global economy. In Reich's words:
There is ... a growing connection between the am ount and kind 
of investments that the public sector undertakes and the capacity of 
the nation to attract worldwide capital. ... The skills of a nation's work 
force and the quality of its infrastructure are w hat makes it unique, 
and uniquely attractive in the world economy. Investments in these 
relatively immobile factors of worldwide production are w hat chiefly 
distinguish one nation from another: m oney, by contrast, m oves 
easily around the world.
W ell-trained workers and m odern infrastructure attract global 
webs of enterprise, which invest and give workers relatively good 
jobs; these jobs, in turn, generate additional on-the-job training and 
experience, thus creating a powerful lure to other global webs. ...
W ithout adequate skills and  in frastructure, how ever, the 
relationship is likely to be the reverse - a vicious circle in  w hich 
global investment can be lured only by relatively low wages and low 
taxes. These enticements in turn make it more difficult for the nation 
to finance adequate education and infrastructure in the future.8
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D ecision-m aking and M in isteria l Fortune  
The opening chapter of this thesis argued that politicians' behaviour on 
economic policy should be analysed w ithin the context of a range of 
considerations driven by the desire for re-election and defined by the nature 
of the electoral cycle. In part this means that ministers will w ant to provide 
material benefits to sufficient voters particularly in the run-up to a general 
election. Yet however m uch the evolution of ERM policy can be explained 
in these terms, both a broad overview of the developm ent of policy and 
particular decisions m ade in  the third term of office do not fit easily into 
this perspective. Indeed, on occasion, ministers pursued options and took 
decisions which offered only extremely short term  benefits and p u t their 
longer-term  re-election in serious jeopardy. It is fu rther difficult to 
understand  how any Conservative policy-maker could have convinced 
them selves otherwise. In operating bo th  ERM m em bership and  non­
membership, the government missed out on possible benefits and incurred 
unnecessary costs, and used inappropriate and inefficient means to achieve 
its ends. In this sense, decision-making became non-rational.
In terms of interest rates and exchange rate stability, the governm ent 
m issed out on the possible benefits that ERM membership offered during 
the 1980s, whilst incurring the costs which the system imposed in the 1990s. 
For m ost of the period from 1981 to 1989, ERM m em bership offered the 
government a relatively effective means of achieving exchange rate stability 
and lower interest rates for a given rate of inflation. By October 1990 
m em bership  was the only m eans by w hich the governm ent could 
im m ediately achieve either end. Yet w ithin a year the situation  w as 
reversed, as any sound assessment of the UK's economic perform ance and 
the likely behaviour of the Bundesbank could have predicted. In a recession 
as deep as that facing the UK, exchange rate stability was an  unnecessary 
counter-inflationary discipline and interest rates were far h igher than  
w ould  have been possible outside the system, given the diam etrically  
opposite positions of the German and UK economies. In purely  m onetary
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term s the governm ent imposed on itself high interest rates and exchange 
rate instability outside ERM, and high in terest rates and an uncredible 
stability for sterling inside ERM. In neither case did it maximise its electoral 
interests.
Beyond m onetary policy, ministers w asted the opportunity that non­
m em bership of ERM gave them  to pursue an independent fiscal policy. 
Having used an increase in public expenditure in 1986 and income tax cuts 
in 1987 to secure re-election at the general election, Thatcher and Lawson 
proceeded with another expansionary budget the year after. By acting hastily 
in 1988 the Prime Minister and Chancellor wasted the opportunity to make 
further tax cuts towards the end of the electoral cycle. At the same time, they 
escalated the economic boom so that it could not possibly be corrected in 
time for an election by 1992 and forfeited at least part of their claim to be the 
party  of low inflation.
The governm ent's economic failure on  ERM m em bership  was 
com pounded by a European Community policy in w hich the governm ent 
pa id  the costs of bo th  isolationism  and activism  w ithou t securing the 
benefits of either. The policy was not isolationist because despite the 
governm ent's professed opposition to m onetary union it agreed to the 
creation of the Delors Committee, and to start work on the Delors Report 
and the creation of an IGC. One former Cabinet m inister comm ented on 
Thatcher's performance on EC policy:
She was very powerful in her rhetoric, bu t then at the end of the day, 
she w ould say, "Well, I have said my piece and therefore I have 
salved my conscience. I have said that the Germ ans suffer from 
halitosis and the rest. And if that is w hat you w ant I did m y best, and I 
will go along w ith w hat you want." It is very difficult to interpret her 
actions because she w asn 't all that effective at blocking things.9
At the same time, the policy was not active because UK core executive 
actors were unable to bargain effectively w ithin  the range of EC forum s 
deliberating on monetary union. Ultimately, m inisters left themselves open 
to the charge both from Labour and from w ithin their ow n party that they 
w ere too isolationist b u t w ere too w eak to  effectively p resen t the
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governm ent as a defender of UK national interests against the 'hostile7 EC. 
In October 1990 Thatcher could no t save herself from  one final self­
destructive act in allowing m em bership whilst sim ultaneously breaching 
the protocol of the system and creating further ill-will towards the UK.
Even w ithin the terms and limitations of membership from 1990 to 
1992, Major and Lamont failed to achieve the ends they sought. From the 
start sterling was not a credible ERM participant and the governm ent's 
actions in  bo th  in terest rate policy and reserve in terven tion  only 
underm ined that credibility further. In the words of one City economist: 
'H ow  and w hy the Treasury and the Bank saw fit to confront the m ight of 
the international currency m arkets from a position of abject weakness 
beggars be lief/10 W hilst the Danish referendum  in June 1992 heralded a 
period  of instability for the whole system, the lira and sterling w ere 
prem aturely  ejected from  the ERM that autum n because the financial 
markets quite rationally believed that the parities were unsustainable. The 
governm ent later claim ed that the suspension of the ERM's w orking 
arrangements vindicated its view that sterling's departure resulted from the 
system 's 'fault-lines'. In truth, Black W ednesday cannot be separated from 
the failure of the Prime Minister and Chancellor to understand the relation 
between ERM membership and their own objectives.
The Breakdown o f Core E xecutive D ebate  
After the series of broad-based discussions on ERM membership in  1985, 
Thatcher found herself isolated from almost all other senior core executive 
actors. H er response was to effectively veto any discussion of ERM 
m em bership for the next four years w hilst retaining in office those w ho 
opposed her on the issue. W ith this background split in the Prime M inister- 
Chancellor axis, debate w ith in  the core executive on economic policy 
became unstructured and officials were m arginalised, particularly at the 
Bank of England.
After the 1986 devaluation there was little open discussion of how  to 
operate m onetary and exchange rate policy outside ERM. From February
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1987 to March 1988 Thatcher essentially left Lawson to choose and ru n  an 
alternative policy for himself. Since Lawson's policy of shadow ing the 
Deutschmark bore a clear relationship to ERM membership, and therefore 
Thatcher could not publicly endorse it, no broad discussion of its m erits or 
likely effectiveness took place. The Bank of England was responsible for its 
implementation bu t was neither consulted nor properly informed about the 
decision. W ithout participating in any formal debate about m onetary and 
exchange rate policy, the Bank was in a weak position to contribute to 
discussions on overall macro-economic strategy and the appropriateness of 
the fiscal-monetary policy mix.
In M arch to April 1990 Major persuaded Thatcher on a purely  
bilateral basis to use a public commitment to membership to talk sterling up 
as the m ain instrum ent of exchange rate policy, even though the Prime 
Minister was still privately opposed to membership. Since the deal did  not 
recreate a firm Prime M inister-Chancellor axis on the issue, Thatcher's 
position continued to preclude any broad discussion of the policy and its 
consequences in terms of actually achieving entry or remaining outside the 
system. The Bank of England was again left in the dark about the rationale 
for the chosen monetary and exchange rate policy.
At the same time as the economic policy debate was deteriorating, the 
governm ent's decision-m aking on European Council level EC issues 
became unco-ordinated and fragm ented because the Prim e M inister's 
position precluded any effective policy debate. Policy on m onetary union 
was often determ ined by ad hoc Prime M inisterial decision-m aking very 
shortly before or at summits, notably at Madrid, w hen Thatcher suddenly 
decided that the governm ent w ould develop an alternative to the Delors 
report. After Thatcher returned from sum m its, other Cabinet m inisters 
were left to deal w ith the consequences of policies which were form ulated 
w ithout their input.
The unco-ordinated nature of the decision-m aking process w as 
particularly well demonstrated by the government's handling of the Delors 
Committee and its aftermath. At Hanover Thatcher agreed to the creation of
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a committee on m onetary union and then left Leigh-Pemberton to operate 
on his ow n w ithin  the committee. W hen she and Lawson subsequently 
became worried about the likely contents of the report, they initiated a series 
of broad core executive discussions to develop a strategy to manage the 
Committee. However, their intervention was too late and when the Delors 
Report was published over their objections, broad discussions w ithin the 
core executive on European m onetary matters ceased again. To try and 
reactivate any discussion on the issue, Howe was forced to convene an 
Anglo-Dutch sum m it on military policy.
In sum , the m anner in w hich the core executive took decisions 
became erratic and susceptible to unilateral and unpredictable initiatives 
from  w ithin  the Prim e M inister-Chancellor-Foreign Secretary triangle. 
There came to be very little scope for structured debate of these initiatives 
betw een all the relevant core executive actors, even including those w ho 
w ould be responsible for dealing with the new policies on a day to day basis. 
As a result, decision-making by the whims of feuding ministers suppressed 
rational discussion based on knowledge and experience.
A t the sam e time, after 1985 the substance of debate on  ERM 
membership was reduced to a struggle by those who advocated membership 
to secure the Prime Minister's support for entry. Between 1985 and 1990 four 
visible shifts in policy occurred: the M adrid conditions; Thatcher's implicit 
repud ia tion  of the conditions in October-November 1989; the  public 
commitment to mem bership from May 1990; and entry to the system. All 
four were essentially ad hoc decisions unaccompanied by any formal Prime 
M inisterial m eetings in w hich the strategic base of policy could  be 
examined. The first two simply resulted from a shift in the power relations 
betw een the Prim e M inister and her Chancellors. Before the  M adrid  
sum m it, Lawson forged an alliance w ith Howe and the pair threatened a 
joint resignation. As a result, Thatcher was forced to make at least a public 
concession to them . W hen Lawson resigned office four m onths later, 
Thatcher was able to reassert her previous position as governm ent policy 
and implicitly repudiate the M adrid conditions.
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In March-April 1990 Major was able to shift Thatcher's position on a 
bilateral basis in part because of the Prime Minister's need to avoid conflict 
w ith her new Chancellor backed by a new Foreign Secretary. The decision to 
enter ERM was then conceded by Thatcher in October 1990 at the moment 
w hen she decided that further resistance was futile. During 1985 the Prime 
M inister held three broadly attended meetings to discuss m em bership. In 
1990 the governm ent entered ERM w ithout any such meeting. A nd ERM 
supporters ignored the question of the appropriateness of m em bership at 
this time given the divergent m onetary im peratives confronting the UK 
and the Bundesbank.
Policy on a Prayer 
W hilst sustaining low inflation and some kind of balance of paym ents 
equilibrium  were necessary to make ERM membership successful, ministers 
and officials ruled ou t the means to achieve these two ends. Those w ho 
supported ERM membership never addressed the incompatibility of their 
support for entry w ith  their views that inflation was only a m onetary 
phenom enon or that the balance of payments deficit was irrelevant. Their 
position w ould have been less ill-considered if the governm ent's overall 
policy framework could have been easily adjusted once inside ERM. Yet at 
least on inflation the opposite was true. By presiding over the creation of a 
decentralised pay bargaining structure in the private sector, the government 
m ade it very difficult for itself to pursue any policy w hich linked wage 
increases to the dem ands of the national economy. W ithin the housing 
m arket asset price inflation was not an unfortunate outcome which could 
be simply avoided in the future. As H utton notes, by the mid-1980s a whole 
edifice ranging from DIY superstores to estate agents chains was created on 
the basis that the two million houses bought and sold each year w ould 
continue forever. Similarly banks lent to small businesses not according to 
their business prospects but more on the degree of collateral th rough  
housing equity they could provide. The government allowed activity in the 
econom y to be structurally  dependent on rising housing prices.11 To
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com pound the problem, ministers made a rhetorical political investm ent in 
the policy framework by proclaiming that in a free-market economy there 
neither was nor should be an alternative.
It is particularly striking that core executive actors retained their ill- 
considered view  of m acro-econom ic policy relationships even  w hen  
practical experience was dem onstrating the fallacy of their intellectual 
fram ew ork. W hen Lawson made his first bid for ERM entry as Chancellor, 
the inflation problem  lay dorm ant because the governm ent was careful to 
trum pet its counter-inflationary credentials. However, outside the ERM 
from 1986 to 1990, the governm ent pursued policies which were directly 
inflationary: and it failed to pursue policies which w ould tackle inflationary 
pressures in the wage market. By the second half of 1988 rising inflation 
m ade it difficult to sustain sterling w ithout high interest rates, and by the 
second half of 1989 and 1990 to sustain sterling at all. Yet only at the Bank of 
England did any supporters of ERM membership adjust their position to the 
changing economic conditions produced by the governm ent's ow n policies.
On the balance of payments, ERM supporters turned a blind eye to its 
relation to membership even in 1985. Although the overall current account 
rem ained in  surp lus, underlying problem s of com petitiveness in  the 
m anufacturing sector were emerging. Lawson and the other actors w ithin 
the core executive d id  no t accept that the prospective external deficit 
constituted a potential problem, since they believed that it could easily be 
financed given the level of international capital flows. Between 1986 and 
the second quarter of 1989 their view was to some extent vindicated because 
the deficit only produced short episodes of sterling weakness in September 
1986, May to June 1988 and November 1988.
However, from May 1989 the deficit became a manifest constraint on 
the governm ent's ability to pursue exchange rate stability as a policy. The 
financial markets increasingly took the view that since the deficit w ould 
constrain  grow th  (w ith  consequent costs in  term s of o u tp u t and  
employment) the government would ultimately allow sterling to depreciate 
to deal w ith the problem. By 1990 international capital flows were stabilising
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after the expansion driven by financial deregulation. International investors 
were increasingly careful about where they directed their money and were 
less willing to hold a range of different currencies and international assets, 
particu larly  w hen their m oney was being used to finance excessive 
consum ption. Despite this evidence, supporters of ERM m em bership 
continued to press their case in 1990 without changing course. They did  not 
seek either a devaluation or action to tackle the structural aspect of the 
deficit, by shifting resources from the consumer service sector (which could 
not export) to recreate a broad m anufacturing base (which could). They 
sim ply secured Thatcher's acceptance of m em bership w ithout anyone 
examining just how membership was supposed to work.
In the same way, Thatcher's opposition to ERM membership flew in 
the face of the m anifest failure of the m onetary targets and  her ow n 
acceptance of the costs of practicing benign neglect tow ards the exchange 
rate . The pursu it of exchange rate stability offered Thatcher a counter- 
inflationary fram ework centred around interest rates, and consistent w ith 
her rejection of policies which assumed relationships betw een costs and 
dem and  and inflation . W hatever d isadvan tages T hatcher saw  in 
m em bership, it was the m ost attractive means to pursue exchange rate 
stability since for a given rate of inflation, it offered lower interest rates.
By trying to pursue exchange rate stability outside ERM, Thatcher left 
a perennially open question: if the UK was serious about exchange stability 
and was not prepared to allow sterling to depreciate, w hy was it not a 
m em ber of ERM, (given that the system  had  a successful record  of 
delivering exchange rate stability)? Thatcher acted as if the costs of the public 
airings of divisions over ERM membership did not exist. For in  the specific 
sense that the governm ent w ished to control inflation once the m oney 
supply targets were discredited by a monetary counter-inflationary policy, 
ERM m em bership was always an inevitable outcome. If Thatcher ever 
w anted to do more than delay membership then  she w ould  have had  to 
construct a counter-inflationary fram ework outside the vestiges of the 
MTFS. Like the ERM supporters, Thatcher ended up w illing an end whilst
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she renounced the m eans to achieve it in large part because they bo th  
refused to accept that inflation was more than a monetary phenomenon.
The governm ent's general tendency to make decisions which lacked 
any kind of empirical rationale can only be termed government by faith and 
hope. One influential account of UK economic policy-making argues that 
the governm ent concentrates on m assaging back to norm ality  those 
variables which show signs of going badly wrong, a pattern of policy stability 
punctuated  by crisis management. However, Conservative m inisters took 
decisions which were always likely to create crises for themselves. At the 
macro-level ministers were aiming after 1983 to deliver as low as possible 
inflation for the lowest interest rates and the lowest taxes, w ithout using 
any counter-inflationary policies which could be labelled as a return  to the 
1970s. Yet these priorities were always likely to conflict with each other. The 
governm ent appeared to react by seeking the maximum potential rew ard on 
each priority, assuming that particular policies were successful and w ithout 
costs in  term s of another priority. As a result, m inisters m ade their 
calculations of the costs and benefits of particular policies not in terms of the 
m ost likely outcom es given past experience bu t in term s of the m ost 
beneficial possible outcomes. By discounting the potential cost in term s for 
one priority  of maximising on another, the governm ent risked having to 
pay a higher cost in terms of one or another or both than by initially trading 
off between priorities. Ministers maintained this stance even w hen the basis 
for the most beneficial scenario occurring was nothing more than  hope for 
the best. Even for economic benefits crucial to the governm ent's electoral 
benefits, adverse policy consequences were only dealt w ith  after they 
occurred and not assessed ex ante in the decision-making process.
The Thatcher-Lawson Conflict 
The Prime Minister and her fraught relations w ith successive Chancellors 
w ere central to the governm ent's problems. Conflicts over sterling and 
personal struggles of ambition between Prime Ministers and Chancellors 
have been regular occurrences - Attlee and Dalton, Wilson and Callaghan,
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W ilson and Jenkins, and Callaghan and Healey. However, the Thatcher- 
Lawson schism was uniquely resonant in terms of the core executive's 
whole approach to decision-making.
By the Conservatives' second term  of office the Prime Minister and 
Chancellor were firmly established as the core political actors due to the 
early predominance of economic objectives and Lawson's unwillingness to 
accept the subordinate role adopted by most of Thatcher's ministers. As a 
resu lt the Prime M inister-Chancellor axis often dom inated  the core 
executive beyond economic policy. Their alliance or their divisions were 
influential on a range of issues from the poll tax to health  policy to 
education. To some extent, and apparently in the view of the protagonists, 
the conflict over ERM m embership eventually became a personal struggle 
for power over economic policy between the two most influential actors in 
the core executive.
Such a conflict was always likely to cloud the objective economic 
issues at stake. However, given the two m inisters' general approach to 
office, the rise of a direct European component to the issue in  1988 left the 
governm ent w ith little opportunity to pursue a coherent policy. Europe 
could not be ignored as an issue either on political or economic grounds. 
Politically, there was no alternative to the Com m unity and the UK's 
effectiveness in  the Com m unity w ould be dim inished outside ERM. 
Economically, the governm ent's reliance on m onetary policy and  the 
exchange rate as its central policy tools left it particularly dependent on 
m aintaining international confidence, which could not be divorced from 
ongoing openness to Europe. Given the pursuit of strict financial and fiscal 
discipline, the UK could perhaps have avoided joining ERM. However, the 
governm ent's belief that it needed to offer more than low inflation to voters 
ensured that this was not the case. In an open economy, exacerbated by the 
governm ent's ow n choices, the go-it-alone solution (which defined the 
original Conservative project and for w hich Thatcher kept striving) 
evaporated.
Yet for the Prim e M inister and Chancellor to fully em brace a
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E uropean solution to their problem s after 1988 w ould have seriously 
jeopard ised  their established governing fram ew ork. W hether Lawson 
realised it or not, ERM m em bership was ultim ately likely to produce 
pressures to adopt policies from which he and the Prime Minister recoiled. 
Similarly, Thatcher and Lawson were not well equipped to be effective 
players in EC decision-making either in terms of providing the necessary 
rhetoric or in the kind of international realpolitik required. A t the same 
tim e, their dom inance of the core executive m arginalised those w ith  a 
potentially greater understanding of the terms of the EC's operation, both 
w ithin the Cabinet and inside the Foreign Office and the Bank of England.
Thatcher and Lawson were left trapped betw een their inability to 
m aintain a set of policies which did not include ERM m em bership, or to 
embrace it as part of a full-blooded alternative. In the vacuum, their conflict 
m oved into a feud over tactics. Consequently, even w hen Thatcher and 
Major apparently succeeded in resolving the conflict, the resolution did not 
am ount to a strategy. In effect, Thatcher agreed to m em bership as a final 
effort to secure the benefits which the Conservative's original economic 
policy fram ework could no longer deliver, yet w ithout renouncing that 
earlier effort. Consequently she did not leave either herself or the rest of the 
core executive in any position to use membership w ithin a European policy 
fram ework. By entering ERM Thatcher formally accepted the constraints 
im posed by the open economy. How ever, she left in place a policy 
framework, both as a process and a set of assumptions, which excluded full 
attachm ent to the EC and any new means of controlling economic benefits 
beyond the short term. Unsurprisingly it proved impossible to reconcile the 
im plications of ERM m em bership w ith  the approach to core executive 
decision-making which emerged under Thatcher's premiership.
7.3 CONCLUSIONS 
Yet if the ultimate aim of the Conservative's economic policy was to retain 
office, then they were successful. Ministers were fortunate to operate in 
economic and political conditions in which it was possible to w in elections 
w hatever the m agnitude of the m istakes w hich they m ade. Indeed,
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achieving re-election for the Conservative governm ent actually pu t little 
prem ium  on securing even the semi-optimal performance of UK producers.
M inisters were able to use their regulatory powers to give a general 
stim ulus to certain sectors of the economy w ithout orientating their macro- 
economic policy to maximise the interests of any sector. Given a divided 
opposition , the opera tion  of the electoral system  m eant th a t the 
governm ent only needed to provide economic benefits for a relatively 
n a rrow  constituency , w hich  could exclude those w ho w orked  in  
m anufacturing industry  or more to the point formerly w orked there. The 
governm ent's privatisation policy gave it the means to provide big income 
tax cuts w ithou t having to increase governm ent revenues elsew here 
through sustained economic growth. By deregulating bank and building 
society lending, the governm ent created benefits am ong a new  class of 
mortgage holders, a prosperity which did not require the productive side of 
the econom y to perform  effectively. W hen the consum er-driven boom  
even tually  tu rn ed  to recession in  tim e for the 1992 election, the 
Conservatives could still successfully portray themselves as a less worrying 
alternative on economic policy to the opposition parties. Given this unique 
set of circum stances in w hich the Conservatives' inability  to pursue 
effective policies for the UK's producers did not matter, neither m inisters 
nor officials faced sufficient incentive to critically evaluate their approach to 
decision-making.
Macro-economic policy-making is a unique policy-making area. It is a 
closed policy arena and decisions m ust be m ade in an unpredictable and 
fast-moving international environment. On the issue of ERM membership, 
this posed clear difficulties for policy-makers in term s of m anaging a 
volatile currency in  the rap id ly  fluctuating foreign exchange m arkets, 
m aking trade-offs betw een economic and European policy and taking a 
(supposedly) big strategic long term decision against a background of UK 
econom ic under-perform ance. W hilst the discussion above has been 
heavily critical of certain aspects of Conservative economic policy-making,
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the difficulties that any Prime Minister and Chancellor will face in pursuing 
an effective policy given the policy-making environm ent should not be 
ignored.
The Prime Minister and Chancellor are closeted in  a closed and secret 
policy-making environm ent against the enormous backdrop of the foreign 
exchange m arkets w here their every public w ord  m ight have huge 
consequences. Perhaps it should not be surprising if these two actors 
develop an intense self-consciousness about their capacity or responsibility 
for action. In this situation, the personal psychological impact of any action 
m ay become more im portant than the objective policy rationale of that 
action. For example, could Thatcher simply have treated  questions on 
sterling and ERM m em bership as an act of self-definition because that is 
how she had come to see the issues?
In a more accountable system of governm ent the need to properly 
explain policy might break that self consciousness. Yet in the UK the Prime 
M inister and Chancellor have noth ing  to fear from  scru tiny  by the 
legislature and there are no effective tripartite structures which could serve 
as forums for open discussion w ith external business and labour interests. 
W ithout any kind of freedom of information, the m edia generally feeds off 
insider official information on economic policy and so reinforces a culture 
of secret know ledge and self-im portance. W ith a few exceptions the 
financial press in the second half of the 1980s reinforced the Thatcher- 
Lawson struggle by defining their economic commentary in the same terms 
and unreservedly supporting the Chancellor. Those journalists w ho stood 
out against the trend were simply dismissed as unreconstructed Keynesians.
At the same time, the public language which the Prime Minister and 
the Chancellor m ust use in economic policy may have a generally distorting 
effect on decision-making in two ways. First, the foreign exchange m arkets 
tend to respond as if there is an optimal policy which policy-makers could 
be pursuing, so ministers' public discourse tends to contain a strong element 
of optim al or even idealistic purpose. As a result, it becomes costly for 
ministers to admit that errors have been made and once some mistakes are
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m ade they m ay not be reversed, even w hen further seemingly irrational 
decisions are then required. For example, unless Major and Lamont were 
p rep a red  to devalue sterling and take a risk  on  the infla tionary  
consequences, they could never adm it that either entry  to ERM in a 
recession or the DM2.95 parity were a mistake. Consequently policy could 
not be adjusted to stimulate growth and the cost of the original error was 
increased.
Second, it is possible that the incongruence betw een policy-makers' 
public language and their private knowledge of policy problems affects their 
approach to decision-making. Can a point arise w hen the incongruence 
betw een  the presen ta tion  of policy and  its real rationale  becom es 
psychologically too hard  to bear w ithout adjusting one to the other? If 
policy-makers find it difficult to sustain two diverse realities, then will the 
public language which is less flexible in the short term  and contains a more 
preferable 'op tim al solution ' start to influence decision-m aking itself? 
A lthough ministers operate in m any policy-areas w ith a public rhetoric at 
odds w ith their private motives, only in economic policy is policy-makers' 
language so intensely scrutinised. And only here does any tiny casualness 
have such huge consequences. Moreover, only in economic policy are the 
tw o actors w ho deliver the public rhetoric so uniquely responsible for 
decision-making itself.
Using Goffman's terminology in The Presentation of Self in Everyday 
Life, the Prim e M inister and Chancellor have to give an unrem itting 
performance to the foreign exchange markets w hich ultim ately may affect 
their private judgm ent.12 Goffman defines performance as all the activity of 
an individual which occurs during a period m arked by their continuous 
presence before a set of observers and which has some influence on the 
observers.13 The perform er will seek to control the im pression which the 
observers receive of the situation and so will stage a reality removed from 
the more complex and messy reality. Yet the perform er asked to compress 
two different roles into the same individual can easily suffer from self- 
deception:
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A perform er m ay be taken in by his ow n act, convinced at the 
m om ent that the im pression of reality which he fosters is the one 
and only reality. ... In such cases the performer comes to be his own 
audience; he comes to be performer and observer of the same show. 
Presumably he intracepts or incorporates the standards he attempts to 
m aintain in  the presence of others so that his conscience requires 
him to act in a socially proper way. It will have been necessary for the 
individual in his performing capacity to conceal from himself in his 
audience capacity the discreditable facts that he has had to learn about 
the perform ance; in everyday term s, there will be things that he 
knows or has known, that he will not be able to tell himself. 14
In this sense policy-makers may at least partially substitute the 'reality ' of 
their public discourse for their private knowledge and m ake choices 
w ithout an empirical rationale. For example, it is quite plausible to suggest 
that Major and Lamont could not completely separate their 'perform ance' to 
the foreign exchange m arkets that the commitment to the DM2.95 was 
absolute and credible from the view which they took on sterling as the 
prime if not sole actors in decision-making.
In sum, it is quite possible that the general economic policy-making 
environm ent in the UK reduces policy-makers' capacity to make effective 
and rational choices. Certainly, comparative core executive analysis could 
shed some further light on whether the structures of UK decision-making 
create unique difficulties for ministers in dealing w ith  the foreign exchange 
m arkets. At the same time, the Major governm ent itself has im plicitly 
adm itted the need for greater openness in economic policy-making. The 
governm ent now  consults on a regular and form al basis w ith  seven 
prom inent econom ists and  has at least m arginally strengthened the 
position of the Bank of England within the core executive.
Nevertheless, the problems of UK economic m anagem ent continue. 
W hilst the economy is no longer suffering from a feuding Prime M inister 
and Chancellor, the Conservative governm ent still rem ains in a w eak 
position to pursue any kind of effective policy on sterling. If Major and 
Clarke are personally better equipped on the European stage than were 
Thatcher and Lawson, they have to contend w ith  a small parliam entary 
majority and a party w ith a distorted perspective on international economic
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issues. W hen the go-it-alone solution comes to an end yet again, the Prime 
M inister's and Chancellor's room for manoeuvre will be restricted by a party  
fetish w hich has scapegoated m anaged exchange rates (rather than  the 
circumstances of the UK's membership of ERM) for recent problems. To all 
intents and purposes the ERM is now back in action. However, the Major 
governm ent is too preoccupied w ith problems of party  m anagem ent over 
the general question of Europe to consider the long term strategic questions 
about the UK's relation w ith the reborn system, or the economic realities of 
the im pending  single E uropean currency. W ithout any fundam enta l 
reassessm ent of economic policy-making, the UK's economic problem s in 
an environment defined by global capital flows seem likely to continue.
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APPENDIX I: RESEARCH METHODS
Printed M edia
Since a systematic search of all quality new spapers using 'Profile' was 
im possible to finance, I used the Financial Times, the Tim es  and the 
Economist as my main media sources for the thesis. The Financial Times 
and the Economist provide the most comprehensive and detailed coverage 
of UK politics and international economic developments on a daily and 
weekly basis respectively. The Times was used in preference to other daily 
publications simply because it and the Financial Times are the only two 
British national newspapers taken by the library of the London School of 
Economics. Using the annual indexes, I found and examined every article 
w hich related to the UK and the ERM in the Financial Times and the 
Times and the ERM in general in the Economist between 1979 and 1990.
After having read the secondary literature and assessed all the 
relevant media material, I wrote draft versions of Chapters Two to Six. My 
aim was to have a clear idea of the broad development of policy and the 
central issues involved to maximise the utility of the elite interviews. 
Interview  M ethods
Initially I requested interviews w ith 49 people involved to a lesser or greater 
extent w ith  the issue of ERM m em bership either from  w ith in  the core 
executive itself or as an in terested external party. I w as particu larly  
in terested in contacting people w ho faced the issue in m ore than  one 
capacity, for example, officials who worked in different areas of W hitehall 
and  those w ith significant experience both inside and outside the core 
executive. Twenty three people were unw illing or unable to see me. A 
particular problem was that many of them received letters shortly before the 
UK's abrupt exit from ERM in September 1992 which made the whole topic 
of earlier ERM policy-making highly sensitive
Eventually, I conducted 26 interviews over a sixteen m onth period in 
1992 and 1993. The interviewees were all involved in at least one and 
sometimes several of the following capacities:
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• as a former Cabinet or junior minister;
• as official at the Treasury, Foreign Office, MAFF, the Cabinet Office,
the Number 10 Private Office or the Bank of England;
• an adviser to a minister;
• a European Commission official;
• or as a member of a business organisation.
Overall, officials significantly outnum bered m inisters and  m ost officials 
were from either the Treasury, Foreign Office or the Bank of England.
The interviews were conducted in person w ith one exception which 
involved w ritten correspondence over w ritten questions. Those conducted 
in person ranged in length from half an hour to two hours and all bu t three 
were tape recorded. I asked the interviewees to recall their memories of 
p a rticu la r periods of decision-m aking and  to  com m ent on  m y 
in te rp re ta tion  of general themes. The particu lar questions for each 
in te rv iew  depended  on the in terv iew ee 's position  and period  of 
involvem ent, and the point in time w hen they were interviewed. People 
interviewed towards the end of the period were often asked about claims 
m ade in previous interviews
All the interviews were conducted on a non-attributable basis. Given 
the ongoing sensitivity  of the issue, this w as insisted  upon  by  all 
interviewees. Where possible the approximate institutional position of the 
in terview ee quoted or referred to is cited b u t the requirem ents of 
anonymication sometimes make even this guidance difficult.
O bviously citing non-attributable in terview s as evidence is an 
imperfect approach. The reader is in no position to judge for h im /herself 
about the status or credibility of the source. In addition, using interview 
evidence necessarily involve the researcher in  m aking judgm ents about 
com peting subjective m em ories and claims. H ow ever, a lthough  the 
approach is not perfect is not sufficient reason to w ithdraw  it. First, w ithout 
assuring interviewees of non-attributability, no interview s w ould  have 
taken place. If political scientists are serious about understanding  more 
about core executive decision-making on the most politically sensitive and
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significant issues, then they have to accept the term s on w hich core 
executive actors will allow themselves to be interviewed.
Second, it is possible to make reasonable judgments about the validity 
of p a rtic u la r  in fo rm atio n  offered  th ro u g h  c ro ss-re feren c in g  or 
'tr ian g u la tin g ' evidence, com paring claims w ith  o ther in terv iew ees 
responses, documentary sources and mass media coverage. For example, the 
suggestion in Chapter 2 that Geoffrey Howe came to support m embership in 
1981-1982 was based on evidence to this effect by three interviewees, one of 
w hom  was a personal friend of Howe but opposed to ERM m em bership, 
one of w hom  was a personal friend of Howe and  a su ppo rte r of 
m em bership, and the third who opposed mem bership and had  generally 
clashed w ith Howe. Within the course of any particular interview, it is also 
possible to judge the extent to which the interview ee is generally  
trustw orthy as a source so long as the interviewer has a good overall grasp 
of the subject under discussion. Those interviewees w ho seek to sell a 
suspect line in one part of the interview were treated more sceptically w hen 
offering new information than might otherwise be the case. As a broad rule, 
no information from any particular interviewee has been used unless there 
is some other reason for believing it to be true.
Future historians w ith access to official papers will inevitably be able 
to provide a fuller and more accurate account of the developm ent of the 
UK's policy towards ERM from 1979 to 1990. The reader can certainly not 
take this work as the final word on the subject - for example, the record of 
the discussions which took place about ERM membership in late 1981 and 
the start of 1982 is most clearly incomplete. Nevertheless, the evidence 
w hich is currently available and utilised in this thesis has certain merits., 
The p rin ted  m edia now produces a more rigourous coverage of the 
activities of the UK core executive than was traditionally the case. W hilst 
the press did apparently sometimes get it wrong, broad positions ascribed by 
the press to ministers and officials between 1979 and 1990 were often borne 
out by  insider accounts. At the same time, the interviewees, sometimes
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unw ittingly, offer a unique insight into the atm osphere in which and the 
assum ptions on w hich the core executive took decisions on  ERM 
m em bership during the Thatcher governments.
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